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Genocide is a notoriously difficult problem to define, represent, resolve, and 
remember. Popular cultural texts addressing genocide often showcase considerable 
inconsistency in their attempts to engage each of these four arenas. In part, the textual 
vacillations contained within such popular cultural treatments of genocide reflect extent 
tensions in scholarly discussions of atrocity. Both popular and scholarly discourses on 
genocide demonstrate a substantive ambivalence over the relationships among state 
authority, public agency, and genocidal violence. 
 Genocide Rhetorics in US Popular Culture departs from existing work on atrocity 
concerned with the unstable relationships among state power, public power, and violence. 
Instead, this study centers on the competing ways popular cultural texts constitute state 
authority and public agency within their attempts to define, represent, resolve, and 





each of these four topics, this study also looks at how these texts manage the palpable 
anxiety that arises from such textual incongruences. In the process, it spotlights genocidal 
discourse contained in two museums (the Los Angeles-based Museum of Tolerance and 
the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C.) and one 
documentary (Daniel Goldhagen’s Worse Than War), and is informed by the literature in 
rhetoric, critical/cultural studies, media studies, memory studies, as well as Holocaust and 
genocide studies. 
These texts distinctively manage the anxiety created by inconsistent assessments 
of state authority and public agency, working to sublimate, exacerbate, or recognize these 
tensions. Ultimately, the texts converge in validating state power on matters of genocide.  
Despite paying lip service to popular power, all three of the cases centralize the nation-
state or empowered political actors as critical to genocide intervention or prevention. In 
spite of such shortcomings, this study concludes that the anxiety residing within these 
texts is productive in so far as it imparts messages about audience accountability and 
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The Rhetoricity of Genocide 
 
Popular culture and academic texts on genocide often begin with a story of 
rhetorical invention. This story foregrounds Raphael Lemkin, the Polish jurist credited 
with coining the word, “genocide.”1 As Power recounts the story, Lemkin, a student of 
languages, had long been interested in the history of mass slaughter. Upon hearing of the 
Armenian genocide and questioning the legality of that atrocity, Lemkin learned there 
was no international law condemning genocide. He was skeptical of a logic that 
criminalized piracy as an international crime but left no legal scaffolding for the 
international community to justify intervention when a nation was eliminating its own 
people. Dissatisfied with this lacuna amid the rise of Nazi power in the 1930s and 1940s, 
Lemkin combined the Greek word for race (genos) with the Latin word for killing (cide) 
to create the term “genocide.” After World War II, he exerted considerable effort into 
ensuring the term was used during the Nuremberg Trials. Disappointed with the results, 
Lemkin then turned his attention to the United Nations, beginning an intensive lobbying 
campaign to criminalize genocide through international law.2 The end product of this 
labor was the creation of the 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, a legal and political touchstone for scholars and 
advocates invested in genocide prevention and intervention. 
Lemkin’s academic work, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, provided a figurative 
cornerstone for a new body of scholarship: Holocaust and genocide studies. Despite the 
publication of Lemkin’s landmark text in the 1940s, only scattered scholarly works of 





that contextual forces in the 1960s and 1970s, such as the occurrence of atrocities in 
Indonesia, East Timor, and Cambodia, helped stimulate additional interest in genocide as 
did the opening of the Soviet archives toward the end of the century.4  According to 
Chalk and Jonassohn, “the shocks of the twentieth century” ushered in a rise of a culture 
concerned with the victims of violence, providing a context conducive to the study of 
genocide.5 The field expanded during the 1980s with the publication of several seminal 
texts and the formation of “the first International Conference on the Intervention and 
Prevention of Genocide.”6 One decade into the twenty-first century, Holocaust and 
genocide studies constitute a flourishing area of research, spawning countless books, 
journals (e.g., Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Journal of Genocide Research), and 
numerous institutes or programs (e.g., Yale University’s Genocide Studies Program, 
Clark University’s Strassler Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies, University of 
Minnesota’s Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies).   
This robust and interdisciplinary body of scholarship on genocide exists in 
marked contrast with Lemkin’s struggles to publicize the term just seven decades earlier.7 
Contemporary work in Holocaust and genocide studies incorporates a wide range of 
disciplines including psychology, sociology, anthropology, political science, history, 
legal studies, literary studies, art studies, film and media studies, and philosophy.8 Studies 
range in focus from predictive social science studies examining the societal attributes that 
may contribute to genocide to literary analyses of Holocaust testimony and artwork.9	  
Given the field’s interdisciplinarity, genocide studies depart from a variety of theoretical 
vantage points. Such works also commonly contain divergent epistemological 





for this study, authority, agency, and violence.10 The fault lines produced by these 
competing conceptualizations constitute one of the many sources of the tensions at the 
heart of this project.  
This project extends existing conversations in Holocaust and genocide studies by 
offering a critical analysis of contemporary popular culture texts that address genocide 
cessation.11 These texts, at least in part, discuss the need for intervention into existing 
genocides and/or the prevention of future genocides. In grappling with genocide 
cessation, these mass-mediated texts place differing emphases on the role of the state and 
the public in helping to bring an end to genocide. Within such popular culture depictions, 
the definitions, representations, resolutions, and remembrances of genocide that are 
woven into arguments about cessation offer insight into the perceived relationships 
between state and public authority. Textual attempts to articulate this relationship are 
fraught with anxieties which intimate larger questions about the links between US 
political life and genocidal violence—past, present, and future.  
In what follows, I trace popular cultural interest in genocide and highlight the 
political stakes underlying the mass mediation of genocide. Heated debates over the 
relationship between the Holocaust and other genocides showcase the extent to which 
genocide discourses reflect substantive contestations associated with issues of identity, 
political recognition, and power.12 Moreover, these discourses have the potential to 
expose discomforting narratives regarding moral ambiguity and the nation-state’s 
connections to political violence. This introduction is designed to detail the critical 
foundation for the ensuing study—the ideological dimensions of genocide texts produced 





Popular Cultural Interest in Genocide 
 This study begins with the assumption that popular culture discourse influences 
how historical violence is understood and remembered. O’Neill and Hinton maintain, for 
example, that “[t]he politics and poetics of writing about genocide . . .  produce situated 
knowledges that force us to ask how the act of representing genocide may make genocide 
itself into the cultural category we have come to know.”13 Simultaneously, these 
narratives shape the contours of genocide memory. Despite the abundance of popular 
culture texts engaging the topic of genocide in the early twentieth-first century, genocide 
has not always been a subject of popular interest.  As fluctuations in public engagement 
with the Holocaust suggest, Holocaust and genocide representations and memories are 
imbricated in larger cultural politics. Following an increase in public interest in genocide 
toward the end of the twentieth and start of the twenty-first century, a surge in films, TV 
shows, and museum exhibitions has multiplied the stories told about genocide. These 
popular culture texts often borrow from and reflect other existing narratives about 
atrocity.14 Collectively, these stories constitute the intertextual terrain upon which the 
meaning of the term “genocide” is produced.15  
At the broadest levels, these mass-mediated texts compose the repository of 
narratives and images that constitute “genocide.” Torchin refers to this repository as a 
“popular genocide imaginary” and argues that such discourses furnish the images and 
scripts used to make atrocities legible as genocide.16 For instance, in her words, “pictures 
of bodies, boxcars, crematoria, and emaciated figures behind barbed wire have become 
iconic references points for charges of crimes against humanity and genocide.”17 These 





This collective repository consequently serves as an important rhetorical resource in the 
identification of genocide and the construction of claims related to genocide cessation.19  
Mediated representations of atrocity provide one of the primary avenues through 
which the public builds that repository.20 Torchin writes, “from early on, screen media 
have played a significant role in constructing the popular, political, and legal imaginary 
of genocide and human rights.”21 Corroborating such an assertion, Shandler alleges that 
mediated representations of atrocity may be all the more potent in the United States, a 
nation whose landscape is free from the physical scars of the Holocaust (and, by 
extension, other often-mediated European or African genocides).22 From news accounts 
to fictionalized representations to art exhibitions and memorials, these texts play an 
important role in helping the public access and grapple with the multifaceted problem of 
genocide.23 Despite the presence of witnesses such as Holocaust survivors, “the 
remembrance of the Shoah [and arguably other genocides]…has always been more 
dependent on mass-mediated forms of memory,” argues Hansen.24 Accordingly, these 
mediated representations of genocide have become a subject of considerable scholarly 
interest.25  
Further, these mediated representations of genocide influence how violent 
historical events enter into public memory. Centralizing the role of media in the 
production of Holocaust knowledge and memories, Stier stresses: “media embody and 
transmit the material of the Holocaust – what matters – for the sake of memory. As such, 
the ways memory is made to matter intersect with the matter – the material – of 
memory.”26 Works operating from this perspective take the notion of mediation seriously 





Landsberg’s work implies, the choices made in mediating genocide and the Holocaust 
have the potential to advance new ways of knowing and relating to the memories of these 
horrific events.28 
Although US popular culture seems to be pervaded by mediations of the 
Holocaust and other genocides,29 such an investment in atrocity remembrance has not 
been consistent. Zelizer, for example, presents the evolution of popular awareness and 
interest in the Holocaust (often held as the paradigmatic genocide) as progressing through 
three stages: initial memory (Holocaust – late 1940s), amnesia (late 1940s – late 1970s), 
and intense memory (late 1970s – present).30 Although debate exists over the extent of 
public engagement with the Holocaust during the 1940s and 1950s,31 common arguments 
about US public interest in the Holocaust in that period seem to support the conclusion 
that “the destruction of European Jewry was widely subsumed under the generic category 
of war casualties and crimes.”32 One interpretation of early Holocaust memory suggests 
that at the close of WWII, “The mushroom clouds over Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
appeared to many as ominous as the smoke rising from the crematoria of Auschwitz.”33 
Furthermore, Mintz argues that Jewish communities had reasons for muting the event in 
the first few decades following the end of the war, including a strong desire to assimilate 
and avoid additional attention as special victims.34  Public interest in the Holocaust, thus, 
does not emerge in a pronounced form until the 1960s and 1970s,35 a time period marked 
by the popularization of mediated texts including the cinematic and theatrical productions 
of The Diary of Ann Frank, the NBC mini-series titled Holocaust, and the 





The Holocaust assumed a central role in US public memory after the 1960s and 
1970s with a high point of “Holocaust consciousness” in the 1990s; its successful 
popularization has enabled the Holocaust to serve as a touchstone for other atrocities 
seeking to garner public attention.37  As the twentieth century drew to a close, Novick 
observes “the prominent role the Holocaust has come to play in both American Jewish 
and general American discourse.”38 The Holocaust has become such a common subject 
within popular culture texts, Mintz argues, that US youth in particular “cannot imagine a 
time in which the remembrance of the Holocaust was not a central American concern.”39       
 During this time of “intensive memory work,” 40 atrocity memories have 
diversified and circulated through numerous forms, including television shows, news 
programs, Web sites, films, DVDs, museums, and memorial displays. Beyond the 
Holocaust, other twentieth and twenty-first century genocides, including Armenia, 
Cambodia, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Darfur, have become the subjects of multiple 
interpretations. Although only a partial list, I nonetheless provide a brief introduction to 
the cultural narratives told about six genocides that are often the focus of filmmakers, 
television producers, curators, and authors who help popularize and explain genocidal 
violence. In highlighting these textual examples, I offer a glimpse into extant mediations 
of genocide memory. 
Genocide Narratives in the US “Popular Genocide Imaginary”41 
The Armenian Genocide. The Armenian genocide has been popularized and given 
a public presence through the rock band System of a Down. The band’s attempts to raise 
awareness of the atrocity were featured in the 2006 film Screamers. Celebrities Julianna 





controversial documentary on the Armenian genocide aired on PBS.42 Plans are 
purportedly in the works to give the Armenian genocide an increased public presence in 
Washington, D.C. through the creation of the Armenian Genocide Museum of America, 
to be located on the same street as the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.43  
In 2002, nearly ninety years after the events, the Armenian genocide was featured 
in the award-winning film Ararat. Ararat presents an image of obliteration: first, the 
mass slaughter of Turkey’s Armenian population in 1915, and second, the obliteration of 
genocide memory, portraying the controversy around Turkish responses to these events.  
Ararat creatively works on two levels: It constructs a film within a film to impart some 
information about the genocide, and it creates space to critique that film, emphasizing the 
difficulty of mediating memory against the backdrop of amnesia and denial.44 As 
depicted in the film within the film, under the cover of World War I, Armenians were 
rounded up and exiled from their homes and communities. Cities were turned into ruins, 
and the Armenians were horrifically tortured.  Women were raped and burned alive. 
Ararat implies that Turks engaged in a particularly brutal practice of hammering 
horseshoes to the feet of their victims. Starvation eliminated a number of others as they 
marched through empty lands. All in all, over one million Armenians were killed.  Worse 
still, the events remain “disputed” by the Turkish community, some of whom continue to 
argue that losses were suffered on both sides, and the massacre was more the byproduct 
of the carnage of war rather than a genocide.45 
 The Holocaust. Books, such as While America Watches: Televising the Holocaust 
and Holocaust and the Moving Image: Representations in Film and Television since 





has been the subject of celebrated films including Schindler’s List (1993), Life is 
Beautiful (1997), The Pianist (2002), and The Reader (2008). Numerous memorials and 
museums exist to commemorate and educate about the Shoah, including, for example, the 
Florida Holocaust Museum, the Anne Frank Center USA, and the Holocaust and 
Intolerance Museum of New Mexico.47 Additionally, graphic novels such as Maus and 
youth historical fiction books such as Number the Stars and The Devil’s Arithmetic 
broaden the audiences exposed to this content. 
A detailed picture of the Holocaust emerges from one of the preeminent US 
Holocaust “texts”: the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.  The narrative 
reflected in the permanent exhibition, as well as bolstered through special exhibitions like 
Deadly Medicine and the Holocaust Encyclopedia on the USHMM website, imparts a 
message akin to the following: With the rise of the Third Reich in Germany, in the 
aftermath of the devastation wrought by World War I, a stronger, renewed German state 
was promised through “needed” campaigns to rid the state of its undesirables, including 
Roma, Jehovah’s Witnesses, homosexuals, the mentally or physically disabled, Poles, 
Communists, and Jews.  Capitalizing on racial science (eugenics) and anti-Semitism, 
Jews and other victims targeted as enemies of the state were stripped of their businesses 
and property and were often relocated to “ghettos.” Through an infrastructure of labor 
and concentration camps as well as Einsatzgruppen (mobile killing squads) and death 
marches, six millions Jews and millions of others were killed until the Allied victory at 
the close of World War II liberated the camps and marked the defeat of Nazi Germany.48 
The Cambodian Genocide. The Cambodian genocide has been the subject of 





Killing Fields Museum in Seattle and the Cambodian American Heritage Museum and 
Killing Fields Memorial in Chicago impart a version of the history of the Cambodian 
genocide. Similarly, MoMA featured an installation in 1997 of images of the Cambodian 
genocide’s victims.49 The genocide has been studied steadily throughout the close of the 
twentieth century and the start of the twenty-first, inspiring documentaries such as 
Samsara: Death and Rebirth in Cambodia (1990), S21: The Khmer Rouge Killing 
Machine (2003), The Flute Player (2003), and Biography – Pol Pot: Secret Killer (2006). 
Most notably, the Cambodian genocide was the subject of 1984 Oscar-winning feature 
film, The Killing Fields. 
In The Killing Fields, audiences observe Cambodia’s decimation at the hands of 
the Khmer Rouge through the eyes of Cambodian journalist Dith Pran. Following the 
Khmer Rouge’s conquest of Phnom Penh, conditions in Cambodia quickly deteriorated. 
U.S. and other Western officials left the country after observing only a fraction of the 
Khmer Rouge’s barbarity. The Killing Fields portrays a country reverting to “year zero,” 
a time of no memories and no affection. Year Zero was marked by grueling physical 
(largely agrarian) labor. The bourgeoisie, individuals affiliated with the West, or those 
showing signs of advanced education, were targeted for execution; the people were also 
left to starve. In addition, the family unit was destroyed and children were reared to serve 
Angkor (the Party), functioning as its proxies and initiating executions. As Pran says, the 
people were to “be like the ox” – with no thought – as they ceaselessly toil. From the 
skeletons littering the Cambodian countryside, The Killing Fields provides a glimpse into 





The Rwandan Genocide. Rwanda, too, has been featured several times: from 
documentaries like ICYIZERE: hope and Ghosts of Rwanda (2004) to dramatic portrayals 
in Hotel Rwanda (2004) and Shake Hands with the Devil (2007).  Deogratias: A Tale of 
Rwanda attempts to convey the story of the genocide through the format of the graphic 
novel. African attempts to commemorate and memorialize the genocide drive Harvard 
University’s “Through A Glass Darkly” project, an online catalogue and mapping 
initiative, highlighting existing memorials to Rwandan victims. 
The 2004 film, Hotel Rwanda, provides some historical background to the 
atrocity by discussing the vestiges of Belgium’s colonial rule and informing audiences 
that the ethnic divisions that Belgium used to structure and order society into Hutu and 
Tutsi groups created the rifts in Rwandan society. The initial placement of the Tutsi (seen 
as “taller,” “more elegant,” and lighter in skin tone) in positions of political influence set 
into motion a chain of violence caused by disparities in relative amounts of power. In 
1994, peace seemed to be on the horizon. Rwandan President Habyarimana journeyed to 
Tanzania to sign a peace agreement with Tutsi rebel groups.  Under suspicious 
circumstances, however, the President’s plane was shot down. The Tutsis were blamed, 
and this event became the trigger for mass slaughter. Armed primarily with machetes and 
aided by the hate-fueled rhetoric of Rwandan radio, Hutus pillaged and destroyed the 
land, slaughtering Tutsi adults and children in order to eliminate the next generation of 
“cockroaches.” As violence escalated, the United States and other Western countries 
abandoned Rwanda, leaving Rwandans like Paul Rusesabagina of Hôtel des Mille 
Collines to fend for themselves. Almost one million individuals were slaughtered during 





The Bosnian Genocide.  US memorializations of the Bosnian genocide have 
appeared in a variety of capacities. PBS hosted a website with lesson plans and other 
educational resources to promote the documentary Srebrenica: A Cry from the Grave 
(1999). The Bosnian genocide provides the background for the multi-million dollar action 
film entitled, Behind Enemy Lines (2001), featuring Owen Wilson and Gene Hackman. In 
2011, Angelina Jolie added even more “star power” to the mediation of the Bosnian 
atrocity with the release of In the Land of Blood and Honey, a film she wrote and 
directed. 
The genocide in Bosnia is a major part of the feature film, Welcome to Sarajevo 
(1997). Welcome to Sarajevo provides a glimpse into the genocide in Bosnia through the 
eyes of American and British journalists. Claiming to be premised on historical events in 
Sarajevo between 1992 and 1993, the film concentrates on attempts to evacuate an 
orphanage under siege, with particular attention given to the rescue of a nine-year-old 
child by a British journalist. Yet this rescue narrative is also more broadly situated within 
the declaration of Bosnia’s independence as a part of the dissolution of Yugoslavia. This 
film suggests that as Yugoslavia began to fracture, Bosnian Serbs and Serbian troops 
worked to reassert dominance over the territory, seeking to “purge” Bosnia of its 
Muslims. Sarajevo, a “cosmopolitan city, [and] a symbol of inter-faith co-operation,” 
became a target for violence. Numerous scenes focus on the bloodshed, death, and 
destruction wrought, in particular, by snipers poaching people in public places.  A 
concentration camp is shown filled with emaciated men. Because the film is self-
conscious about the role of mediation (scenes show the journalists working on their 





together with clips of Western world leaders offering unfulfilled promises or refusing to 
intervene. Although the nine-year-old child at the center the film does escape to England, 
the closing credits remind viewers that more than 275,000 people died and hundreds of 
thousands of others were injured or displaced.52   
The Genocide in Darfur. As the most recent of these genocides, the tragedies in 
Darfur have been mediated in unique ways, harnessing the power of new media. mtvU 
hosted “an unprecedented competition bringing together student technology and activism 
to help stop the genocide in Darfur;” the end result of which was the online video game, 
“Darfur is Dying.”53 The genocide has also been the subject of museum exhibitions and 
films, including They Turned Our Desert into Fire (2007) and Darfur Now (2007).  
Highlighting both the power of intertextuality and celebrity, Darfur Now prominently 
features Don Cheadle, the actor playing a genocide survivor in Hotel Rwanda, advocating 
for the alleviation of suffering in Darfur. 
Beyond Cheadle’s involvement with the genocide, Brian Steidle, the US former 
Marine who went to Sudan in 2004 to monitor the ceasefire between northern and 
southern Sudan, has become well known for raising awareness and mediating the 
atrocities in Darfur. While in Sudan, Steidle began to obtain information about the 
conflict in Darfur. “Armed” only with a camera, Steidle took a series of harrowing 
photographs, some of which would later appear in Nicholas D. Kristof’s articles in the 
New York Times and in the movie The Devil Came on Horseback (2007). As described by 
the film, the fighting in the Darfur region of the Sudan can be linked to an April 2003 
attack on an airport launched by two Sudanese rebel groups: the SLA (Sudan Liberation 





their treatment at the hands of the Sudanese government in Khartoum, destroyed 
airplanes and killed 75 people. In retaliation, the Sudanese government closed off Darfur 
and recruited the assistance of the “natural” enemies of the black African Darfuris, an 
Arab militia known as the janjaweed. Accompanied by a series of images from Steidle’s 
collection, the film details the abuses perpetuated by the militia and sponsored by the 
government, including the burning of villages, the looting of properties, the raping of 
women, and the murdering of Darfuri adults and children, ultimately resulting in the 
deaths of 400,000 and the displacement of two and a half million persons.54 
 Collectively, these texts provide a brief introduction to some of the images and 
narratives that compose the “popular genocide imaginary.”55 Far from offering entirely 
original or unique representations, these texts invariably borrow from and reflect other 
cultural narratives about atrocity. Baron concisely captures the nature of this intertextual 
production of meaning in his discussion of cinematic representations of genocide.  
Although “each genocide has its own historical dynamics and litany of atrocities,” he 
explains, “viewers do not enter theatres as a tabula rasa. Instead, they bring with them a 
mental storehouse of all the movies they have seen.”56 Within that “mental storehouse,” 
Holocaust images are often predominant; popular understandings of genocide draw 
heavily on images and narratives associated with the Holocaust.57 Baron holds that the 
Holocaust “furnishes audiences with iconic images of what genocide looks like and 
influences the ways narratives of other genocides get constructed by filmmakers.”58 This 
reliance on the Holocaust’s “symbolic capital”59 in popular cultural representations of 
genocide is considered controversial by some as it touches upon anxieties related to the 





refer to this process of casting contemporary atrocities through the lens of the 
Holocaust.61 Such analogies raise implicit questions about the relationship between the 
Holocaust and other genocides, prompting some of the field’s most provocative debates.  
Troubling the Ampersand in Holocaust & Genocide Studies: Debates over 
Uniqueness 
The “and” in “Holocaust and genocide studies” has become the subject of 
considerable scrutiny.62 Questions over the relationship between these terms are often 
encapsulated in the debate surrounding the uniqueness thesis. Put simply, the uniqueness 
thesis refers to a line of argument that says the Holocaust is not “merely” a genocide. 
Rather, it symbolizes either the pinnacle expression of genocide or an atrocity that exists 
on an entirely different register of violence.63 The debates surrounding the uniqueness 
thesis constitute some of the most intense debates in the field.64 Attesting to the continued 
scholarly interest in this question, debates over the uniqueness thesis have sustained three 
different editions of Rosenbaum’s edited collection—Is the Holocaust Unique?65 The 
ferocity of these debates reflects the politics at stake in assertions of uniqueness.66  
 The conflict surrounding the uniqueness thesis began during the second half of the 
twentieth century in response to a trend toward “‘bilateral historicization,’” a process by 
which the Holocaust was understood in comparison to other historical events; these other 
historical events in turn were understood in comparison to the Holocaust.67 In response to 
these comparative processes, uniqueness discourses increasingly emerged to defend the 
memory of the Holocaust, which some perceived to be under assault from multiple 
historical and political practices. Rosenfeld argues that these historical and political 





include the efforts beginning in the 1950s to explain the Shoah as a part of larger 
intellectual histories linked to genocide, fascism, functionalism, totalitarianism, or 
modernism.68 While such historical contextualization diminished the exceptionalism of 
the Holocaust, Rosenfeld charges that Holocaust memory was threatened by political 
appropriations as well, which obfuscated the atrocity’s “unique” Jewish core.69 In light of 
Rosenfeld’s history of the uniqueness thesis debates, the thesis functions as a response 
utilized by individuals who Power argues, “believe they are staving off any attempt to 
normalize, historicize, relativize, marginalize, or trivialize the crimes of the Third 
Reich.”70  
Although uniqueness thesis arguments assume a variety of forms, at its most 
basic, proponents argue that the Holocaust is a distinct mass atrocity, separate and 
different from other genocides.71 Bauer details three reasons for the Holocaust’s 
uniqueness: First, he argues that the Shoah was ideologically motivated and not driven by 
the “pragmatic considerations” that underlie other genocides.72 Second, he cites “its 
global, indeed, universal character,” charging that “other genocides were limited 
geographically.”73 Finally, Bauer punctuates “its intended totality.”74 Katz devotes an 
entire book-length treatment to comparing the Holocaust to other historical incidents, 
from Roman slavery to the Crusades. He arrives at the conclusion that the Holocaust is 
unique among these atrocities based upon the perpetrators’ intentions.75 Katz contributes 
one of the most “inflammatory” theses in the uniqueness debates in suggesting that the 
Holocaust may be the only historical event that would qualify as a “genocide.”76  
Critics of the uniqueness thesis charge that privileging the Holocaust results in the 





that the insistence upon the “special status” of the Holocaust among other genocides is 
“deeply offensive.”77 The uniqueness thesis creates a “hierarchy of the horribles” that 
reflect racial inequities.78 According to critics of the uniqueness thesis, privileging the 
memory of the Holocaust “above” all other atrocities translates into privileging its 
victims, specifically its Jewish victims, over the victims of other genocides or 
massacres.79 As detractors are quick to note, this often amounts to a valuation of white, 
European bodies over black or non-white, non-European bodies.80 From a slightly 
different perspective, other commentators on the uniqueness thesis argue that this 
configuration of Holocaust and genocide memory is especially detrimental to genocide 
prevention efforts as it “dulls our response” to contemporary atrocity and works to divert 
attention from other forms of suffering that may not quite match the Holocaust in terms 
of scope and scale.81 Such memories may function as cognitive and emotional blocks, 
preventing the recognition of atrocities that are seen as not “measuring up” to the 
precedent set by the Holocaust.82 
Other analysts of the uniqueness thesis debate charge that the intensity of the 
controversy reflects the heightened stakes; underlying uniqueness thesis arguments are 
claims to political recognition.83  As numerous scholars note, atrocity memory has 
become a political tool employed to stimulate recognition and action.84 Holocaust 
memory is often most effective in this regard given its perceived cultural “cache.” As 
MacDonald argues, the success with which knowledge of the Holocaust thoroughly 
penetrated public culture has come to function as “benchmark” for other victims of 
genocide. He explains, “[t]he Holocaust’s Americanization has given hope to other 





recognition and respect if they can provide solid proof of similar events in their collective 
past.”85 This function of the Holocaust’s popularization has resulted in establishing a set 
of unofficial expectations for other victimized groups seeking to gain attention: 
“Demonstrate that what happened to ‘your’ group was comparable to what happened to 
the Jews under the Nazis, or that its perpetrators were similarly impelled by a racist 
worldview, and you have made the case.”86  
Put differently, uniqueness thesis debates are debates over recognition and 
status.87 At their core, Rothberg and others contend these “debates … are primarily 
struggles over injustices of recognition, over whose history and culture will be 
recognized.”88 Accordingly, the “prize” to be attained consists of the acknowledgment of 
one group’s suffering and abuse.89 In other words, cultural and political identities are 
infused into these questions of recognition and comparison.90 As a result, these 
contestations continue to attract popular and academic attention.91 At the broadest level, 
the uniqueness thesis debate clearly showcases the politicized nature of Holocaust and 
genocide studies representations.  
Discomforting Discourses: Ambivalence, Anxiety, and Authority  
 The debates over uniqueness provide a glimpse into the political implications 
associated with the genocide discourses targeting a popular audience. This study engages 
a line of argument prevalent in Holocaust and genocide studies related to the 
“threatening” nature of genocide rhetoric. Arguments adopting this perspective suggest 
that genocide rhetorics are discomforting because they contain within them the potential 
to reveal their audience’s connection to the politics of genocidal violence. This study 





the relationships among state authority, public power, and genocidal violence in popular 
depictions of genocide.  
 Ambivalence, ambiguity, and anxiety are common hallmarks of discussions in 
Holocaust and genocide studies.92 Reflecting Levi’s famous exploration of the “gray 
zone,” Petropoulos and Roth punctuate the centrality of ambiguity to both scholarly and 
popular discourses on the Holocaust.93 In contrast with arguments that the Holocaust 
represents “a moral touchstone,”94 are those claims that the Holocaust and genocide 
discourses showcase “a painful and morally ambiguous reality in which there never is, 
and never has been, a ‘moral high ground.’”95  This lack of moral certitude disrupts the 
clear delineation of perpetrators and victims and raises broader questions about 
culpability and complicity.96 Mandel argues that this lends discussions of the Holocaust, 
and by extension other genocides, a “most disturbing” edge insofar as they reveal the 
“complicity of contemporary culture” in the execution of genocidal violence.97 
 Beyond implicating audiences as complicit in such violence, genocide cessation 
discourses contain the seeds of arguments that challenge the authority of the nation-state. 
Drawing on the work of Žižek and others, Edkins posits that genocides and other 
traumatic events possess within them the potential to expose the violence embedded in 
contemporary configurations of political community. More specifically, her study of 
temporality reveals the ways in which the state obfuscates the connection between 
sovereign political authority and violence.98 Popular discourses surrounding genocide 
thus become threatening because in these instances of violent rupture, “the symbolism 
and ideology that concealed the fragile and contingent nature of authority collapse 





form of concealment.”99 Great potential exists in these moments to challenge state 
power.100 For that reason, Edkins discusses representations and remembrances of 
genocide and other atrocities as “site[s] of struggle” wherein the critic can examine the 
complicated linkages among state authority, public power, and violence.101  
Following Edkins, this project examines genocidal depictions in US popular 
culture as “site[s] of struggle” over state and public power. Far from simplistic or 
shallow, these popular cultural texts play a critical role in contributing to public 
understandings of the politics of genocide and genocide cessation.102 As underscored 
throughout this Introduction, these representations are politically charged; matters of 
authority, power, and recognition are called into question. In the process, discussions of 
genocide threaten to reveal discomforting arguments about Western complicity in 
violence and prompt broader interrogations of the legitimacy of state authority. Given the 
stakes, these discourses are fraught with ambiguity and anxiety.  This study accordingly 
poses two research questions associated with these tensions. First, how do popular 
culture texts constitute notions of state authority and public agency through definitions, 
representations, resolutions, and remembrances of genocide? Second, how do popular 
culture texts rhetorically (re)configure the relationships among state authority, public 
agency, and genocidal violence and manage the anxiety created by competing 
assessments of state authority and public agency? These two questions guide the 
examination of all three of the texts featured in this project. 
Specifically, this study explores the interrelationships among authority, agency, 
and violence through a critical analysis of exhibits displayed in two museums and in an 





criteria: (1) their use of past genocides as a framework for discussing political 
intervention into existing and future atrocities; and (2) their development of popular, 
multi-media, and interactive technology in explicating genocide cessation, including 
films, blogs, and social media platforms for audience engagement.103 These two criteria 
ensure that the texts in this study construct sufficiently robust narratives about genocide 
and political violence thereby facilitating an examination of the research questions above. 
Each criterion connects the texts selected to the questions at the heart of this project. 
First, by utilizing past genocides as a framework for current cessation efforts, the texts in 
this study situate specific genocides within larger historical and political narratives. 
Accordingly, these texts avoid an overly narrow focus on the particularities of any one 
genocide; rather, they include overarching arguments about patterns of political violence. 
In so doing, they widen their scope to consider the relationships among atrocities as well 
as the relationships among violence, nation-states, and “average” citizens.104 Second, the 
use of popular and interactive technologies signals, at minimum, a modest endorsement 
of their audiences’ agency. The presence of such platforms for audience interaction is 
interpreted within this study as evidence of an attempt to engage the general public in 
conversations about the politics of genocide and genocide cessation.  By working through 
popular channels or creating technological opportunities for interactivity, the texts in this 
study imply some level of support for popular power.  
Each chapter centralizes an individual or institution that has attained some degree 
of fame or notoriety for attempting to popularize Holocaust and genocide studies.  These 
individuals and institutions include Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, the Los Angeles-based 





entered the public eye after the controversial success of his 1996 publication, Hitler’s 
Willing Executioners. In 2009, Goldhagen broadened the scope of his work by publishing 
a sweeping meditation on the problem of genocide and genocide cessation, Worse Than 
War. In collaboration with PBS, Worse Than War became a film supported with an 
interactive website.  Like Goldhagen, the Museum of Tolerance has enjoyed a 
considerable amount of public attention, perhaps driven in part by its efforts to market 
itself as a tourist destination. The institution’s flashy displays and emotional appeals have 
drawn praise and criticism from numerous scholarly and popular voices. Nevertheless, its 
expansive mission invites discussion of the relationship among genocides and others 
forms of political violence.105 Similar to the Museum of Tolerance, the United States 
Holocaust Memorial Museum has become a popular tourist destination as well as a 
stimulus for academic and public debate. Through a special exhibition titled, From 
Memory to Action: Meeting the Challenge of Genocide, the institution considers the 
Holocaust as part of a broader history of genocidal violence. In sum, Goldhagen’s 
documentary and the exhibits from the two Holocaust museums offer numerous 
arguments about the politics of genocide and genocide cessation that help answer this 
study’s research questions. 
In each chapter, the study foregrounds notions of authority and agency across 
these texts that struggle to define, represent, resolve, and remember genocidal atrocities. 
The accompanying narratives and images provide an enriched discursive portrayal of 
state authority and public agency in popular cultural calls for genocide cessation.106 
A Rhetorical Approach to Genocide: Genre Studies, Critical/Cultural Studies, 





 This study draws on multiple bodies of knowledge in the analysis of these three 
cases. The arguments in the ensuing chapters are informed by scholarship in rhetoric, 
media studies, memory studies, critical/cultural studies, as well as Holocaust and 
genocide studies. More specifically, this study is predicated upon arguments about the 
rhetorical construction of “genocide,” the significance of understanding genocide through 
genre studies, the importance of attending to temporality, and the value of a vocabulary 
enhanced by both media studies and critical/cultural studies. Finally, I explicate my 
understanding of these central constructs and introduce some of project’s theoretical 
underpinnings.107  
Genocide as a Rhetorical Designation  
 This project is predicated upon a social constructionist understanding of genocide 
politics and thus takes seriously the ideological implications of the use (or nonuse) of the 
term “genocide.” In other words, I understand the term “genocide” as a construct that 
does much more than describe the forms of political violence to which the term refers. 
Toward those ends, this project disavows a positivist understanding of contemporary 
politics in favor of a view of “politics as spectacle.”108 From Edelman’s perspective, 
“[p]roblems [such as genocide] come into discourse and therefore into existence as 
reinforcements of ideologies, not simply because they are there or because they are 
important for wellbeing.”109 Put differently, articulations of genocide are first and 
foremost ideological constructions that shape the ensuing interpretations of material 






 Of course, the power of genocide rhetoric is implicitly understood and recognized 
by many Holocaust and genocide studies scholars concerned with the relationship 
between language and political action as established in the 1948 UN Convention.111 Yet, 
few articulate the ideological implications of this rhetorical designation as clearly as 
Herman and Peterson. In The Politics of Genocide, Herman and Peterson argue that the 
term “genocide” functions as a rhetorical warrant used selectively to advance US 
strategic interests by vilifying some countries while allowing the aggressive actions of the 
United States to go unnamed.  The authors contend that during the 1990s, genocide 
rhetorics replaced Cold War era rationales as a means of legitimating foreign policy 
measures advantageous to the United States.  Like the “‘national security’” logics 
associated with the Cold War, US genocide discourse helps to justify “anything the U.S. 
government cho[o]se[s] to do in the realm of foreign policy, regardless of its brutality and 
criminality.”112 Herman and Peterson’s writing clearly evinces an understanding of 
genocide as a rhetorical term imbricated in complex ideological matrices that privilege 
some, disadvantage others, and have no implicit relationship to the materiality of violence 
as it occurs in particular contexts.  Borrowing from Herman and Peterson’s language, the 
politics of genocide prevention and intervention reflect “choices regularly made that have 
nothing to do with crossing certain thresholds of scale, much less with whether events are 
inherently conscience-shocking. Instead, the distinction turns on who does what to whom 
– and where does power lie.”113  
 Marking genocide as a rhetorical designation has several implications. First, as 
Edelman makes clear in his defense against positivist critiques,114 embracing a 





the materiality of violence whenever or wherever it may occur. Recognizing that political 
problems are built through discursive apparatuses is not the same as arguing that political 
violence exists in name only.  In grappling with questions of truth in their work on 
genocide, O’Neill and Hinton offer a useful model. They write: “Did the Holocaust really 
happen? Of course. Were indigenous peoples throughout the Americas victims of 
genocide? Yes.  Nevertheless, it is important that we remain open to exploring the ways 
in which discourses about truth have been deployed.” Many authors thus move the 
debates away from claims about the occurrence of material events to focus on the 
discourses used to affirm or challenge the occurrences of genocide.115 This rhetorical 
perspective illuminates the ways in which material violence comes to be understood 
through extant discursive frameworks,116 which in turn shape the perceptions of political 
problems and their “appropriate” responses.  
Second, the discursive tactics used to shape public understandings of genocidal 
violence represent an important part of these existing frameworks. These discursive 
strategies are not created anew with each occurrence of political violence.117  As Torchin 
describes it, genocides are deciphered through pre-existing “interpretive gird[s],”118 or the 
stories we tell about genocide that rely on forms of “emplotment” which structure public 
discourse about atrocity.119 Put differently, both Torchin and Rothe invoke the language 
of “gird[s]” or “emplotment” to describe the ways genocide is constructed generically. 
Genres accordingly shape the way genocide enters into public discourse and the range of 
actions then associated with the stories told about genocide and genocide cessation.120 By 
treating genocide as a rhetorical construction, this project is positioned to critique the 





Understanding Genocide Generically 
Genre has gotten a “bad rap” among some rhetorical critics because of a 
perceived preoccupation with classification and form as well as an overemphasis on the 
power of the situation.121 Early work on genre underscores its utility as an organizational 
tool, a way of classifying or making sense of kinds or types of discourse. Campbell and 
Jamieson’s early definition of “genre” reflects this organizational logic. In their words, 
“[a] ‘genre’ is a classification based on the fusion and interrelation of elements in such a 
way that a unique kind of rhetorical act is created.”122  Similarly, Harrell and Linkugel 
argue “that rhetorical genres stem from organizing principles found in recurring 
situations that generate discourse characterized by a family of common factors.”123 Not 
surprisingly, genre criticism became associated with a means of grouping or organizing 
texts, leading Fisher to assert that genre criticism is “not a critical method in and of 
itself;” rather, it is a first step in doing any kind of rhetorical criticism, a precursor to 
analysis.124  
In the last thirty years, productive work on genre has been done in a number of 
disciplines. Devitt’s efforts to synthesize the state of genre theory underscore the most 
productive turns in the development of genre studies. Devitt asserts that “views of genre 
have changed, shifting from a formalistic study of critics’ classifications to a rhetorical 
study of the generic actions of everyday readers and writers.”125 Devitt emphasizes the 
role of genre in offering conceptual maps that help people process and categorize 
events.126 “[S]tudying genre,” according to Devitt, is “studying how people use language 





Furthermore, genre studies allow for a comparative approach that privileges an 
intertextual meaning-making process.128  As Miller contends, “[T]he new is made 
familiar through the recognition of relevant similarities,” and “those similarities become 
constituted as a type.”129 Genres thus function through pattern recognition wherein, 
according to Devitt, individuals recognize “perceived similarities among disparate 
situations.”130 Genre criticism recognizes that all works are predicated upon earlier work. 
Indeed, Jamieson’s study of antecedent genres demonstrates the pull of the past on genre 
selection and rhetorical invention.131 Ergo, genre work moves critics away from studying 
texts “in isolation” and creates a “critical history.”132 This comparative process provides 
scholars with the grounds for making claims about textual uniqueness.133 Importantly, the 
act of comparison presumes a memory of past situations and past texts. Recollection and 
memory consequently come to play an important role in genre studies.  
Public Memory Studies as a Vehicle for Understanding Temporality 
 Memory scholarship serves to examine temporality in this study, exploring the 
representations and intersections of past, present, and future.  At its most basic level, 
memory, according to Terdiman, “is the modality of our relation to the past.”134 Of 
course, “the past” is a very nebulous rhetorical construct, and relationships to the past can 
be constructed in a variety of ways.135  Additionally, the past cannot “be brought back 
intact;”136 it is always (re)constructed in the present.137 Memory represents one of the 
vehicles used to construct the past in the present.	   Although memory is associated with 
the past, it is commonly invoked to meet present or future needs.138 Particularly relevant 
to this project, however, is public memory,139 which Halbwachs fashioned as a public and 





Because public memory concerns the past, present, and future, it provides a 
theoretical framework for discussing and analyzing social conceptions of time. For some, 
the study of memory calls for suspending assumptions of a continuous linear flow (e.g., 
past à present à future).141 Nora and Terdiman, for example, suggest different ways of 
thinking about how the concepts of past, present, and future relate. Nora parses his 
definitions of history and memory as contingent upon a sense of cleavage between past 
and present. History is treated as if there is a break between past and present; in memory, 
contrastingly, constructions of the past inform the present in a seamless fashion.142 
Terdiman offers an alternative conception of “what was” the past, “what is” the present, 
and how the two relate. “Memory,” Terdiman argues, “complicates the rationalist 
segmentation of chronology into ‘then’ and ‘now.’ In memory, the time line becomes 
tangled and folds back on itself.”143 Vivian refers to this process as “temporal folding.”144 
Terdiman, Nora, and Vivian remind us that the ways in which past, present, and future 
are constructed vis-à-vis one another constitute arguments about the nature of temporal 
flow.145 As Huyssen and Edkins underscore, these temporalities have the potential to be 
reconfigured, particularly in the wake of “trauma” or atrocity.146  These relationships and 
understandings of temporality are critical to this project insofar as rhetorics of genocide 
cessation draw upon conceptions of the past to motivate action in the present and future.  
Media Studies, Critical/Cultural Studies, and Exnomination 
Media studies provide the tools for deepening understandings of the ideologies 
and arguments that circulate within popular mediated texts. Although there are multiple 
ways of defining media studies, this project views media as serving three functions: 





elevates media studies to a philosophy.147 Hartley builds the case that media studies are in 
and of themselves “a philosophy of the popular,” fundamentally engaged in working 
through the same tensions around knowing and being that concern the study of 
philosophy.148 Hartley contends,  
Media studies is therefore at least part of the philosophy of the media age: 
it produces both rational and empirical knowledge about how truths are 
told today, from the detail of individual strategies and techniques right up 
to those truths that have power to command on a society-wide basis and to 
a global extent.149  
With its “epistemic authority,”150 media subtly influence what audiences come to know.  
In this capacity, media function as a public pedagogy, offering instruction on a variety of 
topics, including politics and the viability of social change.151  Media also produce and 
reproduce an image of the polis,152 illuminating its contours, highlighting key political 
agents,153 and identifying forms of political action. As Hariman and Lucaites argue 
succinctly: “images in the public media display the public to itself.”154  Media can thus 
offer prescriptions for action within the polis, defining and proffering templates for the 
exercise of citizenship.155 Although considerable debate exists about the media’s ability 
to serve as a (progressive) change agent, mediated texts nonetheless impart lessons about 
the potential for social change.156 
Intersecting scholarship from rhetorical and media studies yields two primary 
benefits. First, it expands the perspectives that could be brought to bear on a text. As 
Medhurst and Benson stress in defending a rhetorical approach to media studies, “critical 





any a priori assertion of territorial rights;” thus a rhetorical study of the media diversifies 
the repertoire of critical perspectives available in analyzing the persuasive strategies 
contained in mediated texts.157 Second, such a combination of lenses serves as a 
corrective to the potential proclivity within some forms of media studies to limit human 
agency. Certain media studies perspectives (like critical/cultural studies) risk eliminating 
a role for agency and choice. A strict political economy approach or interpretation of the 
media through the lens of the Frankfurt school risks eliminating agency as media 
messages and the reception of those messages are determined by the conditions of their 
production.158 A rhetorical approach to the media, while not denying the influence of 
such conditions, maintains a belief in the importance of agency and choice in the 
production, dissemination, and reception of mediated messages.159 
The use of critical/cultural studies scholarship further advances the study of 
ideology and politics.160 As Schulman explains, cultural studies interrogates “meanings in 
human experience as they are realized in language and other signifying practices” while 
also “examining institutional practices…and contemporary political movements.”161 With 
a focus on meaning, texts, and the analysis of discourse, clear areas of overlap exist 
between rhetorical and cultural studies. Elaborating on this overlap, Rosteck creates 
space for what he terms “cultural rhetorical criticism” by returning to Wrage’s initial 
efforts to expand “the objects of critical rhetorical analysis.”162 Culture is a “rhetorical 
mosaic writ large,” argues Rosteck.163A project that intersects both rhetorical and cultural 
studies recognizes “[t]he textualization of culture.”164 Culture is viewed as existing in and 
through texts; texts, in turn, reflect and compose the culture.165 At best, both cultural 





production of meaning in use”166—meanings that are historically and politically situated. 
Yet, the marriage between rhetorical studies and critical/cultural studies is not 
always agreeable.167 One of the chief problems of blending critical/cultural studies and 
rhetorical studies is the pull of ideological determinism.168 At a basic level, ideology is 
“the partiality of ideas;”169 it is the “ideas corresponding to the actions…[one] 
performs;”170 yet ideology is also used to refer to a dominant system of thought,171 a 
“master framework,” with “claims to general representativeness.”172 Controversies arise 
over the extent to which ideology governs or drives behaviors; one peril within the 
critical/cultural studies approach is an overemphasis on power, discipline, coercion, and 
force.173 Maintaining a commitment to a definition of rhetoric rooted in at least some 
measure of choice and agency serves as a potential corrective, enabling this study to 
highlight the operation of ideology while not casting ideology as a totalizing force.174  
For the purposes of this project, cultural studies functions as a useful supplement 
to rhetorical studies, enriching this analysis by introducing a perspective sensitive to the 
power of audiences,175 taking seriously popular discourses,176 and providing a host of 
theories and vocabularies for furthering discussions of ideology, power, and politics as 
they converge in texts. Especially noteworthy, such discussions of ideology, power, and 
politics within critical/cultural studies contribute conceptual tools sensitive to issues of 
marginalization along the lines of various identity markers (e.g., race, class, gender, 
sexuality).177 These markers become particularly important within a study of genocide 
cessation discourse as they are often the markers used to target victim groups.  
Similarly, critical/cultural studies approaches bequeath a vocabulary useful in 





on Barthes’ concept of exnomination. Originally invoked within Barthes’s work to 
describe the privilege of the French bourgeoisie, the exnominated, Barthes charges, is 
excluded from discourse.179 Without being named, it cannot be challenged.180 In Fiske’s 
words, “[o]nly that which is not named appears to have no alternative, only that which is 
not named can achieve the status of the natural, of common sense.”181 In response, this 
study attends to such strategies as rhetorical intimation,182 through which texts “hint” or 
“gesture” toward the unspeakable.183 By recognizing the exnominated, this analysis is 
poised to critique the absences in narratives about genocide and interrogate the political 
implications of the unnamed.184  
Précis 
 The instances of US genocide cessation discourse examined in this study reveal a 
deep-seated ambivalence about the relationships among state authority, public agency, 
and genocidal violence. The texts in this study contain multiple and often inconsistent 
messages about the definition, representation, resolution, and remembrance of genocide. 
The numerous textual vacillations and incongruences in each of these arenas reflect the 
extent tensions in scholarly discussions of atrocity. Such competing narratives about state 
and public authority ultimately create a palpable anxiety. Most revealing is how these 
texts work to manage these anxieties in distinct ways, acting to sublimate, exacerbate, or 
recognize these tensions. 
On the surface, the two museums and single documentary featured in this project 
offer palatable and easy-to-consume messages about genocide and genocide cessation. 
Given the demands of attracting an audience of museum goers or documentary 





ending genocide. The texts commonly depict the US nation-state and the US public as 
potential genocide cessation agents. The US nation-state and its political officials 
consequently are granted the authority and agency to intervene in genocidal violence or 
prevent genocidal atrocity altogether; the US public is also authorized to remain vigilant 
and informed in order to serve as genocide cessation actors.  
At the same time, these texts intimate darker discourses regarding the role of state 
authority and limitations on popular power. The texts simultaneously hint at 
discomforting historical and theoretical arguments that connect state power and violence. 
These intimations are conveyed through differing messages.186 They manifest in 
reminders of the state’s genocidal power to eliminate its own citizens. Correspondingly, 
such intimations can assume the form of haunting questions about the nature of 
indigenous atrocities that often accompany discussions of genocide. These intimations 
and others implicate Western nation-states and raise doubts about the benevolence of 
state authority.  
Similarly, these texts gesture toward the insufficiency of public agency. While 
numerous popular culture texts suggest that “average individuals” have the power to stop 
genocide, they also contain countervailing messages that exclude most from discussions 
of genocide cessation. Alternatively, the texts question whether individuals and 
collectives possess the resources needed to halt or prevent genocide. These contradictory 
assessments of the role of state authority and public agency in matters of genocide create 






 The complexity of the relationships among these constructs – state authority, 
public agency, and genocidal violence – is evidenced by inconsistencies in the textual 
attempts to define, represent, resolve, and remember genocide. The discourses analyzed 
in this study advance inconsistent arguments, blend incompatible genres, and rely on 
rhetorical intimation to gesture toward “that which is not named.”187 Put differently, these 
rhetorical strategies enable the texts to leave certain ideas or arguments exnominated or 
unarticulated, particularly sentiments suggesting that US political actions and ideologies 
contributed to genocidal violence. Attention to these silences and fissures stands to 
spotlight an expressed anxiety within these texts pertaining to the links among the US 
government, its citizens, and atrocity.   
 In the end, the texts elevate the nation-state and state actors as the most powerful 
genocide cessation agents.  Despite paying lip service to popular power, the texts 
corroborate the authority of the nation-state. All three of the case studies examined in this 
project centralize the nation-state or empowered political actors as critical to genocide 
intervention or prevention efforts. They concurrently convey considerable doubt about 
popular agency, evincing a distrust of “average individuals” as genocide cessation agents. 
Although the texts are ostensibly engaging the non-expert public in their endeavors to 
end genocide, they afford their audiences a marginal role in genocide cessation work. 
This configuration of public agency within these popular culture representations of 
genocide normalizes genocide as a “foreign” affair divorced from the lives of US 
citizens.  
 Each of the texts in this study configures the relationships among state authority, 





and remember genocide. Accordingly, each manages the anxieties created by competing 
assessments of state and public power differently.   
 Chapter One offers conflicting perspectives on the definitions, representations, 
resolutions, and remembrances of atrocity contained within scholarship from Holocaust 
and genocide studies. Although there are numerous points of contention in the field’s 
discussion of each of these four arenas, the relationships among state authority, public 
agency, and violence underlie a considerable amount of debate in the field. The 
scholarship in each of these areas reflects an ambivalent assessment of the state and the 
public’s role in the politics of genocide and genocide cessation. The inconsistent 
treatments in scholarly circles over the connections among the state, the public, and 
genocidal violence extend throughout the popular cultural treatments of genocide 
cessation discourse.   
 Chapter Two provides a bridge between the scholarly and popular culture 
treatments of genocide cessation by analyzing Daniel Jonah Goldhagen’s documentary, 
Worse Than War. Goldhagen is a controversial figure as a scholar-turned-media 
celebrity. Even though he is a former Harvard professor, he is heavily critiqued by his 
peers in the academy. Given Goldhagen’s embattled ethos, anxieties over authority 
reverberate throughout the film’s attempts to define, represent, resolve, and remember 
genocide. Ultimately, Worse Than War emphasizes the authority afforded to Goldhagen 
through his spatial and experiential proximity to atrocity. Goldhagen is the son of a 
Holocaust survivor afforded the opportunity to travel to sites of genocidal violence, 
granting him a special forum to speak out on genocide and a level of ethos to do so. 





atrocity or familial connections to trauma are seemingly denied such authority and are 
consequently excluded from genocide cessation work. In the end, the state is elevated as 
the principle actor in anti-genocide efforts. 
Chapter Three examines the Los Angeles-based Museum of Tolerance (MOT). 
Genocide is one of numerous public problems addressed by the institution. This breadth 
in scope only intensifies the anxieties at the heart of this study because it further impedes 
the clear delineation of legitimate and illegitimate uses of state and public power.  The 
MOT exacerbates such anxiety through its use of horror conventions. An abstract sense 
of fear or suspicion percolates throughout the MOT, shaping its definitions, 
representations, resolutions, and remembrances of genocide. Ultimately, this sense of fear 
bolsters the institution’s elevation of state power over public power as integral to 
genocide cessation even as the institution contains haunting reminders of the state’s 
connections to the politics of genocide.188 
 The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum’s special exhibition, From 
Memory to Action, is the subject of Chapter Four. This institution—partly funded by 
private funds and partly funded by government funds—offers a nuanced assessment of 
the politics of genocide and genocide cessation. The museum includes competing 
portrayals of the role of the state and the public in the definition, representation, 
resolution, and remembrance of genocide. In each of these four arenas, From Memory to 
Action advances predominantly optimistic arguments about the feasibility of genocide 
cessation while gesturing toward less hopeful discourses concerning the limitations of 





incongruences by utilizing the strategy of rhetorical intimation to recognize the 
complexity of genocide and genocide cessation work.  
 In the Afterword, I centralize the significance of the ambivalence reflected in 
these textual attempts to define, represent, resolve, and remember genocide. I argue that 
the anxiety engendered by textual inconsistencies and fragmentation is ultimately 
productive because it denies audiences the satisfaction of “easy answers” and fosters a 
sense of accountability. Similarly, the texts provide the impetus for broader conversations 
over the links among the nation-state, the public, and political violence. By gesturing 
toward discomforting narratives regarding the state’s connections to violence, textual 
ambivalence suggests the importance of conditioning audiences to be alert to and critical 
of state behavior.  
 This project must begin by identifying the problems associated with defining, 
representing, resolving and remembering genocide within academic treatments of the 
subject before examining their treatment in popular culture constructs. The scholarship in 
Holocaust and genocide studies reviewed in the next chapter illuminates the rhetorical 
challenges confronting popular cultural attempts to craft palatable and optimistic 
messages regarding genocide cessation.  
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also David Rieff, “An Age of Genocide: The Far Reaching Lessons of Rwanda,” The 
New Republic, January 29, 1996, 33-34. 
2 This paragraph is a brief summary of Power’s detailed exploration of Lemkin’s 
work. See chapters 2-4 in Samantha Power, “A Problem from Hell”: America and the 
Age of Genocide (New York: Perennial, 2003), 17-60.  
3 Samuel Totten and Steven Leonard Jacobs, “Introduction,” in Pioneers of 
Genocide Studies, ed. Samuel Totten and Steven Leonard Jacobs (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction Publishers, 2002), xi; Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, “A Review of the 
Literature,” in The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990), 12-23. Of course, it is important to recognize 
the academic work that was done on the Holocaust and genocide prior to the 1980s. 
Baron’s works features some of the early scholarship on the Holocaust (between 1945-
1960). See Lawrence Baron, “The Holocaust and American Public Memory, 1945-1960,” 
Holocaust and Genocide Studies 17, no. 1 (2003): 66-71. Further, as will be detailed later 
in this project, important studies, such as the Milgram study, were also conducted during 
this time period. 
4 Robert Gellately and Ben Kiernan, “The Study of Mass Murder and Genocide,” 
in The Specter of Genocide: Mass Murder in Historical Perspective, ed. Robert Gellately 
and Ben Kiernan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 6-8. 
5 Chalk and Jonassohn, “The Brutishness of the Past and Collective Denial,” in 
The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies (New Haven, CT: 
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human rights is relatively new in Western society,” they assert (7-8). See Chalk and 
Jonassohn, “The Brutishness of the Past and Collective Denial,” 5-8. 
6 To be sure, using the designation “field” raises questions about disciplinarity: 
what constitutes a discrete academic field? Should this scholarship be treated as its own 
discipline? Although these debates have merit, I am less interested in advancing 
arguments about the place of genocide studies in the contemporary academy and seek 
only to provide a sense of the historical emergence of such scholarship before 
highlighting some of the critical conversations contained within such work. As such, I 
adopt the terminology used by Totten and Jacobs in their treatment of the development of 
genocide studies scholarship as they designate genocide studies “as an academic field.” 
See Totten and Jacobs, “Introduction,” xi.   
7 Mark Levene, “A Dissenting Voice: Or How Current Assumptions of Deterring 
and Preventing Genocide May Be Looking at the Problem Through the Wrong End of the 
Telescope, Part I,” Journal of Genocide Research 6, no. 2 (2004):  154. See again Power, 
“A Problem From Hell.” 
8 I offer representative examples of work in the following areas. For 
psychological approaches, see James Waller, Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People 
Commit Genocide and Mass Killing, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford, 2007). For sociological 
approaches, see Helen Fein, Genocide: A Sociological Perspective (London: Sage 
Publications, 1993); Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Ithaca, New York: 
Cornell University Press, 2000); Kuper, Genocide. For anthropological approaches, see 
O’Neill and Hinton, “Genocide, Truth, Memory.” For political science, see Duncan Bell, 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Politics: Reflections on the Relationship Between Past and Present, ed. Duncan Bell 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 1-29; David B. MacDonald, Identity Politics in 
the Age of Genocide: The Holocaust and Historical Representation (Abdington: 
Routledge, 2008). Schaller describes historians’ roles in Holocaust and genocide studies. 
See Dominik J. Schaller, “From the Editor(s): Genocide Research, Preventionism and 
Politics of Memory – a Personal Note,” Journal of Genocide Research 8, no. 3 (2006): 
246; see also Peter Novick, The Holocaust in American Life (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1999). For legal studies, see Martin Mennecke, “Punishing Genocidaires: A 
Deterrent Effect or Not?” Human Rights Review 8, no. 4 (2007): 319-339. For literary 
studies, see Amy Hungerford, The Holocaust of Texts: Genocide, Literature, and 
Personification (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2003). For art studies, 
Stephen C. Feinstein, “Introduction: A Scream/A Repetition/A Transformation” in 
Absence/Presence: Critical Essays on the Artistic Memory of the Holocaust, ed. Stephen 
C. Feinstein (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2005), xxi-xxxii. For film studies 
and media studies, Caroline Joan (Kay) S. Picart and David A. Frank, Frames of Evil: 
The Holocaust as Horror in American Film (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University 
Press, 2006). For philosophical approaches, see John K. Roth, “Prologue: Philosophy and 
Genocide” in Genocide and Human Rights: A Philosophical Guide, ed. John K. Roth 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), xvi-xxi. 
9 Barbara Harff, “No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing the Risks 
of Genocide and Political Mass Murder since 1955,” American Political Science Review 
97, no. 1 (2003): 57-73; Lawrence L. Langer, Holocaust Testimonies: The Ruins of 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
xxxii. Other works in “genocide studies” include analyses of victims’ bodies to produce a 
correlation between a population’s general health and the occurrence of genocide, gender 
studies of Holocaust memorials, psychological profiles of victims, perpetrators, and 
bystanders, and studies of indigenous atrocity. Ashley Maxwell and Ann H. Ross, 
“Epidemiology of Genocide: An Example from the Former Yugoslavia,” Forensic 
Science Policy & Management: An International Journal 2, no. 2 (2011): 94-102; Janet 
Jacobs, Memorializing the Holocaust: Gender, Genocide and Collective Memory 
(London: I.B. Tauris, 2010); Steven K. Baum, The Psychology of Genocide: 
Perpetrators, Bystanders, and Rescuers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); 
Ward Churchill, A Little Matter of Genocide: Holocaust and Denial in the Americas 1492 
to the Present (San Francisco, CA: City Lights Books, 1997); David E. Stannard, 
American Holocaust: Columbus and the Conquest of the New World (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1992); John H. Bodley, Victims of Progress, 2nd ed. (Menlo Park, CA: 
The Benjamin / Cummings Publishing Company, Inc., 1982). 
10 Though the field’s interdisciplinarity is undoubtedly a strength, on the most 
obvious of levels, the lack of methodological or disciplinary coherence means that the 
participants in the “conversations” bear the vestiges of different disciplinary orientations 
to central constructs. See Michael Rothberg, Traumatic Realism: The Demands of 
Holocaust Representation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 5-7.  
11 “Genocide cessation” is used throughout this dissertation project as a form of 
shorthand referring to efforts to end genocide. As such, it is used as an umbrella term, 
including both arguments for intervention and prevention. Of course, the term “cessation” 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
perspective, preventative goals can seem outside the bounds of cessation-based 
discourses.  
Nevertheless, this study embraces the term “cessation” due, in part, to my 
perspective on the politics of genocide. Although specific genocides may end, the 
problem of genocidal violence transcends its particular iterations. This view of genocide 
treats genocide as an ongoing problem and thus subject to cessation appeals. From this 
vantage point, cessation is not only an appropriate term, it is a reflection of my 
philosophy on genocidal atrocity. The outlook on genocidal atrocity captured in this note 
is informed by the “post-liberal” perspective addressed at greater length in Chapter One.  
12 Michael Rothberg, Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in 
the Age of Decolonization (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009). This 
argument is unpacked in greater length on pages 122-123. 
13 O’Neill and Hinton, “Genocide, Truth, Memory,” 18. 
14 This includes borrowing from fictional narratives as well as Picart and Frank’s 
analysis of Holocaust films illustrates. Picart and Frank demonstrate the extent to which 
Holocaust films employ conventions of horror narratives. Picart and Frank, Frames of 
Evil. 
15 Torchin’s book aptly illustrates the way the meaning of the term “genocide” is 
produced through intertextual exchanges. See Leshu Torchin, Creating the Witness: 
Documenting Genocide on Film, Video, and the Internet (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2012), 216. 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
O’Neill and Hinton also use the idea of the genocidal imaginary, but their 
understanding of the “genocidal imaginary” is not exclusively focused on the role of 
popular culture and media texts in contributing to a public understanding of genocide. 
O’Neill and Hinton, “Genocide, Truth, Memory,” 11. 
17 Torchin, Creating the Witness, 94. Similarly, Ebbrecht writes, “Well-known 
images of Nazism and the Holocaust comprise a basic part of our cultural reservoir of 
representing atrocities.” Tobias Ebbrecht, “Migrating Images: Iconic Images of the 
Holocaust and the Representation of War in Popular Film,” Shofar: An Interdisciplinary 
Journal of Jewish Studies 28, no. 4 (2010): 90. In Baron’s words, “The extensive 
repository of Holocaust cinema furnishes audiences with iconic images of what genocide 
looks like and influences the ways narratives of other genocides get constructed by 
filmmakers.” Lawrence Baron, “Holocaust and Genocide Cinema: Crossing Disciplinary, 
Genre, and Geographical Borders: Editor’s Introduction,” Shofar: An Interdisciplinary 
Journal of Jewish Studies 28, no. 4 (2010): 3. 
18 Torchin, Creating the Witness, 94. 
19 In thinking of this repository as a “rhetorical resource,” I am reminded of 
Hariman and Lucaites’s arguments about the “vectors of influence” associated with 
iconic photographs. Hariman and Lucaites discuss such photos as “providing figural 
resources for communicative action.” In this capacity, the repository of genocide texts 
offers similar resources. Robert Hariman and John Louis Lucaites, No Caption Needed: 
Iconic Photographs, Public Culture, and Liberal Democracy (Chicago: University of 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Of course, other avenues exist for acquiring knowledge of the Holocaust or 
other genocides. Holocaust education programs are one example. However, this study is 
primarily interested in the significant role mediation and popular culture play in the 
acquisition of such knowledge.  
As Flanzbaum writes, “our knowledge of the Holocaust in America has rarely 
been delivered by direct witness; it comes to us by way of representations, and 
representations of representations, through editors and publishers, producers and 
directors.” Hilene Flanzbaum, “Introduction: The Americanization of the Holocaust,” in 
The Americanization of the Holocaust, ed. Hilene Flanzbaum (Baltimore, MD: John 
Hopkins Press, 1999), 4. 
21 Torchin, Creating the Witness, 216.  
Whereas I opt to centralize Torchin’s work in the ensuing analysis because 
Torchin takes genocide as her subject specifically, Wendy Hesford’s recent work also 
examines the role of visual rhetoric in the construction of human rights issues. Like 
Torchin, Hesford also accentuates the relationship between visual practices and the 
construction of our understanding of human rights abuses. See Wendy S. Hesford, 
Spectacular Rhetorics: Human Rights Visions, Recognitions, Feminisms (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 2011). 
22 Shandler’s case study is specifically about the mediation of Holocaust memory. 
With regards to the Holocaust, in contrast to places like Europe and Israel, where 
survivors abound, and the landscape itself bears the scars of these atrocities, “in America 
this subject [the Holocaust] has almost always been mediated through newspapers, 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
broadcasting.” Jeffrey Shandler, While America Watches: Televising the Holocaust (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1999), xv. 
His point about the importance of mediation to our knowledge of these events is 
corroborated by others like Barbie Zelizer, as she holds, “Through films, television, 
cultural artifacts, art, comic books, and photographs, the Holocaust’s visualization is so 
prevalent that it has become an integral part of our understanding and recollection of the 
atrocities of World War II. It is difficult to contemplate the Holocaust without traces of 
familiar visual images coming to mind.” Barbie Zelizer, “Introduction: On Visualizing 
the Holocaust,” in Visual Culture and the Holocaust, ed. Barbie Zelizer (Piscataway, NJ: 
Rutgers University Press, 2001), 1. 
Young similar notes how issues related to place change such representations. In 
particular, he develops this argument in relationship to the ways this changes American 
Holocaust memorialization. Because American memorials are not built upon the sites of 
Holocaust atrocities, “In this sense, American memorials seem to be anchored not so 
much in history as in the ideals that generated them in the first place.” James Young, 
“America’s Holocaust: Memory and the Politics of Identity,” in The Americanization of 
the Holocaust, ed. Hilene Flanzbaum (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins Press, 1999), 71. 
23 One significant strand within the literature on the mediation of genocide 
concerns the news media’s coverage of genocide. Numerous studies have been conducted 
on the news media’s framing of genocide, the frequency of the news media’s coverage of 
genocide, the role of the media in fueling genocide or the failure of news media to trigger 
intervention. For examples of such work, see Laurel Leff, Buried by the Times: The 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Press, 2005); Allan Thompson, ed., The Media and the Rwanda Genocide (London: Pluto 
Press, 2007); Lauren Kogen, “Why the Message Should Matter: Genocide and the Ethics 
of Global Journalism in the Mediapolis,” Journal of International Communication 15, no. 
2 (2009): 62-78; Chinedu Eke, “Darfur: Coverage of a Genocide by Three Major US TV 
Networks on their Evening News,” International Journal of Media & Cultural Politics 4, 
no. 3 (2008): 277-292; Emmanuel C. Alozie, “Voices in the Hills of Rwanda: African 
Press Accountability of the 1994 Pogrom,” International Communication Gazette 72, no. 
7 (2010): 589-617; Christine L. Kellow and H. Leslie Steeves, “The Role of Radio in the 
Rwandan Genocide,” Journal of Communication 48, no. 3 (1998): 107-128. 
24 Miriam Bratu Hansen, “Schindler’s List Is Not Shoah: The Second 
Commandment, Popular Modernism, and Public Memory,” Critical Inquiry 22, no. 2 
(1996): 310. Hansen regards the mass-mediated transmission of memory as a form of 
what Landsberg calls “prosthetic memory.” See Alison Landsberg, “America, the 
Holocaust, and the Mass Culture of Memory: Toward a Radical Politics of Empathy,” 
New German Critique 71 (1997): 63-86. 
25 These studies abound and are too numerous to exhaustively list. They include 
analyses of popular films, such as Hotel Rwanda or Schindler’s List; or analyses of 
particular forms of mediation. For examples of former, see Yosefa Loshitzky, ed., 
Spielberg’s Holocaust: Critical Perspectives on Schindler’s List (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1997); Ann-Marie Cook, “Based on the True Story: Cinema’s 
Mythologised Vision of the Rwandan Genocide,” in Promoting and Producing Evil, ed. 
Nancy Billias (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2010), 161-178. For examples of the latter, see 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
edited collection offers a great example of studies of genocide presented according to the 
various ways they are visually mediated. See Barbie Zelizer, ed., Visual Culture and the 
Holocaust (Piscataway, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2001). 
Multiple studies of Holocaust and genocide museums and memorials also exist, 
including numerous analyses of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. For 
example, see Marouf Hasian Jr. and Rulon Wood, “Critical Museology, (Post)Colonial 
Communication, and the Gradual Mastering of Traumatic Pasts at the Royal Museum for 
Central Africa (RMCA),” Western Journal of Communication 74, no. 2 (2010): 128-149; 
Marouf Hasian Jr., “Remembering and Forgetting the ‘Final Solution’: A Rhetorical 
Pilgrimage through the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum,” Critical Studies in Media 
Communication 21, no. 1 (2004) 64-92; Edward T. Linenthal, Preserving Memory: The 
Struggle to Create America’s Holocaust Museum (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2001); Theodore O. Prosise, “Prejudiced, Historical Witness, and Responsible: 
Collective Memory and Liminality in the Beit Hashoah Museum of Tolerance,” 
Communication Quarterly 51, no. 3 (2003): 351-366; James E. Young, “Introduction: 
The Texture of Memory,” in The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993). 
26 Oren Baruch Stier, Committed to Memory: Cultural Mediations of the 
Holocaust (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003), 1-2.  
27 In At Memory’s Edge: After-Images of the Holocaust in Contemporary Art and 
Architecture, Young holds that how knowledge or the memory of the Holocaust is 
transmitted is often as important to artists/architects born after the Shoah as the content 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
a key role for mediation in constituting memories of the Holocaust/genocide itself. James 
E. Young, At Memory’s Edge: After-Images of the Holocaust in Contemporary Art and 
Architecture (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), 2.  
28 Landsberg, “America, the Holocaust.”  
29 On the prevalence of Holocaust memory, see Alvin H. Rosenfeld, The End of 
the Holocaust (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011). On Holocaust memory as 
providing a framework for expressions of trauma, see Anne Rothe, Popular Trauma 
Culture: Selling the Pain of Others in the Mass Media (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press, 2011). 
30 Barbie Zelizer, Remembering to Forget: Holocaust Memory Through the 
Camera’s Eye (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 14, 141-2. Notably, the 
story of the evolution of Holocaust memory, and in particular, the role of the Holocaust 
in U.S. public memory, is presented in numerous work as various authors highlight the 
factors they argue contribute to the popularization of Holocaust memory. In addition to 
the works cited in the next few notes, see also MacDonald, Identity Politics; Linenthal, 
Preserving Memory; Leon A. Jick, “The Holocaust: its Use and Abuse within the 
American Public,” Yad Vashem Studies 14 (1981): 303-318. 
31 Baron, “The Holocaust.”  
32 Baron, using the work of Peter Novick, Alan Mintz, and Deborah Lipstadt 
(amongst others), argues that this is the predominant way of interpreting the status of 
Holocaust memory immediately after the end of World War II. Baron devotes his article 
to arguing against this interpretation, highlighting early forms of Holocaust memory. 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Holocaust Memory in America (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001); Deborah 
E. Lipstadt, “America and the Memory of the Holocaust,” Modern Judaism 16 (1996): 
195-215; Novick, The Holocaust. 
33 Baron, “The Holocaust,” 63.  
34 Mintz, Popular Culture, 5-9. 
35 Mintz, Popular Culture; Zelizer, Remembering to Forget; Novick, The 
Holocaust. Finkelstein locates the rise of Holocaust memory in a broader culture shift 
toward identity politics around this time. See Norman G. Finkelstein, The Holocaust 
Industry: Reflections on the Exploitation of Jewish Suffering, 2nd. ed. (London: Verso, 
2003), 32-38. 
36 Mintz, Popular Culture, 10. Mintz’s list of the contextual factors that 
contributed to the popularization of Holocaust memory should be nuanced with a 
consideration of Lipstadt and Baron’s contentions regarding the presence of earlier 
markers of Holocaust memory. See Baron, “The Holocaust;” Lipstadt, “America.” 
37 This idea of a 1990s “Holocaust consciousness” is derived from Novick’s work, 
which opens by questioning “how Americans became so ‘Holocaust conscious’” toward 
the end of the twentieth century. Both Novick and Steinweis treat the 1990s as a unique 
moment in the evolution of Holocaust history, and this boom in Holocaust awareness 
becomes the curiosity that drives Novick’s study. Intriguingly, both Novick and 
Steinweis anticipate the memory of the Holocaust declining after the 1990s. See Novick, 
The Holocaust, 1; Alan E. Steinweis, “The Auschwitz Analogy: Holocaust Memory and 
American Debates over Intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s,” Holocaust and 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Novick, The Holocaust, 1.  
39 Mintz, Popular Culture, 4. In supporting this assertion, Mintz turns to the 
numerous museums, books, video testimonies, and of course, the “profitable and high-
profile film and television projects” on the Holocaust. Similarly Lipstadt affirms, “To say 
that the Holocaust has become a central symbol of the twentieth century, particularly for 
American Jews, is to state the obvious.” See Lipstadt, “America,” 195.  
40 Zelizer, Remembering to Forget, 14, 142.  
41 Torchin, Creating the Witness, 16.  
42 This controversy was the byproduct of a decision PBS made to offer a follow-
up program which would feature viewpoints contesting the nature of the genocide. Some 
perceived this as fueling contestations over genocide denial. Michael Getler, “Coming 
Soon to Viewers Like You: ‘The Armenian Genocide,’” PBS Ombudsman Column, 
March 17, 2006, accessed May 22, 2011, 
http://www.pbs.org/ombudsman/2006/03/coming_soon_to_viewers_like_you_the_armen
ian.html; “The Armenian Genocide,” Two Cats Productions, accessed May 22, 2011, 
http://www.twocatstv.com/armenian-genocide/. 
43 “Welcome to the Future Home of the Armenian Genocide Museum of 
American,” Armenian Genocide Museum of America, accessed March 31, 2011, 
http://www.armeniangenocidemuseum.org/. 
44 Markovitz offers a nuanced critique of Ararat, which explains how the film is 
able to both impart some information about the genocide and, more importantly, advance 
a critique about the difficulty of mediating genocide memory. Markovitz notes that if the 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
a failure. The film only provided limited glimpses into the atrocities and does not develop 
a very sophisticated historical context. Worse, the footage that is contained within the 
film within the film is hyperbolic and lacks needed nuance. However, Markovitz argues 
the film’s merit lies in spotlighting the conventions of mediation while at the same time 
securing the Armenian genocide some much needed publicity.  See Jonathan Markovitz, 
“Ararat and Collective Memories of the Armenian Genocide,” Holocaust and Genocide 
Studies 20, no. 2 (2006): 235-55. 
45 Ararat, DVD, directed by Atom Egoyan (Mirimax, 2002). 
46 Toby Haggith and Joanna Newman, ed. Holocaust and the Moving Image: 
Representations in Film and Television Since 1933 (London: Wallflower Press, 2005); 
Shandler, While America Watches. 
47 For an extensive listing of Holocaust organizations, see “Geographical Index of 
Member Organizations,” Association of Holocaust Organizations, accessed May 22, 
2011, http://www.ahoinfo.org/membersdirectory.html. 
48 This summary of USHMM contents is derived from the author’s first-hand 
experience touring the USHMM’s permanent exhibition and special exhibition, “Deadly 
Medicine: Creating the Master Race.” It is also supplemented with recourse to the 
USHMM’s Holocaust Encyclopedia. See “The Holocaust,” United States Holocaust 
Memorial Museum’s Holocaust Encyclopedia, January 6 2011, accessed May 22, 2011, 
http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/?ModuleId=10005143. 
49 For a detailed exploration and critique of the MoMA exhibition see Rachel 
Hughes, “The Abject Artefacts of Memory: Photographs from Cambodia’s Genocide,” 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 The Killing Fields, DVD, directed by Roland Joffé (Warner Brothers, 1984). 
51 Hotel Rwanda, DVD, directed by Terry George (MGM Home Entertainment, 
2005).  
52 Welcome to Sarajevo, DVD, directed by Michael Winterbottom (Burbank, CA: 
Buena Vista Home Entertainment, 1997). 
53  Darfur Is Dying, “About the Game,” Darfur Digital Activist, 2009 
http://www.darfurisdying.com/aboutgame.html (accessed May 22, 2011); Alex de Waal, 
“War Games: The West’s Response to Darfur Reveals More About Its Own Agenda than 
the Reality of the Crisis,” Index on Censorship 36, no. 4 (2007): 6-11. 
54 The Devil Came on Horseback, DVD, directed by Ricki Stern and Anne 
Sundberg (New York: Break Thru Films, 2007). 
55 Torchin, Creating the Witness, 16.  
56 Baron, “Holocaust and Genocide Cinema,” 3. 
57 Baron, “Holocaust and Genocide Cinema;” Torchin, Creating the Witness, 94, 
98. See also Ebbrecht, “Migrating Images.” For a pessimistic assessment of Holocaust 
representation, see Omer Bartov, Murder in Our Midst: The Holocaust, Industrial 
Killing, and Representation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
58 Baron, “Holocaust and Genocide Cinema,” 3. 
59 LaCapra connects Holocaust representations to Bourdieu’s “symbolic capital.” 
Dominick LaCapra, Representing the Holocaust: History, Theory, Trauma (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1994), 63. See also Charles L. Briggs, “Introduction: The 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
414; Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, ed. John B. Thompson, trans. Gino 
Raymond and Matthew Adamson (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991). 
60 See, for example, Rosenfeld, The End. 
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perspectives on genocide (see Chapter One), which undoubtedly influence my outlook on 
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108 Murray Edelman, Constructing the Political Spectacle (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1988), 120. 
109 Edelman, Constructing, 12. 
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Memory,” 13, 21. 
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account for television’s particular modes of meaning and subject production, while 
recognizing that this productivity occurs in a broader context of social-cultural practices 
and activities.” See Mimi White, Tele-advising: Therapeutic Discourse in American 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 Departing from Anderson’s notion of the “imagined community,” both Hartley 
and Hariman and Lucaites suggest the ways the media shapes understandings of the polis. 
Hartley, in The Politics of Pictures, argues that “the public” only exists in texts, 
specifically, pictures or images. Noting that the bounds of the ancient Greek polis were 
delineated based upon the number of people that could be sighted at one time, Hartley 
argues the ways we come to see and understand “the public” today are no longer 
contingent upon how many people can literally be apprehended in a single glance but 
upon the image of the public conveyed through mediated texts. See Benedict Anderson, 
Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, rev. ed. 
(1983; London: Verso, 2006); John Hartley, The Politics of Pictures: The Creation of the 
Public in the Age of Popular Media (London: Routledge, 1992); Hariman and Lucaites, 
No Caption Needed. 
153 For more on the construction of leaders and enemies, see Edelman, 
Constructing, 37-89. Hariman and Lucaites’ description of the “individual aggregate” 
illuminates the role of the individual in media texts. See Hariman and Lucaites, No 
Caption Needed, 88-89. Finally, for an example of a study highlighting a key political 
agent (the President), see also Trevor Parry-Giles and Shawn J. Parry-Giles, The Prime-
Time Presidency: The West Wing and U.S. Nationalism (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 2006). 
154 Hariman and Lucaites, No Caption Needed, 12. In building to this argument, 
Hariman and Lucaites are drawing on the work of Warner and Kaplan. They credit 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2002), 74-76; Louis Kaplan, American Exposures: Photography and Community in the 
Twentieth Century (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), xv. 
155 Notably, this study’s view of citizenship is influenced by the discursive theory 
of citizenship advanced by Robert Asen. Citizenship, according to Asen, is more than a 
traditional set of explicitly acknowledged civic acts – voting, petitioning, running for 
office, etc. Rather, citizenship is situated “as a mode of public engagement.” Citizenship 
exists, then, not exclusively “in the halls of Congress or in the voting booth, but in 
everyday enactments of citizenship.” See Robert Asen, “A Discourse Theory of 
Citizenship,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 90, no. 2 (2004): 191, 197. [italics in the 
original] 
 Such a view on citizenship creates space to recognize the importance of media in 
shaping conceptions of citizenship. As McGovern in his study of consumptive citizenship 
notes, “[c]itizenship does not depend on laws alone, as many scholars have noted. The 
law defines political status, but customs, beliefs and the material world all shape 
affiliation and meaning. It is indeed in culture -- in symbols, language, rituals, and forms 
of expression -- that nationality is made and redefined.” See Charles F. McGovern, Sold 
American: Consumption and Citizenship, 1890-1945 (Chapel Hill: The University of 
North Carolina Press, 2006), 9.  Luke, attentive to the construction of civic identities 
within museums, similarly affirms, “[c]reating citizens is, to a significant degree, a 
process of institutionally organized impersonation….Putting such systems of 
acculturation out at public museum sites may push and pull individual members of their 
audiences to impersonate the values assigned to their images.” See Timothy W. Luke, 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2002), 13. Finally, Hariman and Lucaites, again following on the heels of work by 
Warner and Kaplan, explicitly identify this function of the media in arguing that iconic 
photos provide “model[s] for civic life.” See Hariman and Luciates, No Caption Needed, 
11. 
156 In brief, debate over the media’s progressive potential engages a number of 
critical concerns. Among the factors thought to undermine the media’s ability to serve as 
a vehicle for social and political change, scholars have listed: the media’s close 
connection to the capitalist system of production (thus no critique can ever be so radical 
as to overhaul the system the media depends on), its capitulation to the “mainstream” 
(another byproduct of the market model), the “passivity” of spectatorship, and the 
proclivity to couch all stories in past stories, making the framing inherently conservative. 
For a fuller explanation of these attributes, see the work of: George Gerbner and Larry 
Gross, “Living with Television: The Violence Profile,” Journal of Communication 26, no. 
2 (1976): 172-199; Larry Gross, “Out of the Mainstream: Sexual Minorities and the Mass 
Media,” in Media and Cultural Studies: Key Works, ed. Meenakshi Gigi Durham and 
Douglas M. Kellner (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), 405-423; Shawn J. 
Parry-Giles and Trevor Parry-Giles, “Fahrenheit 9/11—Virtual Realism and the Limits 
of Commodified Dissent,” in The Rhetoric of the New Political Documentary, ed. 
Thomas W. Benson and Brian J. Snee (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 
2008), 24-53; Carolyn Kitch, “‘A Death in the American Family’: Myth, Memory, and 
National Values in the Media Mourning of John F. Kennedy, Jr.,” Journalism & Mass 
Communication Quarterly 79, no. 2 (2002): 304-305; Stuart Hall, Chas Critcher, Tony 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Law and Order (Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillian, 1978), 54; Darrell Y. Hamamoto, 
Nervous Laughter: Television Situation Comedy and Liberal Democratic Ideology (New 
York, Praeger, 1989); Tuchman, “Introduction;” Roderick P. Hart, Seducing America: 
How Television Charms the Modern Voter (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). 
For case studies on the ways progressive representations of women, the feminist 
movement, and the GLBTQI movement are undermined through mediated 
representations, see Margaret J. Heide, Television Culture and Women’s Lives: 
thirtysomething and the Contradictions of Gender (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1995); Bonnie J. Dow, Prime-Time Feminism: Television, Media 
Culture, and the Women’s Movement Since 1970 (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1996); Bonnie J. Dow, “Fixing Feminism: Women’s Liberation and 
the Rhetoric of Television Documentary,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 90, no. 1 (2004): 
53-80; Dana L. Cloud, “The First Lady’s Privates: Queering Eleanor Roosevelt for Public 
Address Studies,” in Queering Public Address: Sexualities in American Historical 
Discourse, ed. Charles E. Morris III (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 
2007), 23-44; Bonnie J. Dow, “Ellen, Television, and the Politics of Gay and Lesbian 
Visibility,” Critical Studies in Media Communication 18, no. 2 (2001): 123-140; Charles 
E. Morris III and John M. Sloop, “‘What Lips These Lips Have Kissed’: Refiguring the 
Politics of Queer Public Kissing,” Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies 3, no. 1 
(2006): 1-26. Morris and Sloop attribute some of this conservative function to the process 
of “claw back” identified in Fiske and Hartley’s work. John Fiske and John Hartley, 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 Martin J. Medhurst and Thomas W. Benson, “Introduction: Rhetorical Studies 
in a Media Age,” in Rhetorical Dimensions in Media: A Critical Casebook, ed. Martin J. 
Medhurst and Thomas W. Benson (Dubuque, IA: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 
1984), xviii. 
158 See, for example, the perspective on the media contained in Max Horkheimer 
and Theodor W. Adorno, “The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception,” in 
Media and Cultural Studies: Key Works, ed. Meenakshi Gigi Durham and Douglas M. 
Kellner, rev. ed. (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing 2006), 41-72. 
159 Medhurst and Benson, “Introduction,” x; Dow, Prime-Time Feminism, xxiii, 8-
9.  
160 See George Lipsitz, “Listening to Learn and Learning to Listen:  Popular 
Culture, Cultural Theory, and American Studies,” American Quarterly 42, no. 4 (1990): 
615- 636; Richard Johnson, “What is Cultural Studies Anyway?” Social Text 16 (Winter 
1986/87): 38-80; Stuart Hall, “Notes on Deconstructing ‘the Popular,’” in Cultural 
Resistance Reader, ed. Stephen Duncombe (New York: Verso, 2002), 185-192; Norma 
Schulman, “Conditions of their Own Making: An Intellectual History of the Centre for 
Contemporary Cultural Studies at the University of Birmingham,” Canadian Journal of 
Communication 18, no. 1 (1993), http://www.cjc-
online.ca/index.php/journal/article/viewArticle/717; John M. Sloop and Mark Olson, 
“Cultural Struggle: A Politics of Meaning in Rhetorical Studies,” in At the Intersection: 
Cultural Studies and Rhetorical Studies, ed. Thomas Rosteck (New York: The Guilford 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 Schulman, “Conditions of Their Own Making,” under “Putting Cultural 
Studies on the Intellectual Map.”  
162 See Thomas Rosteck, “Form and Cultural Context In Rhetorical Criticism: Re-
Reading Wrage,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 84, no. 4 (1998): 475. Rosteck aspires that 
“[t]his impulse [cultural rhetoric] suggests a way to maintain the integrity of the concrete 
textual performance, while at the same time, to consider how ideology is materialized in 
textuality, and to position the nondiscursive background to surround and inform the 
analysis of the text.” Rosteck, “Form and Cultural Context,” 484. 
163 Rosteck argues that this is the position implicit in Wrage’s work. See Rosteck, 
“Form and Cultural Context,” 483. Notably, this seems to mimic the idea Johnson holds 
of the humanities as cultural studies “writ small” as he conceives of humanities as 
“cultural studies in embryo.” See Johnson, “What is Cultural Studies?” 59. 
164 Rosteck, “Form and Cultural Context,” 476.  
165 Rosteck, “Form and Cultural Context,” 476-477.  
166 Sloop & Olson, “Cultural Struggle,” 256; See also Thomas Rosteck, 
“Introduction: Approaching the Intersection: Issues of Identity, Politics, and Critical 
Practice,” in At the Intersection: Cultural Studies and Rhetorical Studies, ed. Thomas 
Rosteck (New York: The Guilford Press, 1999), 1-23. 
167 In At the Intersections, numerous scholars debate the appropriate relationship 
between cultural studies and rhetorical studies, with some advancing arguments that 
thoroughly conflating the two dilutes cultural studies’ commitment to politics and 
potentially overextends rhetoric, forcing it to venture into political territories that may not 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and Olson, “Cultural Struggle,” and Rosteck, “Introduction,” rehearse these critiques. 
168 Rosteck’s review of Turner’s book highlights some of the issues regarding 
ideological determinism, and he concludes by touching upon the consequences of 
embracing a “cultural studies” conception of ideology (nuancing the question of agency 
in his notes). See Thomas Rosteck, “Cultural Studies and Rhetorical Studies,” Quarterly 
Journal of Speech 81, no. 3 (1995): 389, 397, 402n19. See also Turner’s elaboration upon 
the “problems” posed by ideology and cultural studies’ responses to such complications. 
Graeme Turner, “Ideology,” in British Cultural Studies: An Introduction, 3rd ed. 
(London: Routledge, 2003), 166-195. 
169 Philip Wander, “The Ideological Turn in Modern Criticism,” Central States 
Speech Journal 34, no. 1 (1983): 1, 15. 
170 Alternatively, “the ideology of ideology thus recognizes, despite its imaginary 
distortion, that the ‘ideas’ of a human subject exist in his actions.” Louis Althusser, 
“Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Towards an Investigation)” in Media 
and Cultural Studies: Key Works, ed. Meenakshi Gigi Durham and Douglas M. Kellner, 
rev. ed. (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing 2006), 83. 
171 This idea of “ideology” as a system of thought is derived from my reading of 
Fontana who sees “ideology” in Gramsci’s work as “a system of beliefs.” Quoting at 
length from Fontana: “What this means is that hegemony describes the ways and methods 
by which consent is generated and organized, which, in turn, is directly related to the 
mechanisms and processes by which knowledge and beliefs are first, produced, and 
second, disseminated. Here the crux is the formation of a ‘conception of the world’ and 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
system of beliefs) is always opposed to differing conceptions of the world, so they are 
constantly in conflict, in a ‘battle’ against each other. The hegemonic conception is one 
that has become the ‘common sense’ of the people (Gramsci 1975, 1236, 1493). But a 
counterconception is constantly generated, even if only embryonically, to challenge the 
prevailing common sense.” See Benedetto Fontana, “The Democratic Philosopher: 
Rhetoric as Hegemony in Gramsci,” Italian Culture 23 (2005): 98. 
172 In explaining their case study, the authors of Policing the Crisis explain, “And 
this dominance [the dominance of the ideology they are studying], and its claims to 
general representativeness, are connected. It is dominant because it appears to be able to 
catch up quite contradictory life and class experiences within its master framework. 
Ideologies are easier to understand when they seem, within their own logic, to reflect or 
adequately correspond to the experiences, positions and interests of those who hold them.” 
Hall and others, Policing the Crisis, 140. [italics in the original] 
173 Dana L. Cloud, “The Matrix and Critical Theory’s Desertion of the Real,” 
Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies 3, no. 4 (2006): 329-354; Will Tregoning, 
“Authentic Self, Paranoid Critique and Getting a Good Night’s Rest,” Continuum: 
Journal of Media & Cultural Studies 20, no. 2 (2006): 175-188. 
174 In conceptualizing ideology, I subscribe to Radway’s belief about ideology as 
a “patchwork quilt.” She holds “no ideology is a simple, uniform, organic thing.” Thus, 
“[a]s a consequence, when two such practices intersect, as they invariably must, because 
the institutions within which they are situated themselves come into contact, their point of 
connection is often characterized by a seam, their joining is imperfect. Ideology is, 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
others are contradictory and even mutually interactive.” The critic’s job then becomes “to 
identify the seams” which enables “us to expose the ways in which the fit between 
ideological practices is not perfect.” See Janice A. Radway, “Identifying Ideological 
Seams: Mass Culture, Analytical Method, and Political Practice,” Communication 9, no. 
1 (1986): 109, 108, 109, 110. 
175 Regarding audiences, Rosteck states, from some perspectives, “rhetoricians 
have traditionally invested in the idea of a dominant text and the single ‘master’ reading, 
while cultural studies more likely emphasized the affirmative power of readers over 
textuality.” He argues this is a caricature of the two perspectives but affirms cultural 
studies’ investment in audiences. See Rosteck, “Introduction,” 18. 
176 Lipsitz and Hall note the salience of the popular. As Lipsitz states, “Popular 
culture intervenes in the construction of individual and group identity more than ever 
before. Presidents win popularity by quoting from Hollywood films (‘make my day,’ 
‘read my lips’), while serious political issues such as homelessness and hunger seem to 
enter public consciousness most fully when acknowledged by popular musicians or in 
made-for television movies.” Lipsitz, “Listening to Learn,” 360. 
Justifying his attention to the subject, Hall holds, “Popular culture is one of the 
sites where this struggle for and against a culture of the powerful is engaged: it is also the 
stake to be won or lost in that struggle. It is the arena of consent and resistance. It is 
partly where hegemony arises, and where it is secured....That is why ‘popular culture’ 
matters. Otherwise, to tell you the truth, I don’t give a damn about it.” Hall, “Notes on 
Deconstructing,” 192. 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178 Although this study employs a cultural studies vocabulary in elevating 
Barthes’s concept of exnomination, a variety of critics have interrogated the power 
dynamics surrounding silences and absences in texts and communication processes. From 
a rhetorical perspective, this study is indebted to and draws heavily on the work of 
Charles E. Morris and Morris’s critiques of the ideological functions of silence. See 
Charles E. Morris III, “Passing by Proxy: Collusive and Convulsive Silence in the Trial 
of Leopold and Loeb,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 91, no. 3 (2005): 264-290; Charles E. 
Morris III, “Pink Herring & The Fourth Persona: J. Edgar Hoover’s Sex Crime Panic,” 
Quarterly Journal of Speech 88, no. 2 (2002): 228-244. See also Robin Patric Clair, 
Organizing Silence: A World of Possibilities (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1998); Cheryl Glenn, Unspoken: A Rhetoric of Silence (Carbondale: Southern 
Illinois University Press, 2004); Adam Jaworski, ed. Silence: Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1997).  
From a different perspective, these silences could also be explored through 
attention to the limits of rhetoric. For an excellent exploration of the capacity and 
limitations of human rights discourse, see Erik Doxtader, “The Rhetorical Question of 
Human Rights – A Preface,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 96, no. 4 (2010): 353-379. 
179 Roland Barthes, Mythologies, trans. Annette Lavers (1957; New York: Hill 
and Wang, 1972), 137-139. 
180 John Fiske, Television Culture (1987; New York: Routledge, 2006), 42-43. 
181 Fiske, Television Culture, 43. See also Fiske, Television Culture, 290. 
182 This study’s use of “rhetorical intimation” is inspired by Morris’s discussion of 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Proxy,” 267. More specifically, Morris uses the words of D.A. Miller to describe the 
ways through which the unnamed can be intimated. See D.A. Miller, The Novel and the 
Police (Berkeley: University of California, 1988), 194.  
183 As Barthes explains, technically the bourgeoisie can be discussed but it 
attenuates the very language used to reference itself. See Barthes, Mythologies, 138. 
Fiske, Television Culture, 43. 
Again, although I primarily choose to use the language of intimation and related 
terms such as “hint” or “gesture,” Ray’s exploration of “double-voicedness” offers yet 
another vehicle for interrogating the presence of competing narratives and ambivalences 
in textual practice. See Angela G. Ray, “‘In My Own Hand Writing’: Benjamin Banneker 
Addresses the Slaveholder of Monticello,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 1, no. 3 (1998): 
387-405. 
184 In much the same way that silences are of interest to rhetorical scholars, a 
broader body of work probes the role of speech and silence in Holocaust and genocide 
studies. For examples, see Ruth Wajnryb, The Silence: How Tragedy Shapes Talk (Crows 
Nest, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 2001); Sara R. Horowitz, Voicing the Void: Muteness 
and Memory in Holocaust Fiction (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997); 
George Steiner, Language and Silence: Essays on Language, Literature, and the 
Inhuman (New York: Athenum, 1967).  
185 See the discussion on page 282 and note 38 in Chapter Three. Lawrence 
Baron, “Holocaust and Genocide Cinema,” 4. Bartov, Murder in Our Midst, 168-171. 
186 The two example narratives I provide in this paragraph are rooted in differing 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
story that is more closely linked to “liberal” approaches to genocide, and the latter 
gestures toward “post-liberal” narratives. These terms, derived from the work of A. Dirk 
Moses, are introduced and explained in Chapter One.  
187 Fiske, Television Culture, 43. See also Fiske, Television Culture, 290. 
188 In this way, I engage with and then expand upon Brown’s reading of the 
Museum of Tolerance. As is explained in greater detail in Chapter Three, Brown also 
attends to the balance of power between the state and the public in the Museum of 
Tolerance; however, her broader concern pertains to what such arguments mean for 
rhetorics of tolerance. In this context of this study, I suggest that these tensions resonate 
and are consistent with similar anxieties that percolate throughout messaging on genocide 
in popular culture. See Wendy Brown, Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of 






Tensions Surrounding Definition, Representation, Resolution, and Remembrance in 
Holocaust and Genocide Studies 
 
Lemkin’s moment of rhetorical invention proved to be a wellspring for debate 
over the legal definition of genocide. Lemkin’s efforts to have the concept codified in 
international law incited controversy within the UN over the precise wording of the 
Convention text.1  Narratives surrounding the drafting of the Convention accentuate the 
USSR’s concern over the description of genocide victim groups.  As Makino explains, 
the USSR “wanted the concept of genocide to be exclusively related to Nazi crimes,” 
thus limiting the scope and reach of the Genocide Convention.2 During the debates over 
the Convention text, the USSR advocated for the exclusion of “political groups” from the 
UN’s definition of genocide.3 Moves to broaden the description of the victims protected 
by the Convention text would expand the power of other countries to intervene in a 
state’s domestic politics, in turn diminishing that state’s sovereignty. Kuper describes the 
prospect of “the inclusion of political groups in the Convention” as provoking “anxiety” 
precisely because such inclusion “would expose nations to external interference in their 
internal affairs.”4 In other words, these early attempts to legally define and demarcate 
“genocide” incited apprehensiveness among UN member states over their authority and 
agency to manage affairs within their territories and to police atrocities abroad.5 
After multiple drafts and revisions, Lemkin’s concept was ensconced in 
international law through the 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The Convention text defines genocide as follows: 
Article II: In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following 





ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to 
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.6 
This definition is the legal touchstone to which numerous scholarly discussions of 
genocide refer given the definition’s juridical power. Under the Convention, crimes 
meeting the specifications for genocide would demand the action of the Convention’s 
signatories.7 The UN definition consequently takes on enhanced significance because of 
its clear ties to genocide intervention and prevention politics.8 
 Although the UN Convention may set the legal benchmarks for international 
action, numerous scholars argue that the UN definition suffers from substantial flaws.9 
For example, a key part of the UN’s definition is the “intent to destroy,” which creates 
the additional burden of proving intent before a genocide can be named and recognized.10 
Due to the USSR’s successful advocacy,11 political groups are also not protected under 
the UN Convention; ergo, genocidal situations can be reclassified as “political conflicts,” 
and such conflicts would not be protected under this definition.12 Further, cultural 
genocide, a critical part of Lemkin’s original conception of the term, is excluded 
entirely.13 Cultural genocide, which pertains to the destruction of a group’s way of life or 
expression of cultural identity,14 “has . . . always been thought of as part of the crime.”15  





of genocide may differ widely, on one point there is consensus: its uselessness.”16 
Despite Lemkin’s hopes for the adoption of the term, many scholars express frustration 
over the UN’s legal conception of genocide. 
 The perceived “failure” of the UN’s attempts to define genocide highlights a 
central set of paradoxes in Holocaust and genocide studies related to state authority and 
public agency. Early trepidation and anxiety surrounding the drafting of the UN 
Convention text extends into a broader ambivalence about the role of the state in the 
politics of genocide and genocide cessation. The tension at the core of this ambivalence is 
linked to what Hesford identifies “as the fundamental paradox of international human 
rights law, namely its dependency on the sovereignty of nation-states for its 
implementation.”17 As applied to genocide studies, Hinton echoes Hesford’s language in 
arguing that “[t]he paradox of genocide lies in the fact that the very state that is supposed 
to prevent genocide is usually the perpetrator.”18 The nation-state and state authority are 
implicated as genocidal causal factors as well as key components of genocide cessation. 
The state is often empowered within proposals to end genocide yet state sovereignty is 
commonly discussed as a major hindrance to genocide cessation. These contradictions 
lend the politics of genocide and genocide cessation a “schizophrenic” feel as Levene 
alleges that nation-states are put in the position of adjudicating the forms of political 
force on which they too rely or have relied historically.19 Furthermore, this focus on the 
state threatens to occlude a role for public agency in matters of genocide cessation. To the 
extent that state actors become the primary actors in genocide cessation, the broader 
public is seemingly disenfranchised from genocide cessation work. 





incompatible assessments of the role of state authority and public agency in the 
definition, representation, resolution, and remembrance of genocidal atrocity. Although 
there are numerous fault lines in the debates surrounding each of these four arenas, the 
relationships among state authority, public agency, and genocidal violence are prominent 
points of contention. At the level of definition, debates surrounding the applicability of 
the term “genocide” invariably reflect competing causal philosophies. Such causal 
philosophies in turn have the potential to implicate state authority in inciting violence. 
Representation controversies centralize questions pertaining to the authority and agency 
of the rhetor amid numerous contestations over the ineffability of atrocity and the 
sufficiency of the styles and genres selected to depict such horrors. Like definitional 
discourses, discussions of resolutions hinge upon arguments about the authority of the 
nation-state in aiding or stymieing genocide cessation while also prompting extended 
discussions about the public’s agency to help end genocide. Lastly, recent considerations 
of the politics of genocide memory critique and challenge the links among collective 
memories, popular power, and the nation-state. The scholarly debates in each of these 
four arenas punctuate a sense of ambivalence regarding the interrelationships among the 
state, the public, and genocide.  
 In what follows, I centralize key tensions within Holocaust and genocide studies 
pertaining to each of the four aforementioned arenas: definition, representation, 
resolution, and remembrance. Each section serves dual purposes. First, the chapter will 
outline the range of voices and perspectives on genocide definitions, representations, 
resolutions, and remembrances that will provide the backdrop for the assessments of 





in this study reflect variances on scholarly responses to each of these four questions. 
Second, this chapter will survey the debates in Holocaust and genocide studies on matters 
of agency and authority in particular as a means to advance the examination of those 
arguments related to the constructions of the nation-state and the public in genocide 
research. In the conclusion, I address the relationship between academic and popular 
forms of genocide cessation discourse. 
Questions of Definition: Applicability and Causality 
In the seventy years since the term “genocide” entered the public vernacular, the 
concept, as well as the atrocities the concept represents, has incited considerable 
academic debate. As the contestations over the UN Convention suggest, the symbolic and 
juridical power of the term contributes to the potency of the debates over the term’s 
meaning and usage. Chorbajian asserts that, “[o]ne of the most controversial issues 
concerning genocide is its very definition because the role of the state, [and] 
intentionality…are implicated.”20 These controversies manifest in a variety of ways, from 
disputes over the application of the definition to calls that the use of the word “genocide” 
be abandoned altogether. Perhaps the most heated contestations question whether 
indigenous atrocities warrant the appellation “genocide.” As Moses’s work reveals, the 
intensity of these application debates emerges from competing causal philosophies.  A 
closer examination of the range of causal hypotheses in Holocaust and genocide studies 
illuminates wildly divergent understandings of the influence of state authority and 
popular agency in causing genocidal violence. 





 The aforementioned complications surrounding the UN Convention represent 
only one dimension of the definitional debates; applying the term to actual atrocities has 
proven to be an equally daunting task.21 Examples of “genocide” have included (or 
excluded) a wide variety of mass atrocities.  Although the Holocaust is commonly 
recognized as a genocide,22 numerous other catastrophes have been denied that 
designation by key international bodies or nation-states, accentuating the politicized 
nature of the term’s application. For example, the Armenian genocide still vies for 
recognition from the government of Turkey, which continues to deny that the 1915 
massacre was a genocide.23 The barbarities in Darfur in 2003-2004 were recognized by 
the US government as “genocide” but not by other bodies including the UN and Amnesty 
International.24  Others have charged that the term should also be applied to a host of 
additional violent actions, including, for example, the US slaughter of its Native 
American population,25 the US bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki,26 the Soviet 
Union’s “man-made famine” in the Ukraine, Britain’s bombing of Dresden, the US 
conflict in Vietnam, and Germany’s extermination of the Herero in Namibia.27 Such 
disputes over the term’s application contribute to conceptual confusion, which ultimately 
inhibits preventive or intervening acts given that the UN Convention only requires 
nations to take action if the crime receives a classification of “genocide.”28  
Variance in application has fueled a cynicism over a perceived “weightlessness” 
or “meaninglessness” of the term, culminating in calls to abandon the use of the word 
entirely. Makino builds on his earlier criticism of the UN Convention’s definition of 
genocide to suggest that “the UN Genocide Convention has ‘prevented’ as many 





capacity, the UN definition may be better at stopping the use of the word “genocide” than 
stopping the act itself. Due to the aforementioned expectations linking word usage and 
action, state actors tend to be particularly cautious about employing the term “genocide.” 
As occurred most famously during the Clinton administration’s mishandling of the 
Rwandan genocide, state officials avoid use of the “g-word” by finding other ways to 
decry barbarities without obligating themselves to act.30 The State Department was 
criticized by many for their reluctance to call the situation in Rwanda genocide. Brunk 
argues that the memory of this incident contributed to “the pressure to deploy the term in 
reference to Darfur.”31  However, the use of the term to describe the political situation in 
Darfur was perceived by Smith and Pipa as satiating a domestic desire for the recognition 
of the Darfurian atrocities without signaling a US commitment to action. Although the 
term was employed, the label alone took the place of additional action.32 Such historical 
incidents surrounding the genocides in Rwanda and Darfur suggest that the definition 
plays a meager (if any) role in genocide prevention.  Instead of aiding in genocide 
cessation, Chomsky and Herman and Peterson argue that the word “genocide” assumes 
its symbolic currency as a political tool serving Western interests. Regardless of the 
material circumstances, the use of the term becomes a means of vilifying some political 
actors and legitimating intervention into a targeted nation-state’s affairs.33 This perceived 
abuse of the term leads Chomsky to recommend abandoning the term “genocide” until it 
is used with “honesty and integrity.”34 
Perhaps the most heated definitional debates surround questions of indigenous 
atrocities.35  Such debates correspond with what Rothberg terms the “colonial turn in 





relationship between genocide and colonialism, perceptive thinkers and writers have long 
noted these connections, particularly in the early post-World War II period.37 The authors 
of Colonialism and Genocide charge that Lemkin conceptualized “genocide as an 
intrinsically colonial phenomena.”38 Although the two terms are not synonymous, Moses 
and Stone argue that they are nevertheless “profoundly connected;”39 numerous scholars 
have attempted to puzzle through the nature of those connections.40 These analyses 
function as particularly rich sites for the examination of definitional controversies as they 
reflect divergent assumptions about the links between state authority and violence.41 
Moses attributes the ideological “stalemate” over whether or not indigenous 
atrocities should be termed “genocide” to competing causal philosophies.42 As Moses 
explains, at issue in these contestations is “the definition of ‘genocide’ itself,” with 
differences resulting from “how one defines the term, conceptualizes exterminatory 
intention and locates the agent that can possess it.”43 Moses contends that existing work 
on the relationships among the Holocaust, genocide, and colonialism can be discussed as 
falling under two broad headings: the “liberal” interpretation and the “post-liberal” 
interpretation. The liberal approach features a prominent role for agency, in particular the 
agency of the nation-state.44 It provides a framework that underscores the importance of 
determining a “genocidal intention” and emphasizes “the agency of the perpetrator and its 
exterminatory mens rea.”45 Furthermore, liberal theories tend to support proponents of 
the uniqueness thesis (discussed in the Introduction). Accordingly, a correspondence 
exists between individuals who hold that the Holocaust is unique and individuals who are 
also inclined to deny that indigenous atrocities constitute genocidal slaughter; both camps 





The “post-liberal” perspective, by contrast, shifts its focus from state actors to 
look at the influence exerted by socio-political and economic structures. In Moses’s 
words, “it emphasizes the structural determinants of policy development as well as the 
social forces in civil society that precipitate mass death.”47 Concomitantly, this structural 
orientation to the study of genocide tends to leave underdeveloped the operation of 
human agency, “dispers[ing] [the] centralized exterminatory intention and agency” 
central to the liberal approach.48 The post-liberal perspective tends to undergird 
arguments advancing claims about the genocidal nature of colonial or imperialistic 
behavior.49  
Moses’s description of the “liberal” and “post-liberal” orientations to genocide 
provides a useful schemata for making sense of the diverse and highly interdisciplinary 
work that has been done under the auspices of Holocaust and genocide studies.50  His 
argument connects definitional debates to substantive differences in causal philosophies 
and charts them in accordance with their divergent emphases on state authority and 
agency. Thusly, Moses’s work encourages the interrogation of the epistemological 
assumptions about authority and agency, which inevitably shape definitional debates as 
they manifest in both scholarly literature and in the popular culture texts assessed in the 
chapters that follow.  
Understanding Definitional Discrepancies through Causal Debates 
Implicitly or explicitly, definitional disputes invariably bear the traces of 
competing causal philosophies. To be sure, questions as broad as “what causes genocide” 
and “why did the Holocaust happen?” do not have clear and concise answers.51 As Staub 





combination of influences that leads to an unfolding, an evolution that involves changes 
in individuals, groups of people, and whole societies.”52 Nonetheless, a variety of 
scholarly and professional voices have attempted to provide answers to these causal 
questions, naming and interrogating a plethora of factors that may be “genocidal 
warning” signs.53 The myriad of historical and theoretical analyses grappling with 
causality reflects substantial variance in the relative importance of public and state actors. 
In what follows, I showcase the multiplicity of treatments of state authority and popular 
agency by highlighting ends of a causal spectrum.54 On one hand, Holocaust and 
genocide studies informed by work in psychology often offer clear assessments of the 
significance of individual agents in the instigation of violence. On the other, structural 
analyses tend to have a more diffuse understanding of human agency and centralize the 
state’s contributions to the problem of genocide.55 
Psychological approaches to genocide feature the largest role for individual 
agents. As is to be expected, these approaches treat “genocidal behavior [as] ha[ving] its 
cause in the human psyche.”56 Such studies vary dramatically in their foci. Famous 
studies like Milgram’s work on authority and the Stanford prison experiment are common 
citations in psychological approaches to genocidal action.57 Oliner’s work on prosocial 
behavior and altruism adds to knowledge about intervention and the bystander effect.58 
Waller’s work, Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass 
Killing, develops a more comprehensive theory of the variety of factors that facilitate the 
conduct of evil acts,59 as does Staub’s Overcoming Evil: Genocide, Violent Conflict, and 
Terrorism, with his balanced approach to the origins of violence.60 Baum’s scholarship 





bystanders by focusing on questions of maturity in relation to one’s reaction to 
violence.61 Newman and Erber’s edited collection, Understanding Genocide: The Social 
Psychology of the Holocaust, engages topics ranging from authoritarianism to prejudice 
and scapegoating to zoomorphism all under the auspices of a social psychological 
approach to genocide.62 Even as these diverse works blend an appreciation for “[d]ifficult 
life conditions” with culture and psychological motivations,63 Staub underscores that the 
emphasis is “on people, the psychology of the individuals that make up groups, and of 
their leaders: their needs, worldviews, attitudes toward other people, feelings of threat, 
fear, hostility, caring and empathy for others or lack of these emotions, their 
woundedness as a result of past history, and other psychological conditions.”64   
Amid the contributions yielded through psychological approaches, psychological 
studies provide rich theoretical frameworks for conceptualizations of “evil.”  Waller’s 
study is guided by a singular thesis: “Extraordinary Evil” such as genocide is committed 
by ordinary individuals. His work challenges the simplistic idea that evil acts are 
committed by “sadists, psychopaths, and monsters.”65 The belief that “Extraordinary 
Evil” is committed by “extra-human[s]” affords a comfortable distance and means of 
disassociation from the human capacity for violence.66  However, Waller, asserts that this 
“purely evil person is” a caricaturization and is “just as much an artificial construct as a 
person who is purely good.”67 As a corrective to this tendency, some psychological works 
suggest that all humans have the potential to become genocidal killers. Yet, in some 
ways, this is as problematic as positing evil as “extraordinary.” As Kuper notes, early 
works operating from this perspective on evil positioned the seeds of genocide as 





practice, these sentiments reinforce a Hobbesian worldview and a less-than-charitable 
conception of human nature in which individuals, left to their own devices, would 
“naturally” kill one another save for the fear of intervention by the state or civic order.69 
Resultantly, the challenge becomes finding an approach to evil that moves beyond 
caricature to account for the complexity of individual agency. 
Despite such contributions, other scholars have noted the shortcomings of 
psychological approaches, arguing that these perspectives on genocidal causes are 
insufficient and incomplete. More specifically, such approaches to causality fail to 
explain why genocides occur in certain locations or historical contexts and not others. In 
his early assessment of the field, Jonassohn claims,	  “Psychological and psychiatric 
theories dealing with hostility and aggression are unlikely to be relevant because such 
drives surely occur among all peoples and because large-scale phenomena such as 
genocides are not likely to find their explanation in the attributes of individuals.”70 From 
a more charitable perspective, this research may illuminate some components of our 
understanding of the conduct of genocide, but it loses the forest for the trees.71 In other 
words, the unique dimensions of genocide as a collective act are lost when solely looking 
at the processes that govern individual behavior. According to Fein, “inferring 
psychological motives is basically a complementary level of explanation to a 
macrosociological perspective. What is needed is a theory of how structural, situational 
and cultural forces lead potential perpetrators of genocide to define the situation so as to 
mandate and justify the killing of the victims.”72 Such criticisms invert the causal 





genocidal impulse or merely capitalizes on an existing structural opportunity for 
genocidal action. 
In contrast to the propensity of psychological approaches to focus on the 
individual agent, structural approaches locate the origins of genocide in macro-social 
phenomenon. Levene’s corpus is indicative of such a structural orientation. From 
Levene’s perspective, “[g]enocide is the mainstream”73 and is far from “be[ing] a product 
of mad, bad or sad polities, societies, structures or predispositions outside and entirely 
beyond the universe of the ordered, civilized legally constituted, democratically elected 
West.”74 The assumption is that genocide is built into the socio-, political and economic 
systems that govern international relations.75 In short, Levene contends that “genocide is 
not so much a series of isolated, aberrant and essentially unconnected events but is at the 
very heart of modern historical development.”76 In his multi-volume treatment of 
genocide, Levene identifies three structural-level “causal factors” that contribute to the 
rise of genocide: modernity, the nation-state, and the dominance of Western 
civilization.77 These dimensions – far from unique to Levene’s work – have been linked 
to genocide by multiple scholars.78 Importantly, these three structural issues are 
interdependent, not distinct causal attributes. Accordingly, the interrelations among such 
constructs bolster each in turn and solidify genocide as a constituent component of the 
global order.79 
Modernity has long been a part of causal conversations, pinpointed as an 
explanation for late twentieth-century violence.80 Bauman’s oft-cited Modernity and the 
Holocaust typifies such logics. Bauman challenges the idea that the “Holocaust” was an 





the Holocaust is a consequence of modernity.81 Modernity’s byproducts – rationality, 
social engineering, bureaucracy82 – establish the conditions for genocides such as the 
Holocaust.83 Bauman contends that the modern “civilizing process failed to erect a single 
foolproof barrier against the genocide [the Holocaust].”84 Rather, modernity’s emphasis 
on “‘progress’” and “‘civilization’” abet genocide, often providing the rationale for the 
elimination of indigenous peoples.85 Of course, as Hinton and other scholars have 
stressed, “modernity does not lead to genocide in any direct causal sense,”86 but rather 
“modernity inflects genocide.”87  Further, modernity contributes to genocide by 
facilitating the rise of the nation-state, another element of the social structure heavily 
critiqued for contributing to the propagation of genocide. 
The nation-state has been linked to genocide in a number of ways.88 In his book, 
Levene enumerates three aspects of the nation-state that may promote genocidal 
behaviors: the state’s sublimation of other interpersonal human relationships to the 
relationship between the individual and the nation-state, the work of the polity to advance 
or “better” the state, and the latent desire for homogeneity.89  Hayden posits that 
genocides (or ethnic cleansing) are part of state building, a means of attaining a unified 
state. These practices are condoned when the development of a new state serves the needs 
of the powerful and only critiqued when the state in formation is undesirable. In these 
latter cases, the label of “genocide” is applied.90 Corroborating Hayden, Levene and 
Moses have argued that, “states which are new, or are heavily engaged in the process of 
state and nation building” are often the culprits of genocide.91 For Moses, this is part of 
the dynamic which marks the “racial century,” a period from 1850-1950 that laid the 





as a cause of genocide, holding that nation-states have a tendency to use the memories of 
atrocities for national unification purposes, rallying populations through identification 
with victimhood.93 Entrenching memories of animosity fuels antagonisms against 
“Others” and potentially plants the seeds for future genocidal conflict.94   
 Finally, “the rise of the West” to a position of global predominance has been 
widely discussed as a source of genocidal violence. From such vantage points, 
colonialism is linked to the practice of genocide in both direct and indirect ways.95 
According to some, the West’s rise occurred largely at the expense of indigenous or non-
Western “Others;” whether through colonial or imperial slaughters or though the 
reification of other forms of structural inequality which sustain the conditions for 
continued violence.96 Surely, as has occurred countless times throughout world history, 
the “acquisition” of territory often occurs at the expense of indigenous peoples and 
cultures. Some have argued that such devastation should be seen as genocidal.97 These 
arguments about the “rise of the West” and its connections to genocide represent the 
clearest approximation of a post-liberal perspective.  
Yet the links between Western dominance and genocide need not only be 
conceptualized in terms of the violence associated with colonialism and imperialism. 
Other forces include the restructuring of the global order and the disruption of other 
economic systems and patterns of (inter)dependency that occurred while centering the 
West as a hegemon. These acts led to destabilization, bred resentment, and reinscribed 
inequalities that would provide additional impetuses for violence.98 As Levene puts it, 





annihilation of foreign peoples, it did create a broader cultural discourse in which such 
annihilation was perfectly conceivable.”99 
 In much the same way that psychological approaches have their critics, so too are 
structural perspectives subject to critique. Levene is aware of the potential critiques of his 
work and structuralist perspectives on genocide more broadly. Levene is self-reflexive 
about the fact that his work “carries with it an almost imponderable moral dilemma.” 
From his perspective, “It is human beings who suffer (as well as commit) genocide. 
Surely to treat them as abstractised items in some grand narrative is to be as guilty of the 
same clinical mindset with which we have already been at pains to charge a complicit 
modernity.”100 Worse, Semelin holds that such moves strip individuals of agency, treating 
them as “always ‘acted upon’ by external factors.”101 Chiefly, these are problems of 
determinacy and agency. Moreover, if the macro-social order is to blame, then genocide 
is seemingly intractable, woven into the fabric of global politics.102  From such 
perspectives, genocide is enmeshed in the current structure of the international 
community; thus, genocide cessation can seem little more than a pipe dream unless the 
entire system can be overhauled,103 a Herculean task that can work to diminish a sense of 
human agency. Although structural orientations offer what Andreopoulos identifies as “a 
constructive reminder of the role of impersonal forces in shaping group and individual 
choices,”104 their predilection toward these “impersonal forces” has significant 
implications for the ways agency and the plausibility of genocide cessation work are 
conceptualized.  
 This examination of the divergent approaches to causality within the field 





inconsistencies regarding the relative importance of popular agency and state authority. 
They simultaneously suggest why discussions of genocide might be considered 
threatening as they potentially implicate individuals and states as causal agents. 
Individual agents are indicted through discomforting arguments about the human capacity 
to commit “evil” acts. And states – and in particular Western states – are impugned for 
establishing an international order that breeds violence. The anxiety created by such 
claims seeps into definitional debates and is met by a similar form of anxiety regarding 
Holocaust and genocide representations.  
Questions of Representation: Trauma and Ineffability  
Given that genocide is difficult to define, it is an equally challenging subject to 
access, represent, and consume. As Kuper reinforces, “the enormity of … genocide seems 
to defy understanding.”105 Representational hurdles are compounded by the deficiencies 
of certain popular culture mediums that tend to reduce complex social issues to narrative 
plots or forms of individual or interpersonal conflict.106 Numerous scholars have 
attempted to puzzle through some of these complications associated with the mediation of 
genocide memory, whether in analyses of specific genocide-related texts or a particular 
medium’s treatment of genocide.107 At the heart of these representational contestations, 
Shandler argues, are matters of “propriety (that is, what constitutes ‘appropriate’ or ‘just’ 
use of the Holocaust [or other genocides])” as well as “property rights (that is, who are 
the ‘rightful’ arbiters of ‘proper’ Holocaust [and genocide] memory).”108 These matters 
of propriety and property are complicated by the association of genocide with “trauma,” a 
controversial appropriation of psychiatric vocabulary often found within some scholastic 





genocides are (or are not) represented as well as subsequent concerns over the authority 
of authorship and the appropriateness of various representational choices.  
 “Trauma” is a complicated and problematic term; therefore, any scholastic 
framing of genocide as a form of trauma contributes to arguments about how and if 
genocide memories should be represented. Genocide memories are subsumed 
occasionally under a larger category of “traumatic memories,” with the designation of 
“trauma” recalling psychiatric and therapeutic rhetorics. Although “trauma” is a clinical 
condition, used in the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM),109 the term has been adopted and utilized in a 
number of disciplines such as literature, history, film studies, and sociology.110 This 
expanse in the term’s application creates tension between those who argue “trauma” is a 
specific psychological diagnosis (i.e., used to describe the very real psychological 
consequences of duress) and others who are less convinced that traumas objectively exist 
and thus use the term more loosely.111 From the latter perspective, traumas are social 
constructions rather than material experiences.112 In other words, events are understood to 
be traumatic not because of their inherent characteristics but because of a perceived sense 
of “disruption” imparted by such events, either to identity or understandings of 
temporality (e.g., traumatic events are commonly depicted as dividing time into “pre” and 
“post” periods as in “pre-9/11” or “post-Holocaust”).113 As Gray and Oliver claim, this 
perceived sense of disruption is critical in explaining why some events (like genocide, for 
example) are understood as “catastrophic” or “traumatic” whereas consistent concerns 
(like poverty) are less likely to be understood as such.114  





yield some useful insights,115 criticisms of therapeutic and traumatic discourses abound, 
highlighting a few of the troubling implications of using the term “trauma” in discussions 
of genocide representations. Recalling Farrell’s work on “post-traumatic culture,”116 Gray 
and Oliver posit that society has become obsessed with the trauma framework so much so 
that “there may be few individuals who could not now lay claim to the status of trauma 
victim.”117 This obsession with trauma and other therapeutic concepts has troubling 
implications for conceptualizing human agency.118 Therapy rhetorics, Furedi argues, 
condition individuals to believe that they are psychologically and emotionally flawed or 
vulnerable.119 When the world is constructed as a series of potential “threats” to 
individuals’ “fragile” and susceptible mental states, messages of powerlessness and 
passivity are also imparted.120 An abundance of such public discourses, Cloud contends, 
teaches individuals to relinquish their agency, encouraging them to accommodate social 
ills rather than challenging social systems and agitating for social or political change.121 
In addition to decreasing perceptions of agency, traumas, according to some 
definitions of the term, “defy” representation; thus, to label genocide memories 
“traumatic memories” is to suggest that they are somehow beyond the realm of mediation 
and representation. According to such logic, trauma should not be represented because 
any attempts to do so pale in comparison to the atrociousness of the inflicted harm. As 
Roth and Salas explain, “The horror of trauma is such that it is often seen as a black hole 
of sense and meaning that consumes even the principles of its interpretation: no 
meaningful relationships between what came before and after a traumatic event can be 
created; every attempt to apply concepts of development fails.”122 Paradoxically, they 





representation and the refusal to be represented.”123  
Thus, to classify genocide as a trauma is to suggest that its memory can never be 
adequately represented or mediated, a position that aligns with some of the arguments 
and anxieties that have long circulated in Holocaust and genocide studies about “the 
limits of representation.”124 Such arguments often date back to Adorno’s frequently 
invoked condemnation of artistic expression after the Holocaust.125 The crux of the 
controversy “center[s] on intangible but nonetheless perceived boundaries” to 
representation.126 Friedlander, for example, charges “that there are limits to 
representation which should not be but can easily be transgressed.”127 These arguments 
over representational strategies are complex and have been fueled by a number of 
contextual factors influencing the evolution of Holocaust and genocide studies. The 1989 
Historians’ Debate in Germany and the rise of postmodernism and cultural studies, for 
example, offered challenges to predominant ways of thinking about representation.128  
As the debates over the appropriate ways of representing such atrocious events 
continue, a wide range of perspectives emerges. At one end, some viewpoints suggest 
that even language – the spoken or written word – is incapable of capturing the horror of 
these events, as the essence of these harrowing experiences simply can never be 
represented.129 In marked contrast, others believe this kind of “rhetoric of the 
unspeakable”130 perpetuates an “ideology of silence” that severely impairs knowledge, 
comprehension, and societal growth.131 In trying to navigate the nebulous terrain between 
these viewpoints, scholars often engage in a kind of “moral connoisseurship,” according 
to Shandler, heralding or decrying various forms of Holocaust and genocide memory as 





produced the representation, which medium was utilized, and whether the text adheres to 
or deviates from a realist aesthetic.133 
 In terms of the author or producer of such texts, the trauma framework suggests, 
some maintain, that only certain individuals are capable of interpreting or mediating such 
memories.134 By and large, this dynamic results in giving privileged status to genocide or 
Holocaust survivors over other voices that attempt to enter these conversations.135 
Holocaust survivor Eli Wiesel offers the following remarks during the Remembering for 
the Future conference to substantiate this experiential perspective: 
If in the beginning few critics and commentators paid attention to our 
work, now there seem to be too many. My friend and companion Primo 
Levi, with whom I shared the barracks in Auschwitz, called them “thieves 
of time, they look and sneak through keyholes, take our memories and 
leave without a trace.”136 
Mocking the “entitlement” or the authority of these non-survivor “thieves,” Wiesel’s 
indictment is most vehement: “They know better than I do what I endured where, with 
whom, under what circumstances?”137 Wiesel is not alone in articulating this critique 
regarding the ownership of Holocaust memory. Grappling with the role of art and the 
artist in the representation of the Holocaust, Feinstein notes, “Not only Wiesel, but others 
such as Theodor Adorno, Jean Amery, and Primo Levi have emphasized that there is a 
wall the nonsurvivor can never surmount, and art, in any form, can never 
conceptualize.”138 Illustrating the strength of the survivor’s authority in meaning making, 
Feinstein cites the backlash to an exhibition titled “Mirroring Evil,” which featured not 





very questions over the authority to intercede in meaning making: “Can the artist, 
especially one who was not ‘there,’ stumble upon some essential truth that even the 
survivor may have missed?”139 Beyond the survivor’s power, claim is often laid to the 
authority to represent these traumatic events by the children of survivors, or in the case of 
the Holocaust, the Jewish community at large, setting the stage for skirmishes over which 
voices should be heard in debates about the mediation of genocide memory.140 
These mediation debates over traumatic memories also extend to debates over 
which mediums and styles may or may not be appropriate for traumatic representation.  
As the title of Norfolk’s photo essay (For Most of It I Have No Words) implies, because 
“words” are seen as insufficient representations, images are often privileged.141 From 
other perspectives, electronic forms of mediation, chiefly television, are critiqued as 
inadequate as the ephemerality of these mediums contrasts with the concreteness of 
artifact or object-driven forms of representation.142 
Even more problematic than these medium choices are the debates pertaining to 
the destabilizing influences of postmodernism and the use of creative or poetic license.143 
Rothberg argues these debates over representations are the byproduct of conflicting 
epistemological perspectives: realism, modernism, and postmodernism.144 The latter is 
particularly troubling for certain scholars in Holocaust and genocide studies. On the one 
hand, postmodernism’s tolerance of incompleteness and its awareness of the limitations 
of texts align with viewpoints that believe “that even the most precise historical 
renditions of the Shoah contain an opaqueness at the core.”145 On the other hand, 
postmodernism’s skepticism toward claims about “Truth” and “Reality” is distressing to 





In Friedlander’s words, “postmodern thought’s rejection of the possibility of identifying 
some stable reality or truth beyond the constant polysemy and self-referentiality of 
linguistic constructs challenges the need to establish the realities and the truths of the 
Holocaust.”146 Although Rothberg attempts to offer a theory of “traumatic realism” to 
bridge these perspectives,147 he implies that these epistemological rifts inform debates 
over realism and give rise to the conflicts that ensue as representational strategies move 
away from realist aesthetics to include fictive elements and less literal styles.148 
To elaborate further, the introduction of creative license, in particular, incites 
considerable controversy. Walker and Lowenstein acknowledge the constraints placed on 
traumatic representations and the fear created by deviating from realistic portrayals of 
traumatic events.149 Regarding the Shoah, Brenner argues that “numerous critics qualify 
the majority of fiction, dramatization, and figurative speech about the Holocaust as 
misrepresentation;” thus, “the singularity of the Shoah is viewed as being in danger of 
violation whenever it is not read literally.”150 As Zelizer highlights, a tendency exists in 
visualizing the Holocaust “to valorize visual forms like filmed testimony, archival 
photograph, or documentary film more than representations that track reality in a less 
manifest fashion.”151 Walker and Lowenstein defend non-literal or fictionalized 
representations of traumatic pasts. As Walker stresses, all representations – even the most 
“realistic” or “authentic” – involve acts of invention and bear the imprint of their 
production.152 For such scholars and political actors, the potential to produce a richer 
understanding through the embrace of creative forms of representation outweighs any 
need to protect the sanctity of traumatic memories.153  





genocide denial. As forms of representation abandon “the real” in creating awareness of 
their own inventive or imaginative capacity, they invite questions about reality versus 
representation that provoke discourses of denial and threaten the inviolability of genocide 
memory.154 Not surprisingly, then, the invention used in “false” genocide memoirs, like 
Fragments: Memories of a Wartime Childhood and I, Rigoberta Menchu, has incited 
turmoil.155  
While all of these quandaries regarding the various modes, styles, and sources of 
genocide mediation complicate acts of representation, others debate the fundamental 
ethics of mediating genocide memory in the first place.156 Some of these ethical concerns 
center on the implications of (re)producing the horrors of genocide. As White and others 
have illuminated, even with progressive or idealistic ends, media producers must be 
accountable for their role in propagating images of violence and oppression.157 Such 
arguments hold that reproduction, representation, and mediation may do more harm than 
good. As Crane questions, “How, then, do we responsibly face the possibility that 
viewing atrocity images revivifies the perpetrator’s gaze, re-enacting the dehumanization 
and terrorizing of the victim?”158 Arguing that what viewers of such images want is 
largely “safe titillation, and redemption,” Crane calls for the removal of Holocaust 
images from the public sphere.159 She concludes that “[s]eeing atrocity images in 
ignorance only shocks the senses; it does not teach meaning-making or historical 
truthfulness, and it risks kitsch.”160 The fears over trivializing genocide, fostering prurient 
interest, and reproducing its horrors precipitate the interrogation of mediation strategies 
as well as the motives for representing memories of atrocity. Skeptical of the ethics of 





mnemonic invocation, inviting a critical analysis of the links forged between genocide 
representation and cessation.  
Questions of Resolution: Antagonistic Relations among Cessation Agents 
 Just as no single “cause” exists for genocide, so too no single “solution” exists to 
the problems posed by atrocity. As Heidenrich puts it, “If the problem of genocide had an 
easy solution, we would have conquered it a long time ago.”161 Instead, the literature is 
flooded with competing propositions, challenged not by a lack of ideas, but a seeming 
confusion over where to target one’s intervention. This confusion is exacerbated by 
inconsistent assessments of state and public involvement in genocide prevention and 
intervention efforts. The state is both positioned as a hindrance to genocide cessation and 
an agent of genocide cessation. Similarly, the public is at once empowered and excluded 
from proposals to end genocide. As Jones highlights, the divergences in resolution 
rhetorics reify a split between popular and scholarly forms of genocide cessation 
discourse. At the same time, changes to the media environment create additional avenues 
for exercising popular agency. 
Obstacles to Genocide Cessation 
Before interrogating proposed solutions to end genocide, discussions of genocide 
cessation often identify common obstacles to prevention or intervention politics. These 
obstacles further the ambivalence about state authority as they indict the nation-state as a 
possible obstacle to cessation. National sovereignty and the absence of political will pose 
substantive problems to resolution proposals.162 The hindrances created by these 
constructs speak to the complexity of the relationship between state authority and 





State sovereignty is commonly cited as a barrier to genocide cessation politics.163 
Sovereignty, or the idea that each state is entitled to govern its own affairs inside its 
territorial boundaries without the undue intervention of foreign actors, has functioned as a 
cornerstone of international politics since the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia.164 Yet, Voth 
and Noland emphasize that such efforts to defend the autonomy of states too often 
translate into a roadblock to human rights work, resulting in “a pre-eminence of 
sovereignty for states over and against the sovereignty of human individuals.”165 The 
state’s rights take precedence over “human rights,” and the defense of sovereignty is used 
to safeguard the state from outside intervention, creating a protected space where abuses 
against its own people and its acts of atrocities are overlooked.166  Although Kuper notes, 
“no state explicitly claims the right to commit genocide…[nevertheless] the right is 
exercised under more acceptable rubrics, notably the duty to maintain law and order, or 
the seemingly sacred mission to preserve the territorial integrity of the state.”167 The 
principle of sovereignty is thus exploited to shield offending states from interventionist or 
preventionist politics while genocidal action is condoned, at least implicitly, in 
practice.168 Despite the complications to cessation posed by sovereignty, numerous 
scholars have articulated hopeful arguments about the erosion of sovereignty in an 
increasingly globalized world. For example, Totten credits “the relatively new 
international human rights regime (e.g., the UN Declaration of Human Rights, the UN 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, as well as 
others), the end of the Cold War, the onset of the Information Age,” and the creation of 





diminishing the perceived inviolability of “sovereignty” and enhancing genocide 
cessation efforts.169  
In addition to hindrances posed by sovereignty, a lack of political will at the level 
of the nation-state can cripple genocide cessation work.170 As Kuper explains, although 
moral arguments about genocide cessation are not to be discounted, prevention and 
intervention decisions are also strategic exercises in political influence.171 From his 
perspective, intervention is more likely when a powerful state is interceding into the 
affairs of a weaker state as the stronger state need not fear retaliation; however, this 
power dynamic creates “a situation all too reminiscent of colonial interventions.”172 By 
utilizing realism as a lens through which to analyze US responses to genocide, Ronayne’s 
work elucidates the role “of other geostrategic priorities and domestic political concerns” 
in inhibiting cessation.173 Roth refers to this logic as a “deadly calculus of passivity” and 
contends that such a calculus has guided political responses to atrocity in multiple 
contexts.174 By way of example, Roth includes the international community’s lack of 
investment in Saddam Hussein’s persecution of the Kurds as well as the Guatemalan 
government’s persecution of indigenous populations.  He argues that Hussein’s behavior 
was ignored because of larger oil politics whereas the decision to discount the violence in 
Guatemala reflected Cold War dynamics.175 As these instances and numerous others 
highlight,176 genocide cessation politics are fundamentally enmeshed in boarder 
considerations about “national interest” and political will. As Totten puts it, “[w]ithout 
the willingness of an international body, a group of nations, or, at the very least, a single 
nation to act to prevent a genocide or intervene early on, not even the most sophisticated 





use.”177 Totten accordingly subtitles his exploration of genocide prevention and 
intervention as: “Where There Is the Political Way, There Is A Way.”178 
Perhaps not surprisingly given these obstacles, genocide scholars and writers have 
offered less-than-optimistic assessments of existing approaches to intervention and 
prevention. Noted genocide scholar and activist Power charges that the United States has 
an abysmal track record when it comes to genocide cessation. According to Power’s 2003 
Pulitzer Prize winning study, “[t]he United States had never in its history intervened to 
stop genocide and had in fact rarely even made a point of condemning it as it 
occurred.”179 She continues, “the forward-looking, consoling refrain of ‘never again,’ a 
testament to America’s can-do spirit, never grappled with the fact that the country had 
done nothing, practically or politically, to prepare itself to respond to genocide. The 
commitment proved hollow in the face of actual slaughter.”180 Other scholarly voices 
balance these critiques and retain a more optimistic perspective on the politics of 
intervention or prevention.181 Some stress the perceived agency of the United States182 
and others highlight cases in which possible genocides were averted or stemmed (e.g., the 
curtailment of Iran’s persecution of its Bahá’í population).183 Nevertheless, difficulty in 
ending such atrocities might suggest why genocide is referred to in Power’s book as “‘A 
Problem from Hell.’”184 
Ending Genocide: Perspectives on Prevention & Intervention 
Despite the problems posed by sovereignty and political will, Chirot and 
McCauley stress that “[t]here is a large and rapidly growing literature on conflict 
resolution and prevention;” however, they believe there is “little consensus about what 





body of genocide cessation literature tends to be diverse, replete with “solutions” ranging 
from truth and reconciliation committees in the wake of such atrocities to the promotion 
of genocide education programs as preventative measures.186 Amid these proposals, Jones 
notes a curious disconnect between popular and scholarly cessation discourses.187 The 
former he states “adopt a highly individualistic perspective,” which he argues is out of 
sync with “the structural, historical, social science perspective of genocide 
researchers.”188 In other words, Jones suggests that the fault lines in the discussion of 
popular and scholarly forms of genocide cessation discourse hinge upon matters of 
agency and the actors authorized by each body of literature to participate in genocide 
cessation work. In what follows, I highlight only a few examples of cessation proposals 
to demonstrate the ways agency and authority anxieties manifest in the literature on 
cessation. I focus specifically on proposals that affirm the centrality of individual and 
individual-based conceptions of agency as well as proposals that are more structural in 
orientation. 
Resolution discourses focused on moral development and genocide education 
centralize popular agency. Moral development approaches stress the transformative 
power of the individual’s moral character and benevolent actions. Rhetorics of “care” or 
“empathy” are common within such discourses, retaining hope that if individuals were 
only made to care more about one another or identified more closely with “others,” 
genocide would be harder to sustain. Embodying this perspective in placing stock in the 
power of care, Heidenrich asks, “Most of us do care. But do we care enough?”189  
Similarly, Charny reveals the links between care, concern, and identification, noting how 





calls on audiences to recognize a shared investment in the politics of genocide cessation. 
He encourages a fostering of “kinship with all other peoples… and a notion of a common 
humanity [that] begins to transcend identifications with any specific sector of that 
humanity.”190 From that perspective, “there develops a value-commitment to opposing 
the mass destruction of any people, religion, ethnicity or nation,” inhibiting our ability to 
commit or tolerate genocide anywhere in the world, of any victim group.191 According to 
such logic, the more we connect and identify with foreign “others,” the less likely we are 
to tolerate genocide and inaction.  
Closely related to the cultivation of individual morality, other genocide cessation 
approaches suggest that genocide education can function as a preventative force.192 Such 
thinking is undergirded by the belief that teaching students about genocide may condition 
them to want to eradicate it.193 For such reasons, Hamburg treats education as one of the 
central features of genocide prevention politics.194 Echoing the perspectives that treat 
“caring” and “empathy” as critical to genocide cessation, many approaches to genocide 
education adopt what Jones labels “Moral Exemplars Perspectives.”195 According to 
Jones, Moral Exemplars Perspectives implicate the “weakness and flaws of individual 
moral character, especially the lack of altruism, sympathy, and compassion,” as 
deficiencies which can enable genocide.196 Resultantly, Moral Exemplars Perspectives 
hold that “the best way to prevent genocide is to ensure that there are enough people who 
are individually of strong moral character in these respects.”197 As Jones’s works 
elucidates, both moral development approaches and genocide cessation efforts create 





By contrast, other propositions for genocide cessation emphasize the importance 
of structural solutions, examining changes that could be made within the international 
community and diminishing a sense of the role individuals play in ending genocide. In 
elevating solutions at the national and international level, individual agents are 
supplanted by nation-states as the primary actors in genocide cessation. Often these 
proposals call for changes to the structure of the international community. Hamburg’s 
book, Preventing Genocide: Practical Steps toward Early Detection and Effective Action, 
is primarily located on this structural level as he punctuates the need for “preventative 
diplomacy,” “international cooperation for preventing mass violence,” the development 
of democracies,198 and the creation of two “international centers for prevention of 
genocide,” one to be located within the UN and the other inside the EU.199 Although 
there is some sense that individuals could play a meaningful role in such genocide 
cessation politics, most of these suggestions tend to accentuate legal and diplomatic 
action.200  
Much of the resolution discourse focused on the international level contains calls 
for the creation of a standing international body, tasked with monitoring and intervening 
in conflicts that seem to be going through the stages of “genocidal priming.”201 Although 
the details vary depending upon each individual proposal, most advocates call for a 
special body, able to act quickly and concerned exclusively with genocide cessation. 
Totten argues that this body must possess “a strong mandate with a well-trained, well-
equipped, and adequately sized contingent of personnel working in a timely manner” in 
light of the propensity to underfund, understaff, and retard the action of peace-keeping 





US political discourse for decades. His book, How to Prevent Genocide: A Guide for 
Policymakers, Scholars, and the Concerned Citizen, calls for the use of an “international 
legion of volunteers,” “combined into a single standing unit, available to the Security 
Council for relatively small scale but still risky missions of importance.”203 He devotes an 
entire chapter in his text to explaining how this body would be financed and structured.204 
As discussed in greater detail in Chapter Two, Goldhagen, too, advocates for an 
“international watchdog organization” with selective membership tasked with rapidly 
responding to crises.205 Congruent with more structural perspectives on genocide’s 
causes, these policies look toward structural resolutions.  
Media Producers as Agents of Genocide Cessation 
In a move which links representation to cessation, one strand of resolution 
discourse links media production to genocide cessation, opening additional space for 
popular agency given the power of new media tools. “The media” has long been part of 
conversations about genocide cessation.206 Media producers are clearly implicated in 
proposals regarding the creation of a “watchdog” organization and tasked with 
surveillance. Such approaches treat news organizations in particular as the eyes and ears 
of genocide cessation work, responsible for monitoring global affairs and bringing the 
public’s attention to atrocities. Their failure to do so becomes cause for concern and 
subjects media outlets to criticism for their coverage choices.207 These arguments about 
the role of media in genocide cessation are based on the assumption that “ignorance” or a 
lack of awareness about global conflict enables the continuation of atrocity.208 According 
to such logic, if publics are only informed about genocides as they happen, appropriate 





media could have contributed to a successful genocide cessation politics. For a number of 
reasons, other scholars have asserted, this assumption is misguided. To begin, Charny 
writes, “simply knowing the historical facts of the past does not in itself free humankind 
to change the future.”210 Further, several facets of the way mainstream media outlets are 
structured (e.g., the news media’s short attention spans, the provision of coverage only 
after events occur) preclude them from being effective surveillance aides.211 
As genocide studies scholars address the power of new media, additional 
opportunities arise for non-state actors to participate in genocide cessation. New work in 
Holocaust and genocide studies has turned attention from traditional forms of media (i.e., 
television broadcasts, newspapers, etc.) to herald the power of “new media.” Kreps 
highlights the power of mobile phones, satellite imagery, and social networks in raising 
awareness and circulating information about current genocides. Her arguments rest on the 
logic that “If pictures say a thousand words, and millions of people have access to those 
pictures, then the mobilizing effects are potentially enormous.”212 The networked power 
of these new media technologies usefully contribute to breaking down national barriers 
and encouraging the kind of identification with others Charny advocates above. From 
Kreps’s perspective, new media can aid in “bring[ing] events that are far away from us 
close to home, which substantially influences the way people perceive their locality”	  in a 
fashion consistent with Levy and Sznaider’s hopes for a globalized human rights 
culture.213 Ideally, these changes to the structure of mediated communication help 
circumvent the problems Totten and others ascribe to mainstream media and may enable 
the (new) media to aid in genocide cessation.214 Importantly, this emphasis on new media 





New media open additional avenues for engagement in contrast to earlier work on 
network journalism or newspaper coverage which can serve to replicate the faults of 
structural approaches in giving the means of expression to a few.215 Even though Torchin 
is critical of the way new media has been used for popular genocide cessation efforts, she 
nevertheless notes that “[t]he reach and convenience of the new technology has helped to 
draw new people into the political process while arming active groups with resources for 
increased action.”216 Of course, new media is unlikely to be a panacea for global 
violence; yet, at minimum, work on the links between new media and genocide cessation 
has the potential to illuminate ways of navigating the anxiety surrounding state authority 
and popular agency reflected in some genocide cessation proposals. The conversations 
surrounding new media certainly create new space to envision the public as engaged in 
genocide cessation in ways that go beyond the reductiveness Jones ascribes to popular 
forms of genocide cessation discourse.   
Questions of Memory: The Changing Relationship between Memory and the State 
Like questions of definition, representation, and resolution, questions of 
Holocaust and genocide memory are beset by controversy. The Introduction’s 
explanation of the uniqueness thesis showcases some of the heated contestations over the 
use or perceived abuse of Holocaust memory. The uniqueness thesis, however, is but a 
subset of a larger category of political arguments concerning the rhetorical potency of 
genocide memory. Genocide memories commonly function as rhetorical resources for 
interpreting other political events or atrocities as memories from one political context are 
applied to another, a process Akcan discusses as “memory transference.”217 One of the 





might contribute to genocide cessation and the propagation of a stronger international 
commitment to human rights. Evaluations of these arguments rest upon distinct 
understandings of state authority and public agency. In short, as Edkins explains, 
questions of political power are at issue. Edkins’s work aptly links the contestations over 
genocide memory to anxieties regarding the changing nature of state power. She charges, 
“[t]he way in which events such as wars, genocides and famines are remembered is 
fundamental to the production and reproduction of centralized political power…[A]t 
stake [in debates over atrocity memory] is the continuing existence of a particular form of 
power relation: sovereign political authority.”218Against this backdrop of unstable or 
jeopardized state power, memory becomes a battleground upon which state authority and 
popular agency meet.  
Holocaust and Genocide Studies Memory as a Rhetorical Resource 
 Scholarly discussions of Holocaust and genocide memory often locate its utility in 
the provision of rhetorical resources for understanding moral and political behavior.219 In 
line with the presumption underlying the promotion of moral education as form of 
genocide resolution, some scholars highlight the moral purposes of genocide memory, 
stressing its capacity to enhance understandings of righteousness and evil. MacDonald, 
for example, treats “the Holocaust as a generator of norms.”220 He explains: “Morality 
and ethics in the late twentieth century and after have been strongly influenced by the 
legacies of the Holocaust. Through its Americanization, nativization, or 
cosmopolitanization, the Holocaust is seen to provide a universalized standard of good 





Viewed from this perspective, the Holocaust, in particular, helps shape moral codes, 
functioning as “a moral touchstone” and creating “a master moral paradigm.”222 
 Others argue that Holocaust and genocide memory provide a resource for 
understanding political affairs and other domestic and global atrocities. The Holocaust, in 
particular, functions as a rhetorical resource for mobilizing awareness of other 
international conflicts.223  In articulating what he refers to “the Auschwitz analogy,” 
Steinweis argues,  
One might go so far as to say that analogies to the Holocaust have become 
part of the normal language in which American foreign policy is debated 
in the public sphere…an “Auschwitz analogy” has now become a 
recurrent theme in American discussions about how best to confront 
genocide and other systematic atrocities.224 
These political situations need not only involve foreign affairs. Hartman highlights 
activists’ proclivities to “proclaim an ‘Animal Auschwitz’” or “a ‘holocaust of 
babies.’”225 Independent of the cause, Assmann affirms that Holocaust memory “is 
increasingly invoked as a model to articulate, analyse and legitimate other traumatic 
memories around the globe.”226 To be sure, these metaphorical comparisons inspire 
controversy, particularly amongst proponents of the uniqueness thesis to whom such 
analogies violate the memory of the Holocaust.227  
 In contrast to the critics of these comparative practices, others suggest such forms 
of analogizing may function as a resource for building a global commitment to human 
rights. MacDonald claims that “Holocaust imagery has also become a means for substate 





members focus on specific agendas.”228 Resultantly, Assmann asserts that “the Holocaust 
had indeed gone global,” functioning as “a free-floating signifier that is readily associated 
with all kinds of manifestations of moral evil.”229 Levy and Snzaider link this 
phenomenon to the rise of “cosmopolitan memory.” According to Levy and Snzaider, 
cosmopolitan memory is a conception of memory that more adequately reflects an 
increasingly globalized landscape, or rather, a “glolocalization,” which involves the 
merger of both globalizing and localizing forces.230 Spurred by developments in media 
culture that interconnect localities,231 the cosmopolitanization of memory works 
productively to provide a platform for shared advocacy around genocide and human 
rights issues.232 Assmann and Concard link the globalization of memory to a widening 
sense of “global accountability.”233 From these authors’ perspectives, the progressive 
potential for Holocaust and genocide memory expands substantially once such memory is 
unshackled from the service of the nation-state.234  
Memory as a Component of Genocide Cessation 
One of the most hopeful arguments about the Holocaust and genocide memory 
links the circulation of atrocity memory to genocide cessation. This kind of “redemptive 
logic” often manifests in discourses on Holocaust and genocide memory;235 adherents to 
this position believe that such memory can contribute to ending genocide.236 As 
Wollaston writes, “[t]here seemed to be a consensus that the world would be a more 
humane and safer place if only there was more Holocaust education, more children 
visited Holocaust museums, saw films such as Schindler’s List and so on.”237 This logic 
suggests that remembering the Holocaust or other genocides keeps the public vigilant and 





this logic can be found in the introductory remarks to the conference proceedings, 
Remembering for the Future: The Holocaust in an Age of Genocide. In these remarks, 
Lucas implies, “If we do not learn from our historical experience, we will not be guarded 
against revisiting such appalling horror.”238 Put simply, cessation becomes the rationale 
for engaging Holocaust memory. 
Consequently, a palpable fear of forgetting pulses through some attempts to study 
and preserve Holocaust memory.239 Forgetting typically engenders anxiety.240 Yet, in the 
case of Holocaust or genocides studies, “forgetting” the memory of past genocides 
becomes an egregious affront to the victims of past tragedies because the stakes of 
remembering are elevated.  To demonstrate, the obliteration of genocide memory is 
compared to a crime or a sin by some scholars. “Entropy is a moral scandal,” Ignatieff 
writes, “For if everything is forgotten, if all headstones decay, what is the point of 
grieving?”241 Thus, he concludes, “Entropy makes remembering an obligation. In 
remembering we make our stand against the indifference of nature.”242 Similar sentiments 
appear in Wiesel’s works where he treats remembrance as integral to the perpetuation of 
the community.243 Of memory’s centrality, Wiesel argues: “if the truth of our past is to be 
distorted, diminished and repudiated, our memory will have no future. Protect that 
future.”244  Such works position memorialization and remembrance as critical to genocide 
cessation, holding out hope that memory will prevent the duplication of future genocidal 
acts.245 
Of course, despite a seeming abundance of Holocaust memory in particular, 
genocides have not ceased to occur, creating doubt over the proposition that memory 





“redemptive” perspective.246 Critics of redemption need only point to examples like that 
included in Fowler’s work; Fowler reminds his readers that shortly after the USHMM 
held its annual Holocaust remembrance ceremony in April 1994, the Rwandan genocide 
began. While that genocide was decimating the Tutsi population in Rwanda, the 
USHMM welcomed its two millionth visitor.247 “The cliché that ‘we must learn the 
lessons of the past,’” Crane contends, “has never been revealed to be more useless in 
motivating ethical action: learning the lessons of the past only teaches that the past relates 
to the present by being over or ‘dead’ today.”248 Stone too notes the disconnect between a 
commitment to atrocity memory and a lack of commitment to the action steps that could 
alleviate such atrocities: 
[W]e live in a culture of memory, one that is obsessed with the past, at 
least certain easily packaged versions of it that do not challenge 
contemporary behaviour, and, on the other hand, we live in an age that has 
not only failed to prevent genocide in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Darfur ... but 
has even failed to notice that there may be an awkward contradiction in 
commemorating genocide one day and detaining asylum seekers or 
seeking to withdraw from the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees … the next.249 
From Stone’s perspective, not only has a commitment to memory historically failed to 
stop genocide, he suggests genocide memory is completely disassociated from genocide 
prevention action.  
 Others hold that discussing the Holocaust as the “prototypical genocide” 





posits the possibility that “the focus on the Holocaust … somehow prevents people from 
investigating or taking equally seriously cases which do not appear to be exactly like 
it.”250 He also underscores the importance of reinforcing, “that there are many ways in 
which genocide can be committed, and only rarely does it involve the use of gas 
chambers.”251 Similarly, Lentin sees these comparative acts, such as the use of 
Steinweis’s “Auschwitz analogy,”252 as a sign of “the further impoverishment of our 
Western imaginations,”253 undermining our ability to see and think beyond this simplistic 
frame for understanding conflict in the stark good/evil, moral/immoral terminology 
typically used in popular discussions of the Holocaust.254 Treating the Holocaust as the 
“textbook” example of genocide creates unrealistic expectations for the magnitude of the 
situation that would require intervention.255 As Power explains, the problem with this 
logic is that, “the Holocaust sets a grossly ‘high’ bar for attention or action.”256 This 
“high bar,” she believes, allows us “to tell ourselves that contemporary genocides were 
not measuring up;” hence, we are not obliged to act.257 Far from being largely theoretical 
exercises, as Power and others make clear, these debates over Holocaust and genocide 
memory influence our perceptions of genocide cessation.  
In addition to setting a “high bar,” others suggest that excesses of Holocaust 
memory change our perceptions of contemporary atrocities by altering their temporality. 
This argument undergirds the conclusion to Zelizer’s study of atrocity photos: “This 
recycling of photos from the past not only dulls our response to them but potentially 
undermines the immediacy and depth of our response to contemporary instances of 
brutality, discounting them as somehow already known  to us.”258 The problem here is 





contributing to its devaluation.260 As counterintuitive as it may seem to make a case for 
“forgetting genocide,”261 such studies challenge the contention that memorial practices 
contribute to genocide prevention and call on readers to be skeptical of the ways in which 
mediated representations of genocide memory are linked to the termination or prevention 
of genocide.  
Screen Memory, Multidirectional Memory, and the Role of the Nation-State in a Global 
Age 
Returning to Edkins’s remarks, recent work in Holocaust and genocide studies 
suggests that these debates over the politics of genocide memory reflect varying 
assessments of the relationship between memory and the state. Edkins contends that the 
state asserts its authority through attempts to circumscribe the potency of trauma into 
narratives which serve state power. Consequentially, the progressive potential inherent in 
moments of trauma is squandered.262  By unhinging memory from the state, Rothberg’s 
work opens new space for reconciling mnemonic tensions, moving memory discourses 
from competitive models to a multidirectional one. 
Rothberg argues that discussions of Holocaust and genocide memory are confined 
by dualistic, either/or kinds of thinking. In Multidirectional Memory, Rothberg contends 
that much of the discourse about memory is hampered by what he refers to as “collective 
memory as competitive memory – as a zero-sum struggle over scarce resources.”263 From 
a competitive memory viewpoint, the advancement of the memory of one event comes at 
the expense of the remembrance of another. Rothberg implies that this “zero-sum” view 
of memory is what undergirds uniqueness debates and contributes to their ferocity 





Competitive conceptions of memory are also inherent in and signaled by the language of 
“screens” or “blinders” in Holocaust and genocide studies work. For example, 
Worthington’s dissertation on the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum uses the 
Burkean concept of the “terministic screen.”264 Zelizer’s analysis of journalistic coverage 
of the Holocaust suggests that Holocaust memory “blocks out” the memory of 
contemporary violence.265  Freud’s concept of “screen memory” is also employed in 
Holocaust and genocide studies arguments to make similar points.266  
Instead of using the limiting competitive model, Rothberg encourages a view of 
“memory as multidirectional: as subject to ongoing negotiation, cross-referencing, and 
borrowing; as productive and not privative.”267 A multidirectional approach avoids the 
creation of the aforementioned “hierarchy of suffering” associated with uniqueness theses 
as memories do not “compete” with one another from this perspective.268 Freed from 
competition, Rothberg’s approach to multidirectional memory “makes visible a 
countertradition that not only foregrounds unexpected resonance between the Holocaust 
and colonialism but also can provide resources for rethinking justice.”269  
The progressive potential inherent in multidirectional memory adheres in the 
adoption of transnational perspectives. Collective memory studies traditionally situate 
memory as a resource serving national politics.270 Yet, editors of a recent collection of 
work on Memory in a Global Age argue that “the globalization process has placed a 
question mark over the nation state as the seemingly natural container of memory 
debates.” 271 Accordingly, today’s “memory debates not only unfold within national 
communities of pride or attrition but are connected across borders.”272 Rothberg builds 





contained within texts that “have persistently broken the frame of the nation-state.”273 
Herein the interdisciplinary threads found in discussions of genocide causality and 
cessation merge with critiques of atrocity memory in their criticism of state authority. 
Rothberg and others suggest that more productive approaches to atrocity are available 
once scholars and advocates think beyond the confines of the nation state. 
Of course, such optimistic assessments of the power of transnational memory 
meet with some resistance in textual practice. The examples of US popular culture 
discourses examined in this study confront rhetorical challenges posed either by their 
financial ties to the US nation-state (the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum) or 
the conservative influence created through indirect pressures for commercial viability 
(the Museum of Tolerance, Worse Than War).274 Thus, the transnational calls to “eclipse” 
the nation-state are considerably more complicated. As such, the texts in this study 
cannot so easily remove the residue of state power; instead, they work within and around 
it, grappling with the anxieties produced by the now familiar tensions associated with the 
state, the public, and genocidal violence.  
The Intersections between Scholarly and Popular Genocide Discourses 
 Debates continue in Holocaust and genocide studies over the definitions, 
representations, resolutions and remembrances of genocidal atrocity. In deliberating over 
these issues, scholarly literature reflects substantial anxieties over the place of popular 
agency and state authority in the politics of genocide and genocide cessation. Some of the 
most sophisticated studies in this area acknowledge this complexity and find ways of 
overcoming reductive and binary thinking.275 These studies provide models for 





Yet, additional challenges manifest in finding creative ways to translate that complexity 
to non-scholarly audiences.  
The rich terrain produced by the interdisciplinary nature of the conversations in 
Holocaust and genocide studies has yielded different understandings of the nature of state 
authority and public agency; however, as various rhetors offer arguments engaging the 
anxieties over these concepts, they must still find ways of making their genocide 
cessation discourse comprehensible to popular audiences. Put differently, the scholarly 
conversations in this chapter invite questions about the relationship between academic 
knowledge and popular epistemologies. Daniel Jonah Goldhagen’s work provides a 
platform for interrogating the relationship between popular and scholarly ways of 
knowing. Goldhagen is a scholar by training but is often regarded as a contemporary 
media celebrity; thus, he sits on the cusp of academic and popular discourses. Chapter 
Two turns attention toward the questions of genocide definition, representation, 
resolution, and remembrance as addressed in Goldhagen’s Worse Than War. 
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(2005): 81-89; Samuel Totten, “To Deem or Not to Deem ‘It’ Genocide: A Double-
Edged Sword,” in The Genocidal Temptation: Auschwitz, Hiroshima, Rwanda, and 
Beyond, ed. Robert S. Frey (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2004), 41-55; 
John K. Roth,  “Epilogue: ‘After?...Meaning What?’” in Genocide and Human Rights: A 
Philosophical Guide, ed. John K. Roth (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 330; 
Samuel Totten and William S. Parsons, “Introduction,” in Century of Genocide: 
Eyewitness Accounts and Critical Views, ed. Samuel Totten, William S. Parsons, and 
Israel W. Charny, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 1997), 1-13. Notably, Totten and 
Parsons’s “Introduction” provides extensive citations chaining out further the various 
manifestations of these definitional debates. 
Andreopoulos’s edited collection includes multiple chapters centralizing 
definitional concerns. Andreopoulos, ed. Genocide.  
10 Roth, “Epilogue,” 330; Totten, “To Deem,” 43-44; Kuper, Genocide, 31-35. 
11 The USSR’s advocacy combined with the consent of other UN member states, 
including the US. See Kuper, Genocide, 24-30. 
12 Kevin Lewis O’Neill and Alexander Laban Hinton, “Genocide, Truth, Memory, 
and Representation: An Introduction,” in Genocide: Truth, Memory, and Representation, 
ed. Alexander Laban Hinton and Kevin Lewis O’Neill (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2009), 2. In contrast, Totten and Parsons begin their introduction by highlighting 
their choice to include political groups and noting other scholars in this field who 
consider political groups amongst the victims of genocide. Totten and Parsons, 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Lemkin’s early work on genocide sought to capture two facets of the crime: 
what Lemkin termed “barbarity” and “vandalism.” The latter notion of vandalism 
included what we understand to be cultural genocide today. See Power, “A Problem from 
Hell,” 21-22; O’Neill and Hinton, “Genocide, Truth, Memory,” 2-3; Kuper, Genocide, 
30-31; Amy Hungerford, The Holocaust of Texts: Genocide, Literature, and 
Personification (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2003), 7-8. 
14 O’Neill and Hinton, “Genocide, Truth, Memory,” 3; Kuper, Genocide, 30-31. 
15 Hungerford, The Holocaust of Texts, 7. 
16 Makino, “Final Solutions,” 58. [emphasis mine] 
17 Wendy Hesford, “Human Rights Rhetoric of Recognition,” Rhetoric Society 
Quarterly 41, no. 3 (2011): 286. 
18 Hinton, “The Dark Side,” 27.  
19 Mark Levene, “Why Is the Twentieth Century the Century of Genocide?” 
Journal of World History 11, no. 2 (2000): 317. 
20 Chorbajian, “Introduction,” xv. 
For an extended discussion of the complications surrounding “genocidal intent” 
see Akio Kimura, “Genocide and the Modern Mind: Intention and Structure,” Journal of 
Genocide Research 5, no. 3 (2003): 405-420. See also Andreopoulos’s discussion of 
intentionality vis-à-vis structural perspectives. Andreopoulos, “Introduction,” 7-9. 
21 O’Neill and Hinton, “Genocide, Truth, Memory,” 3. As Power notes, despite 
genocide’s inclusion in the 1948 UN Convention, drafting a definition proved only to be 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the treaty, and fifty years would elapse before the international community would convict 
anyone for genocide.” Power, “A Problem from Hell,” 60.  
22 Of course, the relationship between the constructs “the Holocaust” and 
“genocide” is fraught in ways explained in the Introduction’s discussion of the 
“uniqueness thesis.” See pages 15-18. 
23 More than ninety years after the 1915 massacre, this issue remains a political 
landmine.  In March 2010, a U.S. decision to recognize the slaughter as genocide 
infuriated Turkey. See Giles Whittell, “Turkey recalls Ambassador after US vote on 
Armenia ‘genocide,’” The Times (UK), March 5, 2010, 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article7050439.ece. 
24 Nicholas D. Kristof, “A Wimp on Genocide,” New York Times, September 18, 
2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/18/opinion/18kristof.html; Darren Brunk, 
“Dissecting Darfur: Anatomy of a Genocide Debate,” International Relations 22, no. 1 
(2008): 36. See also Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Worse than War: Genocide, 
Eliminationism, and the Ongoing Assault on Humanity (New York: PublicAffairs, 2009), 
237. 
25 As featured later in this chapter’s notes, this argument is often associated with 
the work of Ward Churchill. For a brief presentation of some of his arguments, see 
Catherine Helen Palczewski, “When Times Collide: Ward Churchill’s Use of an 
Epideictic Moment to Ground Forensic Argument,” Argumentation & Advocacy 41, no. 3 
(2005): 123-138. See also page 133n40. 
26 The example of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is used to open 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
category (within the typology he develops) of genocide. Under this broadened conception 
of eliminationism, he places Truman’s decision to use the atomic bomb. Goldhagen, 
Worse than War, 3-8.  
Other scholars treat these bombings as a form of genocide. Kuper also discusses 
this incident as genocidal. Kuper, Genocide, 17. Further linkages between such forms of 
warfare and genocide are developed in Robert Jay Lifton and Eric Markusen, The 
Genocide Mentality: Nazi Holocaust and Nuclear Threat (New York: Basic Books, 
1990). See also Kimura, “Genocide,” 407-408, 418n5 
27 These last four examples are all part of Norfolk’s book. See Simon Norfolk, 
For Most of It I Have No Words: Genocide Memory Landscape, with an essay by 
Michael Ignatieff (Stockport: Dewi Lewis press, 1998).   
28 Totten, “To Deem.” 
29 Makino, “Final Solutions,” 49. 
30 Power reproduces the careful phrasing used by US State Department 
spokesperson Christine Shelly to avoid issuing a designation of genocide. Using 
descriptors such as “acts of genocide,” the Clinton administration went to extreme 
lengths to avoid the word “genocide.” This rhetorical maneuvering ultimately raised 
questions from the news media, including the oft-quoted retort, “‘How many acts of 
genocide does it take to make genocide?’” See See Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, “American 
Reticence,” in The International Dimension of Genocide in Rwanda (New York: New 
York University Press, 1998), 99-100; Power, “A Problem from Hell,” 358-364; Brunk, 
“Dissecting Darfur,” 35-36; Peter V. Ronayne, “The United States and the ‘G-Word’: 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Auschwitz, Hiroshima, Rwanda, and Beyond, ed. Robert S. Frey (Lanham, MD: 
University Press of America, 2004), 101-114. 
31	  Brunk, “Dissecting Darfur,” 35. 
32 Cynthia E. Smith and Tony Pipa, “The Politics of Genocide: U.S. Rhetoric vs. 
Inaction in Darfur, 7 April – 26 September 2004,” Kennedy School Review 6 (2005): 131-
140; see also Brunk, “Dissecting Darfur.” 
33 Herman and Peterson write, “During the past several decades, the word 
‘genocide’ has increased in frequency of use and reckless application, so much so that the 
crime of the twentieth century for which the word originally was coined often appears 
debased.” Edward S. Herman and David Peterson, The Politics of Genocide (New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 2010), 103. Noam Chomsky, foreword to The Politics of 
Genocide, by Edward S. Herman and David Peterson (New York: Monthly Review Press, 
2010), 12. 
34 Chomsky, foreword to The Politics of Genocide, 12. For more on the political 
usage of the term, see Aleksandar Jokic, “Genocidalism,” The Journal of Ethics 8, no. 3 
(2004): 251-297. 
35 As Moses and Stone explain, “The relationship between genocide and 
colonialism is clearly a vexed question that admits of no easy answers and even stumps 
seasoned analysts.” A. Dirk Moses and Dan Stone, “Introduction,” in Colonialism and 
Genocide, ed. A. Dirk Moses and Dan Stone (London: Routledge, 2007), vii. 
36 Michael Rothberg, Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in 
the Age of Decolonization (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), 101. 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 The text contends that Lemkin “wrote chapters on the European settlement of 
the Americas, Africa, and Australia,” as part of his scholarship on genocide although 
these works were not published. A. Dirk Moses and Dan Stone, ed. Colonialism and 
Genocide, (London: Routledge, 2007), i. 
39 Moses and Stone write, “Thus, although colonialism does not necessarily issue 
in genocide, the two phenomena are profoundly connected.” Moses and Stone, 
“Introduction,” vii-viii. 
40 Kuper credits Sartre’s 1968 work with the development of a theory that links 
colonialism and genocide through practices of capitalism. Kuper, Genocide, 44. Jean-
Paul Sartre, On Genocide (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968).  
Kuper is somewhat skeptical of Sartre’s theses, but he holds, “Nevertheless, given 
the many genocidal massacres in colonial history, I think the argument of an affinity 
between colonialism and genocide can be accepted, though with much qualification, and 
we can extract from Sartre’s arguments some of the significant elements in this 
relationship.” Kuper, Genocide, 45.  
In a less direct correspondence, Stone advances an argument about the influence 
of British imperialism on Germany’s Third Reich, discussing the Nazi fascination with 
the British Empire and teasing out shared concerns regarding space or Lebensraum in 
both the British Empire and 1930s Germany. Dan Stone, History, Memory and Mass 
Atrocity: Essays on the Holocaust and Genocide (London: Vallentine Mitchell, 2006), 
174-195.  Stone’s work includes a review of the litany of research on European powers, 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Churchill, too, crafts an argument about colonial practices and Nazi influence, 
moving toward the suggestion that the United States’ policy with regard to Native 
American removal could have influenced Nazi Germany. See Ward Churchill, A Little 
Matter of Genocide: Holocaust and Denial in the Americas 1492 to the Present (San 
Francisco: City Lights Books, 1997), 52. 
41 Chorbajian, “Introduction,” xviii. 
42 A. Dirk Moses, “Conceptual Blockages and Definitional Dilemmas in the 
‘Racial Century’: Genocides of Indigenous Peoples and the Holocaust,” in Colonialism 
and Genocide, ed. A. Dirk Moses and Dan Stone (London: Routledge, 2007), 151, 160-
161. 
43 Moses, “Conceptual Blockages,” 162. 
44 Moses, “Conceptual Blockages,” 162. 
45 Moses, “Conceptual Blockages,” 163. 
46 Moses, “Conceptual Blockages,” 162. 
47 Moses, “Conceptual Blockages,” 162. 
48 Moses, “Conceptual Blockages,” 162. 
49 Moses, “Conceptual Blockages,” 162. 
50 Although I find Moses’s schemata useful for thinking through the broader 
literature on causality, I want to acknowledge Moses’s work in proper context. It is worth 
bearing in mind that Moses’s work emerges from a specific context: the study of the 
relationships among genocide, the Holocaust, and colonialism. Nevertheless, I think 
Moses’s perspective enhances the ensuing analysis of the tensions underlying approaches 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Indeed, each question has historically inspired a variety of responses and fueled 
contentious scholarly debates. These include the structural-functionalist versus 
ideological-intentionalist interpretations of the Holocaust, the controversies around the 
1989 Historians’ Debate, and the 1990s Goldhagen-Browning debates. The structural-
functionalist versus ideological-intentionalist split reflects differing interpretations of 
what caused the Holocaust. The varying “camps” reflect a difference in emphasis (the 
psychology of agents versus the attributes of the social structure), which in some ways 
parallels the tensions to be teased out in the first section of this literature review. I discuss 
the ideological-intentionalist and structural-functionalist debates using Moses’s work in 
Chapter Two. A.D. Moses, “Structure and Agency in the Holocaust: Daniel J. Goldhagen 
and His Critics,” History and Theory 37, no. 2 (1998): 194-219. 
Updating the conversation, Bauer contends that these competing interpretations 
no longer constitute much of a causal debate as a number of historians have sought ways 
to draw on both intentionalist and functionalist positions. See Yehuda Bauer, Rethinking 
the Holocaust (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001), 28-30. 
For an overview of the Historians’ Debate, see Dominick LaCapra, “Representing 
the Holocaust: Reflections on the Historians’ Debate,” in Probing the Limits of 
Representation: Nazism and the “Final Solution,” ed. Saul Friedlander (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1992), 108 - 127. 
For a discussion of the Goldhagen-Browning debates, see Chapter Two, pages 
185-186. 
The answers that are posited tend to reflect disciplinary fault lines in genocide 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
anthropologists spotlighting different aspects of genocide than historians, and political 
scientists examining different phenomenon than sociologists. Again, such divergent 
disciplinary foci are not surprising given the different epistemological beliefs that 
scholars bring to bear under the auspices of the disciplinary umbrella of genocide studies. 
See Michael Rothberg, Traumatic Realism: The Demands of Holocaust Representation 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 5-10. 
52 Ervin Staub, Overcoming Evil: Genocide, Violent Conflict, and Terrorism 
(New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 2011), 15. Phrased differently in his earlier 
work, “Genocide arises from a pattern, or gestalt, rather than from any single source.” 
Ervin Staub, The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 23.  
53 Countless scholars have attempted to identify these warning signs. For 
examples, see the “warning signs,” articulated in Hinton, “The Dark Side,” 29; Barbara 
Harff, “No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing the Risks of Genocide and 
Political Mass Murder since 1955,” American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003): 
57-73; David A. Hamburg, Preventing Genocide: Practical Steps Toward Early 
Detection and Effective Action (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2008), 10; 
Heidenrich, How to Prevent Genocide, 85-86.  
See also note 201 on genocidal priming 
54 As Levene makes clear, “No key analyst offers an entirely monocausal 
explanation” for genocide. Mark Levene, “A Dissenting Voice: Or How Current 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Through the Wrong End of the Telescope, Part I,” Journal of Genocide Research 6, no. 2 
(2004): 163n4. 
55 Although I underscore this in the text, I wish to stress again that this is but a 
sketch of select conversations in Holocaust and genocide studies on the problem of 
causality. As outlined in note 51, numerous significant debates occur over questions of 
causality. In what follows, I highlight literature that should be treated as ends of a 
spectrum rather than diametrically opposed camps with an understanding that few, if any, 
scholars would be so reductivist as to hold genocide’s causes lie only in the “mind” or the 
“social structure.” These particular perspectives on causality are highlighted so as to 
serve as examples of the differential conceptualizations of agency that circulate in these 
causal conversations.  
56 Although Heidenrich expends a considerable amount of space in his book 
talking about aspects of genocide at a more macroscopic level, in his conclusion, he casts 
genocide as more of a psychological phenomenon. I quote from Heidenrich at length to 
demonstrate: “Rather than being compelled by our genes, genocidal behavior has its 
cause in the human psyche, a cause rooted in a fear so deep that this driving fear has 
twisted and corrupted the perpetrator’s intellect, a fear arisen from his own lack of 
unconditional love for himself. Many of us, perhaps most of us, would rather not face our 
innermost feelings about ourselves, a feeling of personal self-doubt or even of self-hatred 
– but that is where the eventual impetus for genocidal behavior originates.” Later, he 
writes, “The ultimate cause and cure of genocide is more psychological than biological, 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 James Waller, Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and 
Mass Killing, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford, 2007), 10. Waller, it should be noted, is 
critical of work that only “follow[s] the shopworn procedure of” citing these two studies 
while ignoring other work in psychology.  
Although I am skeptical of Goldhagen’s work and will critique his scholarship in 
Chapter Two, he, too, is critical of the use of Milgram’s work to explain the 
Holocaust/genocide, concerned that such studies reinforce arguments that remove agency 
from human actors. Goldhagen, Worse Than War, 151-154. 
Staub is not advancing the same criticism of Milgram as Goldhagen; however, his 
description of the Milgram study clearly highlights the complications its poses for 
understandings of agency: “Milgram suggested that people can enter an ‘agentic’ mode in 
which they relinquish individual responsibility and act as agents of authority.” Staub, The 
Roots of Evil, 29. See Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View 
(New York: Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 1974). 
58 Samuel P. Oliner and Pearl M. Oliner, The Altruistic Personality: Rescuers of 
Jews in Nazi Europe (New York: The Free Press, 1988). 
59 Waller, Becoming Evil. 
60 Staub, Overcoming Evil. Staub’s earlier work, although less comprehensive, 
similarly retains a balanced approach to the interaction between the mind and the social 
environment. Staub, The Roots of Evil.  
61 Steven K. Baum, The Psychology of Genocide (Cambridge: Cambridge 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Leonard S. Newman and Ralph Erber, ed., Understanding Genocide: The 
Social Psychology of the Holocaust (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
63 Staub, The Roots of Evil, 13. Staub’s work, overall, is an excellent model and 
works against any inclination to caricature psychological approaches to genocide as only 
concerned with the mindsets of individual agents. Though Staub’s interests primarily lie 
in the study of the psychology of genocide, in both of the texts cited here, Staub balances 
his appreciation of the potency of psychology with an awareness of the ways 
psychological behaviors are influenced by social structures and cultures. See Staub, The 
Roots of Evil, 13-34; Staub, Overcoming Evil, 12-14. 
64 Staub, Overcoming Evil, 14. 
65 Waller, Becoming Evil, 20. 
66 Waller, Becoming Evil, 20. 
67 Waller, Becoming Evil, 20. 
68 Kuper summarizes some of this research in Kuper, Genocide, 51-52. For the 
original arguments and conversations about aggression, instinct, and the Holocaust, see 
Konrad Lorenz, On Aggression, trans. Marjorie Kerr Wilson (New York: Harcourt Brace 
& World, 1966); Erich Fromm, The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness (New York: 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973); Eugen Kogon, The Theory and Practice of Hell: The 
German Concentration Camps and the Systems Behind Them, trans. Heinz Norden, 2nd. 
ed. (New York: Octagon Books, 1976). Although these works are dated, the problematic 
aspects of this perspective (which remove agency and ascribe genocidal violence to 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Staub, in his discussion of evil, notes the ways Hobbes and other theorists’ 
conceptions of human nature correlate with certain beliefs about evil and violence. Staub, 
The Roots of Evil, 26. Although these authors approach their work on genocide with more 
nuance, I would argue that such a conception of human nature animates, in part, Chirot 
and McCauley’s work. Though the authors’ stress the importance of situations as well as 
human proclivities toward peace, their talk of “impulses” and framing of the introduction 
to their text contains elements which arguably seem to reinforce a Hobbesian view of 
humanity, emphasizing the importance of intervention and the need to reroute human 
behavior (through channels that include social and political organization) from the 
propensity to do violent harm. See Daniel Chirot and Clark McCauley, Why Not Kill 
Them All? The Logic and Prevention of Mass Political Murder (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2006), 1-10.  
It is worth noting that the “human nature” argument can also work in the exact 
opposite fashion, by which scholars and authors assume that mass violence violates 
human nature as it defies human beings’ “natural” propensity not to kill one’s species. 
Kuper refers to this as “a liberal assumption as to the nature of human nature or of man in 
society.”  He continues, noting that a liberal assumption is “[t]he assumption … that 
massive slaughter of members of one’s own species is repugnant to [hu]man[ity].” Kuper, 
Genocide, 84. See also Fromm The Anatomy of Human; Chirot and McCauley, Why Not 
Kill Them, 7. 
70 Jonassohn, “What is Genocide?” 24. 
71 Although Levene is not specifically talking about psychological approaches, 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
preventing genocide may be looking at the problem through the wrong end of the 
telescope.”  Levene argues that extant studies of genocide (far beyond psychological 
approaches alone!) may be suffering from “myopic vision.” Overall, Levene contends 
that a much more “macro-context” oriented approach is necessary. The problem, in short, 
is one of sight, and scholars need to broaden their lenses. Levene, “A Dissenting Voice,” 
154, 162, 163. 
72 Helen Fein, Genocide: A Sociological Perspective (London: Sage Publications, 
1993), 44.  
73 Mark Levene, “A Moving Target, the Usual Suspects and (Maybe) a Smoking 
Gun: The Problem of Pinning Blame in Modern Genocide,” Patterns of Prejudice 33, no. 
4 (1999): 20, 24.   
74 Levene, “A Dissenting Voice,” 155. Levene charges that this is an assumption 
that tends to underlie many of the works of note in genocide studies. See Levene, “A 
Dissenting Voice,” 163-164n4. 
75 As Levene expands upon this idea elsewhere: “To return to our basic 
proposition: genocide, instead of being treated as a series of unrelated aberrations, 
afflicting only god-forsaken peoples whose cultural idiosyncracies or ideological 
borrowings predispose them in this direction but who otherwise have no relationship to a 
normative modernity rather needs to be viewed as one critical by-product—though, I 
should emphasize very far from the an exclusive one—of what is actually a very 
seriously dysfunctional modern international system. Or to put it another way, the micro-
level of radicalized state violence cannot in the twentieth century be isolated from the 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
hatred against a particular group or groups can be disentangled from hegemonic, 
globalizing pressures which may finally and fatally push it over the genocidal precipice.” 
Levene, “A Dissenting Voice,” 162. 
76 Mark Levene, Genocide in the Age of the Nation-State, vol. 1, The Meaning of 
Genocide (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005), 32.  
77 Levene, Genocide. 
78 As an aside, Levene notes that these causal factors are not only implicated in 
the causal politics surrounding mass atrocity, “together they represent, on the one hand, 
the most profound shift in human development since the Iron Age and, on the other, key 
fundaments upon which contemporary (or at least Western) society’s peace, security and 
well-being have become largely assured.” Levene, Genocide, 11.  
Additional scholarship on these causal factors is identified in the paragraphs to 
follow, spanning pages 94-97. 
79 As Hinton reminds readers, these concepts are also linked in paradoxical ways. 
Hinton explains, “Paradoxically, however, modernity is also associated with the 
centralization of political control and the predominance of state sovereignty, creating a 
situation in which modern subjects are regulated by state disciplines that may necessitate 
the very type of bodily suffering their ‘rights’ are supposed to protect against.” 
He continues, “Moreover, since modern states, like modern subjects, are supposed 
to have ‘rights’ over their body politic, other states cannot violate their sovereignty, 
leading to another paradox in which international inaction about genocide is legitimated 
by metanarratives of modernity.” Hinton, “The Dark Side,” 25-27.   





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press, 2000). 
82 Bureaucracy is an especially prominent part of the conversation about causality 
as it manifests well-known scholarship on Holocaust causality.  See Staub’s review of 
these theses and reflections on the role of bureaucracy, Staub, Overcoming Evil, 9-10; 
Staub, The Roots of Evil, 28-29. 
83 Bartov adds industrial killing to this list as well. Omer Bartov, Murder in Our 
Midst: The Holocaust, Industrial Killing, and Representation (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1996). 
84 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, 110. 
85 Hinton, “The Dark Side,” 1, 7-12.   
86 Hinton, “The Dark Side,” 27.   
87 As alluded to by this remark, the relationship between modernity and genocide 
is complex as modernity both creates the conditions for genocide even as genocide 
unravels the foundations of “modern” life. Quoting Hinton, “If modernity inflicts 
genocide, then genocide, in turn, inverts modernity, as it creates diasporic communities 
that threaten to undermine its culminating political incarnation, the nation-state.” Hinton, 
“The Dark Side,” 26. 
88 Levene, Genocide, 14-18. In addition to the works cited below, the nation-state 
or nationalism is also linked to genocide in Jonassohn, “What is Genocide,” 24-25; Staub, 
Roots, 19. 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Hayden, “Schindler’s Fate.” Hayden regards the designation of “genocide” or 
“ethnic cleansing” as politically motivated. The usage of the term is thus contingent upon 
the perception of the state asserting control over its territory. 
91 Levene, “Why Is the Twentieth,” 317. Moses, “Conceptual Blockages,” 177-
180. 
92 Moses, “Conceptual Blockages,” 177-180. 
93 Larry Ray, “Memory, Trauma and Genocidal Nationalism,” Sociological 
Research Online 4, no. 2 (1999): http://www.socresonline.org.uk/4/2/ray.html. See also 
Jie-Hyun Lim, “Victimhood Nationalism in Contested Memories: National Mourning and 
Global Accountability,” in Memory in a Global Age: Discourses, Practices and 
Trajectories, ed. Aleida Assmann and Sebastian Conrad (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010), 138-162. 
94 Numerous scholars treat genocide as triggered by the memories of other events 
in the nation’s past. Kosicki, coining the term “victim-aggressor memory,” argues that 
genocides result from the memory of previous abuse or mistreatment of the current 
aggressors at the hands of the current victims, a cycle he contends the world witnessed 
during the Rwandan genocide. Similarly, Buckley-Zistel describes the muting of memory 
in post-genocide Rwanda to avoid inciting additional violence. Piotr H. Kosicki, “Sites of 
Aggressor-Victim Memory: The Rwandan Genocide, Theory and Practice,” International 
Journal of Sociology 37, no. 1 (2007): 10-29; Susanne Buckley-Zistel, “Remembering to 
Forget: Chosen Amnesia as a Strategy for Local Coexistence in Post-Genocide Rwanda,” 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Kuper, Genocide, 44-48, 57-83; Vinay Lal, “Genocide, Barbaric Others, and 
the Violence of Categories: A Response to Omer Bartov,” American Historical Review 
103, no. 4 (1998): 1188-1190. Sartre, On Genocide.  
96 Levene, Genocide, 11-12. 
97 See John H. Bodley, Victims of Progress, 2nd ed. (Menlo Park, CA: The 
Benjamin/Cummings Publishing Company, Inc., 1982); Churchill, A Little Matter; David 
E. Stannard, American Holocaust: Columbus and the Conquest of the New World (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1992). 
For other perspectives on the relationship between the state, indigenous 
populations, and genocide, see Helen Fein, “Scenarios of Genocide: Models of Genocide 
and Critical Response,” in Toward the Understanding and Prevention of Genocide: 
Proceedings of the International Conference on the Holocaust and Genocide, ed. Israel 
W. Charny (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984, 8-9; Leo Kuper, The Prevention of 
Genocide (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985), 151. 
98 Levene, Genocide, 11-12. 
99 Levene, Genocide, 12. For additional backing for this assertion, Levene turns to 
Todorov and Finzsch. Tzvetan Todorov, The Conquest of America (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1984); Norbert Finzsch, “‘The Aborigines…Were Never Annihilated, and Still 
They Are Becoming Extinct’: Settler Imperialism and Genocide in Nineteenth-Century 
American and Australia,” in Empire, Colony, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation, and 
Subaltern Resistance in World History, ed. A. Dirk Moses (New York: Berghahn Books, 
2008), 253-270. 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Jacques Semelin, Purify and Destroy: The Political Uses of Massacre and 
Genocide, trans. Cynthia Schoch (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 2-3. 
Notably, Semelin is not talking specifically about post-liberal approaches here. His larger 
concern in this passage is any causal theory that strips accountability. 
102 Levene in his book responds to this by noting that genocide is “possible” not 
“inevitable.” Levene, Genocide, 18. Although working from a different theoretical 
vantage point (psychology), Staub, too, works around the problem of inevitability by 
instead discussing probability. Staub, The Roots of Evil, 23; Staub, Overcoming Evil, 35. 
103 Such positions’ “claim that genocide is coextensive with the reproductive 
needs of a certain system suggests the normalization of the genocidal process and the 
concomitant impossibility of devising preventive measures against a process that is part 
of everyday life.” Andreopoulos, “Introduction,” 9.  
104 Andreopoulos, “Introduction,” 9. 
105 Although Kuper is not talking about television, he captures the problem of 
accessing and understanding genocide well. He holds, “Yet even in the particular case, 
the enormity of the genocide seems to defy understanding. It is individual suffering 
which speaks to us most directly and meaningfully – the account of a survivor; the 
anguish of a mutilated baby; an Italian Consul’s despair as witness to an episode in the 
Turkish genocide against Armenians; a young boy’s first view of Auschwitz at the time 
of the German annihilation of Hungarian Jews; the narrative of a husband and wife 
moving from a Polish ghetto through the death camps to a heartbreaking reunion with 






	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 On television being ill-suited for the representation of collective issues see 
Roderick P. Hart, Seducing America: How Television Charms the Modern Voter (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Darrell Y. Hamamoto, Nervous Laughter: 
Television Situation Comedy and Liberal Democratic Ideology (New York, Praeger, 
1989); Bonnie J. Dow, Prime-Time Feminism: Television, Media Culture, and the 
Women’s Movement Since 1970 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996); 
Margaret J. Heide, Television Culture and Women’s Lives: thirtysomething and the 
Contradictions of Gender (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995). 
107 See the Introduction, page 46n25. 
108 Jeffrey Shandler, While America Watches: Televising the Holocaust (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 212-213. 
109 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders, 4th ed., Text Rev. (Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000). 
110 On the expanding the definition of “trauma,” see Cathy Caruth, “Introduction” 
in Trauma: Explorations in Memory, ed. Cathy Caruth (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins 
Press, 1995), 3-4; Peter Gray and Kendrick Oliver, “Introduction” in The Memory of 
Catastrophe, ed. Peter Gray and Kendrick Oliver (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2004), 9-10. For examples of the application of the traumatic framework, see 
Adam Lowenstein, “Introduction: The Allegorical Moment,” in Shocking Representation: 
Historical Trauma, National Cinema, and the Modern Horror Film (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2005), 1-16; Dominick LaCapra, Representing the 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 Gray and Oliver, “Introduction,” 9-12; Duncan Bell, “Introduction: Memory, 
Trauma, and World Politics,” in Memory, Trauma, and World Politics: Reflections on the 
Relationship Between Past and Present, ed. Duncan Bell (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2006), 7 -9. 
112 Jeffrey C. Alexander, “Toward a Theory of Cultural Trauma” in Cultural 
Trauma and Collective Identity, ed. Jeffrey C. Alexander, Ron Eyerman, Bernhard 
Giesen, Neil J. Smelser and Piotr Sztompka (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2004), 8. 
113 Alexander, “Toward a Theory,” 9-10; Jenny Edkins, Trauma and the Memory 
of Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), xiv. Although Gray and 
Oliver use the term “catastrophe” to talk through this temporal break, their conception of 
a disruption of temporality is useful. See Gray and Oliver, “Introduction,” 7-8; Bell, 
“Introduction,” 7. 
114 Gray and Oliver, “Introduction,” 8. 
115 Both Kosicki and Gray and Oliver suggest the ways in which trauma studies 
may be of use to memory studies. Kosicki highlights a lacuna in Halbwachs’ original 
work on collective memory: Halbwachs’s failure to theorize about collective memory in 
times of trauma. Kosicki attempts to begin to fill this void. See Kosicki, “Sites of 
Aggressor-Victim,” 10-29.  
Gray and Oliver’s conception of catastrophe as contingent upon a sense of 
temporal “break” or cleavage, “place[s] the processes of memory at the very core of 
catastrophe studies,” a productive intervention for my own study’s purposes. As they 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
life before the disaster and after that disaster; thus, “catastrophes are structured by the 
presence of memory.” See Gray and Oliver, “Introduction,” 8.  
116 Kirby Farrell, “Introduction: Trauma as Interpretation of Injury,” in Post-
traumatic Culture: Injury and Interpretation in the Nineties (Baltimore, MD: John 
Hopkins University Press, 1998), 1-33. 
117 Gray and Oliver, “Introduction,” 11. For an example of this extensive 
application of “trauma,” see Gina Ross’ book on trauma and the media. In her book, she 
holds, “[e]ven seemingly small events can be devastating and trigger traumatic 
symptoms.” Amongst these events, she includes “mercilessly tickling.” Gina Ross, “What 
Everyone Should Know About Trauma,” in Beyond the Trauma Vortex: The Media’s 
Role in Healing Fear, Terror, & Violence (Berkeley, CA: North Atlantic Books, 2003), 
4. 
118 Bell, “Introduction” 9-10. Bell advances this argument by drawing heavily on 
Bourke. See Joanna Bourke, “When the Torture Becomes Humdrum,” Times Higher 
Education, February 10, 2006, 
http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/story.asp?storyCode=201299&sectioncode=26.  
119 Frank Furedi, “Introduction,” in Therapy Culture: Cultivating Vulnerability in 
an Uncertain Age (New York: Routledge, 2004), 21. 
120 Furedi, “Introduction,” 6-8. 
121 Dana L. Cloud, Control and Consolation in American Culture and Politics: 
Rhetorics of Therapy (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc., 1998). See also Mari 
Boor Tonn, “Taking Conversation, Dialogue, and Therapy Public,” Rhetoric & Public 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 Michael S. Roth and Charles G. Salas, “Introduction,” in Disturbing Remains: 
Memory, History, and Crisis in the Twentieth Century, ed. Michael S. Roth and Charles 
G. Salas (Los Angeles, CA: The Getty Research Institute, 2001), 3. 
123 Roth and Salas, “Introduction,” 2.  
124 Saul Friedlander, “Introduction,” in Probing the Limits of Representation: 
Nazism and the “Final Solution,” ed. Saul Friedlander (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1992), 1-21. David Brenner, “Working Through the Holocaust 
Blockbuster: Schindler’s List and Hitler’s Willing Executioners, Globally and Locally,” 
The Germanic Review 75, no. 4 (2000): 296-297. It is important to pause to note here that 
most of these debates are about the representation of Holocaust memory specifically. The 
contestations discussed in the Introduction regarding the uniqueness thesis complicate the 
applicability of Brenner’s and Friedlander’s arguments to other genocides. 
125 Kyriakides’s work probes the meaning of Adorno’s remarks on representation, 
arguing that his famed line about post-Holocaust art is often misunderstood. Yvonne 
Kyriakides, “Commentary: ‘Art After Auschwitz is Barbaric’: Cultural Ideology of 
Silence through the Politics of Representation,” Media, Culture & Society 27, no. 3 
(2005): 441-450. 
126 Friedlander, “Introduction,” 3.  
127 Friedlander, “Introduction,” 3. [italics in the original] 
128 Friedlander, “Introduction,” 1-5. As Friedlander explains, some of the 
viewpoints that surfaced during the Historians’ Debate (mentioned above) created the 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 Of course, this recalls the powerful assertion made by Primo Levi on the need 
for a new “language” in order to capture the horror of the Holocaust: “Just as our hunger 
is not that feeling of missing a meal, so our way of being cold has need of a new word.  
We say ‘hunger’, we say ‘tiredness’, ‘fear’, ‘pain’, we say ‘winter’ and they are different 
things.  They are free words, created and used by free men who lived in comfort and 
suffering in their homes.  If the Lagers had lasted longer a new, harsh language would 
have been born; and only this language could express what it means to toil the whole day 
in the wind, with the temperature below freezing, wearing only a shirt, underpants, cloth 
jacket and trousers, and in one’s body nothing but weakness, hunger and knowledge of 
the end drawing nearer.” See Primo Levi, Survival in Auschwitz: The Nazi Assault on 
Humanity, trans. Stuart Woolf (1958; New York: Touchstone, 1996), 123.  
This insufficiency also recalls one of Kurasawa’s major concerns, building off the 
writing of Paul Celan, about the difficult labor of “bearing witness” to atrocity. See 
Fuyuki Kurasawa, “A Message in a Bottle: Bearing Witness as a Mode of Transnational 
Practice,” Theory, Culture & Society 26, no. 1 (2009): 95. Again, see too Friedlander, 
“Introduction,” 5. 
130 Naomi Mandel, “Rethinking ‘After Auschwitz’: Against a Rhetoric of the 
Unspeakable in Holocaust Writing,” boundary 2 28, no. 2 (2001): 203-228. 
131 Kyriakides, “‘Art After Auschwitz.’”  
The argument that limiting the modes of representation has a crippling effect on 
Holocaust and genocide knowledge also appears in Lentin’s work. Ronit Lentin, 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Presenting the Shoah for the Twenty-First Century, ed. Ronit Lentin (New York: 
Berghahn Books, 2004), 1-24. 
132 Shandler, “Introduction,” xvii. 
As a case study, see Hansen’s review of the debates around representation in 
Schindler’s List. Miriam Bratu Hansen, “Schindler’s List Is Not Shoah: The Second 
Commandment, Popular Modernism, and Public Memory,” Critical Inquiry 22, no. 2 
(1996): 292-312. 
133 This list of factors for consideration in assessing Holocaust or genocide 
representations is by no means exhaustive. Other debates concern the question of 
“closure.” See James E. Young, At Memory’s Edge: After-Images of the Holocaust in 
Contemporary Art and Architecture (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000).  
Hesford also explores the problem of identification between the witness/victim 
and audiences and the power dynamics involved in such acts of identification. See 
Wendy S. Hesford, “Documenting Violations: Rhetorical Witnessing and the Spectacle of 
Distant Suffering,” Biography 27, no. 1 (2004): 104-144; Wendy S. Hesford, “Media 
Review: Rhetorical Memory, Political Theater, and the Traumatic Present,” 
Transformations XVI, no 2 (2005): 104-117.  
134 Shandler, While America Watches, 212-213. 
135 This rise of the survivor as the authority in meaning making can be located 
within a shift during the second half of the nineteenth century. As Holocaust memory 
transitioned to become a larger part of public memorial culture so too did the survivor 
move from the background (seeking to blend in and assimilate) to the foreground, and the 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and the Shaping of Holocaust Memory in America (Seattle: University of Washington 
Press, 2001), 22-23; Peter Novick, The Holocaust in American Life (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1999), 8-9. For more on “survivors,” see Pamela Ballinger, “The 
Culture of Survivors: Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Traumatic Memory,” History 
& Memory 10, no. 1 (1998): 99-132. 
136 Eli Wiesel, “Opening Address,” in Remembering for the Future: The 
Holocaust in an Age of Genocide, ed. John K. Roth and Elisabeth Maxwell, vol. 1: 
History (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 9.  
137 Wiesel, “Opening Address,” 11.  
138 Stephen C. Feinstein, “Introduction: A Scream/A Repetition/A 
Transformation,” in Absence/Presence: Critical Essays on the Artistic Memory of the 
Holocaust, ed. Stephen C. Feinstein (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2005), 
xxiii. 
139 Feinstein, “Introduction,” xxiii.  
140 Bauman, Mintz, and Hungerford all offer variants on this theme. Bauman is 
worried about the consequences of an intergenerational transmission of the “privileged 
status” (of victimhood) from Holocaust survivors to their offspring. Mintz argues against 
ceding privileged status in meaning making by using Fish’s notion of the “interpretative 
community” to discuss claims to Holocaust memory. Hungerford is weary of what these 
privileges in meaning making might mean for/to academics. She writes, “And the 
emerging discipline we are calling Holocaust Studies has become beholden to statements 
of personal connection, to the need to explain one’s connection to one’s subject in a way 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the use of trauma as an interpretative framework that limit rather than expand the 
production of knowledge in Holocaust and genocide studies. See Mintz, Popular Culture, 
170-178; Zygmunt Bauman, “The Holocaust’s Life as a Ghost,” Tikkun 13, no. 4 (1998): 
33-38; Hungerford, The Holocaust of Texts, 155.  
141 Norfolk, For Most of It; Barbie Zelizer, Remembering to Forget: Holocaust 
Memory Through the Camera’s Eye (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), 
85. In contrast, Hughes advances a competing argument about the decay and the 
impermanence of the image. See Rachel Hughes, “The Abject Artefacts of Memory: 
Photographs from Cambodia’s Genocide,” Media, Culture & Society 25 (2003): 23-44. 
142 Shandler argues, “Public memory is conventionally thought of as being best 
served by phenomena with purportive powers of endurance, such as stone monuments, 
official public celebrations, or texts that are widely circulated and regularly read. 
Television, inherently ephemeral and elusive, might well seem inimical to 
remembrance.” Shandler, While America Watches, 259-260. See also Andrew Hoskins, 
“Signs of the Holocaust: Exhibiting Memory in a Mediated Age,” Media, Culture, 
Society 25 (2003): 7-22.   
On a related note, in his discussion of postmodernism, Hartman argues that “[i]n 
the light of media over-exposure the evil of the Holocaust becomes strangely weightless.” 
See Geoffrey H. Hartman, “Introduction: Darkness Visible,” in Holocaust Remembrance: 
The Shapes of Memory, ed. Geoffrey H. Hartman (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 11.  
143 Markovitz highlights the ways these issues around creative license are 
foregrounded in Ararat. Jonathan Markovitz, “Ararat and Collective Memories of the 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 Rothberg, Traumatic Realism, 7-10.  
145 Friedlander, “Introduction,” 5.  
146 Friedlander, “Introduction,” 4-5. 
147 Rothberg suggests that these differences in epistemological perspectives can be 
observed within and contribute to the disciplinary divisions that appear within Holocaust 
and genocide studies. Rothberg, Traumatic Realism, 5-6. 
148 Lentin, too, identifies the contours of these contrasting perspectives. In her 
words, “Beyond the sayability versus unsayability crisis, a further crisis in representation 
is the tension between historical ‘facts’ and interpretation, or the dilemma of historical 
relativism versus aesthetic experimentation in the face of the need for ‘truth’, on the one 
hand, and the problems raised by the opaqueness of the events and the opaqueness of 
language, on the other.” Lentin, “Introduction,” 3.  
149 Janet Walker, “Catastrophe, Representation, and the Vicissitudes of Memory,” 
in Trauma Cinema: Documenting Incest and the Holocaust (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2005), 25; Lowenstein, “Introduction,” 3-6. 
150 Brenner, “Working Through the Holocaust,” 297. 
151 Zelizer, “Introduction,” 2. 
152 Walker, “Catastrophe, Representation,” 24-25. Notably, Walker draws on a 
few other scholars to advance this point. See also Bartov, Murder in Our Midst, 171-175; 
Stone, History, Memory, 125. 
Markovitz charges that a similar position is advanced in Ararat: “Egoyan’s film, 
on the other hand, refutes the notion that the past can be depicted in a transparent manner, 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
memories of genocide are constructed and – equally importantly – erased.” Markovitz, 
“Ararat and Collective Memories,” 236. 
For an interesting case study on the centrality of invention, in the production of an 
“authentic” tourist experience at Auschwitz, see Chris Keil, “Sightseeing in the Mansions 
of the Dead,” Social & Cultural Geography 6, no. 4 (2005): 479-94. 
153 Walker, “Catastrophe, Representation,” 25-27; Feinstein, “Introduction,” xxxi-
xxxii; Lowenstein, “Introduction,” 1-6. 
154 Stone, History, Memory, 125. Hartman charges, “The influence of the media, 
the penetration of their simulacra into daily life, prompts a deep anxiety about forgery, or 
counterfeit evidence.” Hartman, “Introduction,” 17. See also Walker, “Catastrophe, 
Representation,” 25; Markovitz, “Ararat and Collective Memories.” 
155 Numerous works have been written about these controversies, and it is beyond 
the scope of this paper to provide an exhaustive account of such work. For an 
introduction to these controversies and their connections to rhetoric and public memory, 
see Stone, History, Memory, 143-145; Hal Cohen, “The Unmaking of Rigoberta 
Menchú,” in Genocide, Collective Violence, and Popular Memory: The Politics of 
Remembrance in the Twentieth Century, ed. David E. Lorey and William H. Beezley 
(Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2002), 53-64; Roberto Avant-Mier and 
Marouf A. Hasian, Jr., “Communicating ‘Truth’: Testimonio, Vernacular Voices, and the 
Rigoberta Menchú Controversy,” The Communication Review 11 (2008): 323-345; 
Marouf Hasian, Jr., “Authenticity, Public Memories, and the Problematics of Post-
Holocaust Remembrances: A Rhetorical Analysis of the Wilkomirski Affair,” Quarterly 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 Although not specifically about genocide, Sontag’s work on photographic 
images of war and violence provides an excellent introduction to some of the ethical 
quandaries facing the mediation of horrific content. See Susan Sontag, Regarding the 
Pain of Others (New York: Picador, 2003). 
157 White’s work engages a very different context. She is talking about the genre 
of historical fiction (as represented through “nostalgic” television shows) and the 
problems that arise from (re)mediating racism and sexism. Nonetheless, her point 
resonates with Crane’s argument. Not only do these representations continually 
disseminate images of violence, in both cases, the lesson imparted through such 
mediation is that this violent past is “over” (with the attendant and implied belief that the 
present must be more progressive).  See Mimi White, “‘Reliving the Past Over and Over 
Again’: Race, Gender, and Popular Memory in Homefront and I’ll Fly Away,” in Living 
Color: Race and Television in the United States, ed. Sasha Torres (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 1998), 122. See also Hesford, “Documenting Violations,” 107-108; 
Susan A. Crane, “Choosing Not to Look: Representation, Repatriation, and Holocaust 
Atrocity Photography,” History and Theory 47 (October 2008): 309-330. 
158 Crane, “Choosing Not to Look,” 311. This problem of privileging the gaze of 
the perpetrator is taken up in Hesford’s essays as well as in Keil’s work. Hesford, 
“Rhetorical Memory,” 104; Hesford, “Documenting Violations,” 119; Keil, “Sightseeing 
in the Mansions,” 488.  
The replication of the perpetrator’s gazes raises other problems associated with 
witnessing, which Hesford refers to as the “crisis of witnessing” (106-107). As Hesford 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
individual(s); they are stripped of power and seen only as victims. This also complicates 
the relationships between the abused and the witness by creating a power imbalance. 
Hesford elaborates upon the problems challenging these relationships in both of her 
essays cited in this note.  
159 Crane, “Choosing Not to Look,” 315. 
160 Crane, “Choosing Not to Look,” 316.  
Although I do not engage these issues here, Dean interrogates similar lines of 
argument regarding the representation of the Holocaust as a reflection of larger tensions 
pertaining to understandings of empathy in the wake of the Holocaust. Carolyn J. Dean, 
The Fragility of Empathy after the Holocaust (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
2004). 
161 Heidenrich, How to Prevent Genocide, 258. 
162 Samuel Totten, “The Intervention and Prevention of Genocide: Where There Is 
the Political Will, There Is a Way,” in Century of Genocide: Eyewitness Accounts and 
Critical Views, ed. Samuel Totten, William S. Parsons, and Israel W. Charny, 2nd ed. 
(New York: Routledge, 1997), 477-481. 
163 Totten “The Intervention,” 477. Thomas G. Weiss and Don Hubert, The 
Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background, Supplemental Report of 
the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa, ON: 
International Development Research Centre, 2001), 5-14.  
164 Totten “The Intervention,” 477. Totten draws on the work of Weiss and Hubert 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
According to Kranser, upon the conclusion of the Thirty Years War, the Treaty of 
Westphalia established “the modern international system as a universe composed of 
sovereign states, each with exclusive authority within its own geographic boundaries.” 
Stephen D. Krasner, “Compromising Westphalia,” International Security 20, no. 3 
(1995/96): 115. 
165 Ben Voth and Aaron Noland, “Argumentation and the International Problem of 
Genocide,” Contemporary Argumentation and Debate 28 (2007): 40. 
166 Kuper, Genocide, 161-185; Voth and Noland, “Argumentation.” 
167 Kuper, Genocide, 161. 
168 Robert I. Rotberg, “Deterring Mass Atrocity Crimes: The Cause of Our Era,” 
in Mass Atrocity Crimes: Preventing Future Outrages, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Cambridge, 
MA: World Peace Foundation / Harvard Kennedy School Program on Intrastate Conflict / 
Washington, D.C., Brookings Institute Press, 2010), 7-8; Hinton, “The Dark Side,” 25, 
27. 
169 Totten, “The Intervention,” 477-479. See also Helen Fein, Human Rights and 
Wrongs: Slavery, Terror, Genocide (Boulder CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2007), 228; 
Weiss and Hubert, The Responsibility to Protect, 8-14. 
The scholarship on transnational memory discussed later in this chapter similarly 
expounds upon this theme. See pages 117-118, 123-124, 167-168n228-234; 174n271-
273.  
170 Power, “A Problem from Hell,” 508-510; Semelin, Purify and Destroy, 366. 
171 Leo Kuper, “Reflections on the Prevention of Genocide,” in Genocide Watch, 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Ronayne demonstrates this contention in practice through his analysis of the 
United States’ responses to genocide. Peter Ronayne, Never Again? The United States 
and the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide since the Holocaust (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001). 
172 Kuper, “Reflections,” 141. 
173 Ronayne, Never Again? 4. 
174 Kenneth Roth, foreword to Annihilating Difference: The Anthropology of 
Genocide, ed. Alexander Laban Hinton (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 
x. 
175 Roth, foreword, x. 
176 See the discussion of Somalia as an illustrative example later in this study. 
Pages 418-419, 473n213-474n214. 
177 Totten, “The Intervention,” 479. 
178 Totten, “The Intervention.” 
179  Power, “A Problem from Hell,” xv. 
180  Power, “A Problem from Hell,” xxi.  
181 Many scholars in the field attempt to nuance their assessment of the state of 
genocide prevention work, seeking to provide a sense of hope or reasons for optimism. 
Fowler, Totten & Parsons, and Roth all highlight some advances and signs of progress in 
the scholarship and practice of genocide prevention. Totten and Parsons, “Introduction;” 
Roth, “Epilogue;” Jerry Fowler, “Out of that Darkness: Responding to Genocide in the 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Samuel Totten, William S. Parsons, and Israel W. Charny, 2nd ed.  (New York: 
Routledge, 1997), 465-467. 
182 In a 1992 publication, Kuper offered a chapter that concludes with a sense of 
hopefulness that the end of the Cold War could create an international climate better 
adapted to human rights work. He suggests the U.S. ratification of 1948 UN Convention 
could potentially signify an increased US role in genocide prevention work.  Kuper 
argues that this historical moment could “provide an opportunity to activate the United 
States to use its aid policies, trade relations, and diplomatic and other resources to resume 
the leading role in the prevention of genocide that it took in the Nuremberg trials and in 
the framing of the Genocide Convention.” See Kuper, “Reflections,” 161. 
183 Katharine R. Bigelow, “A Campaign to Deter Genocide: The Bahá’í 
Experience,” in Genocide Watch, ed. Helen Fein (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1992), 189-196; Totten, “The Intervention,” 486-488; Kuper, “Reflections,” 139. 
Totten also suggests the Bahá’í example be studied in conjunction with the intervention 
efforts in East Timor in 1999. 
184 Power takes the title of her book from a statement made by former US 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher about Bosnia. Reproducing the quote as it appears 
in her text, Power quotes Christopher as saying, “‘It’s really a tragic problem…The 
hatred between all three groups – the Bosnians and the Serbs and the Croatians – is 
almost unbelievable. It’s almost terrifying, and it’s centuries old. That really is a problem 
from hell.’” As Power aptly notes, this kind of assertion aligns with the position that 
genocide is “inevitable” and works against intervention/prevention. See Power, “A 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
certain parts of the world or certain peoples is also developed in Voth and Noland, 
“Argumentation,” 38-46. 
185 Chirot and McCauley, Why Not Kill, 5.  
186 Chirot and McCauley, Why Not Kill, 5. 
187 David H. Jones, “On the Prevention of Genocide: The Gap between Research 
and Education,” War Crimes, Genocide, & Crimes against Humanity 1, no. 1 (2005): 5-
46. 
188 Jones, “On the Prevention,” 8 
189 Heidenrich, How to Prevent Genocide, 261. 
190 Israel W. Charny, “Preface: Which Genocide Matters More? Learning to Care 
about Humanity,” in Century of Genocide: Eyewitness Accounts and Critical Views, ed. 
Samuel Totten, William S. Parsons, and Israel W. Charny, 2nd ed. (New York: 
Routledge, 1997), xv. 
191 Charny, “Preface,” xv. 
192 Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after 
Genocide and Mass Violence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 3. 
193 Totten and Parsons, “Introduction,” 10-11. 
194 Hamburg, Preventing Genocide, 13. 
195 Jones, “On the Prevention.” 
196 Jones, “On the Prevention,” 11. 
197 Jones, “On the Prevention,” 11. 
198 Fein, Human Rights and Wrongs, 222-224. Fein’s suggestions here seem to 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
genocide. See R. J. Rummel, “Democracy, Power, Genocide, and Mass Murder,” The 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 39, no. 1 (1995): 3-26. 
199 Hamburg, Preventing Genocide, 12-18, 267-273. 
200 Although the International Criminal Court and the threat of legal action have 
been linked by some as a critical part of genocide cessation, Mennecke questions the 
premise underlying such promotions of legal action as a form of deterrence. Martin 
Mennecke, “Punishing Genocidaires: A Deterrent Effect or Not?” Human Rights Review 
8, no. 4 (2007): 319-339. 
For more discussion of the role of the International Criminal Court and genocide 
cessation, see Levene, “A Dissenting Voice;” Rotberg, “Deterring Mass Atrocity 
Crimes,” 8-11. 
201 Hinton describes “genocidal priming” as a precondition for genocide. 
Alexander Laban Hinton, “Introduction: Genocide and Anthropology,” in Genocide: An 
Anthropological Reader, ed. Alexander Laban Hinton (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2002), 
14; Hinton, “The Dark Side,” 29. See also Kuper, The Prevention of Genocide, 281. 
202 Totten, “The Intervention,” 481. 
203 Heidenrich, How to Prevent Genocide, 233-234. 
204 Heidenrich, How to Prevent Genocide, 233-250. 
205 Goldhagen, Worse Than War, 570-571. 
206 Torchin’s book provides a rich history tracing what she discusses as forms of 
media witnessing from Armenia through the conflict in Darfur. Leshu Torchin, Creating 
the Witness: Documenting Genocide on Film, Video, and the Internet (Minneapolis: 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207 See pages 45-46n23.  
208 See Power’s concluding remarks about ignorance as a thin excuse for not 
taking cessation-related action. Power, “A Problem from Hell,” 504-506.  
209 This is the framework that Torchin describes as undergirding faith in the 
media’s role in genocide cessation. See Torchin, Creating the Witness, 1. 
210 Israel W. Charny, “Editor’s Preface,” in Toward the Understanding and 
Prevention of Genocide: Proceedings of the International Conference on the Holocaust 
and Genocide, ed. Israel W. Charny (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), xvii. 
211 Totten, “The Intervention,” 470-472.  
212 Sarah E. Kreps, “Social Networks and Technology in the Prevention of Crimes 
Against Humanity,” in Mass Atrocity Crimes: Preventing Future Outrages, edited by 
Robert I. Rotberg (Cambridge, MA: World Peace Foundation / Harvard Kennedy School 
Program on Intrastate Conflict / Washington, D.C., Brookings Institute Press, 2010), 181. 
213 Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, “Revised Introduction to the English 
Edition,” in The Holocaust and Memory in the Global Age, trans. Assenka Oksiloff 
(Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2006), 10. 
214 Heidenrich, How to Prevent Genocide, 76-77; Roth, “Epilogue,” 332; Totten 
“The Intervention,” 470-472. 
215 See Hartley and Jenkins on the shifting role of audience in meaning making. 
John Hartley, Television Truths (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2008); Henry 
Jenkins, Convergence Culture: Where Old and New Media Collide, updated with a new 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216 Torchin, Creating the Witness, 175. For more on the shortcomings of this form 
of activism, see her discussion of “iWitnesses and CitizenTube.” Torchin, Creating the 
Witness, 172-215. 
From a more optimistic perspective, Ben Voth’s work also explores the 
possibilities created through empowering audiences to participate in genocide cessation 
through new media. Ben Voth, “The Cell Phone vs. the AK-47: The Internet’s Role in 
Stopping Ethnoviolence,” (lecture, February 6, 2012), 
http://web.me.com/benvoth/Ben_Voths_World_of_Rhetoric/Ethnoviolence_Class/Entries
/2012/2/6_cell_phone_vs_ak_47_ethnoviolence.html. 
217 Esra Akcan, “Apology and Triumph: Memory Transference, Erasure, and a 
Rereading of the Berlin Jewish Museum,” New German Critique 110 vol. 37, no. 2 
(Summer 2010): 153-179. 
218 Jenny Edkins, “Remembering Relationality: Trauma Time and Politics,” in 
Memory, Trauma, and World Politics: Reflections on the Relationship Between Past and 
Present, ed. Duncan Bell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 101. 
219 In this capacity, genocide memory demonstrates its usability. “Collective 
Memory is Usable,” Zelizer reminds us. She writes, “collective memory is always a 
means to something else…collective memory is evaluated for the ways in which it helps 
us make connections.” Barbie Zelizer, “Reading the Past against the Grain: The Shape of 
Memory Studies,” Critical Studies in Mass Communication 12, no. 2 (1995): 226. 
[emphasis mine] 
See also Bradford Vivian, “Times of Violence,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 99, 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
220 David B. MacDonald, Identity Politics in the Age of Genocide: The Holocaust 
and Historical Representation (Abdington: Routledge, 2008), 1. 
221 MacDonald, Identity Politics, 2. 
222 The discussion of the Holocaust as “a moral touchstone” comes from Levy and 
Sznaider’s work: “The need for a moral touchstone in an age of uncertainty and the 
absence of master ideological narratives have pushed the Holocaust to prominence in 
public thinking. The Holocaust has become a moral certainty that now stretches across 
national borders and unites Europe and other parts of the world.” See Levy and Sznaider, 
“Revised Introduction,” 18. Shandler contends, “More than a metaphor, the Holocaust 
has become a master moral paradigm, peerless both as a measure of enormity and in the 
catholicity of its application.” Shandler, While America Watches, xii. 
223 Assmann writes, “In the global media age where attention has become the 
currency of a new economy, the prestigious symbol of the Holocaust is used as a 
universal lever to draw attention to other marginalized collective memories.” Aleida 
Assmann, “The Holocaust – a Global Memory? Extensions and Limits of a New Memory 
Community,” in Memory in a Global Age: Discourses, Practices and Trajectories, ed. 
Aleida Assmann and Sebastian Conrad (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 111-112, 
114. 
224 Alan E. Steinweis, “The Auschwitz Analogy: Holocaust Memory and 
American Debates over Intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s,” Holocaust and 
Genocide Studies 19, no. 2 (2005): 277.  
225 Hartman remarks on such overextension: “Such false integration is again a 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
226 Assmann, “The Holocaust,” 111. 
227 The broader discussion of the uniqueness thesis occurs in the Introduction. See 
pages 15-18. 
228 MacDonald, Identity Politics, 2. See also Assmann, “The Holocaust,” 111. 
229 Assmann, “The Holocaust,” 114. 
230 Levy and Sznaider, “Revised Introduction,” 10. Levy and Sznaider ground 
their work in Robertson’s work on globalization and glocalization. Roland Robertson, 
“Glocalization: Time-Space and Homogeneity-Heterogeneity,” in Global Modernities, 
ed. Mike Featherstone, Scott Lash, and Roland Robertson (London: Sage, 1995), 25-44. 
231 Levy and Sznaider, “Revised Introduction,” 10.  
232 The authors suggest that “memories of the Holocaust facilitate the formation of 
transnational memory cultures, which in turn have the potential to become the cultural 
foundation for global human-rights politics.” Levy and Sznaider, “Revised Introduction,” 
4. See also Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, “The Institutionalization of Cosmopolitan 
Morality: The Holocaust and Human Rights,” Journal of Human Rights 3, no. 2 (2004): 
143-157. 
Given Levy and Snzaider’s optimistic assessments of the power of cosmopolitan 
memory, the authors have their critics and have been rebuffed by scholars such as 
Assmann and Conrad as well as Alexander for shortcomings in their arguments. Aleida 
Assmann and Sebastian Conrad, “Introduction,” in Memory in a Global Age: Discourses, 
Practices and Trajectories, ed. Aleida Assmann and Sebastion Conrad (Hampshire/New 
York: Palgrave MacMillan 2010), 8-9; Jeffrey C. Alexander, Remembering the 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
233 Assmann and Conrad, “Introduction,” 7. 
234 Assmann, and Conrad, “Introduction,” 1-16. 
235 Fowler links redemptive beliefs to the discourse on prevention. Fowler, “Out 
of that Darkness,” 457.  Fowler draws on the explanation of the problem of “redemption” 
found in Cynthia Ozick, “Roundtable Discussion: Raul Hilberg, Cynthia Ozick, Aharon 
Appelfeld, Saul Friedländer,” in Writing and the Holocaust, ed. Berel Lang (New York: 
Holmes & Meir, 1988), 277-284. For more on this perspective between remembrance and 
progress, see also Roger I. Simon, Sharon Rosenberg, and Claudia Eppert, “Introduction: 
Between Hope and Despair: The Pedagogical Encounter of Historical Remembrance,” in 
Between Hope and Despair: Pedagogy and the Remembrance of Historical Trauma, ed. 
Roger I. Simon, Sharon Rosenberg, and Claudia Eppert (Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), 1-8. By contrast, Young positions the artists at the 
center of his study in opposition to the redemptive approach. See Young, At Memory’s 
Edge, 2. 
236 The foundational report establishing the United States Holocaust Memorial 
Museum serves as an example of such reasoning. Its authors argue that, “A memorial 
unresponsive to the future would also violate the memory of the past,” bridging their 
present engagement with the memories of the past for the benefit of the future. 
President’s Commission on the Holocaust, “Report to the President,” September 27, 
1979, accessed May 24, 2011, 
http://www.ushmm.org/research/library/faq/languages/en/06/01/commission/.  For more 
on the creation of the USHMM’s Committee on Conscience, see again Fowler, “Out of 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
237 Isabel Wollaston, “Negotiating the Marketplace: The Role(s) of Holocaust 
Museums Today,” Journal of Modern Jewish Studies 4, no. 1 (2005): 74. 
238 Colin Lucas, “Opening Address,” in Remembering for the Future: The 
Holocaust in an Age of Genocide, ed. John K. Roth and Elisabeth Maxwell, vol. 1: 
History (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 3. 
239 See Simon on the trepidation that underlies a perceived “loss” of Holocaust 
memory related to beliefs about genocide cessation: “An unsettling consequence of the 
last two decades of Holocaust cultural memory is a prevalent dominant discourse that 
reduces the significance of this history to the warning ‘we must not let the past be 
repeated.’ This has resulted in a symptomatic repetition in which the imperative to 
remember is acted out in the anxious replay of images and narratives justified as a 
preventive, necessary reiteration given the persisting evils of racism and intolerance.” 
Roger I. Simon, “Museums, Civic Life, and the Educative Force of Remembrance,” The 
Journal of Museum Education 31, no. 2 (2006): 118. 
He expands on this assertion in his notes: “While space limitations here preclude 
a discussion of the range of practices initiated over the last fifty years, the single most 
prevalent shared justification for Holocaust remembrance in North America (across a 
diverse range of schools, museums, public programs, and in relation to built memorials 
and internet websites) is that cultural memory might function as a spur to action that 
would prevent the repetition of genocide.” Simon, “Museums, Civic Life,” 120n6. 
Smith’s arguments here seem to suggest a liturgical performance of memory akin 
to conception functioning with Maier’s work on memory. Maier writes, “In its impulse to 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
impulse, like the Catholic mass which carries out Jesus’s injunction: ‘Do this in memory 
of me.’” Charles S. Maier, “A Surfeit of Memory? Reflections on History, Melancholy 
and Denial,” History and Memory 5, no. 2 (1993): 144. 
240 Bradford Vivian, “On the Language of Forgetting,” Quarterly Journal of 
Speech 95, no. 1 (2009): 89-104; Paul Connerton, “Seven Types of Forgetting,” Memory 
Studies 1, no. 1 (2008): 59-71. 
241 Ignatief essay in Simon Norfolk, For Most of It I Have No Words: Genocide 
Memory Landscape, with an essay by Michael Ignatieff (Stockport: Dewi Lewis press, 
1998). 
242 Ignatief essay in Norfolk, For Most of It, n.pag. 
243 Wiesel, “Opening Address,” 8. 
244 Wiesel, “Opening Address,” 11. 
245 Although Roth’s treatment of genocide is more nuanced than the belief that 
remembrance alone holds the keys to redemption, even his book includes a line 
suggesting “[s]uch remembering could help to bring genocide to an end.” John K. Roth, 
“Will Genocide Ever End? Genocide’s Challenge to Philosophy,” in Genocide and 
Human Rights: A Philosophical Guide, ed. John K. Roth (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005), 151.  
246 The contrast between the optimistic belief that memory of the past would 
safeguard the present from further atrocity and the continued occurrence of genocide in 
the face of memorial efforts has led to responses from mild disappointment to cynicism. 
In the words of Israel Charny, “It also has to be clear to all of us by now that, 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
facts of the past does not in itself free humankind to change the future.” Charny, 
“Editor’s Preface,” xvii.  
Totten and Parsons’s remarks on this subject are also appropriate: “At times it is 
difficult not to be disheartened, especially when governments deny and distort the 
historical record of genocide or do too little or nothing at all when new genocides erupt 
somewhere across the globe. Indeed, at times it is difficult not to wonder whether all the 
scholarship, all the words, and all the pledges to ‘Never Forget’ are simply some type of 
anodyne to ease the pain of the survivors or soothe the conscience of those who deeply 
care about such tragedies but feel impotent to staunch genocide early on. And at times it 
is difficult not to wonder whether those of us who hold out hope that genocide can, at a 
minimum, be halted early on are doing so more out of desperation than any sense of 
objectivity or reality.” Totten and Parsons, “Introduction,” 2. 
Finally, Fowler’s chapter contains the cynical remarks of journalist David Rieff.  
Rieff writes, “For if there was to be no intervention to stop a genocide that was taking 
place, then the phrase ‘never again’ meant nothing more than: Never again would 
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“too much” of a certain kind of memory (referred to as part of an “Auschwitz code”) 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
A similar argument is advanced in Mandel regarding the masking function of the 
“rhetoric of the unspeakable.” Mandel, “Rethinking ‘After Auschwitz.’” See Hungerford 
on privileging memory over learning. Hungerford, The Holocaust of Texts, 155.  
Making the case from a different perspective, Rosenfeld articulates anxiety over 
the dilution of Holocaust memory through its excessive usage in popular culture.  Alvin 
H. Rosenfeld, The End of the Holocaust (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011). 
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this study. Rothberg’s piece examines the work of leading thinkers; thus, his work reveals 
little about how general publics (very much ensconced within particular nation-states) 
grapple with tensions surrounding genocide memory.  The texts in this study must work 
within the limitations on their discourse created by either (a) financial ties to the US 
government or (b) the conservative influence of economic pressures. In the latter cases, 
these texts must find means of attracting audiences. As numerous media studies scholars 
argue, this stymies the potential for social change or radical messaging lending such texts 
a conservative tint (See Introduction, pages 72-73n156). Within these rhetorical contexts, 
challenging the authority of the nation-state becomes considerably more difficult. By 
studying popular representations of genocide cessation discourse for general audiences, 
my study seeks to nuance the assumptions about atrocity memory in light of the rhetorical 
complexities reflected in public texts targeting popular audiences.  
275 In particular, I elevate Moses’s work and Rothberg’s work as examples. Both 
Moses and Rothberg seek to reroute contemporary thought on the problems posed by 
causality and memory in genocide studies away from binary thinking. Both scholars 
make important contributions to the literature (and to this study) by transcending overly 
simplistic binaries. Moses and Rothberg assume a central place in this study because they 
offer resolutions which ameliorate some of the tensions that can be associated with the 
relationships among public agency, state authority, and genocide. Moses’s racial century 
transcends approaches to the colonialism and genocide that would either underappreciate 
structural forces in favor of ceding space for agency or eradicate agency to emphasize 
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CHAPTER TWO  
Proximity, Distance, and Authority in Daniel Jonah Goldhagen’s Worse Than War 
 
“Genocides happen in every corner of the world to every type of people. The numbers in 
the past one hundred years are staggering…All told, in our time there have been more 
than a hundred million innocent victims of genocide—more than all the combat deaths in 
all the wars fought during that time everywhere in the world. Based on the human toll 
alone, genocide and mass slaughter are worse problems plaguing humanity than war.	  	  
	  
We need to understand why.” 
 
-- Daniel Jonah Goldhagen 
Worse Than War1 
 
In April 2010, PBS drew the ire of some of its viewers for its decision to 
collaborate with Daniel Jonah Goldhagen in the production and broadcast of a 
documentary titled Worse Than War (WTW). Commentary on the film’s website reflects 
frustration and disappointment with the network. In the words of one respondent, 
“Goldhagen is a proven fraud…. PBS demeans itself by allowing this charlatan a 
platform.”2 Another charges that “PBS should be ashamed” for “broadcasting Worse 
Than War” because “Goldhagen is too full of himself to be a true scholar and not 
manipulate stories for his personal gain.”3 Of course the comments are not uniformly 
negative. Another post suggests that WTW is “[a] captivating film that is chilling, 
horrifying and fascinating all at once” and a documentary “that EVERYONE should see 
as members of this global community.”4 Another fan offers further praise, concluding 
that, “this is the most powerful view of genocide I have ever watched…. He [Goldhagen] 
has done the research, he has talked with mass murderers to hear their side, he is the more 
thorough [sic] historian and activist I have seen so far.”5 Although the comments on 
PBS’s website reflect a wide range of opinions about WTW’s strengths and weaknesses, 





At their core, the comments above centralize longstanding controversies over 
Goldhagen’s authority. Since the publication of his first book, Hitler’s Willing 
Executioners (HWE), Goldhagen has polarized audiences. He is revered by some as a 
courageous young scholar able to explain the dynamics of historical atrocities. Others, as 
the comments suggest, view Goldhagen as a fraud, a poor scholar lacking the integrity to 
be an expert on matters of genocide and genocide cessation.6   
These authority anxieties percolate throughout WTW. WTW is the cinematic 
adaptation of Goldhagen’s book by the same name. The film and the book introduce 
Goldhagen’s concept of eliminationism.7 Eliminationism is a broad category that includes 
genocide among other forms of violence. By way of elucidating the concept in the film, 
Goldhagen addresses questions surrounding genocide causality and provides an 
introduction to historic atrocities in such places as Armenia, Cambodia, Rwanda, Bosnia, 
and Guatemala. He interviews perpetrators, survivors, and governmental officials in an 
attempt to develop arguments about eliminationism. He concludes the film by positing 
possible resolutions to eliminationist violence.   
Alongside Goldhagen’s analysis of eliminationism, the film includes an extended 
narrative focused on Goldhagen’s relationship with his father, Erich. Together, father and 
son explore their family’s Holocaust past. Goldhagen frequently interviews his father, 
who is also a former professor and Holocaust scholar. Simultaneously, the film slowly 
unpacks Erich Goldhagen’s boyhood experiences during the Holocaust. As the 
documentary progresses, the father and son pair visits a family gravesite as well as Erich 
Goldhagen’s childhood home. Thus, as the film constructs a macro-narrative about the 





Goldhagen family’s direct experience with one example of eliminationist violence: the 
Holocaust. 
 To promote the film PBS developed a website with a host of additional resources 
for viewers. Visitors can stream the film at their convenience through the website and 
learn more about its production.8 The accompanying webpages include resources for 
further reading on the subject,9 including multiple passages from Goldhagen’s book. The 
website polls visitors about the most appropriate methods for genocide cessation and 
includes a tab titled “Get Involved,” which leads visitors to a handful of genocide 
cessation organizations.10  On almost all of the pages, PBS includes comment fields, 
creating space for visitors to register their opinions about the film, Goldhagen’s work, or 
the concept of eliminationism.  
 The promotional materials surrounding the film centralize two of the text’s 
attributes: Goldhagen’s (questionable) authority as a genocide cessation expert and 
WTW’s overtures to popular audiences. These two threads provide the foundation for the 
tensions that circulate throughout WTW as its efforts to enhance Goldhagen’s authority 
undermine a sense of public agency. As the comments on PBS’s website imply, 
Goldhagen is a complicated figure in Holocaust and genocide studies, and WTW is laced 
with arguments fortifying Goldhagen’s embattled ethos. Throughout the film’s attempts 
to define, represent, resolve, and remember the problems posed by genocidal violence, 
WTW bolsters Goldhagen’s authority on the politics of genocide and the public’s role in 
genocide cessation. Such messages about authority hinder WTW’s inclusiveness. In other 
words, even though Goldhagen is ostensibly attempting to engage a broader audience in 





from participating in anti-atrocity measures. The constraints imposed upon genocide 
cessation activity emerge through the ways Goldhagen tethers authority to spatial and 
experiential proximity. Put differently, authority is only bestowed upon individuals with 
direct experiences with atrocity or who inherit the “postmemories” of trauma.11 
Consequently, those without such access to genocide are excluded from participation in 
genocide cessation work. Ultimately, the film glorifies a model for anti-genocide action 
that places all power and responsibility in the hands of a select few, leading to the ironic 
endorsement of passive consumption as the primary avenue through which most 
audiences are positioned to engage with genocide cessation discourses.12 
 By way of establishing the context for this reading of Goldhagen’s film, this 
chapter begins by reviewing the controversies over Goldhagen’s debut publication, 
Hitler’s Willing Executioners. The publication of this book thrust Goldhagen into the 
public eye and ignited considerable debate over his credibility while simultaneously 
raising larger questions about the relationship between academic and non-academic 
engagement with the Holocaust. Lingering questions about authority and the relationship 
between scholarly and popular forms of Holocaust and genocide studies inform WTW. In 
the process of building Goldhagen’s ethos and navigating this fraught academic/popular 
terrain, the film melds incompatible arguments about genocide definitions, 
representations, resolutions, and remembrances. The inconsistencies in each arena are 
reflective of the paradoxical relationship WTW builds between authority and access in 
discussions about genocide. In the conclusion, I complicate the lynchpin in the film’s 
case for Goldhagen’s authority by examining more closely the film’s constructions of 





Goldhagen’s Contentious Relationship with the Academy 
Goldhagen inhabits a liminal position in Holocaust and genocide studies. He 
possesses an elite academic pedigree; yet, his work has been excoriated by respected 
Holocaust historians. At the same time, Goldhagen has had tremendous success as a 
public personality. Multiple critics situate Goldhagen at the nexus of popular and 
academic thought with success in the former arena pitted against rejections from the 
latter. With regard to Goldhagen’s HWE, Lorenz writes that the book “may have made its 
author into a millionaire, but at the same time it has wrecked his academic career.”13 
Jones similarly asserts that “Goldhagen himself has greater celebrity than scholarly status 
these days.”14 Such remarks construct tensions between popular appeal and scholarly 
credibility. The commentary and controversy surrounding Goldhagen’s work raises larger 
questions about the value of the knowledge produced by the media, the academy, and the 
general public. The debates over HWE provide an apt prelude to the interpretations of 
atrocity contained in WTW. 
Goldhagen attained his fame/notoriety in the mid-to-late 1990s for his book, 
Hitler’s Willing Executioners. Trained as a political scientist at Harvard, Goldhagen’s 
doctoral dissertation provided the basis for HWE. Upon its publication, Goldhagen rose 
to a position of international prominence due, in part, to the controversy surrounding the 
book. Goldhagen describes the book as a “radical revision” of existing work on the 
Holocaust.15 Goldhagen situates his book in what he claims is a lacunae in Holocaust and 
genocide studies scholarship, arguing that existing work on the Holocaust has paid 
insufficient attention to the perpetrators.16 Goldhagen contends that the scholarship on the 





tendencies in the scholarship to view perpetrator behavior as a byproduct of situational 
constraints, such as coercion by superiors, obedience to authority, peer pressure, self-
interest, and “bureaucratic myopia.”17 Instead, Goldhagen centralizes perpetrator choice 
as well as what he terms “eliminationist antisemitism” as crucial to explanations of the 
Holocaust. As Goldhagen explicitly states, 
The conclusion of this book is that antisemitism moved many thousands of 
“ordinary” Germans – and would have moved millions more, had they 
been appropriately positioned – to slaughter Jews. Not economic hardship, 
not the coercive means of a totalitarian state, not social psychological 
pressure, not invariable psychological propensities, but ideas about Jews 
that were pervasive in Germany, and had been for decades, induced 
ordinary Germans to kill unarmed, defenseless Jewish men, women, and 
children by the thousands, systematically and without pity.18 
In sum, Goldhagen positions his work to restore perpetrator agency and elevate the 
importance of antisemitism in discussions of the Holocaust. He argues, “Simply put, the 
perpetrators … consulted their own convictions and morality and … judged the mass 
annihilation of Jews to be right.”19  
The publication of the book elicited praise and hostility. Many in the academy 
rejected Goldhagen at the same time the public embraced him.20 Critics perceived the 
book as suffering from substantial flaws in its research, methodology, and tone.21  
Nevertheless, HWE was wildly popular with US and international audiences. The book 
was a New York Times best-seller,22 and when the book was translated into German, the 





Germany’s Democracy Prize.24 Moses contends, “[n]o academic book received greater 
international scholarly and public attention in 1996 and 1997 than Daniel J. Goldhagen’s 
Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust.”25  
The polarized reactions to Goldhagen’s work quickly became an object of 
scholarly inquiry. This disparity between the academic and non-academic responses to 
HWE has raised broader questions about the relationship between scholarly and popular 
understandings of the Holocaust and genocide studies.26 Multiple theses have emerged to 
explain Goldhagen’s public appeal.27 Amongst these theses, scholars have argued that the 
divergent assessments of Goldhagen’s work reflect: (1) critiques of intellectualism or 
“expert” models of knowledge production,28 (2) dissatisfaction with existing genocide 
studies work, and (3) the political demands on US identity construction in the 1990s. 
One explanation for the public’s embrace of the text holds that Goldhagen’s HWE 
capitalized on a kind of anti-intellectual and “anti-establishment” fervor. From one 
perspective, Goldhagen’s story could be read as the narrative of a young, brave man, 
capable of seeing the obvious “truth” elder scholars have missed.29 As Bytwerk explains, 
such interpretations see the book and its reception through the lens of a David and 
Goliath narrative, whereby Goldhagen plays the David to Holocaust studies’ Goliath.30 
Bytwerk’s interpretation is lent support by the audience’s reaction to Goldhagen’s 
appearance on a United States Holocaust Memorial Museum panel. Describing the panel, 
Caplan writes that Goldhagen “was greeted by enthusiastic applause from the audience, 
but when the other historians criticized him, the audience was silent or emitted murmurs 
of dissent.”31 She attributes part of this response to the idea that “junior knuckles being 





visible support for the younger scholar.32 More than a hint of anti-intellectualism can be 
found in such a narrative as “experts” are attacked for their failure to provide the kind of 
answers contained in HWE.33 Put differently, the book offers grounds for the 
advancement of ad populum reasoning over elitist forms of scholarship.34  
From a less pessimistic perspective, the divergent reactions to HWE highlight 
differences in expectations for different modes of knowledge production. Hasian and 
Frank suggest that the reception of HWE presents an opportunity to study the dialectic 
between “expert” and “public” ways of knowing.35 The authors argue that the book’s 
reception reflects whether or not it is treated as history or collective memory.36 Moses 
charges that HWE challenges historians to confront questions pertaining to their 
obligations to the public and the relationship between culturally-produced knowledge and 
universal standards for rationality.37  If not a dismissal of academic ways of knowing, 
then at minimum the wildly divergent responses to HWE contain calls for reconsidering 
the implications of various epistemologies. 
Others have argued that the public’s response to the book does not signify a 
rejection of scholarship writ large, but rather a response to a specific intellectual trend in 
Holocaust and genocide studies. More precisely, Moses reads the book as an index of the 
popularity of structural-functionalism and ideological-intentionalism as competing 
explanatory frameworks for the Holocaust.38 According to Moses, the hallmarks of 
ideological-intentionalism include: (1) an emphasis on ideology, and more specifically, 
anti-Semitism as a cause for the Holocaust, (2) a pronounced focus on perpetrator agency, 
(3) a view of Nazi Germany as an aberration from Western development, (4) the “use [of] 





persecution,” and (6) defense of the uniqueness thesis.39 By contrast, structural-
functionalism posits that “abstract and impersonal structures are to blame for the 
Holocaust.”40 Correspondingly, “the bureaucrat, rather than the ideologue” of 
ideological-intentionalism constitutes the framework’s image of a genocidal 
perpetrator.41 Furthermore, unlike the moralism of ideological-intentionalist writing, 
structural-functionalists adopt “a detached, sober style.”42 
In Moses’s historiography, structural-functionalist interpretations of the Holocaust 
began to gain ground throughout the 1960s and 1980s amid leftist movements willing to 
critique “the unquestioned health and ‘normality’ of Western societies.”43 Significant 
ideological-intentionalists, such as Saul Friendlander, began to soften their earlier 
arguments about intent,44 and structural-functionalist books such as Bauman’s Modernity 
and the Holocaust were published. In 1992, Christopher Browning published Ordinary 
Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland, which drew on the 
foundation set by Raul Hilberg to offer a structural-functionalist explanation of 
perpetrator behavior.45 Given that Browning and Goldhagen investigate the same 
phenomenon (i.e., the behavior of “ordinary” Germans), the two books are commonly 
read as representations of the structural-functionalist school and the ideological-
intentionalist school.46 
Moses and others argue that the reception of Goldhagen’s book symbolizes 
frustration with structural-functionalist approaches.47  Moses suggests that the structural-
functionalist approaches provide an unsatisfying answer to the question “why did the 
Holocaust happen” because they centralize abstract concepts such as “modernity” and 





with seemingly anonymous ‘structures’ and ‘forces’ of history.”49 Thus, Moses reads the 
public’s reaction to Goldhagen’s book as a signal of their “dissatisf[action] with a 
scholarly consensus that makes it very difficult to talk of intention, agency, and 
responsibility in relation to the Holocaust.”50 For all of its faults, Goldhagen’s book 
featured an easily consumable understanding of agency and a simple answer to question 
of the Holocaust’s causality, offering a response to the perceived shortcomings of 
structural-functionalism.51  
 Finally, others theses hold that HWE resonated with audiences because it spoke to 
larger political and intellectual currents circulating among US publics in the late 1990s. 
Most obviously, Goldhagen’s text was published during the height of “Holocaust 
consciousness” as Holocaust memory seemed to preoccupy parts of US popular culture.52 
Thus, HWE was poised to capitalize on an interested audience and offered an argument 
that resonated with their existing knowledge base. As Bartov explains, Goldhagen’s 
position aligned with “what the general public had intuitively known all along [about the 
Holocaust], that it was ‘the Germans’ who had done it, that they had always wanted to do 
it, that they did it because they hated Jews, and that once called upon to do it, they did it 
with great enthusiasm and much pleasure.”53 Such an interpretation pins blame for the 
Holocaust squarely on foreign others,54 which also conveniently halts a broader 
interrogation into genocidal causality.  
In other words, HWE resonates with the view of the Holocaust as the antithesis of 
US political culture.55 In the book’s introduction, Goldhagen clearly casts Germany as a 
strange and foreign culture,56 one which must be observed “with the critical eye of an 





the “alien” foil to “‘normal’ society,”58 which Caplan reads as the US polis. In contrast to 
structural-functionalist explanations which view genocidal violence as endemic,59 
Goldhagen’s framing serves to “absolve” American audiences by reassuring them that 
they had nothing to do with the barbarity that was the Holocaust. Ergo, the book 
establishes a contrast which allows US audiences to craft their identity in contrast to 
German barbarism. Caplan argues that this space for identity construction vis-à-vis a 
German foil was especially important when HWE was released in the late 1990s as the 
US struggled to make sense of its national identity after the Cold War. HWE provided a 
platform that US audiences could use to build an image of the United States in the post-
Cold War that contrasted sharply with Nazi Germany.60 
WTW has proven to be less controversial than HWE;61 nevertheless, it has been 
critiqued by many as suffering from shortcomings similar to the ones ascribed to HWE. 
Such criticisms tend to castigate Goldhagen as a poor researcher. Echoing some of the 
response to HWE, Goldhagen’s research was attacked as overly reductive.62  Gray 
charges Goldhagen with carelessly “lumping together” a variety of different forms of 
political violence.63 Cieplak maintains that the book relies on generalization and 
stereotypes,64 and other reviewers have suggested Goldhagen lacks a familiarity with the 
larger body of literature in Holocaust and genocide studies.65 Others have argued that his 
tone deviates from expectations for scholarship. According to Üngör, “[t]he film 
compensates for …[a] lack of intellectual sophistication with an overdose of moralistic 
indignation about the phenomenon rather than dispassionate reflection.”66 Others describe 





of tone, Romaniuk notes that “[s]ome may find this scholarly inquiry more akin to a 
tedious moralizing lecture or admonition.”70 
In sum, the contestation over Goldhagen's reputation pits scholarly research 
against popular thought in Holocaust and genocide studies. Ash aptly captures the extent 
to which Goldhagen positions himself as an academic insider-outsider. On the one hand, 
Ash stresses that the book has the hallmarks of “academic respectability” due to 
“Goldhagen’s Harvard affiliation and the fact that the dissertation version of the book 
received a prize from the American Political Science Association.”71 However, 
Goldhagen “did not follow the academics usual path to public success via scholarly 
approval;” instead Goldhagen “presented himself to a large public and the media 
directly.”72 As a quasi-public/quasi-academic figure, Goldhagen’s work stands to reveal 
much about the ways US genocide cessation discourse constructs popular understandings 
of the politics of genocide and genocide cessation. Like the texts analyzed in Chapters 
Three and Four, WTW’s genocide cessation discourse is fraught with contradictions and 
offers inconsistent messages about genocide definitions, representations, resolutions, and 
remembrances. While these incompatible frameworks often serve to enhance 
Goldhagen’s authority, they contribute to the disenfranchisement of the audiences WTW 
is ostensibly trying to reach. 
Definitional Debates: Conflicting Frameworks for Understanding Eliminationism  
 At the heart of WTW is what Goldhagen calls “the problem of definition.”73 One 
of the project’s guiding theses concerns the shortcomings of the language used to 
describe atrocities. As Goldhagen explains in the film, “we’ve been missing a critical 





limitations: “[t]erms like ‘genocide’ or even ‘mass murder’ are inadequate to describe the 
phenomenon we have repeatedly witnessed.”75 The inadequacy to which Goldhagen 
refers is a byproduct of the conceptual blindness old terms induce. Rather than focusing 
on specific actions (murder, sterilization, etc.), Goldhagen argues that the field demands a 
name to refer to the broader genus from which all of these individual actions emerge. As 
a corrective, Goldhagen directs the attention of scholars to the problem of eliminationism. 
In his book, he writes, “[e]ven if eliminationism’s many forms are better known by their 
particular and spectacularly horrible consequences and names, such as genocide, the 
desire to eliminate peoples or groups should be understood to be the overarching category 
and the core act, and should therefore be the focus of our study.”76 Although all 
genocides are forms of elimination, not all acts of elimination manifest as genocide.77 
 Goldhagen explains the concept of eliminationism through numerous examples 
both in the book and the film. Primarily the concept takes shape through two conceptual 
frameworks. The first is best understood through the metaphor cluster GENOCIDE IS A 
GAME OF STRATEGY.78 The second can be discussed concisely through Goldhagen’s 
emphasis on “overkill.” These frameworks are not inherently compatible and result in 
conflicting understandings of perpetrator agency. However, they converge in the 
production of readily identifiable agents to blame.79 This establishment of clear 
“wrongdoers” is critical to Goldhagen’s proposed resolutions. As Edelman notes, 
“problems are created so that particular reasons can be offered for public acceptance, and 
… so that particular remedies can be proposed.”80 Ergo, despite the incongruence 





the foundation for WTW’s overall arguments about the politics of genocide cessation by 
shaping perceptions of perpetrator behavior.  
GENOCIDE IS A GAME OF STRATEGY  
This metaphorical understanding of genocide as a strategic game punctuates the 
fundamentally “rational” nature of such atrocities. Near the conclusion of WTW, 
Goldhagen interviews Tharcisse Karugarama, Rwanda’s Minister of Justice. Karugarama 
draws on the notion of genocide as a strategic game when he claims that, “genocide is a 
political game. It’s a power play….If people … knew, at the end of the day they’d be the 
losers, they would not play the game.”81 The game players are critical to this 
understanding of genocide. Karugarama’s remarks imply an intelligent and rational actor, 
able to make assessments concerning the likelihood of success or failure. This view of the 
perpetrators is punctuated by Goldhagen elsewhere in the film. Goldhagen asserts that 
genocidaires “are rational calculators of costs and benefits.”82 The rationalism of 
perpetrator action is a central component of this framework: It is not a game of chance, 
but a game of strategy.  
As a strategic game, this metaphor cluster suggests that the perpetuation of 
atrocity requires both a clear intent and advance preparation. Like chess players, 
genocidaires have identifiable objectives. Early in the film, Goldhagen identifies the 
intentions underlying some twentieth-century genocide: “Pol Pot wanted to radically 
transform Cambodian society,” “Adolf Hitler wanted to create a vast political empire 
ruled by the German master race,” and “Slobodan Milosevic wanted to permanently 
redraw the political map of the region.”83 Genocide, Goldhagen implies, becomes the 





Bosnia, affirms this understanding of genocide. In an interview sequence, Silajdzic 
stresses, “political goals can be reached in different ways,” and “Some people think that 
exterminating a group would help their goals so that’s why they do it [commit acts of 
genocide].”85 Such an understanding of genocide centralizes the importance of 
perpetrator intent. Although other scholars underscore the difficulty of ascertaining 
genocidal intent,86 intention is a critical component of the GENOCIDE IS A GAME OF 
STRATEGY metaphor cluster.  
In addition to identifiable intent, GENOCIDE IS A GAME OF STRATEGY encourages a 
conception of genocide as planned action. Multiple scenes in WTW showcase the 
planning process, the documentation, and the preparation that go into the coordination of 
genocide. In one scene, Goldhagen skims Nazi documentation enumerating the Jews they 
intended to kill.87 Elsewhere in the film, WTW spotlights footage of military training in 
Rwanda.88 Beyond such footage, Silajdzic explains the advance planning that is a 
necessary part of genocide. He tells Goldhagen,  
These things are done in cold blood. This is a design. This is a plan. This 
is a calculation...This is not a reaction to something…This, unfortunately, 
here is a planned genocide. As is any other genocide, because it’s not 
possible to kill a big number of people without prior preparation. Mental 
preparation. Intellectual preparation. Military preparation.89 
By casting genocide as an act that is well thought out, “done in cold blood” and 
“planned,” 90 Silajdzic’s remarks refute what Goldhagen discusses as “a misconception 
that genocides erupt spontaneously out of deep-seated passions or ethnic conflicts.” 91 





In short, genocide is a form of planned action, committed with a strategic intent designed 
to help some political leaders achieve their broader goals and objectives.  
 GENOCIDE IS A GAME OF STRATEGY bolsters ideological-intentionalist approaches 
to genocidal causality by accentuating perpetrator agency and choice.93 In the film, 
Goldhagen stresses ad nausea that genocide is “a series of choices.”94 “Leaders choose to 
initiate the killing,” and “Ordinary people make a conscious choice to participate.”95 By 
underlining choice and agency, Goldhagen extends portions of the explanatory 
framework used in HWE.96 According to Moses’s read of HWE, a central component of 
Goldhagen’s understanding of the Holocaust is rational choice theory. Moses asserts, 
“Rational choice reinvests the individual with the agency and autonomy that the concern 
with bureaucratic structures and social psychology plays down.”97 This elevation of 
“choice” and “agency” over “bureaucracy” and “structures” clearly signals an affinity 
with ideological-intentionalism over structural-functionalism. 
 GENOCIDE IS A GAME OF STRATEGY also sets the conditions for involving 
international institutions in genocide cessation work. The discussion of intent in WTW 
bears a striking resemblance to the language used in the 1948 UN Convention. The 
convention text features the “intent to destroy” as part of the legal definition of 
genocide.98 In accentuating intent as a definitive aspect of eliminationism, WTW 
establishes part of the foundation for mounting a legal case against genocidaires. The 
GENOCIDE IS A GAME OF STRATEGY metaphor cluster enhances the grounds for a legal 
response to genocide by establishing culpable subjects. As explored earlier, mental 
competency is presumed by this metaphor cluster. In conjunction with the emphasis on 





his editor during an interview sequence in the film, Goldhagen explains, “these people 
have risen to the pinnacle of power in their countries;” thus, “they are not crazy.”99 
Elsewhere, Goldhagen contends that eliminationist acts “are not the acts of crazed 
individuals.”100 By removing insanity as an explanation for perpetrator behavior, the 
GENOCIDE IS A GAME OF STRATEGY cluster casts genocidaires as fully culpable and 
responsible for their actions. Such a focus on “accountability” resonates with 
Goldhagen’s past investment in “emphasiz[ing] the responsibility of all killers as 
individuals for their deeds” in HWE.101 In other words, such preemptive refutations 
position the perpetrators as fit to answer for their crimes. Foreshadowing elements of 
WTW’s resolutions to eliminationism, the arguments associated with GENOCIDE IS A 
GAME OF STRATEGY make it plausible to envision the perpetrator as subject to legal 
proceedings. 
The Symbolic Potency of the Notion of “Overkill” 
 GENOCIDE IS A GAME OF STRATEGY exists alongside a competing narrative best 
captured through the construct of “overkill.” WTW introduces the term during a scene at 
the Fundación de Antropología Forsense in Guatemala. At the Fundación de 
Antropología Forsense, Goldhagen meets with Fredy Peccerelli, a forensic 
anthropologist, introduced as an authority on the remains of the victims in Guatemala. 
Peccerelli uses the skull of a deceased individual to explain how the person was killed. 
Peccerelli argues the body suffered from “repeated blows to the head.” He calls this 
traumatic act of death “‘overkill,’” which he associates with “crimes of passion.”102 
Goldhagen repeats the term, stating “‘[o]verkill.’ There’s a word I don’t think I’ll ever 





their victims quickly and be done with it. You have to wonder why we see so much 
evidence of such murderous passion.”103 This brief exchange sketches some of the 
prominent attributes of the term. When violence is interpreted through the “overkill” 
framework, it is treated as an affective phenomenon marked by the experience of 
perpetrator pleasure and gratuitous violence.  
Overkill consequentially represents an expression of affect. From time to time, 
WTW highlights the joy perpetrators derive from their violent acts. Goldhagen describes 
some perpetrators as experiencing “euphoria,”104 which is shown through a series of 
interviews with perpetrators from Rwanda. Some perpetrators mention thinking of 
themselves as “strong” and “on top.” One, for example, describes the emotional high 
derived from participating in eliminationist violence as akin to the feeling that “Nothing 
would touch you.”105 He continues, “You almost felt immortal. You hear people dying, 
cries of agony. And you are thinking you are powerful.”106 Given the thrill and sense of 
self-worth tied to such brutal acts, this conception of eliminationist violence deviates 
substantially from the cool detachment or “cold blood” presumed to be part of the 
GENOCIDE IS A GAME OF STRATEGY cluster.107 If the chess player is a dispassionate and 
calculating actor, then “overkill” encourages a view of eliminationism as an expression of 
passion, emotion, and pleasure. 
Furthermore, overkill connotes excessive brutality. Following from Goldhagen’s 
assertion that “If the killers were simply doing their duty…they would execute their 
victims quickly and be done with it,”108 the notion of “overkill” helps to explain the 
gratuitous nature of certain murderous acts. In Rwanda, Goldhagen ask perpetrators to 





extent to which some perpetrators sought to torture their victims.109 Goldhagen argues 
that the “victims” in Rwanda “were not just killed in . . . the least painful way, but were 
hacked to death, were tortured.”110 This excessive violence borders on irrational at times. 
Through a narrative sequence featuring one Holocaust survivor’s memories of the close 
of the war, Goldhagen suggests that the desire to inflict suffering and pain on the death 
marches was absurd. It superseded the most logical course of action. The survivor, Lilli 
Silbiger, explains, “We knew the Russians were closing in;”111 yet, Goldhagen 
emphasizes that the Nazis “continued to deny them food” and “continued to beat them, 
they continued to kill them, they continued to do it to the very end.”112 Not only was such 
violence superfluous, it was counterintuitive as the Nazis could have used such time for 
self-preservation efforts.113 Goldhagen remarks, “One of the astonishing things is that 
they were marching the Jewish prisoners literally to the last day of the war. Instead of 
running away to avoid capture, they stayed with the prisoners.”114 Through the prism of 
overkill, eliminationism is construed by Goldhagen as an excessive, emotive, and even 
irrational series of violent acts.  
 To the extent that the overkill framework suggests that perpetrator behavior is 
irrational, it undermines critical components of the GENOCIDE IS A GAME OF STRATEGY 
metaphor cluster that is founded on notions of rationality.  As mentioned earlier, 
Goldhagen claims, “There’s a misconception that genocides erupt spontaneously out of 
deep-seated passions or ethnic conflicts.”115 However, Peccerelli asserts that these 
atrocities are “crimes of passion.”116 Even as Goldhagen casts perpetrators as rational and 
logical actors, the film also contains footage of a Rwandan perpetrator claiming that his 





darkness.”117 The contrasts hinge on the extent to which perpetrators are cast as agents in 
command of their actions or as individuals driven by uncontrollable passion and emotion. 
The dual perspectives on perpetrator agency reflected in the “overkill” framework and the 
GENOCIDE IS A GAME OF STRATEGY metaphor cluster establish a tension that the film never 
resolves.  
 In spite of such tensions, the frameworks work together to support WTW’s 
resolutions. Through the overkill framework, wrongdoers are readily identifiable because 
they exist in a world of distinct good/evil demarcations. Regardless of whether the 
perpetrators are in full control of their actions, they are vilified figures in WTW. This 
vilification is enacted in the special feature section at the end of the DVD. Goldhagen 
describes his discomfort over the prospect of having to shake hands with the killers he 
interviewed: 
Shaking the hand of a killer … is a strange thing. It’s an act of politeness, 
it’s a time of human sharing, and yet that same hand…	  I think the same 
hand actually was wielding a machete and striking and killing and hacking 
to death other people, and you can’t flinch, and you can’t say “I don’t 
want to do it,” and you have to do it because it’s part of what you need to 
do when you interview somebody.118 
Goldhagen depicts the perpetrators as so repugnant as to be almost untouchable.  
Through a focus on the perverse joy perpetrators take in excessive violence, 
WTW perpetuates a “they” (the spotlighted murderers) as not like “us” (WTW’s 
audiences). Drawing on Waller’s discussion of “extraordinary” evil featured in Chapter 





is a presentation of “evil” that separates perpetrators’ actions from the realm of “normal” 
human behavior.120 These acts of disassociation are facilitated by the emphasis on the 
gratuitous nature of such violence. In this capacity, the concept of overkill functions in 
much the same way as the lurid and graphic textual descriptions of violence in HWE.121 
As Ash notes, the gruesome detail contained in HWE helps to maintain a chasm between 
the perpetrators and the audience at the same time that such detail indulges readers’ 
morbid curiosity.122 He argues that such graphic descriptions are “distancing because they 
allow readers to imagine the murderers as people quite different from themselves while 
simultaneously experiencing the thrill—and disgust—resulting from imagined direct 
contact with violence.”123 Ash’s assessment foreshadows an important component of 
WTW’s representational strategies: the use of melodrama to construct “good guys” and 
“bad guys” binaries.124 
 At its core, WTW foregrounds the importance of precise definitions as the film 
devotes considerable attention to Goldhagen’s efforts to define and promote the term 
“eliminationism.” As Goldhagen develops the construct through examples, the film 
presents two contrasting approaches to eliminationist violence. The first posits that 
GENOCIDE IS A GAME OF STRATEGY, an understanding of genocide that centralizes 
perpetrator accountability and rationality. The second promotes the notion of “overkill,” 
an affective framework that accentuates excessive brutality and unbridled irrationality, 
aiding in the establishment of clear good/evil demarcations. Both understandings will 
prove crucial to WTW discourse on atrocity resolutions, and both shape the film’s 
approach to representation.  





 WTW navigates the tensions surrounding the representation of genocide in two 
distinct capacities. The film blends generic elements from travel documentaries 
(travelogues), melodrama, and academic discourse as it develops its argument in WTW. 
These generic elements extend WTW’s definitional discourse by giving shape to the 
concept of eliminationism at the same time they contribute to the construction of 
Goldhagen’s ethos. The use of these genres gestures toward the importance of proximity 
in building one’s authority to participate in genocide cessation work.  This emphasis on 
“closeness” also informs the ways WTW treats various vehicles for representation, 
chiefly written discourse, images, and direct experiences. Ultimately, the culmination of 
the film’s strategies for representation privileges a constricted form of access to atrocity 
prevention work dependent upon spatial and experiential proximity. Although redefining 
authority through proximity enhances Goldhagen’s credibility, it excludes numerous 
others from participation in genocide cessation work.  
Generic Conventions and Genocide Representation 
 WTW blends generic conventions drawn from travelogues, melodrama, and 
academic discourse in its representations of genocide. The merger of melodrama and 
academic discourses enhances the film’s claims to veracity while the travelogue narrative 
provides support for the exclusive type of authority Goldhagen relies upon in 
constructing his ethos. Nevertheless, this medley of genres creates apparent moments of 
tension in the film which provides Goldhagen an opportunity to reflect on the 
intersections among these representational techniques. The combination of these genres 
helps to extend aspects of WTW’s definitional discourse while bolstering WTW’s 





 On one obvious level, the film is a travelogue;125 it is the story of Goldhagen’s 
travels around the world to investigate the phenomenon of eliminationism. Early in the 
film Goldhagen explains, “over the past year, I traveled to these ‘somewhere elses.’ The 
sites of some of the worst mass murders of our time.”126 Goldhagen’s commitment to 
traveling to these places is reinforced through multiple shots of Goldhagen in transit: 
whether he is on a plane, in a car, or walking through a city street. He picks up his bags in 
an airport in Berlin;127 he navigates airport security.128 The film shows Goldhagen sitting 
on a plane, looking out the window at a pastoral scene below.129 He walks through the 
streets of New York City and Guatemala City. The film spotlights Goldhagen doing his 
work while traveling, writing on the plane or from a café. These scenes help establish 
Goldhagen as well traveled at the same time they begin to visualize the work of a scholar. 
 Part of the travelogue includes Goldhagen’s efforts to retrace his family’s 
Holocaust history. Early in the film, father and son are shown planning for their 
upcoming journey. They discuss Goldhagen’s efforts to enlist his mother in cajoling his 
father to join him in revisiting the city of his father’s birth. Along the way, father and son 
stop to see a grave filled with massacred members of the Goldhagen family, ride through 
the city of Erich Goldhagen’s birth, and visit the elder Goldhagen’s childhood home. 
As the culmination of the pilgrimage,130 the scene outside Erich Goldhagen’s 
former home provides the emotional climax for the film as well as a point of suture 
between the film’s private familial quest and its larger arguments about the nature of 
genocide. As he stands next to his boyhood home, Erich Goldhagen recounts the memory 
of the day he was almost killed. The elder Goldhagen recalls seeing his father being 





demise.  In a poignant scene, Erich Goldhagen states, “when I remember that moment as 
I walked…I did reflect upon how I would lie dead. What does it mean to be dead and to 
lie in your blood? I remembered vividly this imagery...”131 This revelation provides the 
opening for a montage featuring the faces of many of the victims of eliminationist 
violence featured in the film. The younger Goldhagen asks,  
What must it feel like for a 10-year-old boy to contemplate his own 
imminent, violent death? Or a 16-year-old girl? Or a 19-year-old man? 
What must it feel like to be imprisoned in a rape camp? Or to watch 
helplessly as members of your family are killed? Or as your people are 
decimated?132  
Each of the questions in this scene refers to a story of victimization described earlier in 
WTW. As Goldhagen ponders aloud, the face of the victim to which each question refers 
fills the screen. With these questions hanging in the air, the film moves to its penultimate 
scene: a video of “the men of Srebrenica” about to be executed in a field.133 Goldhagen’s 
family narrative is thus reinserted into the emotionally charged closing sequence of the 
film. In these final moments of the documentary, the film fuses Goldhagen’s macro-level 
investigation of eliminationism with the micro-narrative of his family’s Holocaust 
experience.  
 The poignancy of the aforementioned scene is enhanced by the film’s use of 
melodramatic conventions alongside the travelogue narratives as components of WTW’s 
representation of atrocity. Brooks defines melodrama as “an intense emotional and ethical 
drama based on the manichaeistic struggle of good and evil.”134 The previously explored 





of the perpetrators as depraved, WTW reflects elements of the melodramatic by utilizing 
children to underscore the blamelessness and innocence of the victims. Children are 
described as victims of eliminationist violence on multiple occasions. In Guatemala, the 
film features testimonials from individuals who had watched as children were raped and 
killed. According to a man identified as Placido Jeronimo Grave, “They grabbed the 
children and beat them against the ground.”135 Similarly, Juan Manuel Jeronimo 
continues, “The soldiers took the girls away to another house to rape them, after killing 
all who remained.”136 While standing in the forensics laboratory with Peccerelli, 
Goldhagen holds a tiny jaw bone. The bone is described as belonging to a murdered 
child. Goldhagen punctuates the innocence of these victims by emphasizing that they 
“did not pose a threat to anyone.” Peccerelli echoes the point, arguing that “these are not 
combat deaths.”137 Their blamelessness makes their deaths all the more tragic. As 
Goldhagen notes, “[e]verywhere I go, the faces of children haunt me the most.”138  
 Melodramatic representations aid the film in delineating its characters into 
innocent victims and perverse perpetrators thusly contributing to WTW’s unambiguous 
moral order. As explored above, extant critiques of WTW often highlight its moralism 
and reduction.139 As Üngör notes, WTW presents a world that offers “static binaries of 
bad guys versus good guys.”140 Goldhagen’s proclivity toward melodramatic 
representations is not unique to WTW; similar good/bad dichotomies structured 
Goldhagen’s representations of Germans and Jews in HWE.141 Criticisms of HWE 
stressed that the book perpetuates binaristic “representation[s] of ‘Germans’ and ‘Jews’ 
as two absolutely distinct, essentially opposed, and ultimately abstract principles that 





defeat.”142 Such binaries have clear utility insofar as they remove anxiety about genocidal 
causality. Ash argues that melodramatic dualities like the ones contained in HWE and 
WTW respond to American desires “for simple binary images of good and evil with 
which to structure a moral-conceptual grid of easy certainties, and to locate the 
murderous potential of modernity itself somewhere far away from the good old USA.”143 
As such, the film’s melodramatic portrayals of good and evil enable the film to construct 
a clear moral order at the same time that it distances its audiences from the origins of evil. 
Accordingly, the reliance on melodrama also strengthens the film’s ties to ideological-
intentionalism given the importance of moralism to that school of thought.144 
 Finally, WTW strengthens its arguments about genocide by drawing on the 
conventions of academic discourse to enhance its authority and claims to veracity. 
Although Goldhagen has a complicated relationship with the academy, he nevertheless 
frames WTW as a scholarly endeavor. The film is established early on as part of a well-
articulated and long-standing research agenda. One of the opening scenes in WTW 
depicts Goldhagen at work in his study. The camera zooms in on Goldhagen sitting in a 
dark room illuminated by the light of his computer screen. As Goldhagen works at his 
desk, mounds of books and papers are on display. Goldhagen remains tightly focused on 
the computer screen as the camera focuses in on Goldhagen’s face, intently trained on his 
writing. Through the voiceover, Goldhagen contextualizes this footage by explaining that 
he has “been thinking and writing about genocide for nearly 30 years.” In the 
background, the film builds Goldhagen’s credentials by using news footage in multiple 
languages to reference the controversy surrounding HWE. With the camera trained on 





the Holocaust” and “a controversial book about the Holocaust raising a troubling new 
question.” Through footage of an interview sequence with Charlie Rose, Goldhagen is 
able to review his thesis in HWE.145 
This opening sequence has obvious functions: It renders visible the academic 
“performance” and facilitates a reading of WTW as an academic text. From a 
dramaturgical perspective, these scenes are part of the “dramatic realization” of the 
academic role.146 As Goffman explains, “if the individual’s activity is to become 
significant to others, he must mobilize his activity so that it will express during the 
interaction what he wishes to convey.”147 Thus, Goldhagen uses such scenes as a means 
visualizing the work of a scholar to the documentary’s audiences. Before Goldhagen 
begins to speak, the setting in these sequences cues audiences to recognize him as an 
academic. The use of news media clips to articulate HWE’s thesis for Goldhagen 
similarly establishes the impact of his past work and thus presumed importance to the 
field. This sequence in WTW is the visual equivalent of what some critics have charged 
enabled HWE to strengthen its claims to authority: the performance of academic 
discourse.148 As Bartov notes of HWE, the “jargon-ridden text, the hundreds of footnotes, 
the sheer size of the book, all seemed to prove that this was indeed a most serious 
scholarly undertaking.”149 In other words, the book had the trappings of an academic text, 
and these academic trappings are likewise employed in WTW to cast it as an academic 
project. Beyond the documentary itself, the film’s marketing accentuates Goldhagen’s 
ties to the academy, noting his position at Harvard and his success with HWE.150  
Goldhagen’s claims to academic authority are also enhanced by his father’s 





research agenda. While the screen is filled with an image of Goldhagen on a departing 
plane, Goldhagen explains that his father “journeyed into the darkest chapters of the 
human experience seeking to understand not only what happened but why. Now I am 
continuing the journey he began. A journey that in a sense, I have been on my entire 
life.”151 Growing up with a professor as his father, Goldhagen recalls that “As early as I 
can remember . . . .my father and I have been talking about these things”152 and our 
“home” was filled “with this material.”153 Such remarks tether Goldhagen’s ethos to his 
father’s academic authority and cast this film as part of a research program that preceded 
his own work. 
 By positioning WTW as a scholarly endeavor, Goldhagen builds an argument for 
his authority and expertise. The film contains a clear association of scholarship with 
“truth.” Immediately following the news footage of HWE’s reception, Goldhagen 
describes his work thusly: “I spend my professional life trying to dispel myths.” This line 
can be read in two ways. Because he makes this assertion immediately after the news 
footage covering the controversy around HWE, the line is a potential response to critics 
of HWE. In HWE, Goldhagen positions his work as responding to the ill-conceived 
scholarship of others.154 The remark about “dispel[ling] myths” furthers the notion that 
his work corrects other scholars’ erroneous arguments about the Holocaust and genocide.  
More importantly, such a response positions Goldhagen as the voice of “truth.”155 
These claims to truth are reinforced by Goldhagen’s chosen vehicle for WTW: 
documentary. The film’s marketing as a documentary also imparts a sense of realism and 
objectivity.156  As Torchin writes of genocide documentaries, “[t]he indexicality of the 





despite the fact that “documentary remains a representation of lived reality and its claims 
to truth are made manifest through a vast array of cinematic strategies.”157 Nonetheless, 
the academic patina and documentary format aid in the construction of Goldhagen’s 
authority and consequently lend credibility to the arguments about genocide contained in 
WTW. 
Although the authoritative connotations of both academic and documentary 
discourses enhance Goldhagen’s ethos, they sit uneasily with the moralism of melodrama 
and Goldhagen’s personal investment in the subject matter as established through the 
travelogue narratives. Shugart argues that professional academic discourse “serves to 
foster distance between a critic and her or his text; the illusion of objectivity; and an aura 
of specialized expertise that is above reproach.”158 Both the sense of scholarly distance 
and objectivity are complicated by the affective ties that bind Goldhagen’s family to the 
history of the Holocaust. The emotional intensity of some of the moments in the film, 
such as his father’s recollection of his childhood brush with death, threatens to invalidate 
the film’s claim to documentary neutrality and academic distance.159 Goldhagen’s close 
ties to his father compromise Goldhagen’s past projects for some by suggesting that his 
work is a means of “acting out the senior Goldhagen’s supposed revenge fantasy against 
Germany.”160 
Goldhagen seemingly anticipates such threats to his ethos as he attempts to 
foreclose these challenges in two ways. First, Goldhagen sublimates his familial 
connection to the Holocaust at multiple points in the film. Early in the film Goldhagen 
introduces his father as “a valued mentor, a scholar of genocide, and survivor of the 





introducing the elder Goldhagen in this fashion, Goldhagen centralizes his professional 
connections to his father as a mentor or scholarly advisor over his familial ties. In the 
special feature at the end of the DVD, Goldhagen again emphasizes his academic 
connection to the Holocaust over a more personal provenance for his studies. In 
Goldhagen’s words, “There’s no doubt that my father influenced my initial direction of 
working on the Holocaust, but it’s less because he was a survivor than he was a professor 
who studied this.”162 These arguments suggest Erich Goldhagen’s significance to WTW 
is his scholarly pedigree and not his personal exposure to atrocity.  
Second, both Goldhagens suggest that they are able to preserve their objectivity 
through their unique ability to divest themselves from their personal connection to the 
Holocaust. Goldhagen explains that, “Like my father, I have always endeavored to 
separate my emotions from my scholarly work on genocide.”163 Other moments in the 
film suggest that the Goldhagens are remarkably good at such detachment. Standing by 
the grave of his relatives, Erich Goldhagen recollects, “Sometimes – as you may 
remember when I gave the course on the Holocaust at Harvard – I experience sometimes 
a sense of guilt at the fact that I speak so coolly and analytically over their death.”164 The 
elder Goldhagen’s self-reflexive comments showcase an awareness at how emotionally 
“detached” he must seem to others. Anticipating that his students would notice his lack of 
emotion, Goldhagen’s reaction represents a sense of “guilt” over the disconnect between 
the emotional weight of the subject and the lack of emotion in his academic 
performance.165 Of course, this “guilt” is evidence of his success in circumscribing his 
emotional engagement with the subject matter as a Holocaust survivor in order to 





“I’m your son in many ways, and your dispassion is my own.”166 Standing by the 
gravesite in the same scene, Goldhagen comes to puzzle over “how detached I am, too, 
from this,” calling it “shocking” that he did not put the connections together between the 
kind of scholarly work he was doing and his own emotional connection to these atrocities 
as the son of a Holocaust survivor.167 This scene reinforces an interpretation of the film as 
a neutral intellectual pursuit even as the father-son pair delve into the emotional territory 
surrounding their own personal connections to this subject matter.   
While their personal ties to the subject matter have the potential to threaten their 
credibility as objective documentarians and academics, the elder Goldhagen’s survivor 
status also serves to enhance the Goldhagens’ claims to authority by providing a rare 
form of access. The Goldhagens’ familial ties to the Holocaust provide Daniel Goldhagen 
with a form of authority few can claim. As explored in Chapter One, genocide survivors 
commonly are seen as possessing special authority in the interpretation of atrocity.168 A 
similar authority extends to family members as the families of the victims are often ceded 
privileged positions from which to make meaning.169 As I have argued elsewhere, the 
claims to authority that emerge from familial connections to those who have endured or 
perished in atrocities “become unassailable in many respects” because “the ethos of their 
argument[s] is bound up in their personal experience[s].”170 “To challenge the argument 
of the sufferer is to border on declaring their feelings illegitimate;” those operating from 
“subjectivities of suffering” are therefore able to lay claim to a form of authority granted 
to few others.171 As Lipstadt affirms, “The general public tends to accord victims of 
genocide a certain moral authority,”172 and Bartov suggests that Goldhagen is able to 





Goldhagen “inherits” as a son of a Holocaust survivor is more potent than the academic 
credibility he works to construct in WTW. Whereas numerous individuals can ground 
their ethos in academic authority, fewer can access the authority of the survivor. This 
proximity to atrocity is critical to WTW given the suspicion the film evinces toward 
various forms of mediation.  
Access to the “Real”: WTW’s Treatment of Words, Images, and Experiences 
 In the same way that Goldhagen relies upon seemingly incongruent genres in 
WTW, the film’s positions on the relative strengths and drawbacks of words, images, and 
direct experiences produce inconsistent messages about genocide representation. 
Although the film recognizes the value of words and images, crucial components of the 
travelogue narrative celebrate the authority produced from being on location. The 
glorification of the direct experience acquired through travel perpetuates a 
representation/reality split wherein “being there” is cast as providing unmediated access 
to the “real.” The travel narratives accentuate the importance of proximity, which 
acquires a dual meaning within WTW. Proximity is both spatial and experiential. By 
leveraging both meanings of the term, Goldhagen constructs an elite and privileged form 
of authority that supersedes purely academic modes of knowledge production and 
constrains who is able to engage in genocide cessation advocacy work. 
The Word 
 Written discourse is important in WTW to the extent that it contributes to 
Goldhagen’s academic performance. The scholar’s work is chiefly portrayed through the 
act of writing, with a pronounced focus on the importance of rhetorical invention. 





enhance Goldhagen’s dramaturgical performance. They function primarily as props or 
artifacts, a form of evidence observed at a glance and not engaged with in any depth. 
 From one perspective, WTW is predicated on the importance of words given its 
central contention that the discourse used to discuss mass atrocities is insufficient. By 
punctuating the importance of precise terminology, Goldhagen charges, “Reframing the 
way we think about these deeds is not just an intellectual exercise.” He refers to the 
invention of the term eliminationism as “a critical component of understanding.”174 In 
short, Goldhagen’s concise remarks underscore that words matter. Elsewhere in both the 
book and the film, Goldhagen affirms the significance of discourse to genocide and 
genocide cessation by attending to the persuasive influence of genocidaires and the 
dehumanizing language used in perpetrators’ speech.175 
 Put differently, invention or discourse production is valued within WTW as it 
enhances the project’s claims to scholarly authority through Goldhagen’s academic 
performances. Writing is elevated as an important part of performing the academic role. 
WTW spotlights the act of invention through multiple scenes of Goldhagen writing. 
Many of these shots feature Goldhagen working in his study.176 Often the camera is 
situated behind Goldhagen, positioning the audience to watch him work over his 
shoulder. On other occasions, the scene remains tightly cropped on either the screen or 
the keyboard as Goldhagen’s hands strike the keys. Mimicking the arc of a film from 
beginning to end, the writing process transitions to the editing process near the film’s 
conclusion. Shots of Goldhagen working at his computer are supplemented by a scene of 
Goldhagen editing.177 In these scenes, the written word has value insofar as it helps 





 Although rhetorical invention and discourse production are important parts of 
scholarly work, written texts seemingly have little significance once complete in WTW. 
Notably Goldhagen’s means of performing the academic role is through writing texts, not 
reading them. To the extent that the research process is shown in WTW, it is a qualitative 
process. Goldhagen is seen conducting interviews and engaging in field work. He is 
rarely seen reading others’ work. The lack of scenes featuring Goldhagen reading 
resonates with critiques that he is under read in his field;178 such omissions further 
diminish the power of the written word. 
 On other occasions when written texts are featured, they appear as “sign-
equipment.” Goffman treats sign-equipment as a part of the setting, “the scenery and 
stage props for the spate of human action played out before, within, or upon it.”179 
Written texts function as “props” within the dramaturgical performance, establishing 
relevant context in WTW. These props include things such as a wanted sign hanging in 
an office in Guatemala, which Goldhagen pauses to look at,180 or the signs worn by 
protesters in California.181 They include a pile of documents sitting on a table next to 
Kate Doyle of the National Security Archive’s Guatemala Documentation Project.182  
Representations of written “props” foreshadow a diminished role for rhetoric in 
genocide cessation work. This attenuation of rhetoric’s potency is evidenced by a brief 
scene early in the film wherein Goldhagen examines Nazi planning documentation.183 
The document is sealed away in a glass case. The fact that the document exists and can be 
seen suffices as evidence in the scene; the text does not demand, nor does the film imply 
the need for, further engagement with it. It is the literal representation of written 





Although the idea of rhetoric as a “prop” does give rhetoric a certain authority as a means 
of establishing the setting and corroborating the resultant performance of Goldhagen’s 
academic role, the notion of rhetoric as a prop implies that rhetoric is static, frozen, and 
divorced from the rest of the action in the film. Like the painted door on a stage set that 
cannot be opened, written discourse here is something to be seen and appreciated, not 
engaged with beyond a glance. This mode of representation undersells the potency of 
rhetoric to construct, build, and shape lived experiences as well as to contribute to the 
contexts which give rise to genocidal violence. In sum, the value of the word lies in 
enhancing Goldhagen’s academic performance, a role that limits and weakens the extent 
to which rhetoric is important to genocide cessation. 
The Image 
 Whereas WTW appears ambivalent about the power of written texts, it includes 
multiple scenes affirming the value of images. WTW’s existence as a book and 
documentary offers an inherent endorsement of the power of visuality. Chiefly, the film 
capitalizes on the image’s affective potency, concision, and indexicality.184 Though 
celebrated by Goldhagen, WTW’s editorial interventions compromise the film’s ability to 
sustain a view of documentary as a transparent representation of the real. 
 In a special feature included on DVD, Goldhagen reflects on the process of 
making WTW and the affective potency visuality lends to the film. Contrasting the film 
with the written text, Goldhagen explains that if he were left to his own devices in 
producing the film, “I probably would have produced a nice two- hour lecture of some 
kind with visuals instead of a film that is visually arresting and emotionally evocative 





remarks suggest that images have an emotional weight that words lack.186 Like his father 
and the other victims of genocide interviewed in the film, Goldhagen describes powerful 
visions of faces. He states, “the faces of the people I spoke with and their words are with 
me in a way that the testimony and documents and court testimony and so on never are 
with me.” Through such remarks Goldhagen elevates the power of the word while 
simultaneously marking the written texts as less powerful. While the images “resonate 
with” him,187 the written texts fail to make a similar impact.  
Goldhagen elevates the power of images and deflates the forces of writing a book 
and working on a film. When writing books, Goldhagen remarks, “if I decide something 
needs 20 pages of elaboration, then I do it.”188 However, a premium is placed upon 
brevity in film. Such brevity is possible in part because the image “is more than worth a 
thousand words. It’s worth endless, endless volumes of words,” according to 
Goldhagen.189 Thus, images benefit from their concision.190 
WTW’s appreciation for the concision of the image is evidenced through the 
employment of montages throughout the film. The film uses a montage of WWII planes 
releasing bombs and tanks rumbling across the land during the interview with Holocaust 
survivor Lilli Silbiger as she talks about the end of the war.191 In Rwanda, the film moves 
between different images of men running along the road while the narration describes the 
force of hate speech propagated through Rwanda’s RTLM radio. Despite the film’s 
gestures toward the limited utility of the word, this scene functions as an 
acknowledgement of the dehumanizing rhetoric of the perpetrators.192  As Goldhagen 
narrates the history of the Jews in the Ukrainian town where his father had once lived, the 





The film’s introductory sequence transitions between images from the Holocaust and 
genocides in Cambodia, Rwanda, and Darfur to convey the scope of the problem of 
eliminationism.194  
The problem with these montage sequences is that their inclusion of 
decontextualized and recontextualized images exposes the process of editorial 
intervention and compromises the documentary’s claims to “truth.”195 The images and 
videos used in these sequences risk becoming “free-floating signifier[s]” because they 
have an unclear provenance.196 WTW includes numerous decontextualized images of 
bodies in pain, bodies laboring, and dead bodies, identified only by the names of the 
countries where these images ostensibly were taken.197 Elsewhere in the film, Goldhagen 
describes the work of the “Hutu leaders” while video footage of unidentified black bodies 
fills the screen. The images showcase men running with guns, rolling down hills, and 
chanting. The spoken words help control the interpretation of this footage, suggesting that 
perhaps these images are from some sort of martial training program; however, such a 
determination cannot be conclusively drawn from the decontextualized images alone.198 
These brief examples are representative of trends toward more rampant 
decontextualization of unidentified footage throughout the film.  
Similarly, other visual practices in WTW betray the notion of documentary as a 
“window on the world.”199 Multiple scenes in WTW suggest a clear manipulation of the 
image. For example, WTW animates still photos of violence by superimposing the sound 
of gun shots or adding ominous or foreboding music. These editorial impositions thwart 
the film’s ability to suggest that documentary provides “unmediated” access to the real 





The film’s treatment of images raises larger questions about WTW’s ethics of 
representation. With his previous work, Goldhagen has been accused of being sloppy 
with his evidence, misrepresenting primary source material, marshaling and misusing 
source material to sustain claims that cannot and should not be advanced.201 Crane argues 
that these irresponsible practices are all the more likely when working with photographs. 
In her analysis of Holocaust images, she disparages atrocity photography that is displayed 
“in promiscuous ways we would never tolerate in the use of textual sources—we print 
them sans captions, sans credits, sans textual reference to figure, and sometimes all of the 
above.”202 Because the film often fails to provide any identifying information for its 
images, WTW asks for the viewer’s trust. Trust, in turn, rests upon the film’s attempts to 
restore Goldhagen’s (fraught) credibility.203 Perhaps most ironically, this haphazard 
treatment of visual content plays into the fears of some Holocaust and genocide studies 
scholars regarding the use of creative license and genocide denial.204 With little care put 
into citing images, WTW creates an opening for challenges to the film’s veracity. In spite 
of Goldhagen’s praise of images, WTW’s engagement with this form of representation 
also complicates its claims to authority. 
Direct Experience 
 With visual and written texts compromised in the ways explained above, WTW 
ultimately valorizes the knowledge produced through direct or “unmediated” experiences. 
These discussions of “direct experience” reify a representation/reality divide while 
simultaneously redefining authority through a sense of proximity to atrocity.205 Proximity 
acquires a dual meaning. On one hand, it refers to the geographic closeness afforded 





overcoming critiques of academics as distant. On the other hand, proximity refers to the 
knowledge of the Holocaust Goldhagen “inherits” through his relationship with his 
Holocaust survivor father. By capitalizing on these dual forms of proximity, Goldhagen 
creates the space to weave together incompatible genres and inconsistent positions on 
genocide representation. 
In drawing on the generic features of a travel documentary, Goldhagen not only 
visits important locations in his family’s history, he also visits a variety of mass killings 
sites. WTW includes footage of Goldhagen squatting in a mass grave being excavated in 
Guatemala. In another morose sequence, Goldhagen walks down a street in Srebrenica as 
a companion suggests that victims were shot as they walked through such streets during 
the genocide.206 Early in the film, Goldhagen marvels at the experience of standing inside 
a gas chamber.207 Many of Goldhagen’s interviews take place at the site of the 
interviewee’s victimization: Holocaust survivor Lilli Silbiger recounts her experiences 
near the route of a Nazi death march.208 Emmanuel Gatari stands in a field where he 
sought refuge during the Rwandan genocide.209 Sabaheta Fejzíc discusses the moment 
she was separated from her son during the Bosnian genocide from the site of the UN base 
where she was last with her child.210 
Goldhagen supplements these scenes with other place markers. WTW establishes 
Goldhagen as “on location” through the use of visual landmarks. Scenes in Washington, 
DC and Berlin feature the Washington monument and the Berlin Holocaust memorial 
respectively. Shots of a busy, urban street work in conjunction with textual labels to place 
Goldhagen in New York City. Shots of the outside of office buildings, focusing in on 





office in Guatemala or at former SS member Otto-Ernst Duscheleit’s house in Berlin. On 
other occasions, Goldhagen highlights that he is in a particularly significant place by 
using phrases such as “these hills” or “here.” In Guatemala, the camera focuses on the 
hills visible from Goldhagen’s car window as he explains that “In these hills, the 
Guatemalan military conducted a scorched-earth campaign against Maya and leftist 
insurgents.”211 The marker “here” serves the same purposes. Goldhagen punctuates his 
comments with a reminder of the importance of his spatial location: “A recent episode 
here in Kenya,”212 “Here in Guatemala, a genocidal mastermind walks freely,”213 or “all 
the people here murdered other people?”214 Such scenes very clearly locate Goldhagen 
within particular geographies.  
The pointed emphasis on place in these sequences is significant as it ties 
Goldhagen to emotionally charged landscapes and displaces temporal distance with 
spatial proximity. This focus on “being there” grounds Goldhagen’s authority in 
geographic access. Such claims to authority are reminiscent of the strategies that Zelizer 
contends some journalists employed in the wake of the Kennedy assassination. Framed as 
“investigators,” these journalists sought to construct a case for their journalistic authority 
by offering “tales of the same place but a different time.”215  Like the journalists in 
Zelizer’s study, Goldhagen strengthens his authority by emphasizing his ties to 
significant spaces. Furthermore, the geographies Goldhagen inhabits in these films are 
sites that are viewed by many critics as rhetorically significant. Sites of atrocious 
violence are potent resources for meaning-making.216 As WTW constructs connections 
between Goldhagen and these locations, the film suggests his access to these violent 





 The film minimizes the importance of lapsed time by suggesting that a sense of 
enduring authority inheres in the land itself. This logic is made visible through a 
sequence included in Goldhagen’s interview with Holocaust survivor Lilli Silbiger. As 
Goldhagen and Silbiger walk through the countryside near the site of a Nazi death march, 
the color footage of the current landscape is overlaid with a WWII era image of 
Silbiger.217 The documentary seamlessly fades the contemporary countryside into the 
image of Silbiger’s face.218 The sequence collapses time into space, closing a sense of 
temporal distance at the same time that it reifies an understanding of the landscape as 
rhetorically significant.  
 Goldhagen’s claims to authority through access to these geographies centralize 
the importance of proximity.  Proximity has a dual meaning in WTW. On the one hand, 
proximity is acquired through direct access to a presumably “unmediated” real. In 
elevating direct experience of travel as the gold standard for knowledge production, 
WTW evinces a representation/reality divide wherein words and images are cast as 
shallow substitutes for the “real,” reviving longstanding iconophobic approaches to 
representation.219 As Hartley explains, such an approach is ultimately unproductive: 
“Instead of dismissing media images or discourses as unreal ‘shadows in the cave’, it is 
necessary to recognize that images, discourses, texts, media and so on are themselves 
quite real.”220 Nevertheless, WTW positions direct experience as a means of eclipsing 
problems of representation. 
Because scholarly work is predicated on the value of written texts, this 
denigration of the written forms of representation translates into a critique of the 





his son: “Because you have been sort of an academic, very secluded….you have studied 
this phenomenon from a distance through document.”221 Notably the language of 
“seclusion” used to describe academics resonates with critiques of the academy as an 
“ivory tower” and activates stereotypes of scholars as removed from the “real world.”222  
Other remarks in WTW suggest that the Goldhagens’ travels are all the more significant 
because they rectify the confinement of the “ivory tower.” By way of introducing the 
importance of his travels, Goldhagen states, “As a scholar, I spend most of my time in 
archives and libraries.”223 This introductory clause attains meaning through the 
juxtapositions the film constructs between the academy and the “real world.” 
Goldhagen’s travels attain significance because they take him out of the archive and “to 
these ‘somewhere elses’” where genocides occur.224 This sense of contrast is heightened 
again as Goldhagen notes that he has spent “decades studying Nazis and the Holocaust, 
genocide, but I’ve never been in a gas chamber before.”225 The aggregation of these 
remarks constructs a multi-tied critique of academia as both a place that is quite literally 
spatially distant from the subjects of interest in WTW and limited in the knowledge that it 
can produce because it relies upon written representations which pale in comparison to 
the direct experience Goldhagen acquires through his travels. 
WTW’s elevation of “direct experience” over words and images as forms of 
representation complicates its claims to authority in two ways. First, Goldhagen casts 
WTW as an academic project at the same time that he critiques academics as “removed” 
and beholden to insufficient textual forms of knowledge production. Throughout much of 
WTW, Goldhagen performs an academic role while his travelogue narrative 





academic insider-outsider subjectivity aids him in navigating this tension as he tethers his 
authority to his proximity. In simple ways, Goldhagen responds to such criticism through 
the act of acquiring supplemental experience during his travels. His spatial proximity 
removes the distance and detachment otherwise hampering academic work. Yet, by doing 
so, he opens himself up to critiques from the academic community for his privileging of 
subjective experience over academic objectivity and rigor. 
Yet, Goldhagen is also able to capitalize upon a second sense of “proximity” – the 
proximity to the subject he “inherits” through his status as the son of a Holocaust 
survivor. This sense of proximity corresponds with an approach to epistemology Caplan 
discusses as “knowledge-by-identification, in which true knowledge is supposed to be 
authenticated by its closeness to the subjective experience of the knower.”226 Absent the 
direct experience of a Holocaust survivor, Goldhagen’s claims to proximity reflect the 
larger ways in which children of survivors position themselves to become the proprietors 
of atrocity memory and assert authority over meaning-making.227 Such attempts to 
ground authority in exclusionary access or rights to interpretation underlie some of the 
longstanding debates in Holocaust and genocide studies.228 Nevertheless, Goldhagen 
invokes this sense of proximity as he builds his authority within WTW. 
By levering both meanings of the term “proximity,” Goldhagen is able to make 
space for seemingly incompatible representational strategies as he simultaneously 
positions his claims as irrefutable. Many of the tensions produced by the film’s medley of 
genres and inconsistent evaluations of words, images, and experiences hinge upon 
questions of proximity and distance. Goldhagen’s case for authority through proximity 





Goldhagen’s “closeness” to the film’s subject matter. Furthermore, Goldhagen’s 
construction of authority through proximity preempts challenges from his critics. As 
previously mentioned, many of the critiques in the wake of the publication of HWE 
attacked Goldhagen on the grounds that his book did not meet standards for good 
scholarship, which presume distance and “objectivity.”229 By shifting the basis of 
authority to proximity and the inheritance of memory, Goldhagen invalidates criticisms 
that privilege knowledge that is produced in the academy. Accordingly, Goldhagen builds 
his ethos on grounds that supersede the academic forms of knowledge production relied 
upon by his detractors.230 
However, WTW’s elevation of “proximity” through direct experience creates a 
second complication for the film. At the same time WTW exalts “being there” over more 
shallow textual substitutes, Goldhagen imparts his arguments about genocide cessation 
through a book and documentary. Thus, whereas Goldhagen touts his ability to access an 
unmediated “reality,” WTW offers its audiences mediated forms of engaging with 
genocide cessation through the consumption of these written and visual texts. This latter 
tension complicates the forms of genocide cessation work the film is able to promote as a 
part of its resolution discourse.  
Genocide Cessation and Political Power: The Disenfranchisement of Popular 
Audiences  
  Goldhagen proposes multiple resolutions to the problems posed by 
eliminationism. Chiefly, these resolutions take the form of legal action, martial invention, 
or policy change. Notably, each of these forms of resolution privileges empowered and 





or recommend policy. The options for broader public participation in genocide cessation 
are limited to a form of indirect influence on people in positions of powers. Even this 
restricted role is challenged as WTW extends earlier critiques of representation into 
pessimism surrounding the utility of genocide cessation discourse. These constrained 
modes of engagement offered to WTW’s viewing audiences reflect the film’s earlier 
efforts to cast authority as contingent upon privileged modes of access. As a result, those 
without such access are disenfranchised from the film’s proposed resolutions.	  
 Over the course of the nearly two-hour long documentary, Goldhagen expends 
roughly six minutes authoring solutions to the problem of genocide. In this condensed 
sequence, Goldhagen essentially outlines proposals for genocide cessation that involve 
legal, martial, and policy resolutions. Exploring legal resolutions, Goldhagen raises the 
possibility of prosecuting genocidaires. In advocating this form of genocide resolution, 
Goldhagen draws upon crucial components of WTW’s definitional discourse. Because 
genocidaires are “rational calculators of costs and benefits,” he calls for viewers to “think 
about their cost-benefit calculus.”231 Currently, Goldhagen posits that there are too few 
“costs.” Goldhagen argues that genocide is facilitated by genocidaires’ perceptions of 
impunity. He charges, “because they [potential perpetrators] know they have basically 
impunity, and there has been very little calling to account, and they get away with it time 
and time again.”232 Fear of retribution has the potential to change their “cost-benefit 
calculations.”233 Furthermore, because WTW’s definitional discourse has laid the 
foundation for viewing genocidaires as culpable legal subjects, such retribution could be 
enacted through the appropriate court channels. However, legal resolutions alone are 





some good … they are unbearably slow and ineffective…And the killing continues.”234 
Thus, according to Goldhagen’s logic, legal procedures have a limited role in genocide 
prevention. 
Martial solutions are also briefly explored. Goldhagen references the success of 
NATO’s bombing during the Bosnian genocide.235 He cites this example to demonstrate 
that “as was the case in Bosnia, relatively little force can achieve extraordinary 
results.”236 Though only briefly mentioned in the film, martial forms of genocide 
cessation received the strong endorsement on PBS’s WTW website through the 
discussion of the aforementioned poll of website visitors:   
If the government of a developing country is about to begin, or has begun, 
a genocide of hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children -- 
similar to what happened in Rwanda -- which of the following should the 
United States and the international community be willing to do, if 
necessary, to prevent or stop the mass murder?237 
Respondents are given the option of selecting from among the following preset answers: 
“Take diplomatic initiatives,” “Impose sanctions,” “Threaten to place bounties on the 
country’s leaders,” “Bomb military forces and installations,” or “Send ground forces.”238 
Responses to the poll overwhelming favor martial resolutions; “Send ground forces” and 
“Bomb military forces and installations” collectively received 67 percent of the responses 
as of May 2013.239 
Although martial resolutions may have received the strongest endorsement from 
WTW’s audiences, the film overwhelmingly centralizes policy changes at the 





First, Goldhagen champions the creation of a new response force. Goldhagen argues: 
“instead of the U.N. we need an international watchdog organization made up of 
democratic nations that will enforce a zero tolerance policy on genocide and 
eliminationism.”240 Speed is of the utmost import, Goldhagen claims. Because 
deliberation takes time, he argues, “Each of the members must have the right to intervene 
individually or collectively to stop campaigns of elimination.”241 Yet, even this policy 
change is insufficient. Goldhagen laments, “But intervention, even forceful intervention, 
is not enough. By the time we intervene, tens of thousands can be dead or homeless. We 
need an effective system of prevention.”242 
Thusly, Goldhagen argues for the implementation of “a bounty program” for 
genocidal leaders modeled off the bounty program the US has instituted “to hunt down 
terrorists.”243 By way of building a case for the success of such a solution, Goldhagen 
queries former president Silajdzic, “Let’s say for example, the international community 
declared the leaders of countries that commit genocide to be outlaws. They can be hunted 
down until they either give themselves up or until they’re killed. Would Milosevic under 
these circumstances have ever initiated the slaughter of Bosnians?”244 As expected, 
Silajdzic answers, “I don’t think he would.”245 With this hypothetical scenario offered as 
grounds, the bounty program is promoted as part of WTW’s resolution to the problem of 
eliminationist violence. 
 Goldhagen advocates a similar resolution in his book and his suggestions in both 
texts have been critiqued by others as imperialistic. According to Üngör, “[i]n the film, 
Goldhagen ignores the thorny issue of state sovereignty and travels across the world to 





Rieff and Üngör both suggest that Goldhagen’s call for an international “rapid response” 
task force for genocide intervention is essentially a form of US imperialism.247 
 Yet, the imperialistic bent of the resolutions Goldhagen promotes is occluded 
through the film’s reliance on melodrama. Earlier definitional and representation 
discourses situate the problem with eliminationism within WTW’s world of stark moral 
dualism. Thus, the power dynamics that engender the charge of imperialism are lost 
within a world order shaped by a discernible right from wrong scenario. Because 
melodrama allows for these delineations, the decisions surrounding the use of force or 
intervention become decidedly less complicated. Within this context, the poll results on 
WTW’s website are not surprising. Indeed, the phrasing of the poll further reduces any 
sense of moral ambiguity in suggesting that visitors consider this hypothetical genocide 
as “similar to what happened in Rwanda.” The poll question capitalizes on the memory of 
Rwanda to lend legibility to the construct of genocide and promote apparent right and 
wrong distinctions.248 By capitalizing on twenty years of hindsight which have ensconced 
Rwanda into popular memory as a blatant example of genocidal slaughter, the poll 
encourages dualistic thinking, making the choice to intervene by force perfunctory. In 
other words, the prism of melodrama encourages a kind of reductionist logic that 
oversimplifies genocide cessation into matters of saving innocents by targeting the guilty. 
In such a world, charges of imperialism are a distant concern in the face of seemingly 
unambiguous evil. 
 Beyond critiques of imperialism and reduction, Goldhagen’s genocide cessation 
discourse makes scant reference to the public’s efficacy. Notably, WTW’s resolutions 





resolutions are contingent upon access to governmental platforms: military units, 
international governmental bodies, international courts, etc. Genocide and genocide 
cessation happen through political elites. Popular power is only engaged to the extent that 
people can put pressure on their elected officials. Goldhagen makes this argument 
explicit in the last line in his film: 
We can’t stand by anymore. People are dying every day. A few political 
leaders start genocides. A few political leaders can stop them. The 
presidents and prime ministers we elect have the power to end impunity 
and change the choices potential mass killers make. We must hold our 
leaders accountable and demand that they bring an end to genocide and 
eliminationism.249 
A certain irony exists here: Although Goldhagen is regarded as a popular Holocaust and 
genocide studies figure, he fails to offer his audiences any substantive ways of 
envisioning themselves as part of his genocide cessation efforts. Instead, the resolutions 
in WTW transfer power away from the people.250 The transfer is apparent in the 
promotional materials surrounding the film. PBS’s website asserts, “the film not will only 
leave viewers changed, it should have a galvanizing effect on the public and, most 
importantly on, our political leaders.”251 Although marketed to the general public, 
members of the public have a circumscribed role in the film’s resolution discourse.  They 
are situated as removed from the arenas in which key decisions are made, which are 
visualized in the film as the seats of political power: the US Department of State or the 





to people in positions of privilege.252 They primarily engage in genocide cessation efforts 
by exerting a form of indirect pressure through their elected officials.  
Even this relatively weak form of engagement is undermined at other junctures in 
WTW given the little faith that film places in genocide cessation discourse. The film’s 
earlier critiques of the limitations of words and lack of trust in the value of texts translate 
into diminished faith in rhetoric as a component of genocide cessation efforts. In an 
interview with a radio DJ, Goldhagen forthrightly states that the discourse of “‘Never 
Again’” is “well-meant, but … a hollow phrase.”253 Goldhagen suggests that it is “a 
mockery of itself,” contributing to the sense that words have little impact on atrocity 
prevention.254 Although WTW’s definition discourse bears traces of the 1948 UN 
Convention’s definition of genocide, even legal discourse is disparaged. Goldhagen 
excoriates the UN’s 1948 convention stating that “[t]he document is noble-sounding but 
totally ineffective. It has never once been invoked to prevent the death of a single 
person.”255 An even more pointed critique of discourse is conveyed through the notion of 
“screaming.” Genocide cessation discourse is presented as so ineffective advocates need 
to “scream,” and even once one is screaming the desired results are seldom achieved. 
Playing “devil’s advocate,” Goldhagen’s publisher argues in one interview sequence, 
“[w]e’ve been screaming about these issues for a long time, and the leaders of the world 
haven’t listened.”256 Spoken, written, or “screamed,” discourse is cast as futile in the 
hands of the general public. In contrast to other texts which celebrate the efforts of 
discourse creators (see Chapter Four), WTW suggests words matter little in the face of 





This enfeebled and passive position for viewers reflects the restricted 
constructions of authority Goldhagen relies on elsewhere in WTW. In bolstering his ethos 
Goldhagen constructs his authority to participate in genocide cessation work as 
contingent upon spatial and experiential proximity. These arguments value a form of 
unmediated access to the “real” depicted primarily through travel as well as familial ties 
to atrocity. Notably, both of these avenues for authoritatively engaging the subject 
disenfranchise numerous others from participating in genocide cessation efforts. Few can 
claim such proximity to atrocity through familial channels. Shy of expending the 
financial resources necessary to travel to these “somewhere elses,” similar spatial 
proximity cannot be accessed. Ergo, the primary avenues for engaging in anti-genocide 
work have been foreclosed to many. Resultantly, viewers are left with the experience of 
consuming the documentary text as their primary recourse of action. As Parry-Giles and 
Parry-Giles suggest, documentaries like WTW may “have limited force” because the 
primary means of participating in the film’s advocacy work is through the “‘experience’” 
of watching the documentary.257 In this way, the film’s construction of authority 
constrains the resolutions it can proffer. Whereas constructions of authority shape future 
possibilities for action, they are also underwritten by a particularized understanding of the 
past and an exclusionary form of genocide memory. 
(Post)Memory and Authority 
 WTW’s attempts to define, represent, and resolve genocide are bolstered by 
arguments about the transmission of Holocaust memory. The arguments about 
Goldhagen’s familial connection to the Holocaust are predicated less upon access to the 





contemporary actual reality of the Holocaust…is not the event itself but [the] memory of 
the event.”258 More specifically, the framework for WTW centralizes Daniel Goldhagen’s 
attempts to harness the potency of what Hirsch terms “postmemories” of the Shoah. In 
other words, Goldhagen’s authority is contingent upon the legitimacy of mnemonic 
inheritance, a dubious construct in the eyes of some who question the idea that the 
survivor’s authority over meaning-making is inherently transmitted to their children. 
 The concept of postmemory introduces a set of questions surrounding the 
transference of memories from Holocaust survivors to their progeny. Postmemory is 
Hirsch’s term for the form of Holocaust memory that resides with members of the second 
generation, the children of survivors. Postmemory is a nebulous construct because it 
refers to the possession of a memory of an event one has never experienced.259 As such, 
postmemory is not “recollection but…an imaginative investment and creation.”260 
Numerous authors have attempted to puzzle through the complexities of postmemory by 
attending to its transmission and representation.261 “At stake,” in the study of 
postmemory, Hirsch argues, “is precisely the ‘guardianship’ of a traumatic personal and 
generational past with which some of us have a ‘living connection’ and that past’s 
passing into history.”262 The use of the word “guardianship” implies both the rights of a 
possessor and the custodial power over that which is possessed, hinting at the power that 
comes from being the “owner” of Holocaust memories. 
 Questions regarding the transference of memory and the power of postmemory 
ground the film and undergird Goldhagen’s exclusionary claims to authority. As I have 
underscored at multiple junctures throughout this chapter, WTW oscillates between a 





knowledge of the Holocaust,263 numerous scenes in the film focus on the transmission of 
the elder Goldhagen’s Holocaust memories to his son. Goldhagen punctuates the 
importance of this process by stressing the significance of his trip to his father’s 
childhood home in Czernowtiz, Ukraine.264 Similarly, the elder Goldhagen underscores 
the salience of this trip in rectifying his son’s academic seclusion and distance from his 
family’s past.265 
The film’s investment in postmemory and memory transference is underscored 
through the special feature at the end of the DVD. Goldhagen situates his travels to 
Czernowtiz as a family affair. He explains in the special feature that his wife and his son 
accompanied him to his father’s childhood home. After noting his son’s interest in the 
elder Goldhagen’s Holocaust experience, Goldhagen remarks that to have “one of his 
grandchildren see where my father came from and where he suffered and where his 
family suffered” enhanced the meaningfulness of the trip.266 By introducing his son 
Gideon, Goldhagen reinforces the genealogical elements in his work, and he foregrounds 
narratives related to the transference of memory. The trip to Czernowtiz not only 
advances the film’s larger narrative about eliminationism, but it also functions as a 
pedagogical moment for his family as Daniel and Gideon establish intimate connections 
with Erich Goldhagen’s Holocaust memories. 
 By tethering Goldhagen’s authority to his postmemory of the Shoah, the film 
ensnares itself into larger debates connected to mnemonic transmission. Bauman’s 
exploration of this phenomenon raises two sets of concerns. Bauman is critical of the idea 
that one can assume “the status of a ‘victim by proxy’” or advance claims “of belonging 





ethical indulgence owed to those who suffer).”267 Put simply, he questions the ethics of 
“in blanco certificate[s] of moral righteousness” that seemingly accompany just such a 
transmission of Holocaust memory.268 Bauman suggests that second generational 
righteousness has the potential to be used to justify “whatever the offspring of the victims 
do … [as] morally proper (or at least ethically correct) as long as it can be shown that it 
was done in order to stave off the repetition of the lot visited on their ancestors.”269 The 
problem raised here is that familial memories become the platform for shaping broader 
political arguments. As demonstrated through Goldhagen’s corpus of works, Goldhagen 
is utilizing postmemories to make idiosyncratic meaning of his family’s loss; he is 
leveraging that loss to construct public arguments about the nature of genocide.270 In so 
doing, his postmemories become the vehicle for authorizing his atrocity definitions, 
representations, and resolutions while limiting the broader exercise of public agency. 
Alternative Approaches to Proximity 
 Goldhagen is an intriguing genocide cessation actor because of his unique 
position at the nexus of scholarly and popular forms of Holocaust and genocide studies. 
WTW reflects the tensions that inhere in such a precarious position as Goldhagen 
fortifies his sense of authority while promoting “accessible” genocide cessation texts. 
Ultimately, his efforts to construct the former undermine the latter. The film’s treatment 
of genocide definitions, representations, resolutions, and remembrances are laced with 
arguments that tether authority to privileged forms of spatial and experiential access.  
Those without such access are afforded limited roles in genocide cessation. 
Consequently, Goldhagen excludes the popular audiences he is so often assumed to be 





 WTW is predicated upon managing relations of proximity and distance. The 
film’s employment of these constructs extends select ideological components introduced 
in HWE. Reflecting on the debates surrounding the representation of violence in 
Goldhagen’s first book, Ash suggests that the text contains “ambivalent markers of 
immediacy and distance.”271 Likewise, Brenner observes Goldhagen’s predilection for 
“oscillation between extremes of identification (for example, repetition-compulsion) and 
distanciation (for example, denial).”272 Ultimately, Ash accentuates the potential afforded 
through the management of these spatial relations, charging that “both identification and 
its opposite, moral distancing, are useful means of teaching about the past.”273 Whereas 
the bulk of this chapter has examined the paradoxical implications of Goldhagen’s claims 
of spatial and experiential proximity, these claims to authority also rely on troubling 
presumptions of distance, which preserve notions of US innocence while maintaining the 
conditions which allow for Western nation-states’ disassociation from the politics of 
genocide. 
 First, the film’s treatment of questions of proximity and distance contributes to 
the representation of genocide as a “foreign” phenomenon. In much the same way that 
Caplan notes that HWE positions Germany as foreign,274 the sites of eliminationist 
violence are spatially located beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States. Quite 
literally, Goldhagen refers to these locales in the film as “somewhere elses,” implying 
that genocidal violence is not something that happens “here.” The film’s travelogue 
elements reify this sense of distance as scenes of Goldhagen on a plane or in an airport 
suggest that places of genocidal violence are places that are a plane ride away. 





sequence, Goldhagen is shown retrieving his bags from the baggage claim while 
background signage reads “Welcome to Berlin.” When such clear place-markers are 
absent, the film superimposes Goldhagen’s location onto the screen. These practices help 
mark the sites of such violence as located outside of the US. The creation of this chasm 
between sites of eliminationist violence and Goldhagen’s home country effaces the 
history of atrocities on US soil, including debates around the decimation of US 
indigenous populations. While Goldhagen may impugn the United States in the film for 
not taking action to prevent or intervene in genocides, the United States is nevertheless 
safeguarded from charges of inciting genocidal violence through such effacements and 
distancing. As such, WTW’s construction of spatial relations bolsters perceptions of US 
innocence. 
 Second, the film’s treatment of proximity/distance presumes that the US has no 
inherent relationship to the politics of genocides as they occur in these “distant” locales. 
In other words, the construction of distance in WTW erases the links post-liberal 
approaches to genocide cessation attempt to reveal between Western nation-states and 
sites of genocidal violence. To return to the discussion of causality contained in Chapter 
One, scholars such as Levene treat the historic ascendency of Western nation-states as 
one of the structuring conditions for genocidal violence. Beyond the violence such states 
directly orchestrated (indigenous slaughter, slavery, etc.) in certain locales, Western 
advancement results in asymmetric power relations and relations of dependency with 
wide reaching implications. Levene charges, “[n]owhere was entirely untouched by these 
trajectories” of Western development.275 Yet, the rhetoric of distance contained in WTW 





violence. Just as the sites of violence are positioned as spatially removed from the 
territorial boundaries of the United States, so too does the film’s construction of distance 
imply that the United States is politically removed from the violence unfolding in these 
locales. From a post-liberal perspective, no distance exists between the affairs of Western 
nation-states and the politics of genocide.276 According to such a causal philosophy, these 
states are already implicated in Goldhagen’s eliminationist violence regardless of where 
such violence occurs, an implication that must remain exnominated in WTW.  
 The film’s constructions of proximity and distance reflect one of the many ways 
WTW attempts to navigate its position on the cusp of academic and popular genocide 
cessation discourses. The incompatible arguments and inconsistences in genocide 
definitions, representations, and resolutions reflect the challenges of navigating this 
scholarly/popular terrain. Whereas WTW has an aura of sobriety due to its ties to the 
academy and use of the documentary form,277 such gravitas is compromised by the 
blatant use of entertainment genres employed to attract visitors to the Los Angeles-based 
Museum of Tolerance (MOT) and draw their attention to its genocide cessation 
discourse.  
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CHAPTER THREE:  
The Glorification of State Authority and the Problematic Politics of Security within 
the Museum of Tolerance 
 
 In 2002, the popular television show South Park aired an episode titled “The 
Death Camp of Tolerance.” In this episode, famous South Park residents Cartman, Stan, 
Kyle, and Butters are sent to visit the Los Angeles-based Museum of Tolerance (MOT) 
after being accused of discriminating against their openly gay teacher. At the start of the 
episode, viewers are introduced to a caricatured representation of the MOT as the 
students and their parents tour the institution. A chipper guide wearing a Star of David 
greets the group at the museum and explains the institution’s mission: “Here we try to 
educate you on the dynamics of racism and prejudice in America.” The students enter 
their first exhibit, the “tunnel of prejudice,” a darkened chamber simulating “what it can 
feel like to be discriminated against.”  Ethnic slurs are shouted at the students as they 
pass through the tunnel. The students then enter the “hall of stereotypes [where]… wax 
figures represent how some intolerant people have labeled minorities.” Among the 
figures featured in the hall, the group encounters an African-American man shown eating 
watermelon and fried chicken with a pistol tucked into his pants, a representation of an 
Arab man brandishing a weapon, “an Asian man with a calculator,” “a covetous Jew” 
shown with a bag of money, and a “sleepy Mexican,” who turns out not to be a wax 
figure at all but a janitor that had paused for a nap.1 
Upon exiting the hall of stereotypes, the students learn more about the nature of 
tolerance. In essence the guide’s definition of tolerance is constructed as withholding 
criticism. Cartman’s weight is highlighted as an example; his obesity is equated with 




“cookies and cakes and pies” as he likes. At the conclusion of their tour the guide 
reminds the students that “we have to accept people for who they are and what they like 
to do.”  Yet, seconds later, the guide spots a smoker near the front the museum and 
becomes outraged over his behavior. As the group yells at the man to move, they hurl 
derogatory epithets, condemning him as a “filthy smoker” with “dirty lungs” and “stupid 
tar breath.” In little time, the limits of tolerance discourse become readily apparent.2 
As the object of satire, South Park’s representation of the MOT punctuates 
problematic aspects of the institution’s work to define, represent, and resolve social 
problems. At the definitional level, the episode highlights the institution’s sophomoric 
conceptions of the origins of public problems. The tour guide’s lessons and questions 
(i.e., “Now, did you know that words we use can show intolerance?”3) are so rudimentary 
as to barely warrant discussion let alone museum exhibitions.  At the representational 
level, the episode suggests that the institution propagates rather than eliminates 
stereotypes and violent forms of discourse. As Cartman goes through the “tunnel of 
prejudice,” he visibly enjoys the experience of hearing these offensive phrases and asks 
to “ride again” after he emerges on the other side.  The students glean new insults to use 
on each other and commit to remembering some of the phrases they have heard for later 
usage.4 Finally, the incident with the smoker at the end of segment demonstrates the 
contradictions in museum messaging. Tolerance discourse clearly has its boundaries as 
there are individuals and issues excluded from that which society must tolerate.5 
Although the episode offers a caricaturized version of the MOT, it highlights contentious 




The ambitious scope and structure of an institution devoted to “tolerance” make 
the MOT a unique example of US genocide cessation discourse. Unlike the other two 
texts examined in this study, the MOT does not foreground ending genocide as a major 
part of its vision statement.  Under the auspices of eradicating the roots of public 
problems ranging in severity from high school bullying to the Holocaust, genocide is just 
one of many social ills the institution addresses. Whereas both the Tolerancenter and the 
Holocaust portion of the MOT have been studied extensively, the MOT’s configurations 
of genocide tend to be overlooked.6 Despite the limited space expressly devoted to 
imparting messages about genocide and genocide cessation within the MOT, analysis of 
the institution provides an opportunity to study the interconnections among various forms 
of atrocity. By situating genocide amid a host of public problems, the MOT invites a 
comparative assessment of violent acts, which raises broad questions about the links 
among state authority, the public agency, and the execution or cessation of genocidal 
atrocities.   
Although the institution’s breadth creates the opportunity to probe the 
complexities of the relationships among power, violence, and the nation-state, such 
breadth also intensifies the anxieties at the core of this study, manifesting in 
inconsistencies across the institution’s attempts to define, represent, resolve, and 
remember genocide. Rather than sublimate such anxieties as demonstrated in Chapter 
Two, the institution cultivates an anxious affect, capitalizing on a sense of fear introduced 
through the use of the horror genre. In lieu of a more robust definitional discourse, the 
construct of genocide takes shape through the use of multiple generic frameworks, 




introduced through horror conventions extends into a sense of suspicion as the MOT 
marks the discursive environment its visitors inhabit as dangerous. In turn, these subtle 
messages about lurking dangers feed the institution’s resolution discourses by 
undergirding calls for state-based security solutions.7  Remembrance discourses reify this 
elevation of the nation-state. They do so by constructing a “temporal folding” that 
accentuates a sense of past, present, and future threat even as such messages create 
unease over state power and the politics of genocide and genocide cessation.8 
After exploring existing criticisms of the museum, this chapter examines the 
strategies utilized by the MOT to supplement its abstract definitional discourses through 
the use of horror, melodrama, and self-help or motivational generic conventions. Genres, 
of course, contribute to both the definition of genocide as well as its representation; thus, 
the ensuing section examines the MOT’s focused engagement with representation issues 
through its emphasis on the importance of communication processes and technologies. 
The third section probes the interconnections between the MOT’s approach to 
communication and communication technologies and their proffered resolutions to 
genocide, revealing inherent contradictions in their stance on atrocity prevention. The 
final section on genocide memory suggests that the institution’s constructions of 
temporality reify the importance of state authority in spite of the complications the 
validation of the security state creates. 
A Critical Chorus: Extant Criticisms of the MOT 
 As its own promotional materials stress, the MOT “‘is no Ordinary Museum.’”9 In 
marked contrast to what museum organizers term “ordinary museum[s] of artifacts and 




interactive experience for visitors.11 In the MOT’s words, the institution “is a human 
rights laboratory and educational center.”12 And its stated pedagogical aims are 
ambitious, particularly in its aim to encourage Holocaust understanding and “confront all 
forms of prejudice and discrimination in our world today.”13 Offering a pronounced 
message of empowerment, the MOT seeks to “challenge people of all backgrounds to 
confront their most closely-held assumptions and assume responsibility for change.”14   
The institution attracts a diverse audience. In addition to its appeals to Los 
Angeles tourists, the MOT makes a special effort to reach out to youth.15 The MOT casts 
itself as responding to “a new generation of young people … beginning to question 
whether or not the Holocaust ever happened.”16 Indeed, the MOT is given ample 
opportunity to address youths, claiming that 130,000 students pass through its doors 
annually.17 To facilitate and encourage youth attendance, the MOT offers grant funding 
to offset travel expenses for educators planning school trips from the Los Angeles and 
San Diego school systems.18  
Beyond its targeting of youths, the MOT also markets itself to professional 
communities. Through programming related to its “Tools for Tolerance,®” for example, 
the MOT engages in professional development and training, advertising itself as 
“hav[ing] served over 160,000 professionals including judges, lawyers, managers, 
scientists, nurses, librarians, teachers, police officers, doctors, human resources 
specialists, corporate executives, and many more.”19  Among its clients, the MOT lists 
the Boston Police Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigations, Sony Pictures 
Entertainment, the United States Attorney’s Office, and Wells Fargo.20 In other words, 




in educating professionals about values of justice, tolerance, and diversity, 21 In the 
institution’s words, the MOT “challenge[s] participants to redefine professional roles in 
an increasingly complex and diverse world.”22 
The museum works toward fulfilling these lofty objectives through its use of a 
variety of mixed media, interactive exhibitions. The ground floor of the institution hosts 
the bulk of the MOT’s promoted content. It is typically discussed as organized into a 
“Tolerancenter” and Holocaust exhibition. The Holocaust portion of the MOT consists of 
a seventy minute “sound-and-light guided” narrative that spatially moves visitors through 
selected moments in Holocaust history,23 including a recreated street scene in 1930s 
Germany, a “mock” Warsaw ghetto, and even a simulated “selection” at the gates of 
Auschwitz. Nearby, the Tolerancenter addresses a wide range of topics through 
interactive media consoles. Its contents include a constructed “Point of View” diner 
where visitors have the opportunity to watch videos about issues ranging from drunk 
driving to hate speech. The consoles in front of each visitor at the diner enable them to 
interview the central characters in the video as well as to respond to polls about their 
lived experiences with the topic under discussion.  In addition to the Point of View diner, 
the Tolerancenter features videos on contemporary genocide and the civil rights 
movement, an interactive timeline spotlighting US human rights struggles, and computer 
stations which call visitors’ attention to the prevalence of hate speech on the Internet.  
In the twenty years the institution has been open to the public, much has been said 
about the Museum of Tolerance and its exhibitions, and much of the academic critique of 
the institution is fairly negative.24  Although the MOT has been studied from a variety of 




arguments are not mutually exclusive nor are they distinct forms of critiques; rather, they 
tend to inform one another, often culminating in a multi-tiered declamation of the MOT’s 
inadequacies. These lines of argument accentuate: (1) the limitations of the MOT’s 
substantial use of multi-media and simulation, (2) the MOT’s reductive explanations of 
social problems, and (3) the MOT’s heavy-hand in meaning-making.25 
1) MOT as Hyperreal Spectacle 
MOT exists in Hollywood’s backyard and distinguishes itself from other 
museums in large part based upon its embrace of television and other forms of interactive 
media;26 many critics of the MOT consequently interrogate the implications of its hyper-
mediated exhibition displays, expressing concerns about “truth,” “reality,” and affective 
manipulation.27 Contextually, the MOT is linked both to Los Angeles tourism and the 
“aura” of Hollywood productions. Located near Rodeo Drive and Beverly Hills, the MOT 
is marketed as a tourist destination.28 With promotional materials encouraging potential 
visitors to “take a vacation from your vacation,”29 the MOT in part pitches itself as yet 
another tourist attraction, worthy of visitors’ time, energy, and money. To quote its 
brochure: 
In the hyper-competitive world of Los Angeles tourist sights and 
attractions, the Museum of Tolerance is something of a miracle. Without 
the easy lure of thrill rides or blockbuster art, the MOT has been garnering 
rave reviews and record attendance for powerful interactive exhibits on the 
Holocaust and highly charged subjects such as Human Rights, Diversity, 




experience. We promise you, it will be one of the most meaningful and, 
yes, entertaining days of your life.30 
Acknowledging its competition (which includes popular destinations like Disneyland, the 
Hollywood Walk of Fame, and the Chinese Theatre), the MOT does not try to work 
against the entertainment-oriented tourist logics; rather, it uses such logics to usher 
visitors through its doors. Regardless of whether or not visitors to the MOT frequent 
these other sites, such famed L.A. destinations and the mindset of “entertainmentality” 
constitute the “experiential landscape” within which visitors approach and understand the 
MOT.31 
In addition to its geographical proximity to major Hollywood studios, the 
institution bears traces of Hollywood’s influence. Norden describes Rabbi Hier, the 
founder of the Simon Wiesenthal Center, as “enlist[ing] the friends, Jewish and non-
Jewish, whom he made in the entertainment business” to support the construction of the 
current MOT.32 As a result, “[c]oncern was therefore expressed that … [the MOT] would 
be too show-biz…”33 Such concerns were likely not allayed by having Hollywood 
superstar Arnold Schwarzenegger offer his remarks at the museum’s opening nor by the 
homage paid to Hollywood inside the MOT.34 The “Finding Our Families, Finding 
Ourselves” exhibition, for example, capitalizes on the MOT’s access to celebrity stories 
by featuring narratives spotlighting “poet, best-selling author, historian and educator Dr. 
Maya Angelou; award-winning actor, comedian and director Billy Crystal; multiple 
Grammy winner and Rock and Roll Hall of Famer Carlos Santana; and National League 
MVP and former Manager of the four-time World Series Champions, the New York 




entertainment genre using a quiz show format to ask questions of visitors about social 
issues such as child labor or refugee issues.36 
The associative links between “Hollywood,” “spectacle,” and the MOT give many 
critics pause. Among the many problems of embracing Hollywood’s aura, the MOT risks 
exploiting the suffering of others as entertainment fare, thusly corroborating critiques 
advanced by Rothe and others about contemporary media culture’s willingness to “sell” 
trauma, pain, and anguish.37 Further, others argue that the demand to attract visitors or 
viewers severely constrains these Holocaust or genocide studies representations.38 Tasked 
with showing brutal atrocities and violence on a terrifying scale while also attempting to 
draw audiences, the texts invariably offer sanitized narratives that gloss over the most 
disturbing aspects of atrocities.39  
In addition to the questionable ethics of casting the MOT’s content through the 
prism of “entertainment,” critiques of the MOT as spectacle draw attention to the 
concerns around the MOT’s use of “simulation.” Because of the MOT’s representation 
choices, Kirshenblatt-Gimblett suggests the MOT “is already walking a fine line by using 
dramatic recreations to tell the story of the Holocaust,”40 tapping into longstanding fears 
about the use of fiction and creative license in the depiction of the Shoah.41 Developing 
this critique, Lisus and Ericson discuss the MOT’s mediated exhibitions as hyperreal, 
where “the real – or rather those things that define the real, namely memory and history – 
collapses, in degrees into the fantastic, the fictional, the unreal” within the MOT’s 
doors.42  
Finally, the MOT’s connections to “entertainmentality” lead to critiques of the 




sells visitors on an experience,43 and in particular, an affective experience.44 Critical of 
such an approach, Witcomb and others argue that the institution works to prioritize 
sentiment over historical contextualization and political action,45 “making for an 
unreflective emotionality rather than understanding.”46 Lisus and Ericson discuss the 
MOT as a multi-media “emotion factory,”47 and Bartov goes so far as to assert that the 
MOT ironically embraces the same form of emotional manipulation that it lambastes the 
Nazis for using.48  “[B]y privileging pathos over knowledge,”49 Bartov charges that the 
institution reduces the space for visitors to create and advance resistant or alternative 
readings. As a result, Lisus and Ericson argue that “[t]he aesthetics of emotion [deployed 
within the context of the MOT] become the aesthetics of control,”50 foreshadowing an 
argument which feeds prominently into subsequent critiques offered by Brown, Patraka, 
and others.51  
2) Violence as an Interpersonal Problem 
Some have noted that the emphasis on Hollywood-style production values 
produced an exhibit where “history” and “politics” are lost within the MOT's reduction of 
violence to an interpersonal problem.52 Lisus and Ericson suggest that this may be a 
problem of the MOT’s overuse of television, which has long been critiqued for its 
inability to capture the complexity of systemic political problems.53 Others have argued 
that the institution is thoroughly presentist in its temporal orientation.54 As a result, its 
displays are bereft of the historical context needed to add sufficient depth to its 
narratives.55 Articulating a biting criticism of the MOT’s ahistoricism and superficiality, 




pushed to the sidelines in favor of a multimedia spectacle that ultimately fails to mediate 
much of anything.”56 
 In addition to critiques of the MOT’s ahistoricism, others argue that the institution 
offers overly simplistic explanations of political problems. Complex social issues are 
reduced to interpersonal issues and treated as having their genesis in prejudicial thoughts 
and behaviors. As Rabinbach asserts, “the Tolerance Museum promiscuously regards 
intolerance as the single root from which any manifest social evil, from human rights 
abuses, inequality and AIDS to racism and, ultimately, ethnic genocide could sprout.”57 
By casting prejudice and intolerance as the origins of serious social problems, the 
institution elides the “present political and socio-economic conditions” that Bartov asserts 
generate the kinds of violence featured in the institution.58  These reductive narratives 
have significant implications for the MOT’s resolution discourses. Because the MOT 
locates “[p]rejudice…at the root of genocide,” Bartov contends the solution then becomes 
to “eliminate prejudice [and] (not its causes).”59 He goes on to argue that the paths toward 
the rectification of said ills lie “[n]ot [in] a change of material realities, but a change of 
heart, not a transformation of the conditions that perpetuate frustration and violence, but a 
transformation of our perception of these conditions.”60 In short, these critiques suggest 
that without a broader historical or political context, the problems contained in the MOT 
appear primarily as interpersonal failures.61 
 This framing contributes to the MOT’s apolitical veneer. In her read of the 
institution, Brown argues that the MOT’s reductive understanding of context contributes 
to the propagation “of tolerance as a contemporary discourse of depoliticization in which 




ethnicized hostility or conflict”62 Of course, no institution is apolitical, and Brown 
illuminates the extent to which the MOT’s apolitical discourses of tolerance mask the 
museum’s conservative political interests. Although the institution’s emphasis on the 
interpersonal dimensions of social harms occludes a more substantive discussion of 
politics, the MOT’s ideological bent is perhaps best signaled through its attempts to exert 
control over its messaging.  
3) Hegemony and Message Control 
 Finally, one of the MOT’s more remarked upon attributes is its heavy-handed 
attempts to guide visitors’ experiences. As other critics have noted during their visits to 
the institution, maps are not made available to visitors; thus, visitors are dependent upon 
the orientation to the institution provided by docents.63 Within the Holocaust exhibition, 
there is remarkably little to read; thus, to consume the narrative, visitors must keep pace 
with the order of the audio-visual displays, moving on when the displays move on, 
resulting in little time for contemplation.64  
Brown and others articulating this critique highlight a certain irony: the institution 
pays lip service to audience interactivity while limiting the opportunities for visitors to 
interact. Lisus and Ericson, Witcomb, and Brown all contend that the MOT offers only 
the most superficial modes for visitor engagement (i.e., instructions to press X or Y 
button or select one of the following four options, etc.).65 Lisus and Ericson charge, 
“While the visitor is provided with the sensation of being in a ‘free-flicker’ environment, 
the individual is not as free as she seems” due to “pre-programmed and repetitively run” 
video options. 66 Such limited modes for engagement, Brown argues, render the MOT’s 




the implications are the same for these critics: The MOT repeatedly encourages visitors 
to engage in forms of critical thought all-the-while undermining visitors’ ability to 
demonstrate their critical capacity.67 
In sum, criticisms of the institution’s reliance on Hollywood-esque spectacles, 
reductive approaches to violence, and hegemonic museum messaging provide insights 
which enrich their readers’ understanding of the museum.68 Underlying much of the 
expressed criticism is a palpable lamentation over the superficiality the MOT’s treatment 
of complex political and social issues. There is also a visible dissatisfaction with the 
extent of institutional control exerted over visitors’ experiences. This interplay between 
superficiality and control shapes the MOT’s constructions of state and public authority as 
the institution attempts to define, represent, resolve, and remember genocide. 
Constructing Genocide as a Public Problem: Definitional Struggles within the MOT 
 Within the context of the institution’s vast scope and ambitious mission statement, 
the concept of genocide plays an important role in lending coherence to museum 
messaging. More specifically, the MOT’s conception of genocide bridges the perceived 
division between the Holocaust portion of the institution and the Tolerancenter. In order 
to establish connections between diverse exhibition content, the MOT employs an 
abstract and thus flexible conceptualization of genocide. The institution’s definitional 
discourse retains a considerable amount of plasticity by under contextualizing the 
atrocities it features.69 In lieu of a more robust definitional discourse, the definition of 
genocide takes shape in relation to other atrocities featured in the MOT. By 
conceptualizing genocide through associations and comparisons with other forms of 




genocidal atrocity while avoiding the political quagmires that would mark more 
sophisticated attempts to define and apply the term.  
At first blush, the concept of genocide is only marginally featured within the 
institution. The MOT contains its discussion of genocide to two adjacent areas. In the 
first area, visitors stand in front of a large map of the world flanked by a mounted display 
case on one side and a series of screens featuring a countdown timer on the other. The 
display case to the left includes an image of President Ronald Reagan signing a document 
and a pen. This display marks the moment in 1988 when the US became party to the 1948 
UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. As visitors 
turn away from that display case, they face the map highlighting genocides and crimes 
against humanity during the twentieth century. The map spotlights the atrocities that have 
occurred in countries such as the Congo, Namibia, Armenia, Cambodia, Iraq, Sudan, 
Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo. As each area is discussed, the map shows the affected 
country and includes a sentence or two about the identities of the victims targeted and the 
number killed. The display moves quickly through these locations, interspersing bits of 
information about the Holocaust, Lemkin, and the creation of the term “genocide” as well 
as the introduction of the phrase “crimes against humanity.”  
Next to the map, a timer lets visitors know when they can move into the second 
exhibition area, a small theater featuring a short video on twentieth-century atrocities. 
The film, titled “In Our Time,” addresses the problems posed by “genocide,” “human 
rights abuses,” and “terrorism.” Although never expressly differentiated, these three ideas 
are constituted through a few prominent definitional attributes, chiefly blood, carnage, 




concept that refers to physical violence that culminates in the death of a large number of 
people.  
These two exhibition areas leave the concept of genocide fairly abstract. On one 
hand, the display case featuring Reagan’s decision to sign the 1948 UN Convention as 
well as the repeated references to the Lemkin and his effort to coin the term elevates the 
legal understanding of genocide as contained in the UN Convention text.  On the other, 
so little contextual information is provided about the featured genocides that the 
relationship between the atrocities and the definition remains mystified.  
Further, the mechanics of the displays themselves contribute to the MOT’s 
definitional ambiguity. Extending the aforementioned critiques of the institution’s control 
of the visitor’s experience, the superimposed lines of texts about each atrocity on the map 
flicker across the wall at a clipped pace. A few lines of text are displayed for a moment 
before the exhibition narrative moves on, leaving the visitor little time to digest any of the 
information before the display changes. Additionally, the exhibition scrolls through so 
many countries and addresses so many different topics, definitional distinctions blur. The 
map alternatively discusses the Holocaust, genocide, and crimes against humanity.  The 
map identifies 5 instances of genocide spotlighting the atrocities in Armenia, Congo, 
Rwanda, and Cambodia in addition to an extended focus on the Holocaust. It then 
profiles a number of diverse abuses in countries such as Guatemala, Brazil, Nigeria, and 
Pakistan. The exhibition references the Great Leap Forward and the Rape of Nanking. 
The brevity of the remarks about each event and the display’s fast pacing inhibit a clear 
understanding of the connections between these historical occurrences. The exhibition 




maintaining a sense of distinction between “genocide” and “crimes against humanity” is 
next to impossible given the display’s rapid transitions. The inability to slow the script 
down combined with the limited information given about each historic atrocity result 
only in fostering general impressions of the pervasiveness and longevity of mass forms of 
violence. Otherwise, the correlations between Lemkin’s definition, the UN definition, and 
historical examples featured in this display area are muddled.   
Given the limited information imparted by these exhibition areas, the MOT’s 
definition of genocide primarily emerges through a series of contrasts with the 
institution’s other exhibitions. The relationship between the MOT’s components has been 
discussed by Brown as verging on “incoherence in themes and content.”70  Others see a 
clear narrative unifying the Tolerancenter and the Holocaust exhibition. The MOT’s 
featured genocide exhibitions sit at the nexus of these two segments of the institution and 
come to be defined vis-à-vis contrasts with these segments.  
The construct of genocide helps resolve an organizational problem. Numerous 
critics have noted that the MOT’s diverse exhibitions create problems in terms of 
institutional coherence.71 As a New York Times feature describes the exhibitions, the 
institution “strains to tie together slavery, genocides, prejudice, discrimination and hate 
crimes.”72 With displays addressing content ranging from the Warsaw Ghetto uprising to 
hate speech on the Internet, some existing criticisms of the MOT see it as composed of 
two separate segments: the “Tolerancenter” and the Holocaust exhibition. Stier charges 
that MOT “is actually split in two parts and that the doubled name of the museum [Beit 
HasShoah-Museum of Tolerance] refers to its two distinct sections,” lending the 




Others see the organization as building a coherent narrative about violence across 
the MOT’s numerous and diverse exhibitions. Prosise, for example, draws on social ritual 
scholarship to read the MOT’s exhibitions as creating a sequential narrative of 
transformation, moving visitors through multiple “ritual” stages: separating the individual 
from society (Tolerancenter), providing liminal spaces (the Holocaust exhibition), and 
reintegrating the changed individual back into society (the exit to the Holocaust 
exhibition).74 Operating from a similar perspective, other critics argue that the MOT 
constructs a continuum of violence.75 In Patraka’s words, the institution adopts “a 
teleological narrative of escalating violence,” moving from small scale injustices like a 
sexist comment, for example, to the Holocaust.76  Reading the institution in fashion 
consistent with Patraka, Williams writes, “[t]he question of the scale of behavior – from 
an offensive ethnic joke to mass murder – is one that is little acknowledged. Or rather, the 
sliding scale is exactly the museum’s point – Nazis and other demagogues are there to 
show that if we do not check ourselves for private thoughts, then terrible actions can 
easily follow.”77 Beyond his assessment of the spectrum connecting the exhibitions, 
Williams’s remarks about policing “private thoughts” foreshadow critical aspects of the 
MOT’s resolution discourse.  
Read as part of a continuum, the concept of genocide helps unify exhibition 
content; at the same time, such content provides the concept of genocide with broad 
contours. Viewed from Patraka’s and William’s perspectives, the concept of genocide 
plays an important role on the MOT’s continuum of violence. The construct adds gravitas 
to the “microaggressions” in the Tolerancenter and functions as a contemporary exigency 




shape relationally through contrasts with the other segments of the museum. Unlike the 
Tolerancenter’s discussion of hate speech, genocidal violence is not only symbolic, it is 
also material. Unlike the discussion of the deaths of individuals such as James Byrd, Dr. 
Barnett Slepion, or Matthew Shepard featured in the Tolerancenter, the poignancy of the 
loss is multiplied here because genocide is the death of many. Unlike the Holocaust 
exhibition, the violence depicted in this segment is not “over,” it is ongoing.   
Still, such an understanding of genocide as a point on a spectrum of atrocities 
paints the construct only in broad brushstrokes. The exhibition content expressly 
concerned with genocide offers a vague and underdeveloped definition of the term. On 
one obvious level, this abstract definition frees the institution from the contentious 
political debates that accompany attempts to draw discernments between genocidal and 
nongenocidal atrocities. The MOT’s plasticity in this regard aids the institution in 
cultivating a seemingly apolitical definition of genocidal atrocity. Rather than enhance 
the precision of the definition, the construct of genocide comes into focus through its 
relationship with other MOT exhibitions. The construct is further shaped through MOT’s 
representational choices. More specifically, the MOT’s use of generic conventions drawn 
from horror, melodrama, and self-help lend additional insight into the institution’s 
characterization of the problem of genocide and foreshadow important components of its 
resolution discourse. 
Generic Conventions and Representation Trepidation 
 Representation is a complicated issue within the MOT. Museums are rhetorical 
artifacts, and their exhibitions, displays, and architecture reflect representational 




representations and leery of the power of communication and communication 
technologies. Nevertheless, the MOT’s representational choices shape visitors’ 
understandings of genocide and other forms of violence. The institution relies on generic 
threads drawn from horror, melodrama, and self-help to give meaning to the concept of 
genocide. These generic conventions also influence how genocide and other atrocities are 
represented within the institution. At the same, the exhibition is cognizant of the extent to 
which communication and communication technologies contribute to violence. This 
awareness has the potential to be profoundly destabilizing as the MOT both relies on the 
persuasive potency of its displays while simultaneously expressing concerns about the 
power of persuasion. This trepidation or representational anxiety is managed within the 
institution by making recourse to horror conventions to build a case for the importance of 
security and control over the contemporary “mediascape.”80 
Casting Genocide through a Generic Patchwork81 
Though the MOT may provide limited explicit information about genocide, the 
concept is lent definitional attributes through the utilization of three distinct generic 
frameworks: horror, melodrama, and self-help. Genres, as Devitt explains, influence and 
are influenced by understandings of situations. Devitt contends, “people construct genre 
through situation and situation through genre.”82 Thus, the genres within the MOT 
contribute to the MOT’s conceptualization of genocide and atrocity.  Attention to the 
genres utilized to describe the atrocities featured in the MOT stands to reveal textual 
understandings of these situations. In other words, these genres speak to the kind of 




genocide is established as unabashedly horrible, unquestionably evil, but encouragingly 
mutable in the confines of the MOT.83 
Genocide as Horror Story 
 Horror is a critical component of the MOT’s representation of genocide. Defining 
“horror” as a genre, as Hantke explains, is a challenge because “horror is one of the rare 
genres that are defined not primarily by period or formal idiosyncrasies, but by the effect 
they produce in the audience.”84 For horror, the genre “carries the response it tries to 
evoke proudly in its name.”85 Horror, alongside melodrama, is one of Williams’s “body 
genres.”86 These genres traffic in the production of affective or sensory experiences.87  
The horror genre and Holocaust and genocide representations have a complicated 
history.  Undoubtedly, some of the reason for this tension comes from the perceived low-
culture status of the horror genre and the strict policing of forms of representation 
associated with the Holocaust.88 Kerner argues that horror is not a major genre within 
which one finds treatments of the Holocaust.89 Yet, as Picart and Frank demonstrate, 
elements of horror frameworks often inform and structure Holocaust representations, 
including highly-praised representations such as Schindler’s List.90 The contrasts between 
the configurations of horror contained in Kerner’s work and Picart and Frank’s work 
reflect an uneasiness regarding the appropriateness of the horror genre, especially in 
connection with the Holocaust. Whereas horror may be an appropriate response to the 
Shoah,91 fears regarding the conflation of historical horror with entertainment culture’s 





Placing these ethical concerns aside, the horror genre enhances the MOT’s 
ambiguous conception of genocide in two ways. First, it creates space for an affective 
encounter with atrocity. In Kerner’s words, the horror framework provides a “license, if 
not an expectation, to explore ‘the blood and guts’ of” the Holocaust and genocides.93 
Second, horror genres signify aberrations in the social order, shaping perspectives of 
“evil.”94 In discussing the utility of the horror genre in connection to Holocaust and 
genocide studies, Kerner stresses that the utility of horror comes from its treatment of 
“the existence of evil in the world, and the darker side of humanity.”95  
 The MOT draws upon the horror genre though the use of graphic imagery and the 
cultivation of a sense foreboding.  “In Our Time” makes liberal use of an aesthetic of 
carnage. Mangled bodies pepper the film. As the narration offers examples of 
“genocide,” “human rights abuses,” and “terrorism” in the twentieth century, the film 
includes footage of dead or emaciated babies, naked bodies being pushed with bulldozers, 
and an injured victim of a terrorist attack, his face bruised, distorted and covered in 
blood. The scenes are captured in a tight shot, locating the viewer proximate to these 
horrors.96 The MOT does not hesitate to show footage of harm befalling people. Among 
the content animating the video, “In Our Time” contains video footage of a man being 
struck by a machete.97 As terrifying images fill the screen, tense music and the sound of 
sirens amplify the sense of terror and aid in the cultivation of a state of anxiety. Indeed, 
the first two-thirds of the film are replete with images of bloody violence and the sound 
effects of destruction, creating strong parallels between “In Our Time” and the aesthetic 




Though “In Our Time” may showcase the most graphic carnage in the MOT, it is 
hardly the only exhibition to borrow from the horror aesthetic. For instance, if the visitor 
enters “In Our Time” via the Tolerancenter, then the visitor has already been subjected to 
images of the Napalm girl, a blurred image of a half-nude victim of child pornography, 
and a bloodied image of a woman representing the destruction from the Oklahoma City 
Bombing, to name but a few of the images in the Tolerancenter.99 Some of these images 
are plastered on wall-sized displays. Others flicker across the numerous video screens in 
this section of the MOT.100 
Beyond this graphic imagery, parts of the Tolerancenter promote an affective 
experience of foreboding. “Confronting Hate in America” – the second exhibit the visitor 
encounters in the Tolerancenter – showcases a giant map of the United States flanked by 
large images of violence and atrocity. The exhibition focuses on contemporary examples 
of hate, violence, and intolerance in the United States, including the 9/11 attacks, the 
murder of James Byrd in Jasper, Texas, and an attack on migrant workers in an empty 
warehouse on Long Island, New York. The center piece of the exhibition is a screen in 
the shape of the United States that displays recent news stories concerned with hate or 
violence.101 By superimposing news stories detailing hate crimes or instances of 
discrimination directly onto a screen in the shape of the US nation-state, this exhibition 
most clearly enacts Patraka’s contention that the MOT casts the US “as a potential place 
of genocide.”102 “Confronting Hate in America” depicts the United States as a site of 
danger, where terror, hate, and evil lurk, spawning the steady stream of news stories. In 
other words, it sets the stage for the US to be seen as a place of “horror” and contributes 




A similar affective experience is created in the Holocaust portion of the MOT. 
Although critics of the museum have read the institution as borrowing from 
“Disneyesque” or Nintendo-esque aesthetics,104 perhaps the more apt referent for the 
Holocaust exhibition is that of a haunted house. As visitors enter the Holocaust 
exhibition, they move into a darkened room. The automatic doors close behind the 
visitor, prompting the visitor to move forward. Barely visible in the dimly lit first 
chamber are the contours of a recreated street scene populated by life-sized manikins. 
Such displays in the first chamber establish the Holocaust exhibition’s mise-en-scène 
aesthetic whereby the visitor spatially moves through various “sets” depicting moments 
in Holocaust history. For any visitor with most basic knowledge of the Holocaust, the 
horrific end to this narrative can be anticipated in advance. Thus, a haunting premonition 
of the death and destruction awaiting the visitor at the end of the exhibition is enough to 
encourage the first-time visitor to seek the “safety” that comes from sticking with the 
group, the guided narrative, and lighted parts of the display. Noting this sense of 
foreboding, Weiner, too, comments on the way the affective of experience of horror 
shapes the visit as he stresses that the first room, “shrouded in a darkness … must make 
almost everyone feel the same way: Will this be too terrible for me? Can I turn back 
now?”105 Although the intensity of that sense of terror likely varies by visitor, the 
experience ends where one might expect it to: in Auschwitz, in a gas chamber, with faux 
“barred doors.”106  
The sensory experience of anxiety combined with the prevalence of graphic 
imagery punctuates the sense of harm or danger posed by genocide. At the MOT’s 




Schwarzenegger informed audiences in order to be instructive “‘you have to first grab 
their attention.’”107 To be sure, the use of horror helps the MOT “grab attention” through 
shocking, disturbing, and graphic material. By making liberal use of horror aesthetics, the 
MOT invites visitors to engage on a sensory level with the evidence of brutality.108 
Despite the utility of horror in creating that space, counter arguments question whether 
such a framework simply grants permission for the indulgence of morbid curiosity.109 
While signifying a breakdown in the social order, the MOT’s use of horror as a 
framework for genocide offers little insight into the nature of the problem. Put 
differently, the horror genre may help establish genocide as an atrocious public problem, 
but it offers little insight as to the genesis of the problems and the solutions needed to 
forestall future atrocities. Thusly, the MOT blends aspects of the horror genre with 
melodrama to provide a structure for making sense of atrocities. The combination of 
these two generic frameworks ultimately helps cast genocide as unabashedly horrifying 
and unquestionably “evil.” 
Genocide as Melodrama 
 The MOT draws on aspects of melodrama to continue to lend shape to the 
definition of genocide. As explained in Chapter Two, definitions of melodrama vary; 
however, Brooks treats the genre as characterized by emotionally charged representations 
of “good and evil.”110 Historically, he argues the genre has been concerned with imposing 
a sense of order on a complex political landscape.111 Drawing on Brooks, Rothe argues 
that contemporary “popular trauma culture” employs melodrama in a similar fashion as a 
response to current political exigencies. “[M]elodrama,” she suggests, “echoes the 




experienced as not only disembedded but as insidiously traumatic.”112 Similar to the way 
the genre was used in Worse than War, melodrama enables the MOT to cast atrocities 
through the language of moral absolutes; genocide thus becomes a problem of 
“innocents” felled by “evil.”113 Using children and gendered representations of grief, the 
MOT sketches a portrait of the blameless victim. In stressing the innocence of the 
victims, the melodramatic framework inherently accentuates the culpability of the 
perpetrators of violence. Yet, the construction of culpability in the MOT is complicated. 
Working in conjunction with Christian narratives connected to the notion of original sin, 
the MOT communicates a fairly radical message about the capacity for violence by 
positioning its visitors in “guilty” or culpable subjectivities.114  
As a means of highlighting the distance between the concepts of good and evil, 
the MOT plays on stereotypical conceptions of “innocence” as embodied by children. 
Dead children are a prominent motif. “In Our Time,” for example, opens with a narrative 
about woman whose baby was violently taken away from her. By means of establishing 
the severity of the situation in Darfur, the video contains a narrative about children 
slaughtered in school houses. As the narrative unfolds, the three screens in the exhibition 
showcase dead children’s bodies, framed in a tight shot, including the bodies of very 
young children.115 Quite in contrast to the graphic carnage attributed to the horror 
aesthetic, the images are not gory or bloody; rather, the dead children appear almost 
peaceful. If it were not for the context, the children could be read as sleeping. Given the 
perceived innocence of sleeping babes, such visual resemblance increases the pathos of 




“In Our Time” is not the only exhibition to feature the bodies of dead babies; the 
Holocaust exhibition ends with an extended narrative about massacred infants. In the 
mock gas chamber at the end of the Holocaust exhibition, the visitor encounters a variety 
of Holocaust narratives. In one of these narratives, the female speaker describes the 
evacuation of a hospital during the Holocaust. Once the adults were removed from the 
facility, the woman mentions an empty truck left behind at the scene. This truck was later 
filled with infants as babies were thrown from a hospital window into the truck below. 
While the woman describes the scene, the screens in the room fill with still images of 
infants. Much like the infants in the “In Our Time” story, the tight shots could be children 
at rest had they not been situated as images representing the dead babies in the 
narrative.116  Oddly, between these scenes of sleeping/dead children, the screen fills with 
images of dolls, other markers of childhood and perhaps poignant reminders of the loss of 
the children who would otherwise use these toys. Though dolls also connote youth, the 
juxtaposition of dead babies and baby dolls is troubling on many levels, not the least of 
which because such images raise the issue of the artificial and “real.” The mix of images 
of baby dolls and the still images of deceased children recalls the mix of varying modes 
of representation blended by the MOT: the dolls as symbols of the artificial and the 
images of the dead children signaling a documentary-style representation of the “real.” 
Such a juxtaposition serves as a potent reminder of the complicated status of the role of 
artifice within Holocaust aesthetics.  
The pathos of the violence in the MOT is further communicated through gendered 
representations of grief.117 In a second segment in the same faux gas chamber in the 




mass shooting, the woman escaped a fatal injury; however, she describes awaking in a 
pile of bodies to find her daughter shot in the head. The description of this tragic 
occurrence is visually represented through the black and white image of a girl, eyes 
closed, lying amid a pile of bodies. A moving camera begins by focusing on the face of 
the child and pans out to show that she lies a top a pile of limbs.118 Again, the image 
lacks the graphic nature of the violence elsewhere displayed in the MOT; its poignancy 
instead is a byproduct of the symbolic power of the young “sleeping” girl as a marker of 
innocence. This image is reused as something of a stock image; it appears again in the 
“Ordinary People” vignette as a means of capturing the horrors – at the broadest level – 
of Nazi Germany. The actual context for the image thus seems irrelevant; its symbolic 
power instead lies in its gendered representation of childhood innocence.119 
This deployment of melodramatic motifs to accentuate notions of innocence 
heightens the contrast between “innocent” victims and “evil” perpetrators. As Brown 
argues, a kind of “Manicheanism … courses through the MOT,” which enables a clear 
division of the world into good/bad binaries.120 In this case, the focus on the purity and 
innocence of the victims simultaneously enhances perceptions of the guilt and culpability 
of the perpetrators that have killed them. Through the prism of melodrama, genocide is a 
problem of “bad people” slaughtering innocents. Both evil and innocence are 
caricatures.121 In melodrama, Brooks states, “evil is villainy; it is a swarthy, cape-
enveloped man with a deep voice.”122 “We,” the consumers of these melodramatic texts, 
are nothing like “them”—the evil individuals depicted. These components of the genre 
further a reductive understanding of evil that helps to keep evil safely contained.123 Thus, 




euphoric illusion that we are innocent victims of a hostile world.”124  The MOT 
complicates this narrative by making recourse to a Christian theological framework to 
trouble the idea that its visitors are purely innocent. Through this Christian theological 
framework, the visitor is situated within a subjectivity of culpability, cast as bearing some 
responsibility for the depicted atrocities.125 
Christianity and Original Sin  
Although the MOT is connected to a Yeshiva and read by others as a primarily 
Jewish institution,126 the melodrama framework is bolstered by repeated recourse to a 
Christian iconographical and theological framework.127 The stark duality of heaven/hell 
or salvation/damnation reifies the moral clarity afforded to social problems through the 
use of melodrama. Images of “hellfire” and references to “hell” help to demarcate the 
boundaries between good and evil.  While drawing on hellfire imagery to maintain these 
boundaries, Christian theological narratives about original sin imbricate the visitor into a 
subjectivity of accountability. By stressing that the potential for evil lurks within us all,128 
the institution is able to plant the seeds to support the MOT’s construction of resolutions. 
The Christianization of Holocaust and genocide representation is not a novel 
development.129 Studying the rise of US interest in the Shoah, Novick notes the ways one 
of the central figures in Holocaust memory, Eli Wiesel, is read by some “as [a] Christ 
figure.”130 Wiesel’s story of suffering, Novick charges, “resonates with Christian 
doctrines” and in particular, Catholic theology, with its “close link between suffering and 
redemption.”131 Rothe argues that this infusion of Christian motifs goes beyond Wiesel as 
the Eichmann trial “recycle[d] the Christian suffering-and-redemption trope of spiritual 




survivor as a saint-like figure133 – becomes a constitutive part of Holocaust memory as 
well as Rothe’s “popular trauma culture” more broadly.134 
Furthering the connections to Christianity,135 the MOT deploys the concept of 
“hell” to connote “evil,” functioning as shorthand for facilitating moral judgment. 
References to “hell” and images of hellfire pepper the exhibitions and in particular a film 
for the “Power of Words” display. Visitors hear a man tacitly encouraging violence 
toward abortion providers, a child vowing to kill all of the Jews, and of course, the words 
of Hitler, Stalin, and Osama Bin Laden. They also hear from “hate mongers,” including a 
woman who describes the death of Matthew Shepard thusly: “There is only one important 
thing that happened today. Matthew Shepard was beat to death.  He entered hell for all 
eternity.”136 The aural invocation of “hell” provides a framework for making sense of the 
images that accompany the vignettes. By way of transition, the center screen fills with 
images of flames.  Although these flames can be interpreted in a variety of ways (such as 
references to Kristallnacht),137 the video also contains an image of a cross set ablaze. The 
cross imagery and spoken invocation of “hell” cast the flames within a Christian 
iconography, which helps demarcate and signal the presence of “evil.” In such a way, the 
image of “hell” bolsters the melodrama framework by helping to establish or reinforce a 
sense of moral order.  
Although there are multiple ways of making sense of evil, the “evil” in the MOT 
is not an external evil;138 rather, the MOT’s arguments about humanity’s flaws resonate 
with Christian narratives about “original sin.”139 One of the more “radical” messages 
contained within the MOT, according to Weiner, is the idea that all visitors are potential 




which “encourage[s visitors] to confront themselves, their prejudices, their potential for 
bigotry and violence, and also their apathy in the face of bigotry and violence.”141 Going 
a step further, I suggest the messages reinforced by the Tolerancenter echo arguments 
about original sin.  Many critics of the MOT comment on the peculiar entrance to the 
Tolerancenter.142 The entrance is marked by two doors: One labeled “prejudiced” and the 
other “unprejudiced.”  The “unprejudiced” door is locked, forcing all visitors to walk 
through the prejudiced door. As Derwin and Brown note, such a bodily and spatial 
experience reinforces visitors’ status as “fallen.”143 To use Goldhagen’s words in a 
slightly different context, the exhibition’s spatial construction demands that visitors 
accept “the Caligula that is everyman” as condition of entry.144 The “threat” 
communicated by the Tolerancenter exists because the seeds of evil lurk within each 
visitor. Fortuitously, just as the institution hints at the pervasiveness of the problem of 
evil, it draws upon a third generic framework to offer reasons for hope. 
A MOTivational Story:145 The “Self-Help” Narrative & Messages of Empowerment 
 Motivational discourses are a crucial component of the MOT’s representation of 
genocide because they contribute to conceptions of genocidal mutability thus laying the 
groundwork for the MOT’s resolution discourses. Self-help discourses and motivational 
discourses reinforce an understanding of genocide as a problem created by and 
potentially solved by individuals. Self-help frameworks temper the gravitas afforded by 
horror and melodrama by reinforcing messages about the viability of change and 
stimulating visitor action. The motivational refrain repeated within the MOT is simple: 
The narrative reinforces the theme that every person matters; we all have the power to 




Tolerancenter, the Holocaust portion of the exhibition highlights the consequences of 
individuals’ failure to act. These pronounced messages of audience agency function 
ironically within the context of the MOT as the exhibition elsewhere undercuts visitors’ 
power.146 
Self-help or motivational discourses accentuate the individual over the social 
system as the locus for responsibility and action furthering criticism of the institution’s 
reductive understanding of public problems. This self-help generic framework reinforces 
aspects of the MOT’s definitional discourses drawn from horror and melodrama. As 
suggested by narratives about original sin, the “horror” in the MOT is a “horror” that is 
embedded in individuals and not social systems. This figuration of social ills as problems 
of and for individuals enables melodramatic discourse to exist alongside self-help 
discourses.147 As the aforementioned critiques of the institution have noted, the flaw of 
such a framework is that the social system is granted a kind of de facto impunity, spared 
any form of critical assessment. Without the resources or ability to challenge the social 
system, the only kind of “change” that gets encouraged by such a framework is an 
alteration of visitors’ feelings about contemporary political situations.148 
 Messages of empowerment and reminders of audience agency are voiced fairly 
explicitly in the Tolerancenter and especially in the “In Our Time” exhibition. After 
detailing the ways “genocide,” “human rights abuses,” and “terrorism” “threaten us all,” 
the tenor of the narrative shifts as the film underscores the idea that “even one person can 
make a difference.”149 By way of illustrating the extent to which one person can enact 
change, “In Our Time” offers the example of Raphael Lemkin. Lemkin’s courageous 




showcase the kind of work the individual can undertake to participate in genocide 
cessation. Yet, the film notes that Lemkin’s work is incomplete as “words alone have yet 
to stop” the kinds of atrocities featured in the film. The film implores, “You have the 
power to turn words into action” and cuts quickly to an image of George Clooney telling 
an assembled crowd, “you make the policy” while student activists begin to talk about the 
movement to end atrocities in Darfur.  The nature of the quick transition seems to 
construct an argument that Clooney and modern day participants in the Save Darfur 
movement are the inheritors of Lemkin’s legacy. As uplifting music begins to swell, the 
film repeats a common refrain about the audience’s power to enact change: “Every 
person has opportunities and inner resources” to participate in atrocity prevention work, 
exclaims Daniel Pearl’s father. By way of visually corroborating this message, a variety 
of images of groups protesting and advocating for human rights fill the screen, including 
the image of a young child holding a protest sign as a student advocate charges that 
“Nobody is too young to take action.” The film reminds viewers, “In our time, old 
tragedies don’t have to be repeated,” stressing “YOU can fight hatred” and “YOU can 
make a difference.”150 While these words appear in the theater, a young girl wanders 
toward the camera. Her face fills the screen, gazing directly at viewers. The innocence 
and fragility of this child extend the melodrama framework at the same time that her 
direct address offers a prompt to action.151  
 As with the horror and melodrama frameworks, “In Our Time’s” self-help or 
motivational discourse extends threads that appear elsewhere in the MOT. The entrance 
to “Point of View” diner contains a reminder to visitors about the power of their opinion: 




visitors are presented with models for action, proof of the power individuals have to enact 
change. In one of the more uplifting videos on the ground floor, the MOT features the 
work of advocates from the civil rights movement, their commitment, courage, and 
conviction embodying the power of individuals and collectives. In a display titled 
“Assuming Responsibility,” the MOT features the actions of selected groups or 
individuals, including the “Freedom Writers,” “Seeds of Peace,” “Project Lemonade,” 
and “Take Back the Night.” The exhibition applauds the actions of the individuals who 
joined the National Guard after September 11th and the legislative efforts that resulted in 
Cesar Chavez receiving a governmental holiday and the passage of ADA legislation. As 
Brown notes seemingly little unites the politics behind these actions.153 However, the one 
commonality remains: Each panel proffers a vision of an empowered agent, supporting 
and furthering the use of the self-help genre. 
 The Holocaust exhibition counters these optimistic motivational discourses while 
reinforcing messages about agency and accountability through an emphasis on individual 
failings during the Shoah. In this segment of the museum titled “Ordinary People, 
Ordinary Lives,” visitors enter a darkened chamber where a short film raises the question: 
Why did German citizens chose to participate in the Holocaust? The film begins with a 
series of still photos of children while the narrator argues that Hitler’s plans for Nazi 
Germany could not have been carried out without the participation of the German people.  
Dismissing coercion as the rationale for their actions, the film spotlights people watching 
the denigration of Jews as they forcibly scrub the street, casting spectatorship as a 
reprehensible act. The film escalates the violence from here, concluding with World War 




compositional structure, the film starts where it ends, returning to the photographs of 
German children. Yet, at the film’s end, the camera pulls out to reveal that these angelic 
faces belong to children standing near a Nazi flag or located amidst others giving the 
“Heil Hitler” salute.154  The “innocence” of these children is perverted by their tacit 
complicity. By reminding viewers that the German people could have made different 
choices, the self-help or motivational message takes on a darker tone in this segment of 
the museum.  
 The Holocaust exhibition returns to the messages contained in the “Ordinary 
People, Ordinary Lives” segment at the conclusion of its narrative. As visitors exit the 
faux gas chamber at the end of the Holocaust exhibition, they are told that the liberators 
were also “ordinary people.” These two portions of the Holocaust exhibition establish a 
contrast that fits into the highly polarized worldview (supported and reinforced by earlier 
melodramatic threads) by highlighting individuals that stood by and those that worked to 
end the Shoah. As expressed in the “Ordinary People” exhibition, these messages about 
empowerment have a familiar to ring to them; they echo the titular contention of 
Goldhagen’s famed text, Hitler’s Willing Executioners, as an explanatory ideology for 
the Holocaust and, more broadly, genocidal atrocity.155 Whether spotlighting bystanders 
or liberators, both depictions of “ordinary people” reinforce messages about the 
individual as the locus for genocidal violence or genocide cessation.  
 These motivational discourses complement the other generic frameworks (i.e., 
horror and melodrama) in developing the contours of the MOT’s conception of genocide. 
These three genres become part of what Torchin references as the “interpretive gird” 




frameworks, numerous exhibitions in the Tolerancenter and Holocaust exhibition paint 
the following picture: The world is a violent place. Multitudes of people die or suffer 
other horrific abuses. Such atrocities exist within an unambiguous world of moral 
dualities. Yet, encouragingly, such atrocious violence is within the scope of human power 
to stop—one human at a time.  
Reflections on Representations: Plasticity as Problematic 
 At the same time the MOT relies upon these generic conventions in their 
representation of atrocity, the MOT is self-reflexive about the power of representations. 
A considerable amount of museum exhibition space is committed to exploring the power 
of discursive or mediated representations. These reflections on the representation process 
extend the plasticity associated with the MOT’s definitional discourses. On multiple 
occasions, the institution articulates the argument that texts lack inherent moral valences. 
The impression conveyed is that texts are open, polysemous, and potent. However, such 
messaging about the hermeneutic openness of communication processes and technologies 
potentially taxes the institution’s genocide cessation discourse as it contains within it the 
seeds to unravel the institution’s authority as a rhetor. As such, the MOT counters its 
message about the openness of communication processes with attempts to constrain 
meaning and reinforce hegemonic or singular interpretations of exhibition content. 
Extending the aforementioned critiques of the MOT’s heavy-hand in meaning-making, 
the institution curtails polysemic potential through structured modes for visitors’ 
engagement with its exhibitions, pedantic lessons about the meaning of texts, and the 
cultivation of an affect of suspicion associated with the contemporary mediascape. 




exposes limitations on visitors’ agency and primes audiences for arguments about the 
importance of state authority. 
 The MOT exhibits an institutional preoccupation with the power of 
communication and communication technologies, hosting special events and 
programming revolving around the special links between communication, 
communication technologies, and violence. One such event held early in the MOT’s 
history was a conference session for 200 “communicators.” Described in a 
Communication World review article, one of “the defining moments for many people in 
the group [at the conference] was an exhibit exploring the significant contribution that 
communication makes in the power of demagogues like Adolph Hitler.”157 Quoting one 
attendee, “‘As a communicator, it makes us realize just how dangerous irresponsible 
communication can be…it is our responsibility to make sure that all our communication 
is to generate harmony and goodwill among all people.’”158 Setting aside the vagueness 
of a conference for “communicators” and their descriptions of communication, the 
message conveyed by both the act of hosting such a conference and the remarks 
generated by attendees capture the extent to which the MOT situates itself as important 
voice in conversations about the power of communication. In addition to hosting this 
conference, the MOT was the location for an address by Raymond W. Smith, Chairman 
of Bell Atlantic Corporation, on free speech, hate speech, and the Internet.159 Through the 
staging of these special events, the MOT spotlights the extent to which it sees itself as 





This preoccupation with communication extends into the MOT’s exhibitions. The 
aptly titled “The Power of Words” exhibit underscores the potency of discourse. 
Composed of a looping video and wall text, the “The Power of Words” juxtaposes 
remarks from famous or infamous political figures. The installation contrasts Susan B. 
Anthony with Jean-Marie Le Pen and President Franklin D. Roosevelt with William 
Pierce. The former are featured as means of showcasing how “[w]ords can inspire” 
whereas the latter represent the idea that “[w]ords can incite,” and “[w]ords can be 
hateful.”160 These juxtapositions extend throughout the MOT, reinforcing the embedded 
potentiality and explicitly referenced power of discourse.  
Further, two of the five spotlighted narratives in the recreated Berlin café in the 
Holocaust exhibition revolve around communication professionals. In one exchange, two 
men are discussing how their professional plans will change if the Nazis assume power. 
Articulating a sentiment along the lines of “if you can’t beat them, join them,” visitors 
learn that one of the two men assumes the role of a propagandist for the Nazi party. The 
narrator explains that he will help burn books and author anti-Semitic texts, furthering the 
Nazi party’s objectives. In a different exchange, a second figure, identified as a journalist, 
is cast as working for a “left-wing,” anti-Nazi publication. As the narration jumps in time 
to foreshadow the journalist’s fate, visitors learn that this man was the first of the people 
in the faux cafe to perish. Established as foils, both of these narratives highlight the 
significance of communication: In one instance, the publisher uses his trade to contribute 
to genocide; in the other narrative, the journalist loses his life, presumably using his craft 




refrain, these juxtapositions convey the idea that words can have tremendous social value 
and can cause tremendous harm. 
 The messages imparted by the museum’s discussions of communication and 
communication technology are potentially radical and threatening. By calling attention to 
the dramatically different ways discourse can be employed for public good or public 
harm, the MOT highlights the polysemous and open nature of texts. In Brown’s 
assessment, she argues that the MOT’s meditation on the potency of discourse “suggests 
an unsettled quality or a hermeneutic difficulty inherent in this form of power.” 162 She 
contends that the institution’s messages about the “moral and political ambiguity of the 
power of words” have the capacity to induce “intellectual vertigo” insofar as they invite 
sustained reflection on the nature of discourse.163 As Brown’s allusion to “vertigo” infers, 
such forms of discursive openness or celebrations of polysemy have the capacity to be 
profoundly destabilizing. If words are infinitely open in this capacity, the installation 
raises the specter of relativism and potentially creates the grounds for challenges to the 
institution’s authority.  Ergo narratives about openness are counted by structural and 
ideological maneuvers which contain meaning-making by restoring hegemonic and 
singular frames for interpretation.  
The MOT attempts to exert control and contain meaning-making in three different 
capacities. First, as alluded to in earlier critiques of the MOT, the MOT limits polysemy 
and undermines visitors’ agency through the structure of its exhibitions.  Brown 
demonstrates how such constraints on meaning-making work by analyzing two of the 
more interactive features in the MOT: the Point of View diner and the Millennium 




bullying or the status of refugees. The Point of View diner allows visitors to conduct 
interviews to gain additional perspectives on these topics through a preset number of 
questions. Not only does the structured nature of the question and answer segment limit 
choice, Brown notes that the figures being interviewed embody stock characters and 
stereotypes; thus, “[o]ne doesn’t really need to ‘interview’ any of them to know what 
they will say.”164 In the Millennium Machine, visitors answer a variety of questions in a 
multiple choice fashion and then are given one minute to discuss large global issues. The 
limited number of answers and superficial forms of engagement demonstrated in both of 
these exhibits, Brown and others charge, undermine the pretense of engagement and 
interactivity promoted within the MOT.165 In Brown’s words, “These incessant but empty 
injunctions to think or to offer one’s opinion help to obscure the fact that there is very 
little in the MOT that has not been politically and intellectually premasticated as well as 
dumbed-down, fictionalized, and fitted into clichés and sound bites.”166 Put differently, 
the MOT’s representational choices in structuring their exhibitions undercut their 
messages about the importance of communication processes. 
Such constraints on visitor engagement are exacerbated within the Holocaust 
portion of the MOT. As Brown notes, though the Tolerancenter abounds with interactive 
displays, the Holocaust exhibition lacks such interactivity.167 For example, the Holocaust 
exhibition contains little to read and offers little space for reflection. Because the 
installation is guided by light, sound, videos, and voiceovers, the visitor seldom has the 
opportunity to reflect on or return to any particular point.168  Even when texts are 
featured, such as a 1919 Hitler letter or a 1939 letter between Himmler and Arthur Seyss-




The letters are broken down into smaller, easier-to-read passages, with the museum’s 
annotations on the text providing “quick” interpretations for the visitor. As a byproduct of 
the way the MOT represents these texts, one gets the sense that the letters are not meant 
to be read, save for the museum’s notes on particular passages. As a case in point, the 
Himmler letter is left in German. Even the short articles about contemporary news events 
in the “Confronting Hate in America” display are broken into bold headlines that run 
above the featured articles for those uninterested in reading the rest of the text.169 As 
Brown argues, “More than being guided, the visitor’s very experience of the museum is 
orchestrated by the media installations; so, too, almost all thinking about tolerance, 
bigotry, and prejudice is undertaken by the museum, notwithstanding the frequent 
injunction to the visitor to ‘think.’”170 As a result, the MOT hems in audiences’ 
opportunities for textual interpretation through the representational and structural 
elements embedded in its exhibition displays. 
The MOT works to contain meaning-making in a second way through a pedantic 
special exhibition on Hitler’s writing. This exhibition reinforces the notion that texts have 
singular meanings.  Adjacent to the entrance of the Holocaust exhibition, visitors 
encounter a display featuring a September 1919 letter from Hitler.  The text of a four-
page letter is turned into “an interactive exhibit” by transforming the paper letter into a 
digital touchscreen.171 After selecting whether they would like to read the letter in 
English or in German, visitors can “page” through the letter on the screen. They can also 
click on selected passages in the text to find the museum’s interpretation of the text’s 




size mural of an animated man (presumably Hitler) addressing a crowd. The following 
words are superimposed on top of the mural: 
What began as a private letter – one man’s opinion – in September 1919, 
became the state policy of an entire nation twenty-two years later. This is 
an important warning for future generations – demagogues need to be 
taken seriously. They often mean what they say and under the right 
circumstances, will carry out what they promise.172 
Through such exhibitions, the MOT is able to advance arguments about the potency of 
words while casting aspersions upon individuals who fail to recognize the power of 
communication. The denunciation is clear: Hitler’s contemporaries shoulder some blame 
for his actions because Hitler’s intentions were verbalized years before the start of the 
Shoah. 
 This special exhibition’s arguments rest on highly particularized 
conceptualizations of intent and effect. The contention underlying the aforementioned 
wall text (i.e., wherein a “private letter” becomes “state policy”) rests upon an approach 
to discourse as an easily decipherable blueprint. Thus intent is clearly embedded into the 
document signaling Hitler’s plans for future action. Reinforcing the display’s messages 
about culpability, this understanding of intent rests upon meaning “hiding in plain sight.” 
To borrow the theoretical framework offered by Hall’s encoding/decoding model,173 
Hitler encodes his intention into the discourse; however, rather than acknowledge the 
multiplicity of “decoding” possibilities, the MOT only allows for a singularity of 




Through such a special exhibition, the MOT naturalizes its position as a 
privileged reader, extending previous critique of the institution’s hegemonic control.  In 
this exhibit and others, the MOT positions itself as able to access the one “true” meaning 
of the text, a meaning that then appears “obvious” with the benefit of over ninety years of 
retrospection. Such a representation of the text naturalizes the museum’s reading 
strategies and counters messages about the polysemy of words by restoring a hegemonic, 
singular meaning. The exhibition suggests texts are univocal; thusly, when ill happens 
after a vituperative speech or writing, the only explanation for such ill is a failure to take 
the discourse seriously and not a failure to recognize the inscribed (singular) meaning. 
This presumed univocality alongside the MOT’s naturalized position as a privileged 
reader with access to the “right” meaning seamlessly dovetails with aforementioned 
critiques of the institution’s role in guiding visitors’ experiences.174 
Finally, the MOT contains meaning by inducing anxiety over the polysemy and 
polyvocality of the contemporary media landscape. The MOT subtly extends the 
sentiments cultivated through the horror generic framework to cast the current media 
environment as one filled with potential dangers. Within the MOT, “the media” is often 
cast as a potential tool of the perpetrators,175 a marked contrast from Torchin’s analysis of 
popular representations of the media as agents of genocide cessation.176 The MOT 
approaches the contemporary media environment with an air of suspicion,177 wary of the 
power and control media producers are assumed to assert on their viewers.178 The MOT’s 
conceptualization of the power of media verges on replicating the philosophy of early 
media critics associated with the “strong effects” school.179 As Luke describes it, MOT 




reception” as the institution “openly assumes that what is on the 
airwaves/screen/billboard/printed page/listserv/street picket is what viewers absorb.”180 
Without the power of oppositional or negotiated readings,181 the MOT suggests, 
audiences have few resources to resist the persuasive pull of the media, which increases 
the dangers of the contemporary media environment. 
The MOT cultivates an affect of suspicion or anxiety over the state of the media 
before the visitor even enters the Tolerancenter. The pathway to the exhibition is flanked 
by screens. Some of the screens are televisions displaying news programs from CSPAN, 
HLN, CNN and Fox News. Other screens feature Internet browsers which display pages 
from World News, BBC News, Al Jazeera and Press TV. Both the television stations and 
the websites appear to be streaming live content. During my visits to the MOT at the start 
of November 2012, these news outlets contained stories on the upcoming US presidential 
election and the devastation caused by Hurricane Sandy. This fairly small exhibition 
space represents the polysemic and polyvocal twenty-first century media environment. 
No text exists to frame the experience for visitors and docents may or may not 
contextualize the room for the visiting group. Instead, a sense of cacophony is created as 
newscasters talk over one another, covering different stories, while short commercials 
play alongside the day’s news.   
The disordered and disorganized display cultivates a sense of distrust, 
encouraging skepticism of the media from the start of the visitor’s experience. By failing 
to lend any structure to this hallway, the experience of walking through the screens is 
disorienting and confusing. How do the stories relate? Why are these stories featured? 




over any others and no clues are given as to how the content relates to anything else in 
the museum, the hallway can be interpreted as serving two purposes. First, because most 
of the stories feature social ills, the hallway punctuates the sense that the problems 
featured in the MOT are not “over.” Instead, much work needs to be done to fulfill the 
objectives of the institution given the depicted state of affairs. Second, the hall of screens 
creates the sense that mediation has a tangential connection to events as they happen in 
the “real world,” a potentially destabilizing impression for visitors uncomfortable with 
such a social constructionist approach to the media.182 Because of given differences in 
news coverage of the same event, the multiple screens side-by-side invite questions of 
accuracy and bias: Which story is the “right” story? Which is more accurate? The 
impression is conveyed that both stations are offering different versions of an event, and 
neither likely capture the event as it “actually” happened. Because the visitor has no way 
to ascertain “truth” from the screens displayed, the relativism associated with such a 
display cultivates a suspicion of the contemporary mediascape before the visitor even 
passes through the Tolerancenter’s doors.  
Once inside, that suspicion is fed and extended as disorder of the Internet is used 
to further engender fear over polysemy and discursive openness. As visitors turn from 
“The Power of Words” exhibition to enter the rest of the Tolerancenter, they are exposed 
to the following wall text, informing them that, “Many hate mongers have traded in Klan 
hoods and Nazi arm bands, repackaging age-old hatreds using new language and slogans, 
video, and digital images to target their ‘enemies’ and recruit new followers.”183 Casting 
“digital images” as an accessory to hate crimes in the same way that “Klan hoods” are 




current media environment as containing numerous threats.184 These threats are then 
concretized as visitors approach the “Confronting Hate in America” exhibit. In front of 
each of the eight panels in the exhibition, computer stations showcase the many ways the 
Internet can contribute to violence. The computer stations present examples of social 
media, Internet games, and websites utilized by hate groups.185 Page upon page of racist 
video games or hostile social media sites are included for the viewer’s consumption, an 
interactive demonstration of the many dangers of the Internet. 
By stressing the perils of the twenty-first century media environment, the MOT 
builds an implicit argument about the need for order and regulation. As an illustrative 
case in point, the “Confronting Hate in America” exhibition seems to rest on a 
metaphoric understanding of the Internet as the “Wild West.”186 Like the lawlessness of 
the West, the lack of a “sheriff” or other external authority “policing” the Internet enables 
hateful sites like the ones featured in the exhibition to flourish. The problem of 
lawlessness is exacerbated by the US government’s commitment to free speech and the 
free press. As the inclusion of a fictional narrative about hate crimes triggered by an 
incendiary talk radio host in the Point of View diner suggests, this commitment to free 
speech creates the conditions for the spread of violent discourses.187 In sum, by drawing 
attention to the threats contained in the contemporary mediascape, the MOT lays the 
groundwork for arguments that favor increased authority and regulation, foreshadowing 
the institution’s atrocity resolutions.  
Resolutions: Trading Openness for Order 
 In line with the museum’s aforementioned attempts to exert control over visitors’ 




and openness in favor of a narrative of state control. Capitalizing on arguments about the 
absence of a sufficient regulatory or policing body, the MOT provides the foundation for 
the elevation of the nation-state as a critical actor in genocide cessation. More 
specifically, the MOT implicitly builds an argument for the security state as a “solution” 
to the problems it spotlights. Yet this solution is imperfect as arguments in favor of 
increased security sit uneasily with anti-genocide arguments. As such, the MOT must 
manage the competing implications of promoting “good” forms of US security while 
disavowing the “bad” forms of surveillance promoted by genocidaires.  Ultimately, the 
MOT’s elevation of security culture as a form of resolution intimates the fraught 
relationships among state authority, public agency, and genocidal violence. 
 In contrast to the celebration of individual agency promoted through the use of 
motivational discourses, other MOT texts privilege the role of the nation-state in the 
resolution of atrocity. The MOT builds this case by underscoring the social ills caused by 
the absence of a sufficient regulatory body. For example, the MOT highlights the 
complications created by a lack of external enforcement through a narrative about child 
labor in the cocoa industry inside its Millennium Machine exhibit. After detailing the 
exploitative practices involved in chocolate manufacturing, the Millennium Machine 
mentions an agreement made by chocolate manufacturers to ensure more equitable labor 
practices for cocoa producers. However, the Millennium Machine also insinuates that 
such an agreement is doomed to fail because such decisions tend to be dictated by market 
logics, and without the use of child labor, the chocolate manufacturers will have to raise 
their prices.188 As the narrative states, such economically-driven decisions will 




represents the most explicit articulation of this argument, its message is congruent with 
the MOT’s discourse on problems posed by new media. In both instances, the problem is 
the lack of a “sheriff” in the “Wild West” of the Internet. Through its repeated warnings 
about the absence of regulatory bodies, the MOT creates the conditions for the 
valorization of the nation-state as critical to atrocity resolution.189 
Such arguments about disorder and the need for authority join with the fear 
created through the horror framework to foster a certain affect. Given that the horrors 
featured in the MOT are located within a political atmosphere that lacks the imposition of 
order, regulation, or control, the institution creates a yearning for solutions in the form of 
a strong state or extra-state enforcer. To draw a parallel to Gunn’s reading of the post-
9/11 film, War of the Worlds, the MOT, like Gunn’s text, creates a sense of fear and 
foreboding, which then feeds into a desire for the instantiation of order and control.  
Gunn describes the process as the “cultivat[ion of] a peculiar affective response,” which 
manifests in “a longing for a strong, paternal figure to restore order, unite the community, 
and defeat the enemy.”190 In the film, this response is generated by playing upon post-
9/11 terrorism anxieties. In the MOT, this response is cued by the aforementioned horror 
techniques which stress the prevalence of the sources of evil in conjunction with 
arguments which attribute social ills to the absence of an authoritative policing body. 
Like Gunn’s paternal sovereign in War of the Worlds, this “policing body” is never 
explicitly depicted within the MOT; nevertheless, visitors do learn something about its 
critical components. 
One of the chief components of such a state is its prioritization of security. As 




start of the exhibition as “[t]he heavily screened and regulated admission to the museum 
conveys a sense of potentially violent enmity toward the enterprise and the need for 
constant vigilance in relationship to this risk.”191 “[W]atchfulness, security, surveillance, 
and regulation,” in Brown’s words, are elevated as critical constructs from the start of the 
visit.192 Yet, this elevation of security as an important part of the MOT creates a paradox 
whereby security and policing become an integral component of the institution’s 
imparted messaging about tolerance, freedom, and democracy. Brown aptly captures this 
dynamic: 
While visitors are incessantly reminded that every individual has the 
power and responsibility to shape history, we are directed to confer that 
power to states and NGOs; there is nothing here that affirms – or trusts – 
popular power. Similarly, while we are constantly importuned to 
thoughtfulness, we are not actually trusted to think for themselves [sic]. 
And above all, while tolerance is the ideal or the hope, secure borders and 
heavily armed checkpoints are the necessary reality, just as freedom may 
be democracy’s raison d’être but is ultimately trumped by security.193 
Herein all of the threads in the exhibition come together: The seeds of fear and suspicion 
planted in the exhibition instill a sense of insecurity that creates a longing for an 
empowered state actor and a willingness to trade freedom for security.  
While Brown aptly notes the disjunction created by the MOT’s positioning of 
security as one of “the passwords of tolerance,”194 this “solution” becomes all the more 
fraught because it threatens to expose discomforting connections between state power 




genocide cessation discourse is that arguments about order and security must be muted in 
order to avoid linkages with the emblem of paramount state control: Nazi Germany. In 
other words, returning to the theoretical vocabulary bequeathed by Barthes, the links 
between contemporary security culture (which has heretofore been situated as desirable 
within the MOT) and the empowered and authoritarian state spotlighted in narratives 
about the Holocaust and other genocides must remain exnominated. Messages about state 
control and “desirable” forms of security must be safeguarded from blending into 
arguments that reveal the problems posed by authoritarianism. Put otherwise, state 
control must be recognized as “bad” when practiced by the Nazis; while “desirable” 
forms of state power are positioned as wildly divergent from this model of state abuse. 
The work to maintain the gulf between good state power and bad state power provides 
the rhetorical constraints that result in incongruences in the MOT’s narrative. 
Nowhere are the problems of these conflicting arguments about state control more 
clear than in the Holocaust exhibition. Toward the end of the exhibition, the visitor 
approaches the reproduced gates of Auschwitz and the moment of staged “selection.”  As 
one prepares to walk through these gates, one notes a variety of artifacts presumably 
associated with the moment of entering the camp: a watchtower, barbed wire, fencing, 
etc. In perhaps an ill-advised design choice, the observant visitor also notices something 
else, a technology noticeably out of place and out of sync with the other camp replicas: a 
security camera. On one side of the famed “Albeit Mach Frei” gate is a security relic 
from the Nazi camp—the watchtower, which serves as a reminder of the supreme abuse 
of state power and the perversion of an empowered government destroying its own 




This juxtaposition creates the uneasy awareness that the visitor being surveyed just as the 
visitor’s attention is drawn to the role of surveillance in camp life.195  As Williams notes, 
security is a sensitive matter in museums like the MOT. Williams argues that memorial 
museums exhibit a reticence to add additional “guards, to erect a fence, or to add security 
cameras” to their institutions because “[t]he association of the Holocaust with forms of 
policing and bodily control makes such symbolically loaded actions thorny”196 The 
“thorniness” Williams identifies is part of a broader uneasiness generated through a 
consideration of the relationships between the political values of the perpetrators of 
atrocities and the political values of the nation-state housing the MOT.197  
 This odd convergence of “bad” surveillance (Nazi surveillance) and presumably 
“good” surveillance (the MOT’s surveillance) symbolized by this security camera’s 
unfortunate spatial placement reveals what must remain unspoken or “exnominated” 
within the MOT, thus setting the parameters for the MOT’s discourse about atrocity.  In 
order to make meaning of the atrocities contained in the MOT in ways that are congruent 
with broader narratives about the benevolence of the US nation-state, Nazi Germany 
must remain its foil.198 Its abuses must be disassociated from US abuses. If the Nazi state 
symbolizes control, the United States must stand for freedom. The gap must be enforced 
between the attributes of Nazi Germany and the attributes of US “liberal” society.199 In so 
doing, “[r]eal human complexities” and “fluid shapes,” notes Luke, transform into the 
stock characters and “rigid roles played by Hitler, stormtroopers, Gestapo agents,” etc., 
which makes it all the easier to preserve a gulf between the evils of Nazi Germany and 




life are flattened into a melodramatic script, creating a clear differentiation of “good” and 
“bad” nation-states.201 
The work of maintaining this gap induces a blindness that helps inhibit the ways 
in which the very “ordered” infrastructure of this institution and others like it bears some 
resemblance to the genocidal cultures it decries.  “Like the death camps themselves,” 
Luke contends, Holocaust museums like the MOT and the USHMM “can seem like an 
elaborate edifice dedicated to repeating mechanically reproduced processes: arrival, 
culling, transportation, preparation, dispatch, disposal.”202 The security culture promoted 
by the MOT along with its “‘Disneyfication’ of the death camps ignores how deeply and 
easily the death camp can nest inside the routines of Disneyfication,” bureaucracy, order, 
and control.203 Luke’s argument is all apparent within the MOT given the parallelism 
between the institution’s approach to communication processes and technologies and 
authoritarian models for controlling speech and media distribution. According to 
Witcomb, the MOT’s “approach to interactivity…has more in common with totalitarian 
than democratic approaches to cultural production.”204 Despite longstanding arguments 
about the connections between the modern state, industrial logic, bureaucracy, and 
genocide,205 such linkages must remain exnominated in order for the MOT to offer 
condemnatory narratives about Nazi Germany and other perpetrators of genocide 
alongside the messages it implicitly and explicitly advances about the need for state 
control.206  
Such resolution discourses reveal the limitations of US genocide cessation 
discourse within the MOT. To return to theoretical orientations introduced in Chapter 




any evidence of “post-liberal” understandings of genocide.207 Whereas post-liberal 
approaches to genocide punctuate the connections between the affairs of Western nation-
states and the outbreak of genocide, such linkages are absent in the MOT. Rather than 
noting these connections, the MOT leaves exnominated any sense of the similarities 
between the violence it represents and politics of security and control it promotes. The 
state is to be seen as “a provider not a destroyer of security,” in Edkins’s words, and post-
liberal arguments would threaten that image of the state.208 Developing this critique in 
relation to US and Israeli Holocaust museums, Bartov highlights an institutional 
“insistence on ignoring such aspects of the genocide of the Jews that relate it to precisely 
those present political and socio-economic conditions one would rather maintain.”209 
Within the context of the MOT, Bartov’s argument translates into an institutional 
blindness toward the links between the security state and genocidal violence. The work to 
maintain this gap places limits on the plasticity of the MOT’s genocide cessation 
discourse. Despite this disjuncture within the MOT’s resolution discourses, its arguments 
regarding security are undergird by the institution’s treatment of memory and 
temporality. 
Memory & Temporality in the MOT: The Holocaust as Present, Past, and Future 
 The institution’s engagement with memory primarily manifests through the 
institution’s pronounced investment in time. Although the institution urges visitors to 
“remember,” its discussions of memory are subsumed within larger arguments about the 
links between past, present, and future time. MOT exhibits discuss the significance of 
past violence, the seriousness of present violence, and the threat of future violence. 




present, and future event. Insofar as such arguments about temporality intimate a horrific 
future, they reinforce the MOT’s arguments about the necessity of security and an 
empowered state authority. 
 In Nora’s terms, Holocaust museums are lieux de mémoire;210 however, 
“memory” plays somewhat of a muted role within the MOT, sublimated within a larger 
discourse about time. To be sure, the institution includes standard injunctions to 
remember. Pamphlets available at the end of the Holocaust exhibition declare boldly on 
their front pages: “We remember…” The pamphlets describe the MOT as “dedicated to 
preserving the memory of the Holocaust.”211 Elsewhere in the institution, visitors 
encounter the message to “remember” as they descend the spiral ramp leading to the main 
exhibition floor. Notably, this plea to “remember” is only one of a list of infinitives 
inviting visitors to “dialogue,” “hope,” “create,” etc.212 As one of a multitude of 
inspirational words, this gateway to the main exhibition floor gestures toward a 
diminished role for memory. 
Beyond these clichéd and simplistic commands to “remember,” the MOT signals 
a broader investment in the past through its treatment of “time.” Two Tolerancenter 
exhibits are expressly concerned with time. The “We the People” exhibition provides 
visitors with a detailed timeline highlighting US struggles with “diversity,” “rights,” and 
“intolerance” from the late sixteenth century to the first decade of the twenty-first 
century. Like “We the People,” the Millennium Machine centralizes the import of time. 
As its futuristic name implies, the Millennium Machine invokes a sense of future time to 
highlight the necessity of taking action in the present. After a montage showcasing 




child exploitation or the status of refugees.213 At the conclusion of the vignette on the 
featured topic, the exhibition expresses uncertainty about the future of said issue but 
reminds visitors: “The time is now.”214  
Institutional refrains such as – “the time is now”215 – affirm arguments about the 
institution’s presentist nature. As explored above, critics have charged the MOT with 
ahistoricism. Others have suggested that its heavy use of multi-media contributes to a 
“presentist” temporal orientation.216 In many ways, the Tolerancenter supports this focus 
on the “now.” The problems included in its exhibitions are not situated as past problems. 
Cyberbullying hate speech, and unfair labor practices, for example, are contemporary 
issues demanding visitors’ action in the present.  
This temporal orientation is enhanced by the importance of experience within the 
MOT. The prioritization of experience as a path toward knowledge or understanding is 
such a pronounced part of the institution that it becomes the subject of derision within the 
aforementioned South Park episode. The episode posits as laughable the notion that a few 
moments inside a simulation could recreate “how it feels” to suffer discrimination.217 
Nevertheless, the emphasis on experience is evident in the structure of the Holocaust 
exhibition. As visitors move through recreated street scenes and enter the simulated 
concentration camp, Brown argues the exhibition displays situate visitors so that “we are 
no longer mere witnesses to the Holocaust but are inside the experience.”218 Thusly, 
Brown notes “it is not surprising to find” remarks in MOT guest books which suggest 
that the visitors have acquired experiential knowledge: “‘I had read some things about the 




of the visitors’ present temporal moment. In such an exhibition space, the past is not to be 
remembered but experienced.220 
Of course, the Holocaust is also rooted in a particular historical context; thus, the 
MOT oscillates between past and present temporalities in framing its Holocaust material. 
The slide between these temporalities is facilitated by casting the visitors’ walk through 
the Holocaust exhibition as a form of time travel. While visitors wait for the automated 
doors to open to exhibition, they are invited to sit in an antechamber and watch a short 
film titled “The Jewish World That Was.” The film describes Jewish life before WWII, 
providing a glimpse into Jewish rituals and customs. As a timer above the mechanical 
doors winds down and visitors prepare to enter the exhibition space, the film entreats 
audiences to “remember” and retain the memory of the “world that was” as a means of 
mourning the destruction wrought by the Shoah. As the doors open, the film abruptly 
shifts from the language of remembering to one of experiencing. The film invites visitors 
to “imagine you are going back in time.”221 Through the device of “time travel,” the 
Holocaust exists as both a past event as well as a present experience. 
This liminal past-present temporality is the focus of one of the first displays 
visitors encounter inside the Holocaust exhibition. Before the narrative begins to explain 
the political climate in Germany in the 1920s, the narrative cautions visitors, “Remember 
it [the Holocaust] could have happened anywhere in the world and to anyone of us.” 
Although the Holocaust exhibition offers a specific narrative, the display stresses that 
“history has a habit of repeating itself unless we recognize the signs before it is too 
late.”222 Such phrasing echoes the clichéd adage: “Those who cannot remember the past 




present. Yet the language used here does not ask visitors to remember what happened but 
instead what “could have happened,” introducing a sense of conditionality. The message 
articulated is not “Remember the Holocaust;” rather, the message is “Remember the 
plausibility of atrocity.” This conditional message about the plausibility of violence 
subtly invokes a future temporality.  
From this perspective, the Holocaust is not the “past,” but a dystopic future and 
knowledge of this “future” then necessitates preventative actions in line with the MOT’s 
promotion of security based-resolutions.224 Such a conclusion parallels Biesecker’s 
argument about the manipulation of temporality in the wake of the September 11th 
attacks.225 Biesecker notes the Bush administration’s “discursive transfiguration of a 
historical and political catastrophe [9/11] into the harbinger of an epochal Act ‘to 
come.’”226 She describes the Bush administration’s rhetoric as marked by “the ubiquitous 
deployment of the future anterior.”227 In other words, an act that already was becomes the 
premonition of futuristic action. This future-threat-that-was then necessitates security in 
the present.228  In much the same way the Bush administration situated 9/11 as “the future 
anterior,” the MOT locates the Holocaust as part of three temporal moments: It has 
happened, is happening and will happen.229 Messages about the future support the MOT’s 
emphasis on security while all three temporalities enhance the MOT’s claims to 
significance. 
Flexibility and Rigidity in US Genocide Cessation Discourse 
 In sum, anxiety percolates throughout the Museum of Tolerance. Its broad scope 
and wide-ranging exhibition content imbue the MOT with the potential to produce a 




power, and public agency. Yet as the institution attempts to define, represent, resolve, and 
remember genocide, its arguments are fraught with contradictions and incompatible 
messages. The institution manages the tensions created through these contrasts by 
exacerbating a sense of anxiety, which ultimately enables the institution to validate state 
authority over other forms of popular power in spite of the problematic linkages between 
the nation-state and genocide. 
 The problematic facets of the MOT’s treatment of genocide bespeak broader 
issues in US genocide cessation discourse associated with constructing genocide as a 
public problem. At the heart of these tenuous acts of definition, representation, resolution 
and remembrance is the question of US citizens and the US government’s relationship to 
genocide. On the one hand, the MOT does create the space to acknowledge prevalence of 
violence that has occurred historically and continues to occur within the United States; 
the “Confronting Hate in America” exhibition models such acknowledgments. As Patraka 
explains, in contrast to the USHMM’s configuration of the United States as a force of 
liberation, the MOT envisions the United States as a place where genocide could take 
place.230 She goes on to argue, “to the degree that this museum [the MOT] and this 
ethnicity [Jews] assume the responsibilities of representing oppressions beyond their 
own, they make a gesture more unparalleled in the United States than the dismissals of 
this museum as a Disneyesque theme park would acknowledge.”231 
However, Patraka charges that the MOT still safeguards the United States from 
the harshest critiques. Chief among them, the MOT stops shy of charging the United 
States with genocide. Patraka draws attention to the little space afforded to the discussion 




showcases “a tactful drawing of attention away from the full excess of ‘intolerance’ in 
this country.”232 Thus, the MOT attempts to articulate seemingly contradictory narratives. 
One narrative positions the US as a location where genocide could take place. At the 
same time, other exhibitions maintain a disconnect between US political ideologies (i.e., 
security culture) and the political ideologies that contribute to genocide. 
The relationships among the US government, US citizens, and genocidal atrocities 
constitute fraught terrain, and Patraka’s reading of the MOT punctuates the ambivalence 
that resides at the core of the institution.  The MOT’s exhibitions suggest that the US 
nation-state is a potential site for violence even as it suggests that additional state 
authority could stop violence. The US public is invested with a significant amount of 
agency through motivational messages at the same time that the institution undermines its 
visitors’ ability to take action and participate in genocide cessation work. These tensions 
are never resolved, and the anxiety created by these incongruences reverberates 
throughout the MOT. Whereas the MOT capitalizes on an affective experience of anxiety 
or foreboding, the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum manages this anxiety 
through the interplay of rhetorical intimation and exnomination.  
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crimes.” Raphael Israeli et. al., “‘The Architecture of Erasure’ – Fantasy or Reality?” 
Critical Inquiry 36, no. 3 (2010): 565. The MOT also promotes their youth programming 
on various parts of their website. See “Youth Programs,” Museum of Tolerance, accessed 
May 21, 2013,	  
http://www.museumoftolerance.com/site/c.tmL6KfNVLtH/b.4866091/k.A488/Youth_Pr
ograms.htm; “School Field Trips,” Museum of Tolerance. 
16 “Our History and Vision,” Museum of Tolerance. 
17 “Our History and Vision,” Museum of Tolerance; Israeli et. al., “‘The 
Architecture of Erasure,’” 565. 
18 “Grant Funded Field Trips for Los Angeles Area Schools,” Museum of 














	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 “Client Testimonials,” Museum of Tolerance, accessed May 22, 2013, 
http://www.museumoftolerance.com/site/c.tmL6KfNVLtH/b.5052745/k.703/Client_Testi
monials.htm. 
21 Israeli et. al., “‘The Architecture of Erasure,’” 565-566. Williams reads the 
MOT as part of a genre of institutions he calls “peace museums.” These institutions are 
concerned with “future action” and, Williams explains, can be “key site[s] for civic 
training.” Williams specifically refers to the MOT’s programming for professionals. Paul 
Williams, “The Memorial Museum Identity Complex: Victimhood, Culpability, and 
Responsibility,” in Museum Studies: An Anthology of Contexts, ed. Bettina Messias 
Carbonell, 2nd ed. (West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 107-108. 
22 “For Professionals,” Museum of Tolerance. 
23 “Holocaust Section,” Museum of Tolerance, accessed May 22, 2013, 
http://www.museumoftolerance.com/site/c.tmL6KfNVLtH/b.4865935/k.B355/Holocaust
_Section.htm. 
24 For a more redeeming reading of the institution, see Theodore O. Prosise, 
“Prejudiced, Historical Witness, and Responsible: Collective Memory and Liminality in 
the Beit Hashoah Museum of Tolerance,” Communication Quarterly 51, no. 3 (2003): 
351-366. Prosise notes the critical tenor of much of the existing literature and positions 
his piece as offering an alternative read.  
25 By way of referring to the MOT’s role in meaning-making, Brown refers to 
museum content as “premasticated.” Brown, Regulating Aversion, 127. 
26 Nicola A. Lisus and Richard V. Ericson, “Misplacing Memory: The Effect of 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 (1995): 1-19. On page 5, Lisus and Ericson provide grounds for the argument that the 
heavy use of television screens reflects assumptions made about the presumed 
generational socialization of the MOT’s audience. The screens are part of the institution’s 
approach to attracting generations presumably expecting content to be delivered in 
televised ways. See also Omer Bartov, Murder in Our Midst: The Holocaust, Industrial 
Killing, and Representation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 185. See also 
Derwin, “Sense and/or Sensation,” 247-248. 
See again the discourse used to distinguish the MOT from “ordinary museums” 
on its “Our History and Vision” page. “Our History and Vision,” Museum of Tolerance. 
27 Lisus and Ericson, “Misplacing Memory.” 
28 Museum professional Barry Lord discusses the Museum of Tolerance as “a 
popular example” of an “‘idea museum,’” discussing the institution in his report on 
“Cultural Tourism and Museums.” Barry Lord, “Cultural Tourism and Museums” 
(presentation, Seoul, Korea, September 27, 2002), accessed April 5, 2013, 
http://sinolord.com/Media/Artcl_CltTourismMSeoulKorea_2002.pdf. 
See also Williams on the complexities of memorial museums as tourist 
destinations. Williams, “The Memorial Museum,” 104-107. 
29 Museum of Tolerance, “The Time is NOW” (leaflet distributed at the entrance 
to the Museum of Tolerance, Los Angeles, CA, November 2012). 
30 Museum of Tolerance, “The Time is NOW.” 
31 “Entertainmentality” is Luke’s term for the constraints imposed by the adoption 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Exhibition (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2002), 2-4.  See also his discussion of 
the links between the MOT and entertainment culture in Luke, Museum Politics, 48-49. 
Rather “entertainmentality,” Kornblau prefers to conceptualize the MOT as 
“tak[ing] its cues from infotainment.” Gary Kornblau, “The Museum of Tolerance,” Art 
Issues, May/June 1993, 48. 
Dickinson, Ott, and Aoki coin the concept of the “experiential landscape.” See 
Greg Dickinson, Brian L. Ott, and Eric Aoki, “Spaces of Remembering and Forgetting: 
The Reverent Eye/I at the Plains Indian Museum,” Communication and Critical/Cultural 
Studies 3, no. 1 (2006): 27-47. Dickinson, Ott, and Aoki develop this concept out of the 
work by Blair and Michel on the Astronauts Memorial. See Carole Blair and Neil Michel, 
“Commemorating in Theme Park Zone: Reading the Astronauts Memorial,” in At the 
Intersection: Cultural Studies and Rhetorical Studies, ed. Thomas Rosteck (New York: 
The Guilford Press, 1999), 29-83. Notably, the influence of entertainment logics due to 
the MOT’s proximity to tourist cites mimics the uneasy relationship between Orlando 
tourism and the Astronauts Memorial at the heart of Blair and Michel’s piece. 
See Bartov for his read of the institution vis-à-vis its location in Los Angeles. 
Bartov, Murder in Our Midst, 183-184. 
32 Edward Norden, “Yes and No to the Holocaust Museums,” Commentary 96, no. 
2 (1993): 24. Brown discusses the MOT as the beneficiary of “astonishing sums from 
Hollywood glitterati.” Brown, Regulating Aversion, 109. 
33 Norden, “Yes and No,” 24.  The quote in full reads, “Concern was therefore 
expressed that his new Beit Hashoah – in Hebrew, the House of the Holocaust – would be 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Likud.” Notably, these critiques touch upon the political context Brown builds for 
reading the institution. Brown fleshes out some of the reasons for these concerns. See 
Brown, Regulating Aversion, 109-113. 
34 Norden, “Yes and No,” 24. 
35  “Finding Our Families, Finding Ourselves,” Museum of Tolerance, accessed 
May 22, 2013, 
http://www.museumoftolerance.com/site/c.tmL6KfNVLtH/b.4865963/k.161D/Finding_O
ur_Families_Finding_Ourselves.htm. 
36 Brown links the format of the Millennium Machine to assumptions the 
institution makes about its audiences’ need to be entertained and stimulated. Brown, 
Regulating Aversion, 125. 
37 Alexander Laban Hinton, “The Dark Side of Modernity: Toward an 
Anthropology of Genocide,” in Annihilating Difference: The Anthropology of Genocide, 
ed.  Alexander Laban Hinton (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 26; Anne 
Rothe, Popular Trauma Culture: Selling the Pain of Others in the Mass Media (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2011); Leshu Torchin, Creating the Witness: 
Documenting Genocide on Film, Video, and the Internet (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2012), 112-113, 133, 137-140. Notably Torchin’s discussion of this 
critique on 112-113 occurs through her analysis of the film No Man’s Land. She credits 
the film for fleshing out the connection to commodification.  
38 In Baron’s words, “The commercial demands and genre conventions of motion 
pictures as popular entertainment restrain filmmakers from treating the subject as 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Genocide Cinema: Crossing Disciplinary, Genre, and Geographical Borders: Editor’s 
Introduction,” Shofar: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Jewish Studies 28, no. 4 (2010): 4. 
See also Bartov’s discussion of Schindler’s List. Bartov, Murder in Our Midst, 
168-171. 
39 From Holtschneider’s perspective, the narratives need to be tempered to protect 
audiences. See K. Hannah. Holtschneider, “Victims, Perpetrators, Bystanders? 
Witnessing, Remembering and the Ethics of Representation in Museums of the 
Holocaust,” Holocaust Studies: A Journal of Culture and History 13, no. 1 (2007): 90. 
On Holocaust museums as tourists sites, see Isabel Wollaston, “Negotiating the 
Marketplace: The Role(s) of Holocaust Museums Today,” Journal of Modern Jewish 
Studies 4, no. 1 (2005): 65. 
40 Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, “Folklorists in Public: Reflections on Cultural 
Brokerage in the United States and Germany,” Journal of Folklore Research 37, no. 1 
(2000): 13.  
41 See pages 103-104 in Chapter One. 
42 Lisus and Ericson, “Misplacing Memory,” 13. Witcomb’s alternative read of 
this quotation is engaged in note 53. Andrea Witcomb, “Interactivity in Museums: The 
Politics of Narrative Style,” in Museum Studies: An Anthology of Contexts, ed. Bettina 
Messias Carbonell, 2nd ed. (West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 588. 
43 Luke’s central argument is that the experience produced at the MOT (and the 
USHMM) is akin to the kind of experience that is produced at Disneyland or other such 
entertainment sites. Luke writes, “the high-tech experiential spin of the Tolerancenter 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Disneyland, that can be forgotten or misremembered as soon as the doors fly open to the 
next section.” Luke, Museum Politics, 51. Some of his reflections on the implications of 
the production of such “entertaining” experiences within Holocaust museums are 
engaged toward the end of this chapter, but his full discussion of these implications 
merits consideration. Luke, Museum Politics, 54-62. 
In a very different capacity, Prosise also reads the MOT as producing an 
experience for its visitors, but an experience that moves visitors through the stages of 
social rituals. Prosise, “Prejudiced, Historical Witness.”  
For additional context: Although not engaging the MOT directly, Hamber and 
Hein respectively discuss the role of “experience” in both conflict museums and 
museums writ large. Brandon Hamber, “Conflict Museums, Nostalgia, and Dreaming of 
Never Again,” Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology 18, no. 3 (2012): 268-
281; Hilde S. Hein, The Museum in Transition: A Philosophical Perspective 
(Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2000). 
44 Williams and Hamber treat the production of affective experiences as 
characteristic of the form. Hamber, “Conflict Museums;” Williams, “The Memorial 
Museum,” 108-109. The authors engaged in the following seven notes speak more 
specifically to the affective experience cultivated in the MOT. 
45 Witcomb, “Interactivity in Museums,” 587-588. Although not developed as a 
critique of the MOT, Rothe argues this kind of accentuation of the affective undercuts 
political action. Rothe, Popular Trauma Culture, 5.   
46 Bartov, Murder in Our Midst, 186. 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Bartov, Murder in Our Midst, 184-186. See also Lisus and Ericson, 
“Misplacing Memory,” 17. 
Williams articulates the counter argument about affect in memorial museums, 
viewing the use of emotion as part of a means of establishing a contrast with Nazi 
rationality, “an antidote to the cold intellect associated with Nazism and apartheid that 
produced decisions about the course of others’ lives without regard for emotion.” See 
Williams, “The Memorial Museum,” 108-109. 
49 Bartov, Murder in Our Midst, 186. 
50 Lisus and Ericson, “Misplacing Memory,” 8. 
51 See the argument as fully developed under the “Hegemony and Message 
Control” section. Pages 285-286 and notes 63-67. 
52 Edward Rothstein, “Making the Holocaust the Lesson on All Evils,” New York 
Times, April 29, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/30/arts/design/museums-make-
the-holocaust-a-homily.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
53 Lisus and Ericson, “Misplacing Memory,”18. See Chapter One, pages 98, 
147n106. See also Bartov, Murder in Our Midst, 185. 
Notably, Witcomb charges that the ahistoricism of the institution is not 
necessarily the byproduct of its choice of medium. She attributes the MOT’s 
shortcomings to the ideologies of individualism and faith in technology more so than any 
perceived deficiencies of the medium. See Witcomb, “Interactivity in Museums,” 588. 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
For more on the temporalities of mediation inside Holocaust museums, see 
Andrew Hoskins, “Signs of the Holocaust: Exhibiting Memory in a Mediated Age,” 
Media, Culture and Society 25, no. 1 (2003): 7-23. 
55 Jon Wiener, “The Other Holocaust Museum,” Tikkun 10, no. 3 (1995): 
http://www.tikkun.org/article.php/may1995_wiener.  
Wollaston suggests that this is a problem facing Holocaust museums more 
broadly: “Holocaust museums offer a narrative account of the Holocaust and employ 
slogans to communicate key ‘lessons,’ but do not systematically unpack the complexities 
and significance of the events they represent.” She goes on to construct an argument 
about their partiality. Wollaston, “Negotiating the Marketplace,” 73. For more on 
representations of history in memorial museums, see Williams, “The Memorial 
Museum,” 100-101. 
56 Oren Baruch Stier, Committed to Memory: Cultural Mediations of the 
Holocaust (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003), 148.  
57 Anson Rabinbach, “From Explosion to Erosion: Holocaust Memorialization in 
America since Bitburg,” History and Memory 9, no. 1/2 (1997): 243-244. 
58 Bartov, Murder in Our Midst, 183. As Kornblau argues, the “MOT carries on a 
tradition of pandering to social problems, asking why ‘we can’t all just get along’ while 
ignoring the deep social, economic, and political realities that breed hatred and 
intolerance.” Kornblau, “The Museum of Tolerance,” 48.  
Again, Wollaston argues that this is part of the genre of Holocaust museums. 
Wollaston, “Negotiating the Marketplace,” 73. 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Bartov, Murder in Our Midst, 184. As will be demonstrated below, this view of 
the Holocaust as rooted in intrapersonal prejudices bolsters the MOT’s ability to offer 
self-help discourses and draw upon the political containment of therapuetic rhetorics. 
Dana L. Cloud, Control and Consolation in American Culture and Politics: Rhetorics of 
Therapy (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.), 1998. 
61 Patraka makes this argument from the opposite perspective. By featuring the 
MOT’s content as rooted in interpersonal inadequacies/intolerances, the systemic 
dimension is obscured. Vivian M. Patraka, “Situating History and Difference: The 
Performance of the Term Holocaust in Public Discourse,” in Jews and Other Differences: 
The New Jewish Cultural Studies, ed. Jonathan Boyarin and Daniel Boyarin 
(Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press: 1997), 71; Vivian Patraka, 
“Spectacular Suffering: Performing Presence, Absence, and Witness at U.S. Holocaust 
Museums,” in Memory and Representation: Constructed Truths and Competing Realities, 
ed. Dena Elisabeth Eber and Arthur G. Neal (Bowling Green, OH: Bowling Green State 
University Popular Press, 2001), 150. 
62 Extending this quotation, Brown’s full characterization of tolerance discourses 
reads: “of tolerance as a contemporary discourse of depoliticization in which power and 
history make little or no appearance in representations or accounts of ethnicized hostility 
or conflict, in which ethnicity, culture, religion, race, and belief are often confused and 
conflated, and in which historically produced antagonisms are reified as essential, the 
results of a natural enmity regarded as inherent in ‘difference.’” Brown, Regulating 
Aversion, 109. 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Lisus and Ericson, “Misplacing Memory,” 10; Patraka, “Spectacular 
Suffering,” 160-162; Witcomb, “Interactivity in Museums,” 586-587. 
65 Lisus and Ericson, “Misplacing Memory,” 7; Witcomb, “Interactivity in 
Museums,” 585-586; Brown, Regulating Aversion. 
66 Lisus and Ericson, “Misplacing Memory,” 7. 
67 This point is made repeatedly throughout Brown’s chapter on the MOT. See, 
for example, Brown, Regulating Aversion, 115, 127.  
There is a certain irony that rests at the heart of this critique. Patraka, for example, 
reads the MOT against the USHMM in interrogating the hegemonic and polysemic 
dimensions of each through a de Certeauian analysis of space/place. She suggests that on 
first blush the MOT appears to have the most polysemic potential; however, the MOT is a 
more hegemonic text than the USHMM. She argues that the USHMM does a much better 
job promoting multiple interpretations. Patraka, “Spectacular Suffering,” 162-163. 
68 I draw here on Dow’s insights regarding the goals of criticism. See Bonnie J. 
Dow, Prime-Time Feminism: Television, Media Culture, and the Women’s Movement 
Since 1970 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996), 4. 
69 The inspiration for this chapter’s foregrounding of the notion of “plasticity” 
emerges from Sue Tait’s work on body horror, pornography, and violence. In her article, 
Tait analyzes spectator subjectivities created through the website Ogrish. Ogrish is a 
platform for the display of graphic violence, including content such as beheadings. Part 
of Tait’s argument highlights the problems of overusing the metaphor of pornography. 
She argues that the plasticity of the pornography metaphor occludes important element 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Sue Tait, “Pornographies of Violence? Internet Spectatorship on Body Horror,” Critical 
Studies in Media Communication 25, no. 1 (2008): 91-111. See also Carolyn J. Dean, The 
Fragility of Empathy after the Holocaust (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004). 
70 Brown, Regulating Aversion, 112.  
71 Rothstein, “Making the Holocaust;” Oren Baruch Stier, “Virtual Memories: 
Mediating the Holocaust at the Simon Wiesenthal Center's Beit Hashoah-Museum of 
Tolerance,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 64, no, 4 (1996): 839.  
72 Rothstein, “Making the Holocaust.” 
73 Stier, “Virtual Memories,” 839. 
To some extent, the MOT itself encourages this split reading, demarcating the 
Holocaust exhibition and Tolerancenter as separate entities in their presentation of the 
institution. See “Exhibits,” Museum of Tolerance, accessed April 6, 2013, 
http://www.museumoftolerance.com/site/c.tmL6KfNVLtH/b.4865933/k.DFFE/Exhibits.h
tm. 
74 Prosise, “Prejudiced, Historical Witness.” 
75 Patraka, “Situating History and Difference,” 72; Patraka, “Spectacular 
Suffering,” 150. See also Brown, Regulating Aversion, 136. 
Of course, this question of the relationship between the Tolerancenter and the 
Museum of Tolerance serves as an impetus for debates about the Holocaust’s uniqueness. 
For more on the uniqueness thesis, see the Introduction. Other critics have read the 
institution with an eye toward what its organizational choices might imply about the 
relationship between the Holocaust and other genocides. See Brown, Regulating 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Patraka, “Situating History and Difference,” 72; Patraka, “Spectacular 
Suffering,” 150.  
Indeed, this “sliding scale” logic is visualized in an exhibition at the very start of 
the Tolerancenter. As part of “The Power of Words” exhibit, visitors find a continuum 
that moves from yellow to red and lists a number of social problems – in order: “hate 
language, hate symbols, hate gatherings, disturbing the peace, threats, vandalism, assault, 
civil rights violations, arson, murder, terrorism.”  Without offering any clues as to the 
grounds for this ordering, the continuum exhibits the logic that seems to guide the MOT: 
small acts of violence lead to larger acts of violence; thus, even seemingly small offenses 
demand attention. Museum of Tolerance, physical installation, visited November 12, 
2012. 
77 Williams, “The Memorial Museum,” 108. 
Expounding upon a similar theme, Rothstein suggests that the pedagogy 
embedded in such museums instructs: “We should all get along, become politically active 
and be very considerate of our neighbors. If not, well, the differences between hate 
crimes and the Holocaust — between bullying and Buchenwald — are just a matter of 
degree.” Rothstein, “Making the Holocaust.” 
78 “Microaggression[s],” a term typically used in discussions of racism, “are the 
everyday verbal, nonverbal, and environmental slights, snubs, or insults, whether 
intentional or unintentional, that communicate hostile, derogatory, or negative messages 
to target persons based solely upon their marginalized group membership.” Derald Wing 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Microaggressions and Marginality: Manifestations, Dynamics, and Impact, ed. Derald 
Wing Sue (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 2010), 3. 
One of the major obstacles in conversations about microaggressions is the 
proclivity to minimalize or trivialize this form of harm. As Sue et. al explain, 
“microaggressions are believed to have minimal negative impact.” Derald Wing Sue, 
Christina M. Capodilupo, Gina C. Torino, Jennifer M. Bucceri, Aisha M. B. Holder, 
Kevin L. Nadal, and Marta Esquilin, “Racial Microaggressions in Everyday Life: 
Implications for Clinical Practice,” American Psychologist 62, no. 4 (2007): 278. 
 The Tolerancenter is filled with content punctuating the harms of 
microaggressions. The Tolerancenter warns of the horrors caused by hate speech, 
stereotypes, gossip, etc. Undoubtedly, such microaggressions have damaging 
consequences yet they are hampered by perceptions of insignificance, and as such, fail to 
provide the grounds for the assertion of a crisis. 
79 Numerous books and articles have been written on the rhetoricity of museums. 
As a representative sample, see Greg Dickinson, Brian Ott, and Eric Aoki, “Memory and 
Myth at the Buffalo Bill Museum,” Western Journal of Communication 69, no. 2 (2005): 
85-108; Dickinson, Ott, and Aoki, “Spaces of Remembering;” Tamar Katriel, “Sites of 
Memory: Discourses of the Past in Israeli Pioneering Settlement Museums,” Quarterly 
Journal of Speech 80, no. 1 (1994): 1-20; Gaynor Kavanagh, Dream Spaces: Memory 
and the Museum (London: Leicester University Press, 2000); Luke, Museum Politics; 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 “Mediascape,” as the term is used here, is defined by Appadurai as follows: 
“Mediascapes refer both to the distribution of the electronic capabilities to produce and 
disseminate information (newspapers, magazines, television stations and film production 
studios), which are now available to a growing number of private and public interests 
throughout the world, and to the images of the world created by these media.” Arjun 
Appadurai, “Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy,” Public Culture 
2, no. 2 (1990): 9 
81 I draw here on Kornfeld’s inclination to forsake the language of “hybridity” in 
favor of the metaphoric insights lent by the embrace of sewing metaphors as explanatory 
devices for the combination of genres. Such language also resonates with the use sewing 
metaphors in Radway’s discussion of ideology. See Sarah J. Kornfield, “Postfeminist 
Detectives: Television Genres, Genders, and Crimes,” (paper presentation, NCA Doctoral 
Honors Seminar, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, July 11, 2012); 
Janice A. Radway, “Identifying Ideological Seams: Mass Culture, Analytical Method, 
and Political Practice,” Communication 9, no. 1 (1986): 93-123.  
82 Amy J. Devitt, Writing Genres (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 
2004), 21. 
For more on the relationship between genre and situation, see Amy J. Devitt, 
“Generalizing about Genre: New Conceptions of an Old Concept,” College Composition 
and Communication 44, no. 4 (1993): 573-586. 
83 A few caveats are necessary to complicate this tripartite delineation of generic 
frameworks. First, the boundaries between melodrama and horror are contestable. In her 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
much broader category of films and a much larger system of excess. It would not be 
unreasonable, in fact, to con-sider all three of these genres under the extended rubric of 
melodrama, considered as a filmic mode of stylistic and/or emotional excess that stands 
in contrast to more ‘dominant’ modes of realistic, goal-oriented narrative. In this 
extended sense melodrama can encompass a broad range of films marked by ‘lapses’ in 
realism, by ‘excesses’ of spectacle and displays of primal, even infantile emotions, and 
by narratives that seem circular and repetitive.” Williams suggests that “melodrama” 
includes horror. Yet she continues in her work to delineate the unique properties of horror 
based upon the viewer’s reaction. In this chapter, I retain a division between horror and 
melodrama in order to create space to focus on the production of a fearful affect. See 
Linda Williams, “Film Bodies: Gender, Genre, and Excess,” Film Quarterly 44, no. 4 
(1991): 3-5. 
Second, my project overlaps with and diverges from Rothe’s Popular Trauma 
Culture. Her study of “popular trauma culture” relies upon Latour’s work “to suggest that 
the trauma conception functions as a discursive knot.” She argues, “the discursive knot 
generated by the trauma concept provides the dominant mode of emplotment – the basic 
narrative structure and core set of characters – for representing … diverse experiences.”  
Rothe contends that part of this narrative structure includes melodrama and self-help 
discourses. However, reading the MOT as part of “popular trauma culture” alone would 
fail to sufficiently illuminate the punctuated “horror” elements featured prominently 
within the museum (but underdeveloped in Rothe’s framework). Thus; although I draw 
heavily on Rothe’s work in the ensuing section, I front the generic frameworks instead of 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Trauma Culture, 4. Rothe grounds this claim in Bruno Latour, Science in Action: How to 
Follow Scientists and Engineers through Society (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1987), 201. 
84 Steffen Hantke, “Introduction: Horror Film and the Apparatus of Cinema,” in 
Horror Film: Creating and Marketing Fear, ed. Steffen Hantke (Jackson: University 
Press of Mississippi, 2004), viii. 
85 Hantke, “Introduction,” viii. 
86 Williams, “Film Bodies.” Notably, Williams’s conception of “body genres” 
expands Carol Clover’s work on the subject. Clover earlier identified horror as a body 
genre. See Carol J. Clover, “Her Body, Himself: Gender in the Slasher Film,” 
Representations 20 no. 1 (1987): 187-228. 
Williams’s work is a seminal part of the discussion about the utility of the horror 
genre. Hantke turns to Williams to define the genre. Hantke, “Introduction,” viii. 
Others examining horror and Holocaust representation also draw on Williams’s 
work. See Aaron Kerner, Film and the Holocaust: New Perspectives on Dramas, 
Documentaries, and Experimental Films (New York: The Continuum International 
Publishing Group, 2011), 10-11, 121-176; Walter C. Metz, “‘Show Me the Shoah!’: 
Generic Experience and Spectatorship in Popular Representations of the Holocaust,” 
Shofar: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Jewish Studies 27, no. 1 (2008): 16-35. 
87 Williams, “Film Bodies,” 4-5. Indeed, in her analysis of horror, pornography, 
and melodrama, Williams argues “that the success of these genres is often measured by 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
This focus on the sensory experience is at the core of Derwin’s analysis. See 
Derwin, “Sense and/or Sensation.” 
88 On the low status of the genre see Williams, “Film Bodies,” 3. For more on the 
representation debates refer back to Chapter One, pages 98-106. See also Kerner, Film 
and the Holocaust, 155. 
89 Kerner, Film and the Holocaust, 10, 155. The division that Kerner is drawing 
here is subtle. He does not refute Picart and Frank’s argument about the use of horror 
frames. Rather, he is looking at horror films and arguing that few horror films engage the 
subject of the Holocaust. His claim in this regard rests upon parsing horror from 
exploitation films, the subject of his previous chapter. Exploitation films, Kerner notes, 
centralize graphic material both in terms of carnage and sexually explicit materials. 
Kerner, Film and the Holocaust, 139-153. 
90 Caroline Joan (Kay) S. Picart and David A. Frank, Frames of Evil: The 
Holocaust as Horror in American Film (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 
2006). 
91 As Kerner writes, “the horror genre evokes the sensation of fascination and 
revulsion. Traditional representations of the Holocaust invite our morbid gaze, but at the 
same time, owing to their ‘serious’ form, permit for the disavowal of our own curiosity in 
the abject. This is done either by cloaking the Holocaust behind the veil of objectivity, as 
seen in historical narratives and documentaries, or dressing it up in the garb of ‘noble 
genres,’ such as dramatic narratives or tragedy. The horror genre, in this respect, is 
potentially more productive, because within this genre there is license, if not an 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
also deals with the existence of evil in the world, and the darker side of humanity.” 
Kerner, Film and the Holocaust, 156-157. 
92 Hantke extrapolates on the questionable ethics of the conflation of historical 
and cinematic horror: “Ruzowitzky’s horror film in fact occupies a far more problematic 
position on the scale of discursive authenticity, gravity, and legitimacy. Making a horror 
film that utilizes the Third Reich as a source of cinematic thrills would appear to many a 
dubious proposition. This seems paradoxical because horror film is the one cinematic 
genre devoted primarily to the sensation with which most regard the Holocaust. But 
horrors on the screen and horrors in history occur on different ontological levels, a 
difference that translates into profound ethical differences.” Steffen Hantke, “Horror 
Film and the Historical Uncanny: The New Germany in Stefan Ruzowitzky’s Anatomie,” 
College Literature, 31, no. 2 (2004): 121. (emphasis added).  
Picart and Frank utilize part of this quotation to interrogate the ethical 
implications of the use of horror in Holocaust representations in the introduction and 
conclusion of their book. See Picart and Frank, Frames of Horror, 6, 127. See also 
Kerner, Film and the Holocaust, 155. 
93 Kerner, Film and the Holocaust, 157.  
94  See Torchin’s arguments about the use of horror in the Nuremberg trial films. 
Torchin, Creating the Witness, 83-86.  
Kerner suggests that “the Nazi is figured as an embodiment of absolute evil with 
almost superhuman strength, the virtual spawn of Satan.” Kerner, Film and the Holocaust, 
155. 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Meyrowitz, drawing on Edward T. Hall’s work on proxemics, makes the 
argument that the tightness of a shot can simulate the effect of interpersonal perceptions 
of distance. Thus the tight framing in these shots locates the viewer proximate to the 
violence, increasing its emotional impact in line with the principles of proxemics. See 
Joshua Meyrowitz, “Television and Interpersonal Behavior: Codes of Perception and 
Response,” in Inter/Media: Interpersonal Communication in a Media World, ed. Gary 
Grumpert and Robert Cathcart (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 221-241. 
97 Notably, this sequence is not captured in a tight frame; it is shown at a wide 
angle. 
98 Museum of Tolerance, physical installation, visited November 12, 2012. 
99 As Brown explains in her description of the videos in the Point of View diner: 
“The vignettes are extremely dramatic; the first video contains enough blood, agony, 
death, and sorrow that it could easily be a high school driver education film, and the 
second ends with the accidental killing of an innocent bystander by an enraged black 
security guard.” Brown, Regulating Aversion, 119.  Brown’s emphasis on the “dramatic” 
nature of these films lays the groundwork for the following critique concerning the use of 
melodrama as a genre in the MOT’s genocide cessation discourse.  
Elsewhere, Brown talks about the use of horror in the Millennium Machine 
exhibit. In her words, “The film literally terrifies viewers with its account of the ease of 
making and disseminating anthrax and other massively toxic substances.” Brown, 
Regulating Aversion, 124. 
100 Museum of Tolerance, physical installation, visited November 12, 2012. 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Patraka, “Situating History and Difference,” 70. 
103 Barry Glassner, The Culture of Fear: Why Americans are Afraid of the Wrong 
Things (New York: Basic Books 1999). 
104 See Patraka, “Situating History and Difference,” 74; Patraka, “Spectacular 
Suffering,” 152; Bartov, Murder in Our Midst, 185; Brown, Regulating Aversion, 125; 
Lisus and Ericson, “Misplacing Memory,” 17; Luke, Museum Politics, 51, 55. Kornblau 
describes the MOT as “a sort of It’s a Small World for liberals of all ilk.” He also reads 
the Holocaust portion of the MOT as “reminiscent of the Old Carousel of Progress 
attraction at Disneyland, but here one ends up in a recreated gas chamber.” Kornblau, 
“The Museum of Tolerance,” 48. 
105 Wiener, “The Other Holocaust Museum.”  
106 Museum of Tolerance, physical installation, visited November 12, 2012. 
107 Remarks attributed to Arnold Schwarzenegger, quoted in Norden, “Yes and 
No,” 24, 25. Brown, too, picks up on the significance of these remarks. Brown, 
Regulating Aversion, 125, 240-241n32. 
108 Such sensory experiences may not have a profound affective component. As 
Hantke explains in his analysis of the German film Anatomie: “Using the Third Reich as 
a device that conjures up the uncanny serves not the topic but the demands of the genre. 
Whenever the Anti-Hyppocratics [in the film] are presented as latter day Nazis, they feel 
most like movie villains and least like flesh and blood characters. This recourse to the 
Nazi as Hollywood villain brings with it the risk that the uncanny will be, in fact, just 
that—a generic device. Audiences who understand the rules of horror films, and most 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
conventionality with which the uncanny is cited. Consequently, they will enter into an 
interaction with the film that elides any real emotional involvement. The horror they will 
experience is bracketed from the very beginning as a response appropriate to the genre 
of film they are watching, not as a response to the horrors of Nazi medical 
experimentation.” Hantke, “Horror Film,” 137. [emphasis added] 
This returns us to the reasons that Kerner suggests the use of horror is problematic 
in Holocaust representation. Kerner, Film and the Holocaust.  
109 Kerner, Film and the Holocaust, 156-157. Kerner articulates similar concerns 
in his discussion of exploitation.  Kerner, Film and the Holocaust, 141, 154. 
Such concerns dovetail with debates over the ethics of the representation of 
graphic carnage more broadly. See Susan Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others (New 
York: Picador, 2003); Tait, “Pornographies of Violence?”; John Taylor, Body Horror: 
Photojournalism, Catastrophe and War (New York: New York University Press, 1998). 
110 Peter Brooks, The Melodramatic Imagination: Balzac, Henry James, 
Melodrama, and the Mode of Excess (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1976), 12. 
111 Brooks, The Melodramatic Imagination, 14-15; Rothe, Popular Trauma 
Culture, 46. 
112 Rothe, Popular Trauma Culture, 46. 
113 Rothe argues that this is the storyline of popular trauma culture put into motion 
by events such as the Eichmann Trial. The popularized story lines from the trial, she 
argues, “were constructed around a melodramatic conflict between absolute innocence 
and rank evil, which was embodied in the dichotomized flat characters of victim and 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
decontextualized narratives,” resonating with critiques of the MOT’s reductiveness.  
Rothe, Popular Trauma Culture, 2.  
114 Herein such a contention diverges from Rothe’s sketch of the components of 
“popular trauma culture.” Using a Christian theological framework, within the MOT, the 
visitor is both sinner and witness, the judge and the judged. Or, using terms that resonate 
with Rothe’s framework, the visitor to the MOT is both a “survivor” and a perpetrator. 
As Rothe punctuates repeatedly in her book, the “survivor” is the dominant figure in 
contemporary popular trauma culture.  In asking visitors to accept culpability, the MOT 
challenges part of the “popular trauma culture” narrative. Rothe, Popular Trauma 
Culture, 32-41. 
115 Museum of Tolerance, physical installation, visited November 12, 2012. 
116 Museum of Tolerance, physical installation, visited November 12, 2012. 
117 Although I do not expressly draw out the gendered element included in such 
representations, the displays elevate feminine representations of grief. This Holocaust 
narrative resonates with the expressly “feminine” nature of bereavement conveyed 
elsewhere in the Tolerancenter. Returning to the “Confronting Hate in America” 
exhibition, women and children are overwhelming used to connote tragedy. Exhibition 
images capture women at a vigil, a woman holding a child, and children holding hands 
with a police officer, etc. This visual motif, in other words, connotes “sad” women and 
children. This becomes the aesthetics used to narrate grief. Museum of Tolerance, 
physical installation, visited November 12, 2012. Such representations are consistent with 
Rothe’s argument that the “victim figure … remains associated with women and children.” 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
consistent with larger arguments Kitch has made about the gendering of bereavement. 
Carolyn Kitch, “Mediating Memorial: The Growing Role of Journalism in Local Ritual 
and National Tribute” (lecture, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, November 3, 
2008). 
118 For more on the rhetorical power of animating still photos in this capacity, see 
Judith Lancioni, “The Rhetoric of the Frame: Revisioning Archival Photographs in The 
Civil War,” Western Journal of Communication 60, no. 4 (1996): 397-414. 
119 This image’s treatment clearly evinces practices of decontextualization and 
recontextualization. For more on the decontextualization and recontextualization of 
images, see Shawn J. Parry-Giles, “Mediating Hillary Rodham Clinton: Television News 
Practices and Image-Making in the Postmodern Age,” Critical Studies in Media 
Communication 17, no. 2 (2000):  205-226.  
On Holocaust images as symbols, see Barbie Zelizer, Remembering to Forget: 
Holocaust Memory Through the Camera’s Eye (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1998), 86, 92-94, 118. 
120 Brown, Regulating Aversion, 118. This divisiveness into good or bad polarities 
makes sense within the broader context of melodrama. Brooks suggests “the very logic of 
melodrama” is the “logic of the excluded middle.” Brooks, The Melodramatic 
Imagination, 18. 
121 Melodrama’s caricaturization of evil has clear ties to Waller’s arguments about 
“Extraordinary Evil.” As Waller explains, these understandings the “purely evil person” 
and the “purely good” person are “artificial construct[s];” nevertheless, melodrama 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass Killing, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford, 
2007), 20. See also Chapter One.  
122 Brooks, The Melodramatic Imagination, 17. Rothe, too, utilizes this quotation 
in her discussion of evil. Rothe, Popular Trauma Culture, 46. 
123 This understanding of evil both dovetails with Waller’s arguments about the 
“cognitive escape” provided by such caricatured understandings of evil as well as Picart 
and Frank’s arguments about the utility of the classic horror frame in reifying 
ideological-intentionalist conceptions of “evil as a breach with the ordinary, evil as 
intentional, the space of the monstrous other as dark and the site of the other.” Picart and 
Frank, Frames of Evil, 19.  Waller, Becoming Evil, 20. See also Chapter One. 
124 Smith discusses at greater length melodrama’s “seductive pleasures”: “It is 
comforting to lay the blame for our failure on other shoulders, and shrink from the 
rigours of self-castigation into the euphoric illusion that we are innocent victims of a 
hostile world. Again, it is heartening to cast private doubt and reservation aside, and enter 
wholeheartedly into a struggle against manifest injustice. By attacking villains we can all 
become heroes.” James L. Smith, Melodrama (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1973), 10. 
125 In Rothstein’s words, the lesson is “we are all prejudiced, not just the guards at 
Auschwitz.” Rothstein, “Making the Holocaust.” 
126 For more on the MOT’s ties to Judaism and the complications this has created 
for the MOT, see Brown Regulating Aversion, 109-111; Norden, “Yes and No,” 23-24; 
Wiener, “The Other Holocaust Museum.”  See Stier for an alternative reading of the 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 Rothe affirms the extent to which these two frameworks are compatible. 
Rothe, Popular Trauma Culture.  
Similarly, Stratton notes the ease with which these frameworks meld. Like 
melodrama, in Stratton’s words, “the thematics of the Americanized Holocaust, filtered 
through American culture’s Christian fundamentalist tendency to moral binaries, most 
obviously callous and sadistic Nazis, and murderous annihilation of those designated as 
Other, appear across American culture.” Jon Stratton, “Thinking Through the Holocaust. 
A Discussion Inspired by Hilene Flanzbaum (ed.), The Americanization of the 
Holocaust,” Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies 14, no. 2 (2000): 241. 
128 Prosise argues that this message used to be explicitly conveyed in the physical 
installation. He writes, “Facing visitors on the wall opposite the entry in large print is this 
message: ‘The potential for violence is within all of us.’” Prosise, “Prejudiced, Historical 
Witness,” 359. 
129 For more on the Christianization of the Holocaust, see Tom Lawson, 
“Constructing a Christian History of Nazism: Anglicanism and the Memory of the 
Holocaust, 1945-49,” History and Memory 16, no. 1 (2004): 146-176; Tom Lawson, 
“Shaping the Holocaust: The Influence of Christian Discourse on Perceptions of the 
European Jewish Tragedy,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 21, no. 3 (2007): 404-420. 
On the use of Christian iconography in Holocaust remembrance, see Janet Jacobs, 
“Memorializing the Sacred: Kristallnacht in German National Memory,” Journal for the 
Scientific Study of Religion 47, no. 3 (2008): 485–498.  
Beyond the above discussions of Christian iconography and the Holocaust, 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
genocide and continues to be part of the iconography used to make genocide 
comprehensible. Torchin, Creating the Witness, 9-11, 44-53. In Torchin’s discussion of 
Christianity as a schemata for understanding genocide, she notes the threat of 
Manicheanism and depoliticization. Clearly, both the discussion of moral binarism and 
apoliticism embedded in her critique of the Christian components of such representations 
resonates with this chapter’s analysis of the MOT. 
130 Peter Novick, The Holocaust in American Life (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1999), 274, 351n17.  
131 Novick, The Holocaust, 274. 
132 Rothe, Popular Trauma Culture, 2 
133 Rothe, Popular Trauma Culture, 24-25. Rothe draws on Novick and Amato’s 
work. See Joseph A. Amato, Victims and Values: A History and a Theory of Suffering 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1990), 48; Novick, The Holocaust, 274. 
134 Rothe, Popular Trauma Culture, 2, 24-25.  
135 Although he takes his critique in a different direction, Bartov identifies the 
MOT’s ties to Christian systems of meaning-making. He argues that the MOT “interprets 
the past through a Christian prism of infusing matter with spirit, allowing things to 
remain precisely as they are while simultaneously arguing that they have been 
transformed in their essence through love (and faith).” Bartov, Murder in Our Midst, 184. 
136 Museum of Tolerance, physical installation, visited November 12, 2012. 
137 The author would like to thank the attendees at her fall 2012 presentation of 
this chapter to the University of Southern California’s genocide resistance research 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 See the larger discussion of evil contained on pages 92-93 in Chapter One. 
139 In this capacity, an understanding of “evil” as contained “within” denies the 
separatism of a classic horror understanding evil and reflects elements of the conflicted 
frame insofar as it “weave[s] evil into normality.” For more on this understanding of evil 
and its relation to the classic frame and Holocaust representation, see Picart and Frank, 
Frames of Evil, 8-11. 
140 While this facet of the museum’s messaging appears progressive to Wiener, 
Witcomb, refutes Wiener to reinforce the conservative dimensions of the institution, 
finding little redemption in what she characterizes as Wiener’s praise of the museum’s 
“brave start.” Wiener, “The Other Holocaust Museum;” Witcomb, “Interactivity in 
Museums,” 588-589. 
141 Prosise, “Prejudiced, Historical Witness,” 359. 
142 The doors are mentioned in all of the following analyses or commentaries: 
Brown, Regulating Aversion, 117; Derwin, “Sense and/or Sensation,” 249-250; Lisus and 
Ericson, “Misplacing Memory,” 3-4; Luke, Museum Politics, 49; Prosise, “Prejudiced, 
Historical Witness,” 359; Patraka, “Spectacular Suffering,” 154; Rothstein, “Making the 
Holocaust;” Stier, Committed to Memory, 131-132; Wiener, “The Other Holocaust 
Museum;” Witcomb, “Interactivity in Museums,” 586. 
143 Drawing on Derwin, “fallen” is Brown’s descriptor. Brown, Regulating 
Aversion, 117. Derwin, “Sense and/or Sensation,” 249-250.  
144 Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Worse than War: Genocide, Eliminationism, and the 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 The MOT plays on its name in its promotional materials to urge potential 
visitors to “get MOTivated.” Museum of Tolerance, “The Time is NOW.” 
146 On page 311, I begin to explicate this argument using Brown’s analysis of the 
MOT. 
147 Indeed, Rothe treats each as constitutive components of “popular trauma 
culture.” For more on her discussion of the links between trauma discourses and self-help 
discourses, see Rothe, Popular Trauma Culture, 4. 
148 Bartov, Murder in Our Midst, 184. Indeed, these are the very implications both 
Rothe and Cloud contend follow from the embrace of such self-help or therapeutic 
rheorics. Cloud, Control and Consolation; Rothe, Popular Trauma Culture. 
149 Museum of Tolerance, physical installation, visited November 12, 2012. 
150 Museum of Tolerance, physical installation, visited November 12, 2012. [I 
have preserved the capitalization from the original] 
151 Museum of Tolerance, physical installation, visited November 12, 2012. 
152 Museum of Tolerance, physical installation, visited November 12, 2012. 
Capitalization has been changed here for readability.  
153 Brown, Regulating Aversion, 128-130. 
154 Museum of Tolerance, physical installation, visited November 12, 2012. 
155 See again the explication of Goldhagen’s Hitler’s Willing Executioners in 
Chapter Two. [emphasis added] 
156 Torchin, Creating the Witness, 2. 
157 “Lessons for Communicators from the Museum of 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 Valerie Pethen, quoted in “Lessons for Communicators.” 
159 Raymond W. Smith, “Civility without Censorship,” Vital Speeches of the Day, 
January 15, 1999, 196-198.  
160 Museum of Tolerance, physical installation, visited November 12, 2012. 
161 Museum of Tolerance, physical installation, visited November 12, 2012. 
162 Brown, Regulating Aversion, 117. Specifically, Brown argues, this impression 
is fostered by the “Power of Words” exhibition referenced earlier. 
163 Brown, Regulating Aversion, 117. 
164 Brown, Regulating Aversion, 121. 
Herein Brown’s critique of this portion of the MOT dovetails with Luke’s 
assertion that the use of these entertainment genres “may make the Holocaust more 
unreal as its unfathomable evils are recast as stock characters, plot staples, or moral 
clichés in the diverting simulations of this museum’s shows.” The museum in this 
quotation is the USHMM; although Luke’s critique stands as applied to the MOT. Luke, 
Museum Politics, 38-39. 
165 See also Witcomb, “Interactivity in Museums.” 
166 Brown, Regulating Aversion, 127. 
167 Brown, Regulating Aversion, 137. 
168 Brown, Regulating Aversion, 137. 
169 Museum of Tolerance, physical installation, visited November 12, 2012. 
170 Brown, Regulating Aversion, 115. 
171 “The Hitler Letter: A Letter that Changed the World” flyer, Museum of 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://www.museumoftolerance.com/atf/cf/%7B0418CDF9-65C7-4424-955C-
E30218530A20%7D/Hitler_Letter_Exhibit.pdf.  
172 Museum of Tolerance, physical installation, visited November 12, 2012. 
173 Stuart Hall, “Encoding/Decoding,” in Media and Cultural Studies: Key Works, 
ed. Meenakshi Gigi Durham and Douglas M. Kellner, rev. ed. (Malden, MA: Blackwell 
Publishers, 2006), 163-173. 
174 It also aligns with the generic conventions of melodrama through “the promise 
of a morally legible universe to those willing to read and interpret properly its signs.” 
Brooks, The Melodramatic Imagination, 201. The emphasis herein on “proper 
interpretation” is most clearly evidenced in exhibitions such as the 1919 Hitler letter 
display. 
175 This understanding of the media is easiest to observe in a vignette offered 
through the Point of View diner about a talk radio host. In the narrative, an offensive talk 
radio host is linked to outburst of violence. The moral quagmire presented to visitors 
hinges upon whether or not his offensive speech is the cause of the instance of violence 
featured in the vignette.  This understanding of “the media” as a catalyst for violence is 
also utilized in the Holocaust portion of the MOT, specifically in its representation of 
political cartoons. Museum of Tolerance, physical installation, visited November 12, 
2012. See 367n187. 
176 Torchin, Creating the Witness. 
177 The suspicion with which the MOT approach mediation is reminiscent of the 
suspicion Biesecker argues (drawing on Derrida) the Bush administration cultivated 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Production of the Melancholic Citizen-Subject in the War on Terror,” Philosophy and 
Rhetoric 40, no. 1 (2007): 147-169. 
178 I would be remiss not to mention that the MOT’s trepidation over the power of 
media (and specifically here we are talking about mass media) can be read as part of the 
larger anxieties surrounding Holocaust representation referenced earlier in this 
dissertation project. I am also particularly struck by the way this fear of the media 
resurrects dated Frankfurtian understandings of mass communication. I take my cue here 
from Miriam Bratu Hansen’s work on Schindler’s List. In her analysis of intellectuals’ 
reception of Schindler’s List, Hansen reveals the extent to which the reception of the film 
showcases representation anxieties, and more specifically, encourages the replication of 
“the old debate of modernism versus mass culture, and thus with binary oppositions of 
‘high’ versus ‘low,’ ‘art’ versus ‘kitsch,’ ‘esoteric’ versus ‘popular.’” Hansen is 
cognizant of the extent to which the readings of Schindler’s List replicate “culture 
industry” concerns. See Miriam Bratu Hansen, “Schindler’s List Is Not Shoah: The 
Second Commandment, Popular Modernism, and Public Memory,” Critical Inquiry 22, 
no. 2 (1996): 292-312. 
Frankfurt school understandings of “mass culture” are not just useful in terms of 
redrawing high/low culture distinction within atrocity representation debates. They seem 
to also reappear in terms of the way the MOT understand media effects.  
179 For more on this approach to media see Tamar Liebes, “Viewing and 
Reviewing the Audience: Fashions in Communication Research,” in Mass Media and 
Society, ed. James Curran and Michael Gurevitch, 4th ed. (London: Hodder Arnold, 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Ellis’s work to organize her analysis. John Ellis, Seeing Things: Television in the Age of 
Uncertainty (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000). 
180 Luke, Museum Politics, 50. Derwin writes that “from the point of view of the 
museum planners…the visitors appear to consist of nothing but the media images they 
mindlessly internalize.” Derwin, “Sense and/or Sensation,” 249. 
181 Extending the conversation of encoding/decoding and interpretation above, 
Witcomb expressly notes that the MOT “closes off the negotiation of meaning at the 
same time as producing high levels of crowd control.” Witcomb, “Interactivity in 
Museums,” 585. Hall, “Encoding/Decoding.” 
182 By “social constructionist,” I mean an approach to the media texts that views 
them as creating rather than merely transmitting content. My understanding of the media 
as constructing reality is informed by scholars such as Murray Edelman, Constructing the 
Political Spectacle (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988); James Carey, 
Communication as Culture: Essays on Media and Society (New York: Routledge, 1989); 
John Hartley, The Politics of Pictures: The Creation of the Public in the Age of Popular 
Media (London: Routledge, 1992); John Hartely, Television Truths (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2008). 
183 Museum of Tolerance, physical installation, visited November 12, 2012. 
184 By way of furthering the idea of the Web as a “dangerous” place, Smith states, 
“Neo-Nazis and extremists of every political stripe who once terrorized people in the 
dead of night with burning crosses and painted swastikas are now sneaking up on the 
public – especially our kids – through the World Wide Web.” Of the utmost import, 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Amendment. Thus, at the same time Smith contributes to this discourse of threat, he 
resists the implication that the way to counter such threat is through increased 
governmental control. Smith, “Civility without Censorship,” 196. 
185 Notably, Brown creates doubt over the authenticity of these websites. Brown, 
Regulating Aversion, 240n29. 
186 For more on this metaphor for the Internet, see Jonathan J. Rusch, “Cyberspace 
and the ‘Devil’s Hatband,’” Seattle University Law Review 24, no. 2 (2000): 577-598.  
The number of articles employing this metaphor are too numerous to list. For 
examples, see Michael Fertik and David Thompson, Wild West 2.0: How to Protect and 
Restore Your Online Reputation on the Untamed Social Frontier (New York: AMACON, 
2010); Benjamin Edelman, “Securing Online Advertising: Rustlers and Sheriffs in the 
New Wild West,” in Beautiful Security: Leading Security Experts Explain How They 
Think, ed. Andy Oram and John Viega (Sebastopol, CA: O’Reilly Media, Inc., 2009): 89-
105; Robin Mackenzie, “‘WWW’: World Wide Web or Wild Wild West? Fixing the 
Fenceposts on the Final Frontier: Domain Names, Intellectual Property Paradigms and 
Current Disputes Over the Governance of the Internet,” Information and 
Communications Technology Law 7, no. 2 (1998): 103-116.  
187 Of course, the message imparted by this vignette is not entirely clear, argues 
Stier. The vignette invites a political debate about the connections among the freedom of 
speech, hate speech, and violence, but the potential depth of that debate is undermined by 
the simplistic avenues for audience engagement. See Stier, Committed to Memory, 133-
134. 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189 In articulating such an argument, I am positing that “lawlessness” might 
function in the same capacity that Brown charges the term “security” does within the 
MOT. Brown cites the work of Mary Louise Pratt and Pratt’s argument that “Security is 
one of those words, like ‘celibacy’ or ‘short’ that invokes its opposite.” See Mary Louise 
Pratt, “Security,” in Shock and Awe: War on Words, ed. Bregje van Eekelen, Jennifer 
Gonzalez, Anna Tsing, Bettina Stotzer (Santa Cruz, CA: New Pacific Press, 2004), 140; 
Brown, Regulating Aversion, 239n22. 
190 Joshua Gunn, “Father Trouble: Staging Sovereignty in Spielberg’s War of the 
Worlds,” Critical Studies in Media Communication 25, no. 1 (2008): 3. 
191 Brown, Regulating Aversion, 114. 
192 Brown, Regulating Aversion, 114. 
193 Brown, Regulating Aversion, 142. 
194 Brown, Regulating Aversion, 114. 
195 Museum of Tolerance, physical installation, visited November 12, 2012. 
196 Williams, “The Memorial Museum,” 106. Williams articulates this argument 
in discussing questions surrounding visitor conduct at memorial museums. In particular, 
this discussion of security arises in response to complaints about visitor behavior at the 
Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe in Berlin. 
197 See again Bartov’s artful discussion of these tensions as they shape Holocaust 
museums such as the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum and the Museum of 
Tolerance. Bartov, Murder in Our Midst, 182-183. 
198 To borrow the words of Rose used in Chapter Four, Nazi Germany must exist 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the Law: Philosophy and Representation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), 30.  See also Hasian, “Remembering and Forgetting,” 69. 
199 This negation argument is also contained in Caplan’s work introduced in 
Chapter Two (see pages 186-187, 241n55-60) and is expounded upon in greater depth on 
pages 383, 440-442n43-45 in Chapter Four.  
200 Luke articulates this argument in his read of the United States Holocaust 
Memorial Museum; however, his insights are just as valid – if not more valid – as applied 
to the Museum of Tolerance. Luke, Museum Politics, 60 - 61. Brown, too, notes the 
extent to which the figures in the MOT are caricatures. Brown, Regulating Aversion, 120-
121. 
Wiener expands upon the consequences of such reductive character sketches. He 
argues that “since none of us resembles George Wallace [as an example of villainy] very 
much, the Tolerancenter’s premise--that we are all prejudiced--has been forgotten by this 
point in our journey through the museum.” Wiener, “The Other Holocaust Museum.” 
201 In this case, the MOT mostly clearly embodies the “flattening” that Rothe 
discusses as characteristic of the way the Holocaust is cast through the prism of “popular 
trauma culture” as well as Brooks’s contention that melodrama is marked by the “logic of 
the excluded middle.” Brooks, The Melodramatic Imagination, 18; Rothe, Popular 
Trauma Culture, 2.  See also notes 113, 120.  
202 Luke, Museum Politics, 55. 
203 Luke, Museum Politics, 55.  
In developing this critique, Luke builds on Baudrillard’s work on simulations 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the routines of modern life and the impetuses for violence. Bartov, Murder in Our Midst; 
Jean Baudrillard, “The Precession of Simulacra,” in Media and Cultural Studies: Key 
Works, ed. Meenakshi Gigi Durham and Douglas M. Kellner, rev. ed. (1994; Malden, 
MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 453-481; Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the 
Holocaust (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2000). 
204 Witcomb, “Interactivity in Museums,” 585. 
205 See again Bartov, Murder in Our Midst; Bauman, Modernity and the 
Holocaust. 
206 Regarding exnomination, modernity and the Holocaust, Hansen notes in her 
analysis of the reception of Schindler’s List: “a need for Americans to externalize and 
project modernity’s catastrophic features onto another nation’s failure and defeat-so as to 
salvage modernity the American way.”  Arguably, this need is met by maintaining a 
similar gap between Nazi Germany and the United States. Hansen, “Schindler’s List,” 
311.  
207 See Chapter One for a full discussion of Moses’s work. A. Dirk Moses, 
“Conceptual Blockages and Definitional Dilemmas in the ‘Racial Century’: Genocides of 
Indigenous Peoples and the Holocaust,” in Colonialism and Genocide, ed. A. Dirk Moses 
and Dan Stone (Abingdon, Routledge: 2007), 148-180. 
208 Jenny Edkins, Trauma and the Memory of Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), xv. 
209 Bartov, Murder in Our Midst, 183. 
210 Pierre Nora, “General Introduction: Between Memory and History,” in Realms 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Kritzman, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (1992; New York: Columbia University Press, 
1996), 1. 
211 Museum of Tolerance, “We remember…” (leaflet distributed at the entrance to 
the Museum of Tolerance, Los Angeles, CA, November 2012). These pamphlets are 
available to visitors after they conclude their experience inside the Holocaust exhibition. 
At the start of the exhibition, visitors receive an electronic card synced to a narrative of a 
victim of the Holocaust. Visitors are able to “check in” on their victims’ experience at 
selected moments in the exhibition. At the conclusion of the exhibition, they are able to 
print the narrative of the individual they were assigned.  
This pamphlet also includes a quote attributed to Simon Wiesenthal, asserting that 
“‘Hope lives when people remember.’” 
212 The words on the sign at the bottom of the ramp encourage visitors to 
“remember, dialogue, lobby, learn, envision, take a stand, commit, initiate, assist, speak 
out, support, educate, reach out, hope, lead, celebrate, listen, unite, contribute, participate, 
act, empower, respond, create.” Museum of Tolerance, physical installation, visited 
November 12, 2012. 
213 Brown describes the other examples featured in the Millennium Machine. 
Brown, Regulating Aversion, 121-124. 
214 Museum of Tolerance, physical installation, visited November 12, 2012. 
215 Museum of Tolerance, “The Time is NOW.” 
216 See page 283-284, 341n54. 
217 South Park Studios, “The Death Camp.” 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219 Brown, Regulating Aversion, 139.  Visitor emarks quoted in Brown. 
220 Brown draws on Joan W. Scott’s work to develop an argument about the 
power of such an experiential exhibition. She discusses the simulation of this Holocaust 
“experience” as “an important truth strategy that settles authority and eliminates the 
problem of interpretation.” Brown, Regulating Aversion, 140. Joan W. Scott, 
“‘Experience,’” in Feminists Theorize the Political, ed. Judith Butler and Joan W. Scott 
(New York: Routledge, 1992), 22-40. 
Young substantially complicates this argument by highlighting the artificiality of 
the “experience” of the Holocaust created herein. In critiquing the use of identity cards at 
the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Young cautions that such an attempt to 
recreate the Holocaust experience “obscures our contemporary actual reality of the 
Holocaust, which is not the event itself but memory of the event, the great distance 
between then and now, between there and here. The distance, not the Holocaust itself, is 
our preeminent reality now, no less than the Holocaust was the victims’ preeminent 
reality then.” More importantly, promoting this experience narrative may have insidious 
consequences. Young continues, “By inviting visitors to remember their museum 
experience as if it were a victim’s Holocaust experience, the personal identity card asked 
us to confuse one for the other. While the ‘experiential mode’ has come into increasing 
favor in museums, it is also a mode that encourages a certain critical blindness on the part 
of visitors. Imagining oneself as a past victim may not be the same as imagining oneself, 
or another person, as a potential victim, the kind of leap necessary to prevent other 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Identity,” in The Americanization of the Holocaust, ed. Hilenen Flanzbaum (Baltimore, 
MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 77. 
221 Museum of Tolerance, physical installation, visited November 12, 2012. 
222 Museum of Tolerance, physical installation, visited November 12, 2012. 
223 This adage is most commonly associated with George Santayana. George 
Santayana, The Life of Reason: or the Phases of Human Progress: Volume 1: 
Introduction and Reason in Common Sense (1905; New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 
1920), 284.  
224 Brown, Regulating Aversion, 141-142. Brown describes the link between the 
Holocaust and security culture as predicated on a sense of fatalism, resigning the 
institution and presumably its visitors to the need for security. She also explains why 
“tolerance” is an insufficient response to the problem posed by the Holocaust and 
security is needed. 
225 Similarly, such a manipulation of temporality harkens back to Vivian’s 
discussion of “temporal folding.” Vivian, “Times of Violence,” 211. 
226 Biesecker, “No Time for Mourning,” 152. 
227 Biesecker, “No Time for Mourning,” 152. 
228 Nevertheless, Vivian urges his readers to be suspicious of the kinds of politics 
this form of “temporal folding” ushers into the present. Echoing Zelizer, his work 
suggests that the fixation on past violence occludes violence in the present. Vivian, 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
229 Vivian argues that this slide between past, present, and future temporalities 
animates contemporary humanitarian projects. Vivian, “Times of Violence,” 212. On the 
use of the Holocaust, see Vivian, “Times of Violence,” 213. 
230 Patraka, “Situating History and Difference,” 70. 
231 Patraka, “Situating History and Difference,” 74. 





Rhetorical Intimation and the Specter of the Exnominated within the USHMM’s 
Genocide Cessation Discourse 
 
“I think that if Lemkin came back and saw the history of the last sixty years, in 
part his heart would break over and over again that people have still been 
targeted and been attacked with impunity. 
But I think at the same time he would look at progress that has been made.  
I think he would look at students who are agitating on behalf of people at risk 
in Darfur or people at risk in Congo. 
He would look at people of faith who are meeting in their synagogues and 
their churches and their mosques to demand action by their governments. 
He would look at this worldwide outcry with regard to Darfur, and I think he would – 
he would have hope.” 
-- Jerry Fowler on Raphael Lemkin, featured as one of the “Eyewitness Testimonies” 
in From Memory to Action1 
 
In 2013, visitors to the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum’s (USHMM) 
Wexner Learning Center would find exhibitions about the Sudan, the legacy of the 
Nuremberg Trials, and an installation titled, From Memory to Action: Meeting the 
Challenge of Genocide. The latter, a multi-mediated exhibition, featuring videos, touch-
based interfaces,2 and giant television screens constantly uploading content from the 
Web, appeals to its audiences to take action to end genocide.  Visitors are given the 
opportunity to make personal pledges, offering written responses to the question: “What 
will you do to help meet the challenge of genocide today?”3 These pledge cards are 
submitted to the large glass cases prominently situated near a wall of television screens. 
Answers to the “what will you do” question are displayed in these cases and on the 
television screens above them. A running tally is kept of the number of pledges made; on 
an April afternoon in 2013, for example, 161,798 pledges had been received.  
Amongst the pledge cards displayed, one finds a variety of commitments.  Some 




promote equality whenever possible.” Another holds, “I promise to treat others fairly.” A 
different type of response invokes outside actors or agencies – “I will divest my money 
from any company that is affiliated with genocide” or “I will make my synagogue hold 
events.”  Some responses contain pledges to “call the President” or “contact my Congress 
person.”  One individual makes reference to the USHMM and offers to communicate and 
transmit its content to others.4  Some of these commitments have names attached to them; 
others are anonymous. Identifiable or not, the pledges collectively showcase numerous 
ways that “average” individuals are taking action to stop genocide.5 
Also spotlighted on the USHMM’s website are the pledge cards of political 
leaders and celebrities. Gen. Romeo Dallaire, the Commander of the UN Peacekeeping 
Forces in Rwanda during the 1994 genocide, writes, for example, that, “if we become 
activists for humanity, we will no more resort to conflict due to the frictions of our 
differences.”6  Juan Mendez, the former UN Special Advisor on the Prevention of 
Genocide, also offers his promise: “I will teach my law students. I will urge my human 
rights colleagues to act. I will ‘speak truth to power’ whenever and wherever I can.”7 
Including voices like Dallaire and Mendez imparts a level of expertise to the proffered 
solutions. At the same time, though their connections to the politics of genocide are less 
apparent, the USHMM also features the voices of NBA All Star Player Dikembe 
Mutombo and Olympic Speedskater Joey Cheek, drawing on their celebrity more than 
their policy experience, even as both help bring needed attention to the problem of 
genocide.8  Although the level of sophistication and understanding of genocide varies 




every person, regardless of their resources, knowledge base, or access to political power, 
is capable of doing something to end genocide.  
 Put differently, From Memory to Action works to convince audiences of their 
ability to contribute to genocide prevention or intervention while simultaneously 
reminding visitors of the consequences of past failures to act.9 Despite the persistent 
hopefulness undergirding the exhibition, its displays detail the brutality of the atrocities 
that occurred in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Sudan. The exhibition opens with a large 
photograph of a man whose face has been scarred from a machete attack in Rwanda next 
to an image of prisoners in striped uniforms from “an unidentified concentration camp.”10  
Images fill the exhibition’s walls of menacing perpetrators, emaciated children, and the 
skulls or partially decayed bodies of the dead. In addition to showcasing the number of 
pledges submitted to the exhibition, large wall-sized screens update with frequent 
genocide alerts, notifying the visitor to the threat of violence in such countries as Sudan, 
South Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Moreover, the exhibit’s very 
location, inside the USHMM, situates the necessity of genocide prevention and 
intervention as a response to the Holocaust.  Indeed, the exhibition’s narrative begins 
where stories of the Holocaust often end: with early efforts to prohibit genocide through 
international law. In contrast to the optimism and sense of agency contained in some 
parts of the exhibit, From Memory to Action offers countless reminders of humanity’s 
failure to prevent genocide in the wake of the Holocaust.11 The juxtaposition between 
hopeful optimism and unconscionable failure, even after the international community 
committed to ending genocide, is strikingly apparent. Thus, USHMM is consequently left 




positive messages about the viability of ending genocide while simultaneously inferring 
the intractability of some forms of genocidal violence. 
 Like the other texts examined thus far in this study, the USHMM’s rhetoric of 
genocide cessation is fraught with contradictions. Its optimistic messages about the 
feasibility of genocide cessation compete with less hopeful discourses about the 
prevalence of genocidal violence. Through the strategic interplay of speech and silence, 
From Memory to Action constructs a complicated narrative containing incongruous 
messages about the definition, representation, resolution and remembrance of genocidal 
atrocities. In each of these four arenas, the exhibition proffers encouraging and politically 
palatable narratives about the role of the state and the public in genocide and genocide 
cessation while intimating arguments about genocidal violence that cannot be given 
forthright expression within the context of a partially state-funded institution. In sum, 
these acts of rhetorical intimation give the exhibition a dual-voiced quality;12 the exhibit 
articulates confident and empowering messages about genocide and genocide cessation 
yet also gestures toward pessimistic discourses hinting at what cannot, or may never, be 
achieved.	  
 The succeeding section provides background on the construction of the USHMM 
in order to establish the rhetorical obstacles the museum necessarily confronts in 
articulating anti-genocide messages. Because the USHMM is partially financed by the 
US government, the institution faces certain political constraints that shape the positions 
the institution is able to adopt in its exhibitions. With these challenges acknowledged, the 
chapter then turns to analyze the genocide cessation discourse contained in From Memory 




and remembrance. Each section explicates the tensions underlying the exhibition’s 
arguments about these four constructs. In the conclusion, I assess the merits and 
drawbacks of the USHMM’s use of rhetorical intimation in constructing popular notions 
of genocide cessation. 
The Politics of US Holocaust Memory & the USHMM 
 To argue that a text “intimates” or subtly hints is to invite questions as to the 
rhetorical obstacles which may prevent forthright expression.13 The history of the 
USHMM suggests that one obstacle arises from the institution’s uneasy relationship with 
the US government. In the words used by the institution, the USHMM is “[a] public-
private partnership;”14 it has clear ties to the federal government but is not entirely a 
governmental organization.  Yet, parameters, shaped by US national and international 
political interests, have exerted some influence on the positions the institution is able to 
articulate.15 These constraints may explain why some critics have charged the institution 
with advancing a version of Holocaust history that is advantageous to bolstering the 
image of the United States. In spite of such constraints, the USHMM has found creative 
ways of navigating these limitations, opening spaces for subtle critique through acts of 
rhetorical intimation while simultaneously avoiding the wholesale repudiation of its 
financial benefactor.  
 The history of the USHMM must be situated in three contexts, placed amid the 
backdrop of a larger cultural swing toward “a renewed period of intensive [Holocaust] 
memory work” as well as located within the intricacies of US presidential and 
international politics.16 The idea for the USHMM emerged and germinated during the late 




US audiences with the events of the Shoah. Though some early Holocaust texts circulated 
in the late 1940s and 1950s,17 many scholars credit the 1960s as a turning point in 
spurring the development of a more robust Holocaust memory, with the 1961 Eichmann 
trial providing a critical impetus for public discussion of the Holocaust.18 Further, the 
Six-Day War (1967) and Yom Kippur War (1973) “reignited fears of the extermination 
of Jews in Israel” and “awakened dormant memories of the Holocaust,”19 routing public 
attention back to memories of the Shoah.20 In 1976, the Center for Holocaust Studies, the 
“oldest Holocaust center in the country,” was formed in Brooklyn, New York.21  In 1978, 
a variety of public events aided in the advancement of “Holocaust consciousness.”22 An 
American Nazi group proposed a march in Skokie, Illinois. The Office of Special 
Investigations was formed to track and prosecute Nazi war criminals. And, perhaps most 
importantly, NBC ran the miniseries titled Holocaust, attracting an estimated 120 million 
viewers.23 Yet, as the number of media and public texts about the Holocaust proliferated, 
no US national memorial to the Holocaust existed.24 
Plans for a memorial thus emerged amidst a cultural moment of growing 
Holocaust awareness. Simultaneously, a distrust of the presidency was increasing among 
Jewish Americans as a result of the Carter administration’s perceived shortcomings and 
missteps. Carter’s evangelical Christian background and voiced support for Palestinians 
was a source of concern for many American Jews.25 According to Linenthal, the creation 
of a Holocaust memorial represented an opportunity for Carter to make amends with the 
Jewish community.26 In 1977, following controversial comments by Carter on the sale of 
aircrafts to Israel, the Carter administration appointed a liaison to the Jewish community 




with the Palestinian Liberation Organization, the Carter administration convened a 
commission to form a US Holocaust memorial. On May 1, 1978, the formal 
announcement of the commission was made at the White House during a celebration for 
the thirtieth anniversary of the state of Israel.28 Noted Holocaust survivor Elie Wiesel 
became the commission’s first chairman. In Linenthal’s words, it was a chance to “use 
the power of government to do something many would perceive as ‘good’ and, at the 
same time, reach out to an increasingly alienated ethnic constituency.”29 Politicized from 
the outset, the institution helped signal the administration's support of the Jewish 
community and more broadly the state of Israel.30 
 The institution’s political origins were just the beginning of the complex 
relationship between the USHMM and the US government. Not long after the 
commission began its work, disputes began over issues such as the number and identity 
of the victims. The question quickly became “how expansive could a national memory of 
the Holocaust become without deviating from the established narrative of the 
Holocaust?”31 In contrast to some who prioritized broadening Holocaust memory, Wiesel 
placed emphasis on the centrality of Judaism to the Shoah and the importance of 
maintaining a “Jewish core” at the heart of the museum. As a result, fierce debates 
erupted over issues ranging from the description of the victims to whether or not 
representatives from Eastern European nations should be included on United States 
Holocaust Memorial Council.32 
The museum creators would face other complex political issues. Early in the 
commission’s tenure, support emerged for the recognition of the Armenian genocide as 




museum’s narrative emerged from multiple fronts.  Some involved with the commission 
saw this inclusion as a dilution of the museum’s work, which potentially opened the 
doors to a variety of claims for inclusion.34 Beyond these concerns, external pressure 
from the Turkish government was exerted to curtail any US attempts to acknowledge the 
Armenian massacre as “genocide.” Given that the Turkish government does not deem 
what happened to the Armenians in 1915 a “genocide,” Turkish representatives made 
clear that Turkey would consider any recognition of the Armenian genocide an affront. 
They warned “that the well-being of Jews in Turkey might be threatened were Armenians 
included in a federal Holocaust museum.”35 Despite plans to  include the Armenians in 
the exhibition,36 the only reference in the permanent exhibition to the atrocity remains 
one quotation attributed to Hitler that is located on a fourth-floor wall: “Who, after all, 
speaks today of the annihilation of the Armenians?”37   
 Today, the institution remains as a public-private partnership. It is a clear 
beneficiary of the US government, but it is also not an expressly governmental 
institution. The institution sits on federally-owned land and roughly 60 percent of its 
operating budget is provided by the US government.38 Yet, the institution is not a part of 
the Smithsonian, government-run complex and it retains its status as a semi-private 
museum, partially funded through private donations.  
 Though the USHMM is not operated by the US government, the institution 
nevertheless has been entrenched in debates related to the “Americanization of the 
Holocaust” and charged with crafting a version of the Holocaust memory that is 
politically advantageous to the United States.39 In contrast to counter-memorial or 




many Holocaust museums are read as nationalistic institutions, connected to and 
advancing the image of the nation-states they are housed within.41 Unsurprisingly, the 
USHMM has been understood by many as a vehicle for the promotion of messages about 
US citizenship and US identity, “not only tell[ing] a story about America’s role in the 
Holocaust, but provid[ing] a lesson in how to be a good citizen in the U.S. today.”42 In 
some ways, these lessons are provided through negation; US commitments to freedom 
and liberty are cast against the dismal backdrop of Nazi Germany’s totalitarianism and 
enslavement.43 These negations set up a stark contrast between US “goodness” and Nazi 
evil. “Auschwitz,” Rose posits, functions “as the anti-city of the American political 
community.”44 As Ruffins charges, in this way the USHMM can explicate a politically 
palatable “narrative of European evil and American good [that] can live quite 
comfortably in the national Mall, and be financed by public funds in perpetuity.”45  
This narrative of US “goodness” is supported by representational choices which 
structure the permanent exhibition’s narrative so that audiences adopt the subjectivities of 
US liberators.46 The experiences of audiences are structured so that they are “discovering 
that hell [of the Shoah] through American eyes” as their entry to the permanent exhibition 
begins with audio testimony and a visual image of US soldiers encountering the 
concentration camps.47 Crysler and Kusno charge that “an equivalence is constructed 
between the position of the unsuspecting U.S. soldier and that of the ‘innocent’ museum 
visitor who also comes upon the Holocaust for the first time.”48 This emphasis on 
liberation, Hasian alleges, plays a critical role within the USHMM, for it serves as the 




and others, many see the institution as crafting an “Americanized” version of Holocaust 
memory, one which is politically useful in enhancing the ethos of the US government.50  
 Other critics have extended this critique, arguing that the institution supports a 
self-righteous narrative about US innocence, benevolence, and American exceptionalism. 
Worthington’s dissertation, as a noteworthy example, contends that the USHMM fosters 
the perception of the Shoah as a distinctive form of violence. Such constructions of 
Holocaust memory capitalize on the extremity of the Shoah to suggest that it exists on a 
completely different register from any abuses committed by the US government. These 
Americanized versions of Holocaust memory mark the Shoah as a “foreign” evil, 
removed from the behavior of the US nation-state and its citizens.51 Viewed from these 
perspectives, the USHMM gives rise to the impression that “genocide is something that 
happens elsewhere.”52  “The evil that it [the USHMM] documents,” as Ruffins notes, is 
“outside the U.S.”53  Such a sanitized message communicates to USHMM visitors that 
the United States is “safe from its [the Holocaust’s] implications.”54 To read the USHMM 
from the perspectives voiced in these critiques is, in part, to see the institution as a 
mouthpiece for the promotion of pro-US government messages and to undervalue the 
subtle ways in which the institution creates space for critique. 
 In contrast, other critics argue that the institution enables criticism of the US 
government and inspires complex political discussions of contemporary atrocity. Reading 
the USHMM against the Museum of Tolerance, Patraka ultimately concludes that of the 
two institutions, the USHMM creates more space for audiences to “negotiat[e] 
meanings.”55 While admitting that the institution advances a nationalistic narrative which 




prevent such a genocidal action,” she also argues that the USHMM contains subtle 
challenges to this narrative.56 For instance, Patraka highlights the exhibition’s reference 
to the US’s internal suppression of information about the camps.57 Further, she reads the 
USHMM against proximate governmental institutions (e.g., the US Treasury Building), 
charging that its very location amid these federal buildings invites questions about the 
historic role of US bureaucracy during times of atrocity. As a result, Patraka contends 
that the USHMM enacts, “a localized historical contradiction to its own ideological 
claims about how democracies respond to genocides.”58  In these ways, the institution is 
able to sustain a multiplicity of stories, some which paradoxically contradict idealistic 
moral rhetorics about US goodness and US commitments to genocide prevention.  
Like Patraka, I read the institution as at once promoting narratives which benefit 
the US government while subtly giving voice to competing positions that challenge US 
authority or create doubt about the viability of genocide cessation. Constrained in its 
ability to explicitly repudiate the US government, the institution instead engages in acts 
of rhetorical intimation, articulating politically palatable messages regarding genocide 
definitions, representations, resolutions, and remembrances all-the-while shadowed by 
specters of genocidal immutability, stasis, and powerlessness.  
Defining Genocide: Liberal Narratives and Post-Liberal Intimations 
 On the surface, From Memory to Action appears to trouble little with its 
conceptualization of genocide. In a segment of the online portion of the exhibition titled 
“What is Genocide,” the USHMM clearly foregrounds the definition provided by the 
1948 UN Convention.59  However, the simplicity of this definition belies the difficulty of 




Memory to Action elaborates upon the concept of genocide by offering the narratives of 
particular cases, incongruences in the proffered examples undermine the stability 
imparted by the use of an authoritative, legal definition. These definitional 
inconsistencies are most evident as the exhibition attempts to add depth to the public’s 
understanding of genocide by explaining genocidal causality. In treating causality, From 
Memory to Action showcases a primarily liberal understanding of genocide through its 
prioritization of the nation-state as the locus of genocide and genocide cessation work. At 
the same time, the exhibit creates space to intimate the influence of systemic or post-
liberal causal philosophies. Nevertheless, these post-liberal intimations are restricted, and 
the contributions of colonialism and other systemic forces to genocide remain mystified. 
As such, the vestiges of colonial ideologies continue to structure the representations of 
the relationship between Western and non-Western countries within the exhibition.	  
Although the exhibition implies a hegemonic meaning of genocide by making 
recourse to the 1948 legal document to define the term, such stability in meaning is 
quickly complicated as the exhibition moves from discussing genocide in abstraction to 
contextualizing and explaining instances of genocidal violence.  More pointedly, From 
Memory to Action’s attempts to explain causality highlight divergences in their 
conceptualization of genocide. As discussed in Chapter One, answers to the question 
“what causes genocide” can be discussed as falling into liberal and post-liberal camps.60 
The liberal orientation holds nation-states accountable and suggests the mutability of 
genocide but leaves under explained the contributions of international socio-, political, 
and economic systems to atrocity. The post-liberal orientation helps rectify this by 




colonialism to genocidal acts. Because of their emphasis on systemic forces, however, 
post-liberal orientations risk rendering the problem of genocide intractable, seemingly 
eliminating or reducing clear opportunities for the exercise of human agency. Moreover, 
post-liberal orientations are politically threatening to Western nation-states as they 
expose the culpability of such actors in structuring the conditions for violence. Thus, a 
post-liberal approach would indict the USHMM’s financial benefactor (the US 
government) and its audiences as complicit in genocide. Faced with a spectrum of options 
between the representation of genocide as a mutable, nation-state level problem and the 
representation of genocide as embedded into global systems, From Memory to Action 
offers a largely liberal narrative while rhetorically intimating post-liberal positionalities.  
 The exhibition showcases a primarily liberal understanding of genocide. It does so 
through the sustained emphasis on the importance of the nation-states as a categorical 
construct for comprehending genocidal violence. The state is the primary unit of analysis 
within the exhibition. The physical installation tells the story of three states’ genocides, 
featuring narratives which insinuate that these tragedies are problems within and for 
Rwanda, Bosnia, and Sudan. The online exhibition replicates this structure with 
narratives arranged by nation-state.61 This framework undermines other attempts in From 
Memory to Action to see these tragedies as interdependent on other global politics and 
instead encourages a kind of thinking that contains genocide, reducing it to a state-level 
problem. Such an orientation to the problem of genocide is politically useful; it shifts the 
blame for genocide to the states suffering such atrocities and contributes to perceptions of 




This construction of genocide as a nation-state level problem is evident in From 
Memory to Action’s programming on South Sudan’s 2011 referendum. Amongst the 
content on its website, From Memory to Action includes “Sudan at the Crossroads,” a 
video of a November 2010 public program.62 The primary focus of “Sudan at the 
Crossroads” is not on the genocidal violence in progress; rather, the USHMM frames the 
program as a means of reporting its findings from a “Museum-sponsored bearing witness 
trip to assess conditions in South Sudan” prior to the January 2011 referendum on the 
territory’s independence.63 While the video contains some discussion of past violence, the 
overall thrust of the film is on the importance of South Sudan attaining its own state. In 
the film, the likelihood of peace or violence is cast as contingent upon referendum’s 
results.64 The presumption that animates such positions is a primarily liberal one as it 
situates the locus of genocidal action or prevention at the nation-state level. Although the 
exhibit elsewhere critiques nationalism and sovereignty,65 messages of this sort, either 
centralizing the culpability of afflicted nation-states or promoting state-building, elevate 
liberal understandings of genocide.  
Yet, these liberal narratives are tempered by rhetorical intimations within the 
exhibition which gesture toward the influence of systems beyond the nation-state. The 
online profiles for Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) highlight, 
respectively, Britain’s role in navigating north-south tensions in Sudan and the history of 
exploitation in the DRC set into motion through Belgium’s King Leopold II.66 Further, 
the explanation of the DRC’s conflict hints at the ways in which contemporary market 
exigencies continue to fuel the violence in that region, discussing the “looting [of] 




instances, the institution seems aware of the geopolitical calculus that can be used to 
forestall preventative work. The discussion of the policy responses to the situation in the 
Sudan from 1985-2005 offers a remarkably nuanced assessment of the politics of 
genocide, taking into consideration how Cold War politics and the Sudan’s alignment 
with Iraq in the first Gulf War influenced the international community’s (lack of) 
response to the atrocities unfolding there.68  
These verbal intimations also find subtle visual corroboration in the images that 
accompany From Memory to Action. Images are, in many ways, ideal vehicles for acts of 
rhetorical intimation. As Palczewski underscores, images can give “voice” to positions 
that cannot otherwise be spoken or written.69  In this case, some of the images in From 
Memory to Action become a means of articulating a post-liberal emphasis on global 
interconnectivity, which subtly enacts challenges to the liberal narrative the images 
accompany. In a section of the website titled, “Who is at Risk,” for example, each 
county’s profile contains an image on its overview page. The South Sudan overview 
features an image of a lone male child. He stands in a fairly barren environment, arms at 
his side, gazing directly into the camera’s lens. He wears faded clothing; yet, barely 
visible on his yellow shirt are two Chinese characters.70 Chinese, of course, is not the 
native tongue of South Sudan; thus, the characters on the boy’s shirt are a subtle reminder 
of China’s role in the oil politics of the region, a fairly post-liberal indicator of the links 
between these global players.71 Similarly, an image on the website of a victim of the 
violence in Bosnia, depicts a young seemingly Caucasian man in a black shirt bearing the 
text, “Hard Rock Café,” a reminder of the reach of American culture and American 




interconnectivity. They consequently stand in for a more robust narrative that explains 
these complex global relationships, projecting visual intimations of a post-liberal 
understanding of genocide. These “nods” toward the influence of systemic conditions 
both complicate the exhibition’s causal narrative as well as threaten to expose the 
USHMM’s chief benefactor. They do so by drawing attention to roles that Western 
nation-states have played in carving up Africa, for example, or exploiting states through 
colonial and imperialistic economic relationships. 
These intimations, however, are contained such that they fail to undermine the 
exhibition’s predominantly liberal framework. As an illustrative example, the “Patterns of 
Genocide” section of From Memory to Action enacts this simultaneous intimation and 
containment. On the one hand, to talk about “patterns” is to recognize structural 
influences that transcend the internal and idiosyncratic politics of the nation-state.  The 
recognition of common patterns in genocidal execution shifts attention from the nation-
state as the primary locus of culpability to influences that supersede the particularities of 
state-level contexts. This post-liberal understanding is visibly modeled in the construction 
of the physical exhibition space. The narratives detailing the genocides in Rwanda, 
Bosnia, and Sudan run in horizontal lines across three walls of the room. Parts of each 
nation-state’s story are vertically aligned under headers, reading “past group violence,” 
“preparations,” “sounding alarms,” etc.73 This structure enables the visitor to analyze 
across genocides, encouraging, for example, contemplation of how the “preparations” for 
the Rwandan genocide might be similar or different from the “preparations” for the 
Bosnian genocide.  On its face, the features within the exhibition which enable these 




to Action frames the “Patterns of Genocide” section ultimately contains post-liberal 
thought. Prose introducing this portion of the website explains, 
Genocide does not occur spontaneously. While warning signs can vary 
from case to case, there are common indicators that suggest a growing 
potential for genocide. Some of these signs can be found within a society’s 
history. The potential for genocide, however, increases when leaders 
decide to heighten tensions between groups and make specific plans to use 
violence.74 
The passage stresses that the warming signs are “found in a society’s history.” The 
society is singular, sending the message that those studying genocide need only look 
within the internal politics of the country in question, not interrogating its connections to 
other global actors or the implications of larger economic systems, for example, which 
can structure internal affairs. Even then, the study of the society’s history is further 
narrowed as the passage centralizes the actions of leaders, another move away from a 
systemic orientation hinted at in other parts of the exhibit. Ultimately, what “Patterns of 
Genocide” evidences is a process of containing post-liberal intimations; the gestures 
toward the influence of the systemic, again, are couched within a primarily liberal nation-
state framework. 
By only intimating or gesturing toward the post-liberal critique, From Memory to 
Action, at minimum, fails to challenge or overcome the colonialist and imperialistic 
politics that some argue have long contributed to these atrocities. At worst, the exhibition 
replicates these oppressive ideologies.75 In spite of some discussion of the role of 




passages are often brief and underdeveloped. In some instances, the only trace of 
colonialism is to be found in the country’s profile, with the appearance of “English” as a 
language spoken in the region, serving as a marker of the West’s involvement in the 
affairs of states.  On other occasions, genocidal violence is framed as a post-colonial 
phenomenon, such that these situations become problematic after colonial powers left. 
The country profile for Rwanda, for example, reads, “Large-scale violence against 
civilians because of ethnic identity began in Rwanda towards the end of Belgian colonial 
rule.”76 Such a framing implies that violence in the region correlates with the departure of 
Belgium, a narrative that takes no account of the influence of Belgium in reifying ethnic 
divides during their rule. Similarly in Burundi, “[t]he Hutu-Tutsi divide” is cast as “a 
post-independence phenomenon, resulting from the political use of ethnicity to 
consolidate power.”77 These ways of discussing colonialism give rise to the sense that 
colonial powers kept peace in the region—arguments that minimize the role of 
colonialism in contributing to genocidal violence. 
 Visually, the exhibition replicates the problems of the colonialist gaze. As a 
substantial part of genocide cessation, the exhibition endorses the importance of 
“watching,” “monitoring,” or “surveying.” From Memory to Action emphasizes the need 
for its audiences to “remain vigilant”78 and lists countries that need to be “monitor[ed].”79 
The physical installation invites its audiences to partake in such ocular action. Visitors to 
the installation are positioned in front of a series of screens which repeatedly turn into a 
large map of the continents. The map zooms in on the continent of Africa as “alerts” 
signal the danger of violence that lurks within the DR Congo, South Sudan, and Sudan.80  




map, they exist as something of omniscient subjects, given a removed and privileged 
view of the world.81  Film and Media Studies scholar Lisa Parks charges that 
subjectivities akin to the ones described here and used in From Memory to Action, 
activate a familiar imperialistic gaze that relies upon “Western tropes of Africa as a ‘dark 
continent’ in need of ‘exposure’ and ‘enlightenment.’”82 The embrace of these visual 
practices leaves the exhibition fundamentally compromised: At the same time the exhibit 
espouses arguments for genocide cessation, it employs longstanding colonialist and 
imperialist conceptions of the relationship between the West and Africa as a structuring 
condition for the representation of genocidal atrocity. Such a strategy represents an ironic 
endorsement of an ideology that contributes to the very problem the exhibition is 
ostensibly trying to eradicate.  
 In sum, beneath a seemingly stable legal definition, the exhibition’s explanations 
of genocide reveal inconsistencies in its conceptualizations of genocidal atrocities. 
Through the articulation of causal narratives, From Memory to Action blends elements of 
liberal and post-liberal ways of thinking about genocide. Centralizing liberal narratives 
while intimating the influence of post-liberal causal philosophies, From Memory to 
Action ultimately leaves mystified and replicates colonial ideologies that some have 
linked to genocide. As the exhibition’s fraught relationship with colonialism reveals, 
inconsistencies in the exhibition’s conceptualization of genocide reverberate through its 
attempts to represent such atrocities.  
Ocular Action, Realism, and Metonymy: The Problematic Politics of Representation    
Representations of genocide attain special significance within From Memory to 




to understand the concept of genocide and as a key part of the exhibition’s discourses of 
resolution. This dual function is especially true of visuality, which is punctuated as 
critical to the exhibition because of the linkages drawn among sight, knowledge, and 
action.83 More specifically, From Memory to Action relies on specific forms of seeing, 
chiefly employing the genre of documentary realism and relying upon the use of visual 
metonymy as a means of depicting the scope and scale of genocide. However, at the same 
time the exhibition celebrates visuality, other discourses within the exhibit expresses 
considerable uncertainty about the role and value of such representations. In much the 
same way From Memory to Action articulates competing narratives about genocide 
definitions through the use of rhetorical intimation and exnomination, the exhibition’s 
strategies of representation intimate anxieties over the sufficiency of photography and the 
links between photography and action. 	  
From Memory to Action promotes practices of “sighting” as integral to genocide 
cessation work.  The website abounds with photo essays, and the installation foregrounds 
the salience of seeing genocide (i.e., the giant television screens, the wall-sized digital 
map, the use of large photos). Both the web and physical installation also employ an 
ocular-centric language with their calls to remain vigilant (e.g., “watch,” “monitor,” or 
“survey”), and their references to featured advocates, victims, rescuers, journalists, and 
jurists as “eyewitnesses.” Thusly, the exhibition privileges an “ocular epistemology,”84 
validating long-established links between witnessing and knowing, sight and 
knowledge.85 The import of sight is expressly articulated in the video for the 2006 




images from contemporary atrocities in Sudan onto the USHMM’s edifice. Upon seeing 
the public projection of these images, one attendee remarked on tape:  
It is very difficult for most Americans to understand what is going on in 
Darfur, and I think the best way to do that is visually. So to have these 
pictures projected and on such a large scale and a public place. I think is 
gonna to reach a lot more people than than [sic] many of the news stories 
will reach.86 
Underscoring familiar arguments about the accessibility of the image,87 such remarks 
establish clear links between seeing and knowing, with the corollary assumption 
undergirding such comments holding that once audiences know about genocide they will 
take action.88 
 By so punctuating and elevating the importance of sight, From Memory to Action 
makes recourse to an approach to visual culture, discussed by Torchin as grounded in an 
“Enlightenment-style faith in the power of knowledge.”89 From this perspective, sight 
leads knowledge, and knowledge leads to action in a fairly linear and direct fashion. 
Torchin explains that popular genocide texts tend to be read through these kinds of 
assumptions about the links between sight, knowledge, and action for two reasons. First, 
the 1948 UN Convention links genocide “recognition” and “obligation to act;”90 
therefore, the ties between visual recognition and action are bolstered by the framing of 
the Convention text. Second, this “Enlightenment-style” approach to visual culture 
dovetails with the growth of monitoring as an important part of journalistic and human 
rights work in the twentieth century.91 As monitoring becomes an increasingly important 




in Torchin’s words, such that “revelation contributes to recognition, recognition demands 
action, and representations throughout transform audiences into witnesses and publics.”92  
Of course, this approach to visual culture and media power rests upon presumptions of 
transparency and realism even as these presumptions of realism and transparency elide 
the extent to which media rely on “interpretive grid[s]” to construct the public’s 
understandings of both “genocide” and “action.”93  
In line with these assumptions about the transformative power of atrocity images, 
From Memory to Action relies on strategic uses of documentary realism as a genre for 
representation and metonymy as a means of depicting the systemic nature of genocidal 
atrocity. With few exceptions the primary genre through which the USHMM attempts to 
represent atrocity might best be considered a form of photographic or documentary 
realism. The exhibition’s alignment with realism is signaled by the extent to which From 
Memory to Action tethers itself to the work of photojournalists. From Memory to Action 
spotlights the work of these genocide cessation actors in featured programs and 
narratives. The installation relies heavily on their images, using photography as their 
preferred means of “showing” genocide.   
In centralizing the work of photojournalists, the USHMM activates a generic 
framework long associated with transparency, objectivity, truth, and realism.  As Jenkins 
explains, “[p]hotojournalism inculcates a specific, if often unrecognized, mode of 
seeing.”94 Chiefly, this form of representation traffics in the formation of an 
understanding of the image as “a window on the world.”95 Such representational 
strategies exert a potent influence insofar as they seek to obscure understandings of the 




real.96 However, this “documentary mode of seeing” is, of course, a strategy of 
representation in and of itself and not an inherent quality of the image.97 As Taylor 
concisely states, “[r]ealism is a matter of style, not content.”98  The use of documentary 
films or photojournalistic images like those featured in From Memory to Action erects a 
structured subjectivity and utilizes a particular set of generic conventions all-the-while 
seemingly doing little more than displaying “reality.”99  
If documentary realism is the primary genre for representation, within this genre, 
visual metonymy is one of the USHMM’s critical strategies for the depiction of the 
systemic.100 Metonymic representations are common in the representation of the atrocity 
as figurative resources signaling both partiality and generalizability.101 Hariman and 
Lucaites showcase an example of visual metonymy through their concept of the 
“individual aggregate.”102 In Hariman and Lucaites’s words, the individual aggregate 
enables the “depict[ion of] collective experience in a manner that fulfills both the need 
for collective action and the primacy of individual autonomy in a liberal-democratic 
society.”103 Put differently, Hariman and Lucaites suggest that systemic issues can be 
read as crystallized into representations of individualized experiences, which then stand 
in (within frame of the iconic photo) for larger collective issues. Of utmost importance 
here is a metonymic act of substitution. The individual within the frame functions 
rhetorically as a mode of representing a larger systemic influence which may otherwise 
“defy” or “escape” representation without the use of such metonymy. 
To some degree, the USHMM relies on the logic of the individual aggregate, 
finding ways to allow the plight of a few individuals to stand in for many. Fowler, in a 




we talk about numbers, when we talk about a place that’s very far away, we forget that 
they are human beings and individuals;”104 thus, it becomes important to represent them 
in a way that captures their individuality. Rwanda survivor and presenter at the 
USHMM’s 2006 “Darfur: Who Will Survive Today” program, Clementine Wamariya, 
encourages this move, asking people, when they see “[t]he pictures outside, [to] just pick 
one person and be that person for a day in a desert, hungry, knowing that next day you 
won’t wake up.”105 Using the logic of the individual aggregate, the USHMM attempts to 
minimize some of the challenges of representing genocide by depicting systemic issues 
through personalized plight.  
Beyond the use of the individual aggregate, the institution engages in several 
actions of symbolic substitution. Some of these substitutions entail acts of repetition, 
using the same images over and over again within different contexts. Employed in a way 
that suggests these images operate as symbols rather than markers of specific 
occurrences,106 certain images within the exhibition become ubiquitous, unmoored from 
their contexts and used repeatedly throughout the exhibition. The pictures from Steidle’s 
and Fowler’s photo essays as well as the images taken by Haviv appear in multiple 
contexts, reproduced in segments of the From Memory to Action exhibition and on 
USHMM promotional materials. For example, the images that appear as part of Fowler’s 
photo essay, “Staring Genocide in the Face” also appear as images accompanying the 
“eyewitness” testimony pages for Jennifer Leaning, Omar Ismail, and in the “Smallest 
Witnesses” video.107 In one instance, the exhibition makes use of an image from one 
genocide within the context of an entirely different genocide, allowing an image from the 




International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.108 While seemingly benign acts of 
representation, such forms of visual metonymy work against the “referentiality” and 
documentary force of the image.109  
Not only does the exhibition allow images from one context to stand in for 
another, the USHMM employs visual metonymy in allowing shots of “violent” or 
“victimized” landscapes to stand in for atrocity. This is particularly a troubling move that 
can be seen as obscuring the culpability of agents and, in turn, reinforcing stereotypical 
associations of Africa as a place carnage and death. Voth and Noland as well as Ewalt 
have highlighted this tendency to represent Africa as a site of what Ewalt terms 
“embedded injustice.”110 Adopting a Burkean framework, Voth and Noland argue that 
media coverage of genocide tends to obscure the agents of genocide in favor of a focus 
on scenes. Coverage of genocide consequently tends to lapse into language which 
suggests the “‘place is violent,’”111 or as Ewalt would put it, “[i]nvasions of human rights 
and injustices are embedded in the very spatiality of the African continent.”112 Both 
Ewalt and Voth and Noland stress that this kind of place-centric discussion or 
visualization of genocide tends to reinforce a sense of inevitability.113 Such a construction 
of genocide undermines other attempts in From Memory to Action to assure audiences of 
the mutability of genocidal conditions while at the same time reifying colonialist 
stereotypes of the African continent.114 
To be sure, such representational practices are clearly on display in From Memory 
to Action. The album, “Bearing Witness in the Congo,” for example, includes a photo of 
a UN peacekeeper secured in a bunker, gun visible, peering at an empty, lush African 




visible in the shot. Additionally, the album “Staring Genocide in the Face” opens with a 
shot of the desert in Chad, and the caption,  
When you see the harshness of the desert, and how barren it is, and feel 
the heat, and see how few resources there are, how little margin for error 
there is, you realize that driving people into the desert and then making it 
difficult for them to get help is tantamount to condemning them to 
death.116 
As captured in this caption, “the desert” is featured as the agent of destruction, promoting 
the sense that Africa is dangerous. There is something about the land or the scene that 
causes destruction; thus, it is not surprising to find a visual equation between the 
hazardous African landscape and a menacing perpetrator in the image on the cover of a 
USHMM brochure.117  
 At the same time, the metonymic use of the landscape can be read alternatively, as 
part of the exhibitions’ attempts to manage anxiety around “about to die” photos and their 
inability to escape the problems of representing genocide. One of the images repeatedly 
used in From Memory to Action shows the burning of Um Zaifa.118 The image, although 
cropped in various ways depending upon the context of its reproduction, depicts a series 
of square plots of lands, fenced properties with domiciles included within each plot’s 
perimeter. Among these residences, the shot shows one of these fenced plots ablaze, 
black smoke billows up toward the top of the frame, and scorched land is already visible 
where part of the fence once stood. Here the destruction of property clearly substitutes for 
images of the destruction of life. Although it is possible to read this as indicative of the 




possible to see this image as employing the “subjunctive voice” of “about to die” 
photos.119 As Zelizer explains, by depicting moments right before death, about to die 
images exist in the subjunctive tense, creating a sense of contingency as well as “the 
irrational hope that death may not occur.”120 The subjunctive helps “soften that force 
[contained in these “about to die” images] with qualifiers that are suggestive of 
possibility, contingency, and hypothesis.”121 In application, Zelizer uses the concept of 
the subjunctive to explain why the image of the Twin Towers was used to represent the 
violence of 9/11: In contrast to images of the “jumpers,” the images of the buildings were 
able to sustain a greater sense of contingency.122 Akin to use of the Twin Towers to 
represent 9/11, decisions to spotlight landscapes within From Memory to Action might be 
viewed productively as attempts to manage the problems of representing atrocity by 
engaging the subjunctive voice of the “about to die” photo, and thereby avoiding 
representations of more graphic carnage.123  
 Importantly, this landscape-based aesthetic is not only used to represent Africa. In 
its photo galleries, the From Memory to Action website has a series of images from 
Chechnya as well as from Srebrenica. The Chechnya album – “Chechyna: A View from 
the Ground” – showcases a destroyed marketplace and memorial which appears to be 
composed of (or mimics) an aesthetic of ruins.124 Even the title of the albums reflects a 
decision to let the landscape, the “view from the ground,” speak to the destruction, a 
substitution of damaged places for damaged bodies. The album from Srebrenica, though 
only containing six images, has a series of two photographs from a mass grave, allowing 
the long shot of the graveyard and the aluminum wire used to tie victims’ hands found at 




depicting violence.125 Thus, the focus on place is not only used to represent Africa as a 
place of violence. These shots also suggest the use of landscape as part of a broader 
aesthetic, historically used during the Shoah,126 to represent the devastation caused by 
genocide without having to represent graphic carnage.127 Ergo, the focus on scene need 
not only be read as a replication of a colonial gaze that leads to assumptions about the 
inevitability of genocide in these locales. A metonymic focus on place, land, and 
buildings also can be read as offering a resolution to a representational quandary by 
creating a way to depict a systemic and horrific problem such as genocide in a way that 
avoids the gruesomeness of depicting slaughter.128 
The exhibition’s use of metonymic representation reaches its extreme with the 
“Smallest Witnesses” program—a public program which perhaps most clearly embodies 
the complications, uncertainties, and anxieties about the visual rhetoric of genocide. The 
program – available as a video on the From Memory to Action website – spotlights Dr. 
Annie Sparrow’s work with Human Rights Watch during a 2005 trip to Darfur. Sparrow 
packed crayons and paper to allow the children she encountered to draw. The images they 
drew, in her words, “absolutely corroborate the testimony that we’d gathered…of the 
adults.”129 In the video, Sparrow unpacks the children’s drawings insisting that a blue and 
red patch of color represents a woman who has been shot in the face and other children’s 
sketches represent “sophisticated” weaponry such as AK-47s and Anntonov aircrafts.130 
Although not uncommon in certain forms of therapy to use artwork as a means of 
working through children’s trauma,131 in the context of this public program, the images 
aren’t being used in a private, therapeutic context, but to stand in as evidence of 




which the camera cannot capture—images that seemingly “show aspects of these crimes 
against humanity that have evaded photographers and television crews.”133 Far from the 
realism and the “naturalistic enthymeme” attributed to photography,134 this 
unconventional choice exacerbates tensions surrounding the representation of genocide, 
intimating that the vehicles for action promoted as critical to stopping genocide may be 
inadequate. 
 This metonymic choice in particular (the use of the “Smallest Witnesses” 
drawings) creates a host of problems for the USHMM. First, the program’s focus on the 
imaginative work of children threatens the realism of other representations of atrocity or 
at least potentially inspires questions about the realism elsewhere in the exhibition.135 
Given the importance of authenticity to the USHMM and to Holocaust memory more 
broadly,136 these symbols of atrocity must be couched as real, as having some sort of 
evidentiary potential, not as the fictional or creative work of children. Further, these 
images lack the indexicality of photographs,137 opening them to numerous interpretations.  
Thus, their “fatal polysemy” may make them hard to use to advance an argument for 
genocide cessation.138 As Sparrow even acknowledges, “some of these pictures [are] … 
not immediately clear what they mean until … the children actually explain them.”139 She 
demonstrates this with an image of what looks like a multicolor flower but is “really” an 
image of a child’s hut exploding. Through her efforts to decode the drawings for her 
audience, Dr. Sparrow attempts to control or manage the meanings of these images by 
capitalizing on what Biesecker terms “aesthetics of dematerialization.” As Biesecker 
explains, this “aesthetics of dematerialization” comprise a mode of seeing which works 




Individuals given the power to decipher these aesthetics are ceded positions of authority 
to make meaning.141 On one hand then, the “Smallest Witnesses” images are an asset to 
the USHMM in bolstering their authority. On the other hand, they stand to cast doubt 
upon the authenticity of other modes of representation utilized by the exhibition.  
The Specter of Insufficiency 
The complications around the use of the “Smallest Witnesses” images gesture 
toward the inadequacies of some of the USHMM’s strategies for representation, 
intimating uncertainty about the sufficiency of images as vehicles for the depiction of 
atrocity. This uncertainty exists on two levels. At the same time visuality is elevated as 
critical to genocide cessation, the exhibition also imparts contradictory messages 
suggesting that visual rhetoric is an inadequate medium for representation. Through such 
intimations, From Memory to Action activates longstanding forms of argumentation that 
treat the image as incapable of conveying the totality of trauma. Additionally, the 
exhibition calls into question the links between sight and action, opening spaces for 
debate over the viability of rhetorical resolutions as means of genocide cessation work. 
For all of the emphasis on sight in From Memory to Action, the exhibition is haunted by 
the shortcomings of visual rhetoric, creating a situation whereby the exhibition at once 
endorses the power of visual culture while calling it into question.  
Among one of the largest fears “haunting” From Memory to Action is the sense 
that visual rhetoric is inadequate as a means of capturing the complexity of genocide. Just 
as the institution touts images as critical in helping the public understand genocide, the 
exhibition intimates that the image’s power is limited. Nowhere in the exhibition is this 




program. Ismail introduces the photographic exhibition by suggesting that the images will 
help the public “see what genocide looks like in Darfur.”142 Yet after praising the images, 
the tenor of his introduction shifts, and he stresses the limitations of photography:  
But it [the exhibition] will not show you the life of peoples destroyed. It 
will not show you the dignity of human being being [sic] stripped. It will 
not show you the stigma that a woman raped will carry around for the rest 
of her life. It will not show you the broken hearts of those who feel guilty 
because they survived. That is what you have to deduce for yourself from 
these images.143 
By so hedging, Ismail contains the power of visual rhetoric, gesturing toward the 
limitations of the medium. Indeed, Ismail’s discussion of the limitations of images is 
corroborated by absences in the exhibition. For example, From Memory to Action 
contains relatively few images of perpetrators and when these perpetrators are shown, 
they are shown at rest, holding their weapons or walking around.  The images of 
genocide contained in From Memory to Action rarely depict abuses in action; images 
spotlight the body after the harm has been inflicted.144 Although Ismail offers an 
explanation for some of these absences (i.e., he stresses that the “culprits” of certain 
genocides are “elusive”145), the exhibition is haunted by the sense that some critical facets 
of the problem of genocide have escaped representation. In this way, From Memory to 
Action rehearse familiar fears regarding the inadequacy of representation writ large, 
tapping into anxieties circulating in broader scholarly literature in Holocaust and 
genocide studies by implying that “traumas,” such as genocide, can never be 




These anxieties dovetail with the intimation of related fears concerning the 
relationship between images and action. As stated earlier, visuality attains special 
significance as a form of representation within From Memory to Action because it is also 
closely aligned with discourses of resolution. In contrast to earlier configurations of 
visuality as an integral part of genocide cessation, a subtle sense lingers within the 
exhibition that images might not “resolve” the problem of genocide.  These anxieties are 
articulated in a narrative offered by photojournalist Ron Haviv in his “eyewitness 
testimony” in the exhibition. Haviv tells the story behind a photo, which appears on the 
pledge cards made available to exhibit’s visitors.147 The image shows a Bosnian man, 
hands raised in front of his body and a fearful expression on his face. Behind the man, 
clearly visible in the frame, are two individuals with firearms brandished. The man, with 
his imploring look in the midst of a seemingly perilous situation, seems to nonverbally 
ask visitors the question that is printed on their pledge cards: “What will you do to help 
meet the challenge of genocide today?”148  
The subject of the picture, Haviv explains, was accused of being a Kosovo 
fundamentalist. In Haviv’s story, the man is captured and taken away only to escape by 
jumping out of a second story window. Remarkably, the man survived the fall, though his 
captors found him, poured water on him, and continued to physically abuse the man as he 
lay on the ground.149 
The photo Haviv snapped was taken just before the man was seized. In Haviv’s 
words, the man “put his arms up and basically looked at me as if I was probably the only 
person that could save him, which, probably in his mind I was, but unfortunately there 




“save” the man depicted in the sense of sparing him this abuse, Haviv recasts his role in 
the scene as something of a heroic documentarian. As Haviv recounts, “I was shaking, for 
sure, when I was doing it because I realized how precarious everything was, but I really 
thought it was unbelievably important to be able to have the world see what 
happened.”151 Constructing the scene so that it appears he too was in danger,152 he returns 
to the importance of the photograph: “I had to make sure that there was a document,” he 
declares, “there had to be evidence of this crime, of what was happening. And that, I 
think, gave me the courage to try – to take those photographs.”153  
Haviv’s testimony reflects an artful form of negotiating the relationship between 
visuality and action: Unable to participate in genocide cessation by stopping the violence 
in front of him, Haviv’s contribution – his way of taking action – is to create an image, to 
document atrocity. Confronted with the man’s imploring gaze, Haviv’s initial response is 
one of resignation: “unfortunately there really wasn’t anything I could do.”154 This 
gesture toward a lack of agency to stop the atrocity seemingly intimates a sense of 
inevitability, suggesting the violence unfolding before Haviv could not be stopped. Haviv 
counters this sentiment by positing a relationship between photography and action. 
However, the conception of photography-as-action reflected in Haviv’s narrative is 
clearly imperfect. In spite of Haviv’s attempt to restore a sense of agency linked to visual 
documentation, Haviv’s photographic intervention ultimately fails to stop the ensuing 
violence. The man is still seized, assaulted and thrown from a window. Haviv’s 
photography does not bring an end to the violence before him. While the photo, or more 
precisely the narrative contextualizing the photos, links visuality and action, it also 




so intimating a connection between photography and stasis, Haviv’s testimony 
complicates the relationship between images, action, and the cessation of violence 
constructed elsewhere in the exhibition. In so doing, Haviv’s narrative invites reflection 
on the connections between genocide representation and genocide resolution. 
Rhetorical Resolutions: Potency & Powerlessness in From Memory to Action 
 As demonstrated above, representations are closely linked to resolutions in From 
Memory to Action. Indeed, in response to the question of “what can be done,” the 
exhibition features rhetorical resolutions as key elements of genocide cessation.  Writing 
and speaking, for example, are commonly presented as important parts of genocide 
prevention and intervention. The actors celebrated within the exhibition are often average 
individuals and collectives who take action by “speaking out” or otherwise creating 
discourses about genocide, creating space to recognize public agency. This focus on the 
importance of discourse to resolutions includes an emphasis on legal discourses, once 
again accentuating the significance of the 1948 UN Convention to genocide cessation 
efforts. Simultaneously, the exhibition expresses anxiety about the sufficiency of these 
rhetorical resolutions.156 This anxiety is exacerbated by From Memory to Action’s 
treatment of martial action. By utilizing militaristic metaphors to refer to journalists and 
photojournalists as genocide cessation actors, the exhibition calls attention to its limited 
discussion of martial intervention as a viable means of genocide cessation. 
At first blush, the exhibition clearly promotes the idea of rhetoric as a form of 
action,157 offering rhetorical resolutions to the problem of genocide. The pledge cards, for 
example, exemplify this belief. The mere act of writing the pledge is seen as a part of a 




cessation. In an article co-written by the exhibit designers, Bridget Conley-Zilkic and 
David Small explain that the prompt on the pledges cards (“What will you do to help 
meet the challenge of genocide today?”) “is designed to provoke a first-person statement 
from the visitors, thereby asking them to write themselves into the solution.”159 The act of 
authoring a pledge becomes a form of taking action invested with special significance. As 
Conley-Zilkic and Small continue, “When visitors also see their pledge projected on the 
screen and visible to others, it helps them see their own choice as part of a larger 
movement, each choice to take action a unique contribution to a problem of global and 
historical dimensions.”160 Writing out the pledge then becomes a transformative act and 
key part of genocide cessation work.  
Additionally, voice, speech, and speaking out are valorized within From Memory 
to Action as forms of rhetorical resolutions. The “What Can I Do” page encourages the 
USHMM’s audiences to “Talk about the need to provide humanitarian assistance, protect 
civilians, stop the violence, and promote solutions to the crises.”161 Echoing this 
sentiment, former US Marine Brian Steidle reminds audiences in one website video that 
“the biggest things is [sic] talking, spreading the word, so that everybody knows what is 
happening… write your Senators, write your Congressmen, write the President, write 
Kofi Annan. Tell ‘em that you are interested in this issue. Tell them that this must 
stop.”162 Museum resources further stress the power of individual voices, emphasizing to 
their visitors, “your voice can make a difference” and imploring audiences, “Do not be 
silent.”163  
The eyewitness testimony included in the exhibition features many individuals 




survivor Nesse Godin’s eyewitness account includes a pointed emphasis on the 
importance of public discourse: 
And the world was silent while we were suffering, and I said, “We cannot 
be silent again.” And I turned to the young woman that was standing there, 
and I said, “Yes, we are going to stand – I, personally, am going to stand 
shoulder to shoulder, and not allow the world to be silent.”165 
Godin’s public promise to advocate on behalf of and alongside the people in Darfur rests 
upon the assumption that “speaking out” is a critical part of genocide prevention or 
intervention.166 This emphasis on talking, advocating, or telling stories is repeated in 
various capacities throughout From Memory to Action. In describing his work 
photographing atrocity in Darfur, Fowler explains that the Darfuri refugees he spoke with 
want “to have their stories told.”167 The exhibition emphasizes that many of the former 
victims of genocide featured as “eyewitnesses” become advocates and activists, 
ostensibly continuing to model the importance of using one’s voice as a form of action in 
combating injustices.168 
 In some ways, promoting “voice” as a form of action helps to allay anxiety 
surrounding perceptions of powerlessness in genocide cessation work.169  Senator 
Proxmire’s (D-WI) narrative embodies these connections between individual agency, 
rhetoric, and action. Although Proxmire inhabited a position of political power, his 
narrative is framed to underscore the remarkable capacity of the individual advocate’s 
voice. Proxmire’s story, states US Representative Ron Kind (D-WI) in a video in the 
exhibit, is an inspirational narrative about “the difference one person can still make in the 




discourse. Proxmire, his profile stresses, delivered “3,211 speeches arguing that the 
United States should sign the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide,”171 a “constant drum beat” underscoring the importance of the 
United States becoming a party to the Convention.172 His “legacy,” according to Kind, is 
one “of the persistence of one man and how he made a tremendous difference for our 
country and throughout the world”173 through the exercise of his voice. Proxmire’s 
narrative affirms the importance of “speaking out” as a form of resolution. His story also 
suggests the salience of legal action to genocide cessation work. 
The law functions as a significant arena for discursive action in From Memory to 
Action, accentuating the central role afforded to rhetoric in the exhibition. As Parry-Giles 
asserts, “[s]ystems of law and legal practice are decidedly rhetorical.”174 The law is 
rhetorical in multiple senses.175 On the most obvious of levels, trials are forums for the 
exchange of public arguments and settings for deliberation.176 Yet, more to the point, the 
entire legal enterprise, White suggests, might be viewed productively “as a branch of 
rhetoric.” White treats law as a rhetorical “art by which community and culture are 
established, maintained, and transformed.”177 Thus, the case made through From Memory 
to Action about the importance of law is a repeated endorsement of the importance of 
rhetoric to genocide cessation efforts. 
From Memory to Action punctuates the importance of legal action to genocide 
cessation efforts on multiple occasions. One of the “eyewitnesses” to genocide featured 
in the exhibition is Stephen Rapp, an international prosecutor involved in the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.178  Rapp’s profile mentions his efforts 




work amid “a marked change in the willingness of individual countries and the United 
Nations to use international criminal proceedings in response to atrocities.”179  In addition 
to the content on Rapp’s profile, a section of the physical installation highlights the role 
of legal processes – prosecutions and international tribunals – in creating closure in the 
wake of atrocity.180 Furthermore, the aforementioned “What is Genocide” timeline, 
focused on “trac[ing] the development of the word and law of genocide,” inherently 
assumes the development of international law is a critical part of genocide cessation 
work.181 Through the timeline, legal action is treated as so significant that it functions as 
something of a consolation in lieu of other steps to prevent or end atrocity. In the most 
basic sense, the timeline contributes to the perception that legal action is a meaningful 
way of participating in genocide cessation work.182 
Above all, the exhibit’s promotion of Raphael Lemkin and the 1948 UN 
Convention elucidates the sophisticated relationship constructed between rhetoric, law, 
and action. As stressed earlier, Lemkin’s moment of rhetorical invention is credited by 
the exhibition as providing the authoritative legal definition of genocide.183 Lemkin’s 
definition appears as the first slide in the “What is Genocide” timeline and as the 
definition in the museum’s brochures.184 The UN Convention and the definition of 
genocide contained therein constitute the central reference point for the exhibition’s 
discussion of genocide. By elevating Lemkin’s work and the 1948 UN Convention and 
ascribing them a critical role in the exhibition’s representation of genocide cessation 
work, From Memory to Action again returns to the importance of both law and discourse.  




Alongside discourses celebrating individuals who “speak out,” the exhibition 
intimates that rhetoric is an insufficient form of resolution. A looming sense that words 
alone are not enough lingers. One finds this sentiment in the featured pledge made by UN 
Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide Francis Deng. In his pledge, Deng 
promises “to turn the words into deeds.”185 Deng’s comments assume that words and 
deeds are distinct, a formulation of the relationship between rhetoric and action that 
contradicts other conceptions within the exhibit of rhetoric as action. Ismail’s remarks 
contain a similar configuration of the links between rhetoric and action. In Ismail’s 
words, “[y]ou have to act;” rather than “just stand[ing] on the sidelines arguing” about 
the meaning of the word “genocide.”186 Ismail reinforces the idea that talking about 
genocide and taking action are separate and distinct constructs. On one hand, From 
Memory to Action endorses the power of the word; on the other, the exhibit is haunted by 
the sense that words are insufficient, evincing an uncertainty and anxiety about rhetoric 
that the exhibitions’ earlier exhortations seem unable to dispel.  
Further, the exhibition intimates that the act of naming “genocide” – a 
declamation central to the activation of a legal response to genocide187 – is trivial and 
disconnected from violent acts. Despite Lemkin’s Herculean efforts to codify the word 
and his earnest belief in the significance of promoting and using the word “genocide,” 
others featured in the exhibition suggest that the word itself is meaningless. Such 
positions trivialize the importance of naming genocide, of using the appellation as a 
means of triggering international action as specified in the 1948 UN Convention. Jean-
Phillipe Ceppi, a journalist included in the exhibition for being the first individual to 




of the word. Of his decision to use the term, Ceppi cites the piles of bodies he saw and 
the reports he heard of the tens of thousands of victims. He states: “for me, [it] was good 
enough to use this word ‘genocide.’”188 He remarks that, in the midst of watching the 
violence unfold in Rwanda, he never stopped to ask the question “is that a ‘genocide’ or 
what?”189 His testimony consequently implies that “mincing words” matters little in light 
of the materiality of genocidal violence. A similar sentiment is found in Darfuri activist 
Omar Ismail’s testimony in which he pleads, “There is a real issue here. Please don’t 
reduce the suffering of my people to a mere issue of semantics.”190 Contained in both sets 
of remarks is a clear derision of the importance of the word. From Ceppi’s and Ismail’s 
perspectives, words don’t matter nearly as much as others might assume, even when such 
words have the force of international law behind them.  
Consequentially, the exhibition promotes the power of the word – and more 
specifically, the power of the word “genocide” – as a crucial part of international law 
while intimating that words are meaningless. At some points in the exhibition, the legal 
frameworks for “genocide” matter, and the legal codification of the word “genocide” is 
significant. At other points in time, troubling with the “semantics” of the word is absurd. 
These competing evaluations of the relationship between rhetoric and genocide cessation 
engender an anxiety about the potency of rhetoric as a form of atrocity resolution.  In 
turn, such anxiety is fueled by incongruous uses of martial rhetorics to elevate journalists 
and photojournalists as key actors in genocide cessation while simultaneously 
sublimating considerations of military intervention as a form of genocide resolution. 




 As means of glorifying the work of discourse creators, From Memory to Action 
embraces martial rhetorics as a discursive framework for describing journalists’ genocide 
cessation work. Journalists are commended for their valor, courageousness, and 
bravery.191 This act of symbolic substitution, whereby journalists are cast as martial 
actors, draws attention to the relative lack of discussion of military intervention as a 
viable form of “resolution” within From Memory to Action. This absence within the 
exhibit stands in stark contrast to the promotion of a pro-US military narrative elsewhere 
in the USHMM.  Indeed, rather than promote the US army-as-liberation force narrative, 
the exhibition complicates the feasibility of post-Holocaust US troop interventions, 
intimating the operation of larger political considerations pertaining to the use of US 
forces. Through the attention to speech/silence surrounding martial discourses, the 
situational constraints which hamstring the USHMM’s genocide cessation discourse 
become the most apparent.   
Militaristic discourses are engaged within the exhibition to construct a discursive 
framework for lauding journalistic action. The photograph of the Bosnian man accused of 
being a Kosovo fundamentalist illustrates conflations between military and journalistic 
intervention. Stressing the precariousness of the situation he experienced in Bosnia (“they 
were screaming at me not to take photographs”),192 Haviv’s “courage” to take the photos 
constructs journalistic intervention as a daring and dangerous act.  Narratives about 
journalist killed during the atrocities in Chechnya reinforce this view of journalistic 
action.193 This notion of journalists “under fire” or in danger mimics the kinds of 
discourse that might be used to talk about soldiers engaged in military interventions. 




Survive Today” event are suggestive of how this mimicry works. Zeidman states, “The 
photographers who went to Darfur to document the tragedy are truly courageous, 
traveling to a dangerous region, risking their lives, and donating their photos in order to 
show us the faces of genocide. These brave photographers acted and they compel us to 
act.” 194 Furthering the militaristic framing, Zeidman continues, “[w]e salute these 
individuals.”195 The hallmarks used here to describe journalists – courage, risk, and a 
sense of self-jeopardy –	  could just as easily be used to describe soldiers. Ultimately, such 
language valorizes the work of photographers as powerful agents of genocide cessation.  
The narratives surrounding Brian Steidle, a former US Marine turned 
photographer, provides the clearest examples of this journalist-military conflation. 
Steidle’s photographs are a critical part of the USHMM’s exhibition. His photo of Um 
Zaifa appears on the Committee of Conscience’s brochures. His work was featured in a 
public program made available as a video on the From Memory to Action page. He is an 
eyewitness in the exhibition, and he has a photo essay included on the website. Given his 
place of prominence in From Memory to Action, his work has been described by the 
USHMM in numerous ways. In one photo, Steidle, appears alongside men in camouflage, 
weapons visible. Steidle is wearing an all khaki outfit that resembles military attire. This 
photo accompanies his profile, which introduces Steidle as a “former U.S. Marine … 
invited to serve in Darfur as an unarmed military observer and U.S. representative to the 
African Union.”196 Steidle’s former position as a US Marine stands in contrast with “his 
position as an unarmed military observer in Darfur.”197 Denuded of the defensive 
resources of a Marine, Steidle “did not have much in the way of equipment with him as 




photographs.”198 “Unarmed” and with minimal equipment, his camera becomes his 
primary means of intervening, standing in as a phantom appendage, a shallow substitute 
for the Marine’s gun. Casting his camera as his “weapon” in the fight against atrocity, 
such an introduction furthers the militaristic comparison between “shooting” a camera 
and “shooting” a gun.199  Steidle’s enactment of the Marine-turned-journalist narrative 
represents the pinnacle of From Memory to Action’s martial conflation, enacting a 
symbolic substitution whereby journalists and photographers function in the place of 
other military actors. 
 Whereas journalists are cast through these highly militarized narratives, other 
martial actors play a minimal role within the exhibition. None of the featured 
“eyewitnesses” within From Memory to Action are part of a liberation force.200 Nowhere 
on the “take action” pages does the exhibition suggest that military force might be 
necessary to end genocide. When military forces are spotlighted as part of liberation 
attempts, they are often depicted as failing in their missions, unable to “substantially 
alleviate the crisis” in the DRC,201 “undermanned and ill-equipped” in Sudan,202 and 
“severely handicapped” in Rwanda.203  The visuals accompanying the “armed force” 
section of the physical installation reinforce these messages. In one image, Rwandan 
Patriotic Front soldiers stand behind a pile of victims’ skulls, seemingly powerless in 
light of the violence that has obviously already occurred.204 In another photo, coffins 
draped with AU-UN flags are identified as the fatalities of a peacekeeping mission in 





The near absence of martial figures in From Memory to Action and the 
accompanying narratives of “failed” military action exist in stark contrast with the 
prominence of US liberators and the glorification of US soldiers throughout the 
USHMM. As noted earlier, the subjectivity of the soldier-liberator is a predominant part 
of the visitor’s experience at the USHMM; the role of the US military in liberating the 
concentration camps, in fact, serves as part of the justification for the USHMM’s very 
existence on US soil.207 The front entrance to the institution is lined with the flags of the 
US military divisions involved in the liberation of concentration camps.208 The institution 
sponsored a special exhibition focused on liberation, complete with profiles of each of the 
divisions engaged in liberation on its website.209 The result is a fairly pronounced 
juxtaposition: Whereas, the US military is a critical part of the narrative that the USHMM 
constructs about the Holocaust, the exhibition cedes little responsibility to US troops in 
contemporary genocide cessation discourse.  
 The inconsistencies in the USHMM’s engagement with martial action intimate the 
political logics influencing deliberations over the expenditure of US resources. In his 
work on post-Holocaust genocide prevention, Ronayne stresses that “American foreign 
policy is not made in a vacuum;”210 therefore, any consideration of US commitments to 
stop atrocities abroad must be factored against multiple other political considerations, 
among those, US domestic public opinion.211 As Ronayne concisely points out, “[f]ear of 
political consequences at home should American forces suffer causalities during a 
humanitarian intervention” has historically inhibited some politicians’ willingness to 
support the deployment of US troops.212 Such fears were heightened, some argue, in the 




called “Somalia Syndrome” has been cited as a reason for US reticence to aid or alleviate 
the genocidal violence in Rwanda and Bosnia.214 Although some reporting on public 
opinion polls seemingly suggests that the American public favors the use of US troops to 
stop genocide,215 trepidation over the loss of US lives haunts discussions of US resources 
in genocide cessation efforts. 
 These political logics are intimated within other USHMM discourses which 
complicate the feasibility of atrocity resolution. The From Memory to Action website 
features museum resources for educators that gesture toward the political factors that may 
hinder genocide intervention/prevention. As part of a set of guidelines for teaching about 
genocide, the USHMM offers the following advice: 
The world community is very different and far more complicated in the 
aftermath of the Holocaust…Students may become frustrated when they 
learn of governmental inaction in the face of genocide. While there are 
certainly cynical reasons for not intervening, teachers can lead students to 
understand the complexity of responding to genocide, that it is usually not 
a simple matter to step into another country across the world and tell one 
group to stop killing another group.216 
Indeed, the guidelines go on to advise instructors to have their students consider 
questions such as “How much international cooperation can be mustered? How much is 
needed?” “What are the possible ramifications of intervention?” and “Is a nation willing 
to absorb casualties and death to stop a genocide?”217 Notably, these rhetorics are distinct 




guidelines.218 Instead, the aforementioned questions prime instructors and ultimately their 
students to moderate their expectations for US action and atrocity resolution. 
 Consequentially, the USHMM paints a complicated picture of genocide cessation 
work. The institution validates then repudiates the salience of rhetorical resolutions to 
genocide. The exhibition valorizes journalists and photojournalists through militaristic 
metaphors as crucial agents in genocide cessation but affords a limited role to martial 
actors in From Memory to Action.  The exhibit intimates but leaves exnominated the 
broader deliberations which contextualize the politics of troop deployment. The result is 
the promulgation of optimistic messages about genocide prevention and intervention 
alongside subtle intimations of the importance of tempered expectations. Similar 
contradictory assessments of historical successes and failures in genocide prevention and 
intervention shape USHMM’s discussions of genocide memory. 
Remembering Genocide: Configurations of Temporality 
 Arguments about genocide remembrance are interwoven into discussions of 
definition, representation, and resolution within From Memory to Action. At the most 
basic level, Terdiman defines memory as “the modality of our relation to the past.”219 
From Terdiman’s perspective on memory, the arguments contained in From Memory to 
Action about the relationship between past genocides and the present political moment 
speak to the politics of the museum’s acts of genocide remembrance. The exhibition 
connects the past and present in two distinct ways, utilizing a temporal narrative of 
progress and one of stasis. The progress narrative promotes the perception of genocide as 
mutable and contributes to the glorification of the nation-state as an actor in genocide 




insinuates stasis. Such a temporality presumes the inevitability of continued atrocity. 
From this vantage point, genocides will continue to happen as they have always 
happened. This view of time confers authority on the USHMM as an important 
institutional voice on matters of contemporary genocidal atrocity. Simultaneously, the 
omissions in the selective construction of the stasis temporal narrative enhance the 
palatability of the USHMM’s genocide memories. 
From one perspective, From Memory to Action offers hopeful narratives about the 
relationship between the past and the present, accentuating a sense of incremental 
progress. The physical installation constructs a temporal narrative stressing steady 
progress in safeguarding human rights from the 1940s to the present. The physical 
installation situates the Holocaust as a stimulus that ushered in a political culture attuned 
to human rights violations.221 It proclaims that “OUT OF THE HOLOCAUST,”222 as the 
first panel reads, “individuals and world leaders [were inspired] to devise new means to 
identify, prevent, and punish mass violence against entire civilian groups.”223 The 
narratives in the physical installation make a point of acknowledging the efforts made by 
“individuals, organizations, countries, and international coalitions” to stop the atrocities 
in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Sudan.224  In contrast to the first panel’s pictures of genocidal 
violence, the installation ends with a panel featuring activists rallying on behalf of Darfur 
accompanied by text that reads, “THE FUTURE CAN BE DIFFERENT.”225 Thus, the 
narrative arc of the exhibition concludes with messages about empowerment, agency, 
mutability, and ultimately, if tentatively, progress. 
Such notions of incremental progress are even more explicit in the “What Is 




failure of the signatories of the 1948 UN Convention to respond to the genocide in 
Cambodia,226 the timeline notes several legal advances. Situating the late 1980s and the 
1990s as something of a turning point, the tenor of the timeline changes in 1988 with the 
signature of US government officials on the 1948 Convention.227 The narrative slides that 
follow this moment in time include: “The World Acts to Punish but Not to Halt Atrocities 
in the Former Yugoslavia” (1993),228 “After the Genocide Ends, the World Creates a 
Tribunal for Rwanda” (1994),229 and “A Permanent Court to Prosecute Atrocities against 
Civilians is Established” (1998),230 highlighting the creation of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC). The timeline ends in 2004 with the US declaration of genocide in Darfur.231  
Not only does such a framework trumpet the agency of the United States in matters of 
genocide cessation (as the turning point in the narrative is the entry of the United States 
into genocide prevention politics in 1988232), the narrative bends in the direction of 
incremental progress. Although the world did not prevent the atrocities in Bosnia, 
Rwanda, or Darfur, steps toward genocide cessation, the narrative reassures audiences, 
have been taken: tribunals were organized, war criminals were indicted, and the ICC was 
established. Though confronted with the international community’s repeated failures to 
prevent genocide in the past, the timeline suggests that progress has been made.  
 On an ontological level, this conceptualization of genocide memory has important 
implications for arguments about US political power. Linear temporalities, such as the 
one employed here, enhance the authority of the nation-state, which helps to account for 
the correlation between the progress narrative and the glorification of US action featured 
prominently in the exhibition.233 Edkins argues that traumatic events, such as the 




time because traumas, by some definitions, defy society’s conventional modes of 
representation.234 Yet, “[b]y rewriting these traumas into a linear narrative of national 
heroism,” Edkins asserts, “the state conceals the trauma that it has, necessarily, 
produced.”235 Put simply, Edkins holds that nation-states exert control over traumas such 
as genocide by working to fold them into linear time. In this way, states can inhibit the 
connections between the actions they may have undertaken to cause such traumas and 
instead can subsume the events within overarching narratives which promote a kind of 
heroic nationalism.236 This vision of the nation-state is particularly well suited to support 
a liberal understanding of the problem of genocide given their shared focus on the 
primacy of the state. Thus, the utilization of this kind of temporality lends additional 
support to that strand of the exhibition’s definitional discourse. Taken as a whole, the 
progress narrative aligns with a construction of genocide and genocide cessation that 
maintains perceptions of mutability, agency, and US benevolence. 
 At the same time, by writing the memory of past genocide into a narrative of 
progression, the USHMM weakens its institutional authority as the Committee on 
Conscience’s operational mission is premised in the occurrence of ongoing atrocity. 
From Memory to Action is an initiative hosted by a part of the USHMM known as the 
Center for the Prevention of Genocide. The Center for the Prevention of Genocide is 
advised by the USHMM’s Committee on Conscience (CoC), “a standing committee of 
the United States Holocaust Memorial Council.”237 The CoC’s central mission “is to alert 
the national conscience, influence policy makers, and stimulate worldwide action to 
confront and work to halt acts of genocide or related crimes against humanity.”238 The 




replication of genocidal violence in the wake of the Holocaust.239 Ergo, the CoC’s work 
is contingent upon the need for vigilance to avoid or stem the occurrence of atrocity.  Its 
very exigence is grounded in an assumption of continued violence. Given that a narrative 
of progress undermines the CoC’s reason for existence, this narrative is tempered by 
arguments intimating stasis, arguments which suggest the sustained and lingering threat 
of genocide. When the threat of genocide haunts contemporary politics, the CoC, and the 
USHMM in turn, is ceded additional authority as a voice in genocide cessation work. 
Hence, alongside optimistic genocide memories, the exhibition intimates a second 
temporality marked by stasis. This temporality configures past-present relationships in 
less hopeful terms. In these narratives, violence has not been overcome but continues to 
haunt the present. A notion of a sustained genocidal threat manifests within From 
Memory to Action in multiple ways. On the most obvious of levels, From Memory to 
Action identifies a number of states as “at risk” for genocide. The “Who is at Risk?” 
webpage features profiles for the DRC, Sudan, South Sudan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Rwanda, Burundi, and Chechnya.240 The act of designating “at risk” states contributes to 
the sense of impending violence, suggesting the need for “monitoring” and enhancing the 
case for the CoC’s operation. The presence of such a list clearly intimates that genocidal 
violence continues to occur, or at least the threat continues to lurk, in some (largely 
African) regions.  
The “legacy” section of the profiles for each “at risk” country highlights the 
possibilities for the outbreak of future violence. “In [the] Congo,” as the exhibition 
explains, “the violence continues to recur in spurts, never dissipating enough to provide 




Darfur region of Sudan, “violence continues with a wider array of perpetrators,” and 
“[c]ivilians continue to be displaced and suffer attacks that often take the form of 
robbery, rape, and murder.”242 In other locales, there are problems of political recognition 
(Bosnia),243 lingering medical problems in the survivor community (Rwanda),244 and 
governmental instability (Burundi).245  Removed from whatever progress has been made, 
this construction of temporality posits each nation-state as potentially primed for 
additional violence.  
The selective examples employed to construct the stasis temporal narrative offer a 
palatable form of genocide remembrance by focusing on minimally contestable instances 
of past genocide while foreclosing debates about politically charged instances of past or 
present atrocity. As Zelizer concludes, “we may remember earlier atrocities so as to 
forget contemporary ones.”246 Curiously, three of the narratives for the nations featured 
as “at risk” – Rwanda, Bosnia, and Chechnya – centralize violence that has occurred 
nearly a decade before the exhibition. Though the legacy sections provide some 
justification for their continued inclusion on this list of nations needing to be 
“monitored,”247 From Memory to Action’s recycling of past violence potentially raises the 
question: “Are there no more current examples of atrocity to discuss?” The stasis 
narrative’s emphasis on these well-worn stories of violence in Rwanda and Bosnia 
intimates other atrocities that are either relatively minimized or entirely absent. For 
example, the physical installation and online exhibition overwhelmingly feature and 
designate as “cause for concern” violence in Africa and – to a more limited extent – 
Europe. Although the physical installation includes sporadic references to violence 




Australia, and the Americas, are given relatively little attention.249 By spotlighting 
familiar examples of past genocides, the institution minimizes its engagement with 
present atrocities.  
Furthermore, its version of genocide memory is tamed by omissions in the 
narrative. From Memory to Action constructs an innocuous version of genocide memory 
through conspicuous silences in its narration of the history of genocide. For example, the 
choice to start the exhibition’s narrative with Lemkin’s invention of the word “genocide” 
obfuscates important debates about pre-twentieth and early twentieth century violence as 
well as issues related to indigenous slaughter. The USHMM’s choice to construct the 
narrative so that it coincides with the creation of the word “genocide” reduces the 
“history of genocide” to 1944 and beyond, despite the fact that the concept of genocide 
long preceded the coinage of the term.250 By centralizing Lemkin’s moment of rhetorical 
invention, From Memory to Action not only reinforces arguments about the importance of 
rhetorical resolutions, it provides the grounds for the exclusion of atrocities that preceded 
the invention of the word. Thus, the controversy around the Armenian genocide can be 
avoided as can discussions of the disastrous effects of colonization and imperialism on 
indigenous populations, including the United States’ own Native American communities. 
By constructing the timeline for the exhibition so that it starts in 1944, the installation is 
able to foreclose debates about the nature and morality of such violence and safeguards 
these historical incidents from public scrutiny. At the most basic level, this construction 
of temporality protects the image of the United States by shaping the memory of 
genocide in such a way that the devastating violence visited upon native communities by 




 The contours of the USHMM’s narratives of genocide remembrance are 
constructed through the simultaneous uses of competing temporalities. The progress 
narrative offers hopeful and empowering messages about genocide mutability while the 
stasis narrative intimates the intractability of some forms of violence. In establishing the 
linkages between the past and the present, gaps in the narratives showcase the politics of 
the institution’s decisions to avoid or minimize selective instances of contemporary or 
historic atrocities. Taken as a whole, the exhibition’s arguments about remembrance 
enact a familiar pattern whereby the institution offers innocuous narratives about atrocity 
while intimating the politics that underlie US genocide cessation discourses. 
Competing Evaluations of the USHMM’s Use of Rhetorical Intimation 
 Through the use of rhetorical intimation, the USHMM promotes contradictory or 
paradoxical messages about genocide definition, representation, resolution and 
remembrance. The exhibition advocates politically palatable messages about genocide 
and genocide cessation which contribute to a fairly positive image of the US government. 
At the same time, the exhibition’s use of rhetorical intimation hints at facets of national 
and international politics that moderate the optimism of the exhibition’s genocide 
cessation discourse.  This rhetorical strategy suggests several implications. Although 
rhetorical intimation complicates overly simplistic narratives about US genocide 
cessation work, it ultimately leaves the many ideologies that factor in political decisions 
about genocide exnominated. 
 Rhetorical intimation facilitates a more sophisticated form of genocide cessation 
discourse by creating spaces for the articulation of less comforting narratives about 




toward the complexity of the politics that surround genocide and genocide cessation. In 
this sense, the exhibition exceeds many scholarly expectations for a popular 
representation of genocide, especially one financed by the US government. By, at 
minimum, giving voice to competing perspectives and hinting at obstacles to genocide 
cessation work, the exhibition avoids the worst flaws of omission. Through such 
rhetorical maneuvers, the USHMM intimates unspeakable arguments about genocide and 
genocide cessation without the wholesale repudiation of the US government. On these 
grounds, this chapter’s analysis departs from the aforementioned critiques of the 
institution, which place emphasis on its nationalistic and conservative dimensions.252 
 Nevertheless, as I have argued throughout this study, rhetorical intimation leaves 
the ideologies implicated in genocide and genocide cessation largely exnominated. These 
“hints” toward the influence of colonial ideologies, for example, are visible only to the 
most sophisticated viewers. As Morris suggests, the nods or intimations are received only 
by those who know what to look for.253 The extent of the connections between genocide 
and broader domestic and international politics are never fully exposed, stripping viewers 
of the resources to launch a critique of these ideologies. The subtly of these acts of 
rhetorical intimation may render such gestures invisible to members of the public without 
the requisite knowledge in the subject area to recognize them. For an institution 
committed to accessibility and public education,254 rhetorical intimation curbs the 
institution’s pedagogical potential by merely gesturing towards complicated issues that 
require more substantive explanations.255   
Such a conclusion corroborates Bartov’s assessment of the USHMM by 




discourse as a result of the institution’s relationship with the US government.256  By 
safeguarding the US government from extensive critique, the institution undercuts the 
potency of its genocide cessation arguments. Worse, rhetorical intimation leaves 
mystified some of the very ideologies that contribute to the continuation of genocide by 
failing to explicitly address them within From Memory to Action.  
Undoubtedly, rhetorical intimation as a discursive strategy has its utility. As I 
have argued in this chapter, rhetorical intimation enables From Memory to Action to 
articulate a more robust form of genocide cessation discourse while working within 
USHMM’s situational constraints. At the same time, such acts of intimation invariably 
alter the ways genocide is understood, represented, and remembered. The interplay of 
speech and silence creates a dual-voiced genocide cessation discourse within the 
USHMM that is optimistic yet tempered, palatable yet instigative. The implications of 
intimation and exnomination in genocide cessation discourse at the broadest levels are the 
subject of the Afterword to follow. 
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the author.  
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design of the installation. By May 2013, these touch-based interfaces were gone. The 
table was still present, but visitors could no longer select which narrative they wanted to 
hear. Further a feature that had enabled visitors to save exhibition narratives to the 
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3 United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Take Action! (postcard distributed 
as a part of the “From Memory to Action: Meeting the Challenge of Genocide” 
installation, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, D.C., February 
2011).  
4 This response card read, “I will tell my students to go to the exhibit website.” 
Other cards reference the importance of the Committee on Conscience. 
5 The institution displays a sample of the pledges it receives on its website. These 
pledges were taken from the website’s display of submitted content in April and May of 
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6 Gen. Romeo Dallaire, “Featured Pledges,” Preventing Genocide – Take Action – 
Featured Pledges, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, accessed April 20, 2013, 
http://www.ushmm.org/genocide/take_action/action/featured_pledges. This quotation has 
been shortened. 
7  Juan Mendez, “Featured Pledges,” Preventing Genocide – Take Action – 
Featured Pledges, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, accessed May 17, 2011, 
http://www.ushmm.org/genocide/take_action/action/featured_pledges. This quotation has 
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8 In some ways, this characterization is unfair; both Mutombo and Cheek have 
connections to genocide politics. However, whereas Dallaire and others are introduced 
with titles that make their connection to genocide prevention work clear, Mutombo and 
Cheek are simply presented on the USHMM website as athletes. Mutombo and Cheek 
both have a history of activism work. Mutumbo is an advocate for peace in the Congo. 
Cheek cofounded Team Darfur, an organization to help end the atrocities in that region. 
Mutombo’s pledge reads: “Influence the United States and Europe to support the Congo, 
Uganda, and Southern Sudan in the arrest and capture of rebel leader Kony who is 
responsible for the genocide in northeast Congo.” See Dikembe Mutombo, “Featured 
Pledges,” Preventing Genocide – Take Action – Featured Pledges, United States 
Holocaust Memorial Museum, accessed April 20, 2013, 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Uzodinma Iweala, “Stop Trying To ‘Save’ Africa,” Washington Post, July 15, 2007, 
accessed May 17, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/07/13/AR2007071301714.html. Cheek’s pledge card states: “I 
will engage the athletes of the world to use their celebrity to fight the injustice of 
genocide.” Joey Cheek, “Featured Pledges,” Preventing Genocide – Take Action – 
Featured Pledges, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, accessed April 20, 2013, 
http://www.ushmm.org/genocide/take_action/action/featured_pledges. See also Martha 
Heinemann Bixby, “Introducing Team Darfur,” Save Darfur Blog, July 18, 2008, 
accessed May 17, 2011, http://blogfordarfur.org/archives/44. 
9 In contrast to the optimism in the aforementioned pledges, Francis Deng, Former 
UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, begins his commitment with an 
acknowledgment of the international community’s inability to deliver on past pledges. 
His pledge card notes, “First, we must recognize that we have repeatedly pledged ‘Never 
again’ and have repeatedly failed. But each failure raises our conscience and our 
determination to do better, to turn the words into deeds, to prevent all forms of genocide. 
I pledge to do my best, in my official and private capacity, to contribute toward this 
goal.” Francis Deng, “Featured Pledges,” Preventing Genocide – Take Action – Featured 
Pledges, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, accessed April 20, 2013, 
http://www.ushmm.org/genocide/take_action/action/featured_pledges. 
10 The image is contextualized with a caption identifying the man as “Nsabimana, 
scarred by machete wounds.” United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, physical 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 As if to further punctuate the extent to which the horrors depicted in the 
installation are part of current affairs, contemporary narratives scroll across the top of the 
large screens near the glass pledge cases. During an exhibition visit on April 24, 2013, 
these stories focused on potential “crimes against humanity” in Syria, the prosecution of 
Bosnia’s General Ratko Mladic, trials for Khmer Rouge generals, and violence in the 
Nuba region of Sudan. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, physical installation 
text, “From Memory to Action,” visited April 24, 2013. 
12  In discussing this exhibition as “dual-voiced,” this discourse has parallels to 
what Ray discusses as the “double-voiced” quality of Benjamin Banneker’s writing. See 
Angela G. Ray, “‘In My Own Hand Writing’: Benjamin Banneker Addresses the 
Slaveholder of Monticello,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 1, no. 3 (1998): 387-405. 
13 Silence works within larger ideological/disciplinary apparatuses and systems of 
power. Morris makes this clear at the beginning of his piece.  Thus attention to the 
interplay of speech and silence demands an awareness of the political and ideological 
context. Charles E. Morris III, “Passing by Proxy: Collusive and Convulsive Silence in 
the Trial of Leopold and Loeb,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 91, no. 3 (2005): 264-290. 
14 “About the museum,” United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, accessed 
April 20, 2013, http://www.ushmm.mobi/about/. 
15 See the debate over the USHMM’s enumeration of the victims of the Shoah and 
its inclusion of the Armenian genocide. Both are explained below. 
16 Barbie Zelizer, Remembering to Forget: Holocaust Memory Through the 
Camera’s Eye (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), 142. Notably, 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
cultural and the political. Edward T. Linenthal, Preserving Memory: The Struggle to 
Create America’s Holocaust Museum (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 5-
56. 
17 Lawrence Baron, “The Holocaust and American Public Memory, 1945-1960,” 
Holocaust and Genocide Studies 17, no. 1 (2003): 62-88; Jeffrey Shandler, While 
America Watches: Televising the Holocaust (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 
1-79.  
18 Baron, “The Holocaust,” 62; Tim Cole, Selling the Holocaust: From Auschwitz 
to Schindler How History is Bought, Packaged and Sold (New York: Routledge, 1999), 
7-9; Leon A. Jick, “The Holocaust: its Use and Abuse within the American Public,” Yad 
Vashem Studies 14 (1981): 310; Linenthal, Preserving Memory, 8-9; David B. 
MacDonald, Identity Politics in the Age of Genocide: The Holocaust and Historical 
Representation (Abdington: Routledge, 2008) 19; Alan Mintz, Popular Culture and the 
Shaping of Holocaust Memory in America (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
2001), 11-12; Peter Novick, The Holocaust in American Life (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1999), 133, 144-145; Zelizer, Remembering to Forget, 172. 
Shandler complicates this narrative somewhat, arguing the “telecasts of the trial 
… did not emerge as a fixture of American Holocaust memory culture.” Shandler 
problematizes the nature of the mediation of the trial to thus highlight its limitations. He 
argues, “despite its landmark status in the history of Holocaust documentation and 
commemoration, the trial telecasts have had a less enduring impact on American 
Holocaust remembrance than have either other contemporary phenomena – such as the 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Night, both of which appeared during 1961 – or more recent televised presentations of the 
Holocaust.” See Shandler, While America Watches, 127-132.  Lipstadt as well nuances 
the impact of the trial. See Deborah E. Lipstadt, “America and the Memory of the 
Holocaust, 1950-1965,” Modern Judaism 16 (1996): 205-208. 
19 Linenthal, Preserving Memory, 9-10. 
20 Baron, “The Holocaust,” 62; Cole, Selling the Holocaust, 10-12; Jick, “The 
Holocaust,” 312-314; Lipstadt, “America,” 208; MacDonald, Identity Politics, 19-20; 
Mintz, Popular Culture, 14-16; Novick, The Holocaust, 149-155; Shandler, While 
America Watches, 156; Zelizer, Remembering to Forget, 172.  
Elsewhere, Novick is emphatic about the importance of the Six-Day War, stating, 
“There is no difficulty in specifying the proximate, and most important, catalyst of 
Holocaust consciousness: the fears of a renewed Holocaust in the weeks immediately 
preceding the Six-Day War of June 1967.” Peter Novick, “Holocaust Memory in 
America,” in The Art of Memory: Holocaust Memorials in History, ed. James E. Young 
(New York: Prestel, 1994), 161. 
21  Linenthal, Preserving Memory, 18. 
22 Linenthal, Preserving Memory, 11; MacDonald, Identity Politics, 22.  Again, 
“Holocaust consciousness” is derived from Novick’s work. See Novick, The Holocaust, 1 
23 Linenthal, Preserving Memory, 11-12. On Skokie, see Novick, The Holocaust, 
226.   
On the miniseries, see Novick, The Holocaust, 209-214; Shandler, While 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
moment in the entry of the Holocaust into general American consciousness was NBC’s 
presentation, in April 1978, of the miniseries Holocaust.” Novick, The Holocaust, 209.  
The viewership numbers do range, and there is some debate about how many 
Americans watched the miniseries. For more on these estimates see Novick, The 
Holocaust, 333n5; Shandler, While America Watches, 288n1. 
24 Linenthal, Preserving Memory, 18. It is worth pointing out that some local 
memorials did exist, with some proposed or emerging immediately after the war in places 
such as New York and Indianapolis to say nothing of memorials in Jewish cemeteries and 
synagogues. Baron, “The Holocaust,” 77-78. For more on early forms of American 
Holocaust commemoration and memorialization, see James E. Young, “America’s 
Holocaust: Memory and the Politics of Identity,” in The Americanization of the 
Holocaust, ed. Hilene Flanzbaum (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1999), 69-70; James Young, The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993), 287-94.  
For a broader sketch of the memorial context within which the USHMM emerged 
and operates, see Rabinbach’s recounting of US Holocasut memory. Anson Rabinbach, 
“From Explosion to Erosion: Holocaust Memorialization in America since Bitburg,” 
History and Memory 9, no. 1/2 (1997): 226-255. 
25 Linenthal, Preserving Memory, 17-18. This narrative of the “politicized” 
origins of the USHMM is also contained in Philip Gourevitch, “Behold Now Behemoth,” 
Harper’s Magazine, July 1993. A related political narrative appears in Greig Crysler and 
Abidin Kusno, “Angels in the Temple: The Aesthetic Construction of Citizenship at the 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
also MacDonald, Identity Politics, 22-23. My narration of the USHMM’s history over the 
next three paragraphs draws heavily on Linenthal’s account of the construction of the 
USHMM.  
26 Linenthal, Preserving Memory, 17-18.  
27 Linenthal, Preserving Memory, 17-18.  
28 Linenthal, Preserving Memory, 19. 
29 Linenthal, Preserving Memory, 17.  
30 Cole, Selling the Holocaust, 13; Linenthal, Preserving Memory, 17-19. 
31 Linenthal, Preserving Memory, 26. 
32 These debates are detailed in Linenthal’s text.  Regarding the description of the 
victims, Linenthal explains that the central problems included both the number used and 
the identity markers used to describe the victims. Quoting Linenthal, “these numbers 
would become the subject of increasingly bitter debates between the White House and 
members of the Commission and the United States Holocaust Memorial Council, 
particularly Elie Wiesel.” For example, the controversy hinged on such matters as 
whether or not the victims should be described as “11 million innocent victims—6 
million of them Jews,” language that Lienthal quotes Carter as using, or for example, 
simply “‘six million,’” another means Carter had used previously to describe the 
Holocaust dead. The numbers and adjectives used to describe the dead were taken as 
markers indicative of the forthcoming memorial’s position on Jewish centrality and 
uniqueness. The way the victims were identified would offer insight on the national 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
On the debates over the United States Holocaust Memorial Council’s 
composition, see Linenthal, Preserving Memory, 38-49. 
For more on the tensions surrounding the maintenance of a “Jewish core,” see 
Linenthal, Preserving Memory, 257-258; Rabinbach, “From Explosion to Erosion,” 243. 
33 Linenthal, Preserving Memory, 229. 
34 As a concrete example of such logic, Linenthal quotes Yaffa Eliach, a central 
figure in the USHMM’s construction, as saying, “‘Once you include the Armenians as 
part of the Holocaust, I don’t see why other African tribes which are being annihilated at 
this very moment should not be included.’” See Linenthal, Preserving Memory, 229.  
35 Linenthal, Preserving Memory, 232. 
36 Linenthal, Preserving Memory, 233. 
37 This quote was reproduced from the USHMM’s online repository of quotes 
from the museum. The museum’s reproduction of this quote can be found at: “About the 
Museum,” Library – Frequently Asked Questions, United States Holocaust Memorial 
Museum, accessed June 4, 2012, 
http://www.ushmm.org/research/library/faq/details.php?lang=en&topic=06#15. 
38 The percentage I have arrived at here attempts to account for the different 
figures and variance in budgets from FY2012 and FY2013. The FY2013 projections can 
be found online: “Press Kits,” United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, accessed 
April 20, 2013, http://www.ushmm.org/museum/press/kits/details.php?content=99-
general. FY2012 numbers were taken from United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Gourevitch suggests that Berenbaum coined the phrase, “‘The Americanization 
of the Holocaust.’”  Gourevitch, “Behold Now Behemoth.” Linenthal, too, discusses 
Berenbaum’s view of the Holocaust’s “‘Americanization.’” Linenthal, Preserving 
Memory, 44-45, 255.  
For more on the Americanization of the Holocaust, see Cole, Selling the 
Holocaust; Hilene Flanzbaum, ed., The Americanization of the Holocaust (Baltimore, 
MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999); MacDonald, Identity Politics. 
40 See Akcan’s review of links between modernity, monumentality, and 
countermemorial trends, which provides the basis for Akcan’s review of the Berlin 
Jewish Museum. Esra Akcan, “Apology and Triumph: Memory Transference, Erasure, 
and a Rereading of the Berlin Jewish Museum,” New German Critique 110 vol. 37, no. 2 
(Summer 2010): 153-179. Akcan ultimately offers a more pessimistic read than Young, 
who discusses the potential of countermonuments as a form of Holocaust 
memorialization. See Young, Texture of Memory, 27-48.  
For more on postmodern memorialization and counter monument trends, see 
Carole Blair, Marsha S. Jeppeson, and Enrico Pucci Jr., “Public Memorializing in 
Postmodernity: The Vietnam Veterans Memorial as Prototype,” Quarterly Journal of 
Speech 77, no. 3 (1991): 263-288; John R. Gillis, “Introduction: Memory and Identity: 
The History of a Relationship,” in Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity, 
ed. John R. Gillis (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 16-17. 
By contrast, Hasian argues that “Unlike some of the more traditional structures, 
which maintain a respectful distance (both spatially and temporally) from the past, this 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
edifice that blurred the lines between intellectual histories, public memories, and didactic 
museums.” See Marouf Hasian, Jr., “Remembering and Forgetting the ‘Final Solution’: A 
Rhetorical Pilgrimage through the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum,” Critical Studies 
in Media Communication 21, no. 1 (2004): 71. Crysler and Kusno corroborate such a 
read of the USHMM seeing some grounds for what they discuss as “anti-memorial” 
(instead of countermemorial) elements of the USHMM. See Crysler and Kusno, “Angels 
in the Temple,” 55-56. 
41 Crysler and Kusno, “Angels in the Temple,” 55. 
Holocaust museums can also be read as humanistic institutions, a counter to the 
nationalist reading. From this perspective, these museums are not merely about the 
nation-state they are housed within but strive to attain universal meanings. Omer Bartov, 
Murder in Our Midst: The Holocaust, Industrial Killing, and Representation (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1996), 183; Cole, Selling the Holocaust, 175. 
42 Crysler and Kusno, “Angels in the Temple,” 52. For more on the use of the 
USHMM as a form of civic education for US citizens, see also Gourevitch, “Behold Now 
Behemoth.”  Further, many of the sources cited in note 39 also make this connection in 
the process of highlighting the construction of US identity within the USHMM through 
these acts of negation.  
43 In his article, Gourevitch writes that Berenbaum “explained to me that the 
museum’s mission is twofold: to memorialize the victims of Nazism by providing an 
exhaustive historical narrative of the Holocaust; and, at the same time, to present visitors 
with an object lesson in the ethical ideals of American political culture by presenting the 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
See also Crysler and Kusno, “Angels in the Temple;” Cole, Selling the Holocaust, 
154-155, 157-158; Linenthal, Preserving Memory, 255; Young, “America’s Holocaust,” 
72-73; Rick Crownshaw, “Photography and Memory in Holocaust Museums,” Mortality 
12, no. 2 (2007): 177-178; Vivian Patraka, “Spectacular Suffering: Performing Presence, 
Absence, and Witness at U.S. Holocaust Museums,” in Memory and Representation: 
Constructed Truths and Competing Realities, ed. Dena Elisabeth Eber and Arthur G. 
Neal (Bowling Green, OH: Bowling Green State University Popular Press, 2001), 141-
143; Isabel Wollaston, “Negotiating the Marketplace: The Role(s) of Holocaust Museums 
Today,” Journal of Modern Jewish Studies 4, no. 1 (2005): 72; David L. Worthington, 
“American Exceptionalism and the Shoah: The Case of the United States Holocaust 
Memorial Museum” (PhD diss., Indiana University, 2007), 3-4, ProQuest document ID 
304856056.  
44 Gillian Rose, Mourning Becomes the Law: Philosophy and Representation 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 30.  See also Hasian, “Remembering 
and Forgetting,” 69. 
45 Fath Davis Ruffins, “Culture Wars Won and Lost: Ethnic Museums on the 
Mall, Part I: The National Holocaust Museum and the National Museum of the American 
Indian,” Radical History Review 68 (Spring 1997):  89.  Ruffins goes on to say that this 
powerful narrative of US goodness is so strong that “the possible complicity of the 
American government [in horrors of the Holocaust] is far outweighed by the story of 
American triumph over evil.” Ruffins, “Culture Wars Won,” 90.  
This point about funding is critical. As Bartov is well aware, the funding sources 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
asserts, “no state would allow the erection of a major cultural institution devoted to 
subverting its very essence right in the heart of its own center of power.” Omer Bartov, 
“Chambers of Horror: Holocaust Museums in Israel and the United States,” Israel Studies 
2, no. 2 (1997): 74; Bartov, Murder in Our Midst, 182. 
46 To be clear, the liberator subjectivity is not the only subjectivity offered to 
visitors to the USHMM. Other scholars argue that, in addition to or in the place of the 
vantage point of the liberator, visitors are also asked to identify with the victims or as 
“witnesses.” See Crysler and Kusno, “Angels in the Temple;” Wollaston, “Negotiating 
the Marketplace;” Worthington, “American Exceptionalism;” Jenny Edkins, Trauma and 
the Memory of Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 158-163; Carole 
Blair, “Reflections on Criticism and Bodies: Parables from Public Places,” Western 
Journal of Communication 65, no. 3 (2001): 271-294. For a different perspective see K. 
Hannah Holtschneider, “Victims, Perpetrators, Bystanders? Witnessing, Remembering 
and the Ethics of Representation in Museums of the Holocaust,” Holocaust Studies: A 
Journal of Culture and History 13, no. 1 (2007): 82-102.  
Cole and Gourevitch expressly discuss the confusing ways in which the USHMM 
casts its audiences into multiple subjectivities simultaneously. Cole, Selling the 
Holocaust, 163; Gourevitch, “Behold Now Behemoth.” 
47 Gourevitch, “Behold Now Behemoth.” 
48 Crysler and Kusno, “Angels in the Temple,” 56. 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Hasian, “Remembering and Forgetting;” Crysler and Kusno, “Angels in the 
Temple;” Gourevitch, “Behold Now Behemoth;” Worthington, “American 
Exceptionalism.”  
51 Cole, Selling the Holocaust, 14, 155, 157; Worthington, “American 
Exceptionalism,” 5, 11. 
52 Crownshaw, “Photography and Memory,” 178-179. 
53 Ruffins, “Cultural Wars Won,” 90.  
54 Bartov, Murder in Our Midst, 180. Bartov’s argument here invokes a problem 
connected to the representation of temporality within the USHMM, a subject I will return 
to later in this chapter. He argues “the Holocaust keeps happening only within the 
confines of the museum, and we, the visitors, are safe from its implications by the very 
fact that we can only see it exhibited as an historical event. Since by now most visitors to 
the museum were born after the event, they may well come out with the sense that 
terrible things had happened in the past, in some cases even to their own relatives, but 
that these concern them only as historical facts, not as related in any direct manner to 
their present society.” 
55 Patraka, “Spectacular Suffering,” 144. 
56 Patraka, “Spectacular Suffering,” 142. 
57 Patraka, “Spectacular Suffering,” 143 
58 Patraka, “Spectacular Suffering,” 144.  
59 The content of the slide in full reads:   
“Genocide is a term created during the Holocaust and declared an international 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Crime of Genocide. The Convention defines genocide as any of the following acts 
committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group, as such: 
a. Killing members of the group; 
b. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
c. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part;  
d. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
e. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.  
The specific ‘intent to destroy’ particular groups is unique to genocide. A closely related 
category of international law, crimes against humanity, is defined as widespread or 
systematic attacks against civilians. 
This timeline traces the development of the word and law of genocide.” 
See “What is Genocide?” (slide number 1: “An Evolving International 
Framework”), United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, accessed April 20, 2013, 
http://www.ushmm.org/genocide/take_action/genocide. 
60 The use of the labels “liberal” and “post-liberal” to make sense of competing 
approaches  to understanding the causes of genocide emerges from the work of A. Dirk 
Moses. I treat Moses’s understanding of the varied approaches to understanding 
genocide’s causes more fully in Chapter One. See A. Dirk Moses, “Conceptual 
Blockages and Definitional Dilemmas in the ‘Racial Century’: Genocides of Indigenous 
Peoples and the Holocaust,” in Colonialism and Genocide, ed. A. Dirk Moses and Dan 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Although the “Who is at Risk” section of the website replicates the physical 
installation in organizing the narratives by nation-state, other parts of the From Memory 
to Action website offer different constructs through which a visitor to the exhibition can 
read and understand how genocide occurs. The “Patterns of Genocide” interactive web 
feature is organized first by the stages of genocidal progression (e.g. “Warning Signs,” 
“Acts of Violence,” “Responses,” and “Legacy”) and then supported by narratives from 
each nation-state’s genocide. I will discuss the “Patterns of Genocide” web content later 
in this chapter; nevertheless, I pause to temper the assertion I make in this paragraph to 
note that there are some alternative ways of organizing content within the exhibition. See 
“Who is at Risk?” United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, accessed April 24, 2013, 
http://www.ushmm.org/genocide/take_action/atrisk. See also “Patterns of Genocide and 
Related Crimes Against Humanity,” United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 
accessed August 30, 2012, 
http://www.ushmm.org/genocide/take_action/genocide/patterns. 
62 “Sudan at the Crossroads,” USHMM video, 8:54, from “Preventing Genocide: 
Learn More & Take Action” video gallery, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 
accessed April 24, 2013, http://www.ushmm.org/genocide/take_action/gallery/video/11.  
This video is also accessible via YouTube. “Sudan at the Crossroads,” YouTube video, 
8:54, posted by “ushmm,” January 5, 2011, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NziZwhbv1qE. 
63 “Sudan at the Crossroads,” United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 In the video, peace is closely aligned with South Sudan’s statehood. One boy 
holds a sign that reads “SEPERATION MEANS PEACE.” Later in the film, Sudanese 
governmental official Gabriel Changson Chang, interprets the options posed by the 
referendum as “this dream” [the separate state] or “war.” Chang states, “is this dream 
going to be realized or not; are we going back to war or not?” “Sudan at the Crossroads,” 
USHMM video. 
65 The timeline is forthright, for example, in making reference to the fear that 
signing the 1948 UN Genocide Convention “would diminish U.S. sovereignty.” This part 
of the timeline reads in full, “Despite facing strong opposition by those who believed it 
would diminish U.S. sovereignty, President Ronald Reagan signed the 1948 UN 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide on November 4, 1988.” What 
is Genocide?” (slide number 6: “1988 The United States Ratifies the Convention”), 
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, accessed May 3, 2013, 
http://www.ushmm.org/genocide/take_action/genocide. 
Similarly, the discussion of the cause of the conflict in Bosnia implicates 
nationalism as a causal factor. The “Warning Signs” page for Bosnia-Herzegovina reads: 
“Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic seized on nationalism, which gained momentum 
after the 1980 death of Yugoslavia’s longtime leader, Josip Broz Tito, to engineer 
changes in the Yugoslav constitution that strengthened Serbia's position. He also 
transformed the military so that it became 90% Serbian and extended his control over the 
country’s financial, mass-media, and security structures to support Serbian nationalists in 
Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia.” Such small concessions align with the robust discussions in 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
triggering genocidal conflict and signal, in part, the ways the exhibition moves away 
from a liberal understanding of genocide. “Bosnia-Herzegovina – Warning Signs,” 
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, accessed May 3, 2013, 
www.ushmm.org/genocide/take_action/atrisk/region/bosniaherzegovina/warning. 
66 As stated on the “Sudan – Warning Signs” page, “From 1924-1956, the British 
had treated the north and south as two separate entities. The first Sudanese civil war 
(1955-1972) erupted on the eve of independence, prompted by angry southerners who 
had been promised and then denied regional autonomy.” From the “DR Congo – Warning 
Signs” page, “Since European colonization in the nineteenth century, civilians in the 
DRC [formerly Zaire] have endured several periods of violence and systematic 
exploitation. Under Belgian King Leopold II, the country’s natural resources were 
systematically looted and its people enslaved, beaten, and killed in massive numbers. 
Leopold transferred power to the state of Belgium in 1908. The period around 
independence in 1960 was marked by intense and often violent Congolese bids for power 
and succession, caught up in the tensions and geopolitics of the Cold War era.” 
Noticeably, this is a much richer explanation of the violence than is contained in the 
physical installation. “Sudan – Warning Signs,” United States Holocaust Memorial 
Museum, accessed April 24, 2013, 
www.ushmm.org/genocide/take_action/atrisk/region/sudan/warning; “DR Congo – 
Warning Signs,” United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, accessed, April 24, 2013, 
www.ushmm.org/genocide/take_action/atrisk/region/dr-congo/warning. 
67 “DR Congo – Warning Signs.”  The quote in full is a bit vague but hints at a 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
groups and militias, some ethnically based and many sponsored by up to nine foreign 
militaries, also formed and took part in the conflict. The UN has accused all nations 
involved of using the war as a cover for looting diamonds, coltan, gold, and other 
resources from this mineral-rich region.”  
68 “Sudan – Responses,” United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, accessed 
April 24, 2013, 
http://www.ushmm.org/genocide/take_action/atrisk/region/sudan/responses. Quoting 
from the explanation: “The international policy responses to the conflict in Sudan (1985-
2005) varied greatly over the twenty years of the conflict, affected by the Cold War, 
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Herman and David Peterson, The Politics of Genocide, with a foreword by Noam 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Catherine H. Palczewski, “The Male Madonna and the Feminine Uncle Sam: 
Visual Argument, Icons, and Ideographs in 1909 Anti-Woman Suffrage Postcards,” 
Quarterly Journal of Speech 91, no. 4 (2005): 374, 385-387. 
70 “South Sudan – Overview,” United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 
accessed April 24, 2013, www.ushmm.org/genocide/take_action/atrisk/region/South-
Sudan. 
71 Alexander Dziadosz, “Special Report: South Sudan’s Chinese Oil Puzzle,” 
Reuters, November 14, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/14/us-southsudan-
chinese-oil-idUSBRE8AD0B520121114; Alex de Waal, interviewed by Christopher 
Alessi, “Oil Diplomacy in the Sudans,” Council on Foreign Relations, October 8, 2012, 
accessed May 3, 2013, http://www.cfr.org/sudan/oil-diplomacy-sudans/p29214?cid=rss-
analysisbriefbackgroundersexp-oil_diplomacy_in_the_sudans-100812; Peter S. 
Goodman, “China Invests Heavily In Sudan’s Oil Industry,” Washington Post, December 
23, 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A21143-2004Dec22.html; 
Herman and Peterson, The Politics of Genocide, 39. 
72 Hasan Nuhanović, “Hasan Nuhanović,” “Eyewitness Testimony” video gallery, 
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, accessed April 24, 2013, 
http://www.ushmm.org/genocide/take_action/gallery/portrait/nuhanovic. 
73 United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, physical installation text, “From 
Memory to Action,” visited April 24, 2013. 
74 “Patterns of Genocide.”  This prose is also included in the physical installation. 
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, physical installation text, “From Memory to 
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Both Ewalt and Parks have highlighted the traces of colonialism and reproduction 
of colonialist ideologies within the USHMM’s genocide prevention initiatives. Their 
work, on the extent to which the USHMM’s means of visualizing genocide replicates a 
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Framing, and the Politics of Viewing on Google Earth,” Communication, Culture & 
Critique 4, no. 4 (2011): 333-354; Lisa Parks, “Digging into Google Earth: An analysis 
of ‘Crisis in Darfur,’” Geoforum 40, no. 4 (2009): 535–545. 
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accessed April 24, 2013, 
http://www.ushmm.org/genocide/take_action/atrisk/region/rwanda/warning. This prose 
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Google Earth.”  
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(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); Anne McClintock, Imperial Leather: 
Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest (New York: Routledge, 1995); Jan 
Nederveen Pieterse, White on Black: Images of Africa and Blacks in Western Popular 
Culture (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1992). 
For an additional example and further discussion of the links between 
contemporary media and colonialism, see Casey Kelly, “Neocolonialism and the Global 
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on Film, Video, and the Internet (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012). 
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(2011): 233. 
85 Ron Burnett, “Images and Vision,” in Cultures of Vision: Images, Media & the 
Imaginary (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 1-31; Torchin, Creating the 
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86 “Our Walls Bear Witness,” USHMM video, 18:32, from “Preventing Genocide: 
Learn More & Take Action” video gallery, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 
accessed April 24, 2013, http://www.ushmm.org/genocide/take_action/gallery/video/3. 
87 Mitchell Stephens, The Rise of the Image the Fall of the Word (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), 61. 
88 The problem with such an assumption, as Torchin illuminates, is that this 
configuration of the links between sight, knowledge, and action “presume[s] a transparent 
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explored below, such assumptions are clearly flawed. Torchin, Creating the Witness, 2. 
89 Torchin, Creating the Witness, 1. 
90 Torchin, Creating the Witness, 3-4.  See the Chapter One for a full explanation 
of the relationship between recognition and action as interpreted as adhering in the 
Convention text. 
91 Torchin, Creating the Witness, 4.  
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95 Jenkins, “Seeing Katrina,” 94. Taylor likewise centralizes the window 
metaphor as a key part of his analysis of documentary realism. See John Taylor, “Iraqi 
Torture Photographs and Documentary Realism in the Press,” Journalism Studies 6, no. 1 
(2005): 39-49. 
96 In other words, such perspectives on the image disavow “artistic” 
representations in favor of “documentary.” For more on the tensions between art and 
documentary, see Cara A. Finnegan, “Documentary as Art in U.S. Camera,” Rhetoric 
Society Quarterly 31, no. 2 (2001): 37-68. 
97 Jenkins, “Seeing Katrina,” 93. 
98 Taylor, “Iraqi Torture Photographs,” 42. 
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“Seeing Katrina,” 95. 
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29, 2013, http://www.ushmm.org/genocide/about/. 
238 “About the Center.”  
239 “About the Center.” 
240 The USHMM uses the labels “warning” and “monitor” to designate areas of 
concern. The DRC, Sudan and South Sudan were issued “warning[s]” at the time of 
authorship; whereas, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda, Burundi, and Chechnya were listed 
as “monitor.” See “Who is at Risk?” 
241 “DR Congo – Legacy,” United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, accessed 
April 26, 2013, http://www.ushmm.org/genocide/take_action/atrisk/region/dr-
congo/legacy. 
242 “Sudan – Legacy,” United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, accessed 
April 26, 2013, http://www.ushmm.org/genocide/take_action/atrisk/region/sudan/legacy. 
243 “Bosnia-Herzegovina – Legacy,” United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 
accessed April 26, 2013, 
http://www.ushmm.org/genocide/take_action/atrisk/region/bosniaherzegovina/legacy. 
Quoting the online exhibition: “In January 2008, Kosovar Albanian leaders declared their 
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244 “Rwanda –  Legacy,” United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, accessed 
April 26, 2013, 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
exhibition explains, “Many survivors have lost their spouses, parents, children, extended 
families, and friends. They suffer complex health problems, like HIV/AIDS, as a result of 
sexual violence during the genocide. Large numbers live in dire poverty.” 
245 “Burundi – Legacy,” United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, accessed 
April 26, 2013, 
http://www.ushmm.org/genocide/take_action/atrisk/region/burundi/legacy. As the 
country’s online profile states, “The government has been accused of violating the rule of 
law, committing human rights abuses, and establishing a system of patronage and 
corruption. The last remaining rebel group, the National Liberation Force, signed a 
formal ceasefire in September 2006 in talks mediated by South Africa. Since then, 
however, hostilities between the national security forces and the FNL [National 
Liberation Force] have resumed and threaten to destabilize the nation.” 
246 Zelizer, Remembering to Forget, 227. More recently, Vivian has articulated a 
similar argument about the West’s preoccupation with violence past. He argues, 
“omnipresent public investments in displaying the realities of historical violence and 
disseminating their ostensibly universal truth can unwittingly eclipse efforts to publicize 
the realities of emerging or ongoing patterns of systemic violence.” Bradford Vivian, 
“Times of Violence,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 99, no. 2 (2013): 210. 
247 The case for the inclusion of Rwanda is premised in “Shifting Violence” 
involving Rwandans in the conflict in the DRC. The case for the inclusion of Bosnia is 
couched in the incomplete process of repopulating Srebrenica with Bosnians, the “ partial 
international recognition” afforded to “Kosovar  Albanian[s],” and the vulnerability of 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Violence”). Similarly the inclusion of Chechnya is couched as part of larger narrative 
about continued “Tensions throughout the North Caucasus” as Chechnya is discussed as 
lacking an internal commitment to human rights as well as problems of infrastructure and 
accountability. “Rwanda – Legacy;” “Bosnia-Herzegovina – Legacy;” “Chechnya, Russia 
–  Legacy,” United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, accessed May 3, 2013, 
http://www.ushmm.org/genocide/take_action/atrisk/region/chechnya-russia/legacy. 
248 During a visit at the start of May 2013, From Memory to Action featured four 
news items in a ticker scrolling across the top of the giant screens in front of the glass 
pledge submission cases. Two of these news items made references to a country beyond 
the three featured in the physical installation and seven featured online. These news items 
referenced Syria and Cambodia. The former read “Syria: Civilians at risk of genocide.” 
The other read “Cambodia: Trials of Khmer Rouge ‘Killing Fields’ Generals Under 
Way.” United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, physical installation text, “From 
Memory to Action,” visited May 8, 2013. 
249 Over the course of the years I have been working on this project, the USHMM 
has shown optimistic signs of increasing the scope its genocide cessation work to 
recognize atrocities in countries beyond the ones prominently featured in From Memory 
to Action. The May 2013 Genocide Prevention email newsletter featured discussions of 
atrocities in Guatemala, Syria, Burma, and Iran. USHMM Genocide Prevention e-
Newsletter, “Verdict in Guatemala Genocide Trial Overturned,” May 22, 2013. 
250 Leo Kuper, Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century (New Haven, 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
251 Such rhetorical moves seemingly corroborate the thesis advanced in Novick’s 
work; a focus on the Holocaust allows Americans to avoid grappling with their own 
history of atrocity. Novick, The Holocaust, 15. For a more thorough discussion of the 
relationship between the US Holocaust memory and indigenous atrocities see Chapter 
One. 
252 For example, Worthington, “American Exceptionalism;” Ewalt, “Mapping 
Injustice;” Parks, “Digging into Google Earth.”  
253 Morris, “Passing by Proxy;” Charles E. Morris III, “Pink Herring & The 
Fourth Persona: J. Edgar Hoover’s Sex Crime Panic,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 88, 
no. 2 (2002): 230-231. 
254 Like the MOT featured in the last chapter, reaching out to school-age children 
is also a major component of the USHMM’s work. Its homepage spotlights the number of 
educational resources available for teachers and students. Additionally, the institution’s 
emphasis on accessibility is readily apparent. For example, the homepage also highlights 
the number of languages used to transmit the USHMM’s content. Both of these 
components speak to the institution’s emphasis on public education. See United States 
Holocaust Memorial Museum homepage, accessed May 21, 2013, 
http://www.ushmm.org. 
255 Sincerest thanks to Shawn Parry-Giles for her insight in noting the special 
irony that comes from the use of rhetorical intimation in an  institution ostensibly 
attempting to reach publics with little knowledge of the subject area. 





The Productivity of Anxiety in Popular Genocide Rhetorics 
 
Phrases such as “never again” or “always remember” have become clichés in 
popular conversations about genocide. Platitudes like these contribute to a perception of 
genocide cessation discourse as simplistic and grossly reductive. Such pithy remarks can 
seem barely worthy of critical attention, bemoaned as shallow and superficial ways of 
engaging the subject of genocide prevention. Multiple scholars argue that current 
rhetorics of genocide cessation are woefully inadequate,1 even when such discourses 
emerge from sites of political power. Rieff critiques a report on genocide prevention 
overseen by former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and former US Secretary 
of Defense William Cohen, arguing that it contains “little history” and is “painted with a 
disturbingly broad brush.”2 Rieff calls the “solutions . . . hollow” because the world 
created in the document “bears little or no resemblance to the complexities that actually 
exist.”3 Similarly, Üngör laments the “obscure jargon, vague abstractions, incredible non 
sequiturs [and] caricatural acronyms” found in the US Army’s MARO (Mass Atrocity 
Response Operations) report.4 Echoing Rieff’s critique, Üngör contends that the MARO 
document offers a naïve form of genocide cessation rhetoric that masks “the complexity 
of the many processes that occur during genocide.”5 Joining this chorus, Langer 
punctuates the insufficiency of extant genocide cessation appeals and issues a call for “a 
new kind of discourse,” one appropriately “disturb[ing to] our collective consciousness” 
and capable of inciting “practical action that moves beyond mere pity.”6 
Undoubtedly, popular cultural discussions of genocide are limited in numerous 
ways.7 Yet, to dismiss such discourses as superficial is to risk overlooking their potential 




analyses highlight a deep-seated ambivalence regarding the associations among the 
nation-state, its citizens, and genocidal violence within popular cultural texts on genocide. 
This ambivalence manifests in the numerous contradictions and vacillations both within 
and across textual attempts to define, represent, resolve, and remember such atrocities. 
The inconsistencies in these arenas reflect broader tensions over the role of state authority 
and public agency in scholarly discussions of genocide and genocide cessation. The 
textual vacillations and incongruences in these popular cultural discussions create a 
palpable anxiety percolating throughout the texts in this study. In turn, the two museums 
and single documentary spotlighted in this project manage this anxiety in distinct ways, 
sublimating, exacerbating, or acknowledging such frictions.  
 On the surface, these three texts are replete with optimistic and easy-to-consume 
narratives about genocide and genocide cessation. Both the US nation-state and its 
citizens are celebrated as empowered genocide cessation actors. Worse Than War 
suggests that a US bounty program for hunting terrorists might offer the best model for 
genocide cessation efforts, and From Memory to Action lauds the efforts of prominent 
political figures such as former Secretary of State Colin Powell and former Senator 
William Proxmire for using their privileged platforms to discuss genocide. The texts 
construct an image of the US nation-state as a benevolent agent of genocide cessation, 
authorized to undertake the requisite actions to end genocide.  
Such texts also suggest that their audiences are powerful agents of genocide 
cessation. By creating numerous opportunities for audiences to signal their opinions on 
atrocity, the Museum of Tolerance gives rise to the impression that the voices of its 




explicitly affirming to their visitors, “YOU can make a difference.”8 Similarly, From 
Memory to Action provides a list of actions that visitors to their website can undertake to 
contribute to genocide cessation. These textual features reinforce a sense of public 
efficacy. By encouraging their audiences to remain vigilant, monitor global affairs, and 
use their voices to raise awareness about genocide, the texts allot “average individuals” 
an important role in genocide cessation. 
 Yet, alongside such hopeful messaging, the texts also contain traces of darker or 
more doubtful discourses, intimating connections between political violence and the 
nation-state and raising doubts about their audiences’ abilities to participate in genocide 
cessation work. Scholarly literature on atrocity tethers the nation-state to genocide in 
multiple ways, and the texts in this study gesture toward some of these troubling 
associations. At times, the texts contain subtle challenges to the legitimacy of the state’s 
use of violence, including haunting reminders of the state’s use of force to commit 
atrocities against its own people. The spatial juxtaposition of the Nazi surveillance tower 
and the contemporary security camera in the Museum of Tolerance functions as the most 
blatant prompt for reconsidering the validity of state actions and the illegitimacy of state 
power as shown through distinctions between “good” and “bad” state behavior. On other 
occasions, the texts implicate the nation-state in a web of violence harkening back to the 
structural inequalities incited by histories of colonialism and imperialism.9 The subtle 
intimations of the role of colonial powers in From Memory to Action’s profiles of “at risk” 
states serve as one such reminder of these exnominated connections (e.g., the references 




components of the texts’ narratives jeopardize the aforementioned image of the nation-
state as a benevolent actor and critical component of genocide cessation. 
 The texts also suggest that publics may be limited in their abilities to participate in 
efforts to end genocide. The film Worse Than War constructs its understanding of 
authority in such exclusionary ways that the majority of the film’s viewers seemingly 
lack the needed spatial or experiential access to engage matters of atrocity. Alternatively, 
the texts question the sufficiency of the resources at the public’s disposal. From Memory 
to Action suggests that audiences “speak out” about genocide at the same time the 
exhibition implies that words may be powerless in the face of such extreme violence. 
Despite earlier arguments promoting the power of “average individuals,” such conflicting 
messages leave the audience few options for engaging with anti-genocide campaigns. 
Resultantly, such doubt contributes to pessimistic assessments of public agency and the 
immutability of global violence. 
 This profound ambivalence is signaled by a host of textual inconsistencies across 
the definitions, representations, resolutions, and remembrances of genocide included in 
this study. Worse Than War, for example, depicts genocide as both a form of rational and 
irrational behavior. On other occasions, the texts simultaneously embrace competing 
“liberal” and “post-liberal” logics in their conceptualization of genocide. They also blend 
incompatible genres by turning to such popular forms as horror, melodrama, Christian 
iconography, self-help, documentary, and academic discourse to represent such 
atrocities.11  
 And further evidence of this ambiguity is visible in the textual practice of 




Memory to Action, the use of rhetorical intimation forecloses the most disturbing 
arguments that link the US nation-state to instances of political violence. Demonstrably, 
the exhibition’s choice to begin their narrative in the 1940s excludes the United States’ 
treatment of its Native American populations—atrocities that some label as genocide.13 
By attending to these inconsistencies, this study reveals the presence of substantive 
anxieties associated with an uncertainty over the linkages among state power, public 
agency, and political violence.   
 Ultimately, the texts in the study converge in validating state power while 
expressing doubts about public agency. Worse Than War, the Museum of Tolerance, and 
From Memory to Action undermine their gestures toward public agency by exhibiting 
considerable skepticism over their audiences’ capacity to participate in genocide 
cessation.14 Consequently, the resolutions offered in these texts favor empowered 
political actors and contribute to the construction of genocide as a nation-state-level 
problem. This understanding of atrocity reifies the perception of genocide as a “foreign” 
affair, largely divorced from the lives of US citizens.15 
 In spite of all of their shortcomings, however, the internal inconsistencies in these 
texts create a productive anxiety by imparting messages about audience accountability 
and by prompting critical reflection on issues of state power, public agency, and violence.  
By treating anxiety as productive, this study further aligns itself with Fiske’s perspective 
on popular culture. Fiske embraces the contradictions in texts and treats “the repression 
of contradictions” as “a reactionary ideological practice” because “it mobilizes a 
consensus around the status quo and thus militates against social change.”16 The case 




silences in these texts contribute to a lingering sense of unease regarding their audiences’ 
connections to genocide and genocide cessation efforts. Although the texts foreground 
hopeful narratives about the viability of genocide cessation and offer seemingly 
simplistic solutions, their attempts to define, represent, resolve, and remember genocide 
are fraught with inconsistencies and intimate less optimistic arguments about the 
likelihood of ending atrocities. This ambivalence denies their audiences the satisfaction 
of “easy answers.” Read from the more productive perspective,17 I suggest that the 
lingering doubt created by textual contradictions may foster a sense of irresolution that 
frustrates audiences’ ability to “wash their hands” of their responsibility to engage issues 
of political violence. At best, the anxiety produced by this lack of closure or absence of 
simplistic arguments may induce a sense of accountability and invite audiences to 
reconsider their connections to the politics of atrocity and their role(s) in genocide 
cessation work. To that end, the texts help constitute a role for citizens in deliberations 
over genocide and genocide cessation. 
 Furthermore, these texts stand to raise substantive questions about the nature of 
political violence and the tenuous associations among violence, the nation-state, and its 
citizens. As discussed in Chapter One, Holocaust and genocide studies scholars have 
been exploring these associations for decades with scholars operating from a “post-
liberal” perspective suggesting an implicit link between the nation-state and genocide. 
Scholars such as Levene posit that “genocide … is at the very heart of modern historical 
development,” woven into the fabric of international relations.18  Such arguments have 
the potential to be profoundly threatening because they raise the specter of state 




cultural discourses examined in this study do not avoid these issues entirely.  Rather, to 
borrow Radway’s metaphor, the textual incongruences across and within the three case 
studies may have their most utility in exposing the “ideological seams” contained within 
popular cultural discussions of political violence.20  By highlighting these seams and 
engaging discomforting arguments about complicity -- even if only through rhetorical 
intimation -- the texts open opportunities for confronting and challenging the ideologies 
which contribute to atrocity. Such a reading of these texts corroborates Edkins’s assertion 
that atrocity representations and remembrances are “site[s] of struggle” wherein the 
balance of political power between the state and its citizens stands to be recalibrated, for 
better or for worse.21 Such textual intimations constitute state actions as subject to public 
scrutiny, opening for interrogation a host of state decisions ranging from domestic uses of 
force to inaction in the face of global violence.22 
 To be more explicit, the anxiety created by the inconsistencies in popular 
genocide cessation discourse may prompt scrutiny of the linkages among the nation-state, 
the public, and violence. Such an assertion stands to be the most progressive 
interpretation of the preceding analyses. The unresolved ambivalence at the core of these 
texts opens space to consider systemic forms of violence and interrogate the connections 
among colonialism, imperialism, and genocide.23 By hinting at darker discourses 
regarding the state’s role in the execution of various genocides, such texts at least prime 
audiences to be critical of the state’s use of power, both domestically and abroad. 
 As I pen this Afterword, considerable anxiety exists surrounding the moral and 
political problems created by the horrific state-sponsored violence in Syria. As various 




struggle with a familiar set of tensions surrounding atrocity definition, representation, 
resolution, and remembrance. US leaders and US citizens ponder whether the actions by 
the Syrian government constitute genocide. They deliberate over the appropriateness of 
comparing past atrocities like the Holocaust to the Syrian conflict. They also debate 
whether or not to air horrific images of children who died from such chemicals. And they 
differ over how best to respond to such acts in order to resolve it. Most contested still is 
whether the reputation of the US government and its citizens will be tarnished by the 
engagement or non-engagement in the atrocities. .  
Unfortunately, no easy answers exist, and the lack of clarity in each of these four 
arenas only compounds the complexity of the situation. The case studies featured in this 
project do not offer a clear path forward. They provide no simple “takeaways,” lessons, 
or guides for navigating situations like the one in Syria in the fall of 2013. Yet, even 
though such texts may fail to provide answers, perhaps their merit lies in raising 
discomforting questions. Through their ambivalent treatment of issues of state authority, 
public agency, and atrocity, the texts prompt audiences to consider their connections to 
political violence and beg us to ask: What (if any) role should US citizens and US 
governmental officials play in ending genocidal atrocities? 
Notes
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Of course, Langer does not take as his subject “genocide cessation discourses” 
specifically; rather, he is speaking more broadly about the language used to describe 
atrocities. Lawrence L. Langer, “The Alarmed Vision: Social Suffering and Holocaust 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 David Rieff, “The Persistence of Genocide,” Policy Review 36 (February/March 
2011): 35. Specifically, in this passage, Rieff is describing the report’s discussion of the 
situation in Darfur; yet, ahistoricism is a hallmark of the report. Rieff punctuates the 
extent to which the authors of the report disavow the need for any engagement with 
history. See also Rieff, “The Persistence of Genocide,” 40. 
3 Rieff, “The Persistence of Genocide,” 34. Rieff continues in his analysis to 
imply that cowardice contributes to the report’s generalities. Rieff most explicitly 
develops this argument through an example toward the end of his analysis in which he 
laments the lack of “courage” demonstrated by Albright and Cohen in regard to their 
response to the Armenian genocide. See Rieff, “The Persistence of Genocide,” 39-40. 
4 Ugŭr Ümit Üngör, “Team America: Genocide Prevention?” Genocide Studies 
and Prevention 6, no. 1 (2011): 36. 
5 Üngör, “Team America,” 37. 
6 Langer, “Alarmed Vision,” 47.  
7 Some of these issues are byproducts of popular cultural forms of expression. 
Critiques from Bartov and Baron featured earlier in this study highlight the limitations of 
conveying atrocity narratives through popular cultural channels. Lawrence Baron, 
“Holocaust and Genocide Cinema: Crossing Disciplinary, Genre, and Geographical 
Borders: Editor’s Introduction,” Shofar: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Jewish Studies 
28, no. 4 (2010): 4; Omer Bartov, Murder in Our Midst: The Holocaust, Industrial 
Killing, and Representation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 168-171. 
8 Museum of Tolerance, physical installation, visited November 12, 2012. [I have 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 See again the discussion of the “post-liberal” approach spotlighted in Chapter 
One, page 90. 
10 Refer to the discussion of these profiles on pages 391-393 in Chapter Four. 
11 In such ways, the study reifies the work of scholars such as Torchin, Rothe and 
Picart and Franke who discuss genocide representations as drawing on some of the genres 
above. Leshu Torchin, Creating the Witness: Documenting Genocide on Film, Video, and 
the Internet (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012); Anne Rothe, Popular 
Trauma Culture: Selling the Pain of Others in the Mass Media (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Rutgers University Press, 2011); Caroline Joan (Kay) S. Picart and David A. Frank, 
Frames of Evil: The Holocaust as Horror in American Film (Carbondale: Southern 
Illinois University Press, 2006). 
12 Roland Barthes, Mythologies, trans. Annette Lavers (1957; New York: Hill and 
Wang, 1972). 
13 See again the work of Churchill and Stannard. Ward Churchill, A Little Matter 
of Genocide: Holocaust and Denial in the Americas 1492 to the Present (San Francisco, 
CA: City Lights Books, 1997); David E. Stannard, American Holocaust: Columbus and 
the Conquest of the New World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). 
14 Again, Brown’s work centralizes this component of the Museum of Tolerance 
in her reading of that institution. Wendy Brown, Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the 
Age of Identity and Empire (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006). 
15 Langer is especially critical of this framing as he disparages efforts to 
“sequester[s] mass suffering in other regions of the world from the comfort and safety we 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Fiske’s point of departure here is Althusser’s conception of ideology, which 
Fiske interprets as a form of resolving or “iron[ing] out contradictions.” Challenges to 
ideologies, then, are inspired by the presence of contradiction. John Fiske, Television 
Culture (1987; New York: Routledge, 2006), 88. 
17 In other words, I challenge the assessments of genocide cessation discourse 
offered at the beginning of this piece. Although these discourses have their shortcomings, 
I suggest that these texts offer more nuanced accounts of the politics of genocide 
cessation than first meets the eye. 
18 Mark Levene, Genocide in the Age of the Nation-State, vol. 1, The Meaning of 
Genocide (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005), 32.  
19 Moving beyond the “post-liberal” approach, Edkins’s study departs from a 
critical perspective on the state that fundamentally links it to violence. See again Jenny 
Edkins, Trauma and the Memory of Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003), 6-7. 
20 Janice A. Radway, “Identifying Ideological Seams: Mass Culture, Analytical 
Method, and Political Practice,” Communication 9, no. 1 (1986): 93-123.   
This is where Edkins sees the most potential. The texts have a revelatory function 
as they possess the capacity to “expose” the state and the harms the state has caused. 
Edkins adopts the language of “betrayal” and the illumination of betrayal to talk about 
this capacity. In this way, her work moves toward the same argument: The texts have 
merit insofar as they help expose the fault lines. Edkins, Trauma and the Memory, 11. 
21 Edkins, Trauma and the Memory, 15. The language of “recalibration” may be 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
great potential. Jenny Edkins, “Remembering Relationality: Trauma Time and Politics,” 
in Memory, Trauma, and World Politics: Reflections on the Relationship Between Past 
and Present, ed. Duncan Bell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 99-115. 
22 Edkins, Trauma and the Memory; Edkins, “Remembering Relationality.” 
23 See, for example, Moses’s recent edited collection. A. Dirk Moses, ed., Empire, 
Colony, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern Resistance in World History 
(New York: Berghahn Books, 2008). 
24 For stories about governmental officials making allusions to past genocides, see 
Emma Roller, “You May Have Missed John Kerry’s Subtle Holocaust Reference at the 
Syria Hearing,” Slate, September 3, 2013, accessed September 8, 2013,  
http://www.slate.com/blogs/weigel/2013/09/03/john_kerry_compares_syria_chemical_att
ack_to_the_holocaust.html; “Obama Raises Rwanda to Justify Possible Syria Action,” 
Voices of America, September 6, 2013, accessed September 8, 2013, 
http://www.voanews.com/content/obama-raises-rwanda-to-justify-possible-syria-
action/1744694.html. 
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